

BITTERSWEET

DEMOCRACY?

ANALYZING
CITIZENS'
RESENTMENT
TOWARDS
POLITICS
IN BELGIUM

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4. Emotive participants? Emotions, apathy, and protest participation

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Abstract: Using the RepResent Voter Panel Survey conducted around the 2019 elections in Belgium, this chapter investigates the affective complexity of resentment and its impact on protest participation, understood as non-electoral protest participation and protest voting. We focus on the combination of two core emotions towards politics and their intensities: anger and hope. We highlight five groups that vary in their intensity of anger and hope: neutral, high-intensity hopeful, high-intensity angry, high-intensity emotive, and apathetic. We then connect these five groups to protest behaviours. Our results indicate that different emotional clusters guide distinct types of protest actions. Apathy leads to electoral exit and decreases the probability of non-electoral protest participation and protest voting. High intensities of anger turns citizens away from mainstream parties and increases their propensity to vote for protest parties. The combination of high intensities of anger and hope motivates the expression of resentment through non-electoral protest actions. Our findings reaffirm the significance of the affective dimension of political action. They support a conception of affective arrangements in which emotions combine to produce political outcomes. Finally, they nuance the idea that there would be absolute positive vs. negative emotions.

Introduction

This chapter investigates the affective complexity of resentment and its impact on protest participation, using the RepResent Voter Panel Survey conducted around the 2019 elections in Belgium. More specifically, we analyse whether specific combinations and intensities of anger and hope drive different choices in terms of protest participation, understood as non-electoral protest participation in between elections and protest voting on election day.

Our contributions are twofold. First, rather than looking at emotions as discrete concepts (Ekman, 2016), we unpack how emotions combine into clusters, with a specific focus on anger and hope. We identify five distinct classes of respondents depending on their combination of various intensities of anger and hope. In doing so, we emphasize that citizens are characterised by different ‘clusters’ of emotions (Cowen, et al., 2019) beyond a simplistic binary distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ affects (Watson et al., 1988). Second, we connect these five classes to protest participation. We demonstrate that each class develops distinct protest behaviours paralleling ‘exit’, ‘voice’, opposed to ‘loyalty’ conceived as the defense of the status quo (Hirschman, 1970). Citizens who display a combination of high intensities of anger and hope are more prone to take part in protest actions (‘voice’); while low intensities of anger and hope decrease the propensity to participate in non-electoral protest and increase the likelihood that a person ‘exits’ the electoral process (i.e., abstains from voting). High intensities of anger increase the likelihood that a person voices their discontent and votes for a protest party. With these findings, we connect the affective/emotional dimension of resentment and the behavioural expression of resentment.

Overall, our findings give credit to the idea that politics is not only rational and evaluative, but also involves a significant affective dimension that should be taken into account (Theiss-Morse et al., 1993). We show that protest behaviours can result from the combination of both anger and hope, as well as from the absence of an affective relationship to politics.

Emotions, resentment and protest

The affective dimension of politics has received increasing attention in recent years. The role of emotions in social movement and collective action is nowadays well established (Flam & King, 2007; Jasper, 1998, 2011; Woods et al., 2012). The affective turn has also reached electoral studies, where various symptoms of the crisis of representative democracy, such as the success of protest parties, the growing voting abstention, etc., have increasingly been explained by citizens' affect towards politics (Close & van Haute, 2020; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019; Vasilopoulou & Wagner, 2017).

Our conceptualization of affect and emotions relies on two assumptions that are linked to our focus on resentment. First, we distance ourselves from most studies in political psychology that look at citizens' emotions towards specific events. Rather, we are interested in citizens' emotions towards politics in general, which is connected to the concept of political resentment vis-à-vis the political elites and institutions (Capelos & Demertzis, 2018). Second, we are interested in the effect of different combinations of emotions and their intensities, rather than in the effect of discrete emotions. We focus on anger and hope, as they are central in the existing studies and as they stand out in our empirical analysis as the most prominent emotional clusters (see below). This goes against what has been the dominant view in social psychology, which considers emotions as discrete concepts comprised of various categories (Ekman, 2016; Brader et al., 2019), some labeled as positive, others as negative (Watson et al., 1988). We side with a growing line of research that is interested in the complexity of emotions (Cowen et al., 2019). This is because we conceptualize resentment as characterised by affective complexity, involving a moral judgment of enduring and cumulative perceptions of unfairness across time (Celis et al., 2021; Capelos & Demertzis, 2018; Fleury, 2020). This conceptualization means that, in order to grasp resentment, various emotions or affects should be combined, leading to the notion of 'affective arrangement' (Knops & Petit, 2022). Affective arrangements offer a framework for understanding how emotions impact experiences of agency and the power to act, either via conventional (voting) or unconventional forms of political participation (protest) (Knops & Petit, 2022). We thereby acknowledge that these

emotional clusters can drive distinct types of behavior, namely 'exit', 'voice', or 'loyalty'.

Emotions and non-electoral protest participation

Political psychology has so far mainly accepted the dominant discrete conceptualization of emotions. Studies have examined the interplay between single discrete emotions, especially anger or hope, and individual protest behaviours such as signing a petition, demonstrating, or boycotting (Landmann & Rohmann, 2020; Marcus, 2000; Roseman, 1991; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). Anger has been pinpointed as a crucial driver of protest actions (Gaffney et al., 2018; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019; Woods et al., 2012), as it closely relates to feelings of frustration, indignation (Jasper, 2014) or *ressentiment* (Capelos & Demertzis, 2018; Celis et al., 2021). By contrast, studies have emphasized that fear and anxiety deter individuals from engaging in protests, particularly in autocratic contexts where the risk of repression is high (Dornschneider, 2020; Nikolayenko, 2022). In democratic contexts, Capelos and Demertzis (2018) show that, during times of crisis in Greece, anxious people reported low levels of political activity while angry people reported a high degree of participation, especially in violent actions. Individual protest behaviour is also associated with positive emotions. Capelos and Demertzis (2018) again show that during times of crisis in Greece, hopeful people reported a high level of engagement in legal and illegal actions alike. Yet few of these studies look at the combination of emotions (for exceptions, see Dornschneider, 2020; Landmann & Rohmann, 2020; Nikolayenko, 2022). Conversely, social movement studies analysed the role of sets of emotions in the process of collective identity building and in creating, nurturing, and potentially breaking collective action (Jasper, 1998; Melucci, 1995, p. 45; Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Jasper refers to protest as being the result of 'pairs of positive and negative emotions' (Jasper, 2014, p. 211), such as outrage and hope (Castells, 2012), or the result of sequences of emotions, such as shame turning into pride through anger in groups sharing a stigmatized identity (Britt & Heise, 2000).

Given our conceptualisation of emotions, we side with social movement studies in arguing that it is the combination of anger and

hope that prompts protest participation. In other words, being angry is not enough; hope—the belief that things may change—is also necessary. Consequently, we expect that:

H1: A combination of hope and anger has a positive relationship with protest participation.

Emotions and protest voting

Emotions are also expected to affect electoral protest and voting behaviour (Close & Van Haute, 2020; Ladd & Lenz, 2008; Rico et al., 2017). Political psychology studies have examined the effect of single discrete emotions, especially anger or hope, on voting for protest parties (Altomonte et al., 2019; Marcus et al., 2019; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019). Looking at voting behaviour during the Brexit referendum, Vasilopoulou and Wagner (2017) show that, while anger was positively associated with support for the Leave option, fear prompted more moderation. This is because fear enhanced individuals' reliance on evaluations of the situation and triggered risk-avoidance behaviours (Dornschneider, 2020; Valentino et al., 2008).

In this chapter, we explore the relationship between the combination of various intensities of anger and hope and three types of voting behaviour, based on the 'Exit, Loyalty and Voice' framework (ELV Model). This model, introduced by Hirschman (1970) posits that citizens within a society have two responses at their disposal if they perceive an institution as failing to deliver on its objectives: they can exit (withdraw) or voice (i.e., aim to improve the relationship with the institution by making their grievances explicit). Hence, citizens in an electoral context can choose to support the status quo or the mainstream parties that are in power ('loyalty'), express their dissatisfaction by supporting parties that promise to bring change ('voice'), or they could withdraw by not casting a vote ('exit'). We argue that in a situation of resentment, anger and hope will contribute to predict citizens' choice of voting behaviour (Close & Van Haute, 2020). We add to the prior literature by arguing that the absence of anger and hope, or apathy, drives protest behaviour too, but in a distinct way.

First, we expect hope to feed loyalty. Hope has been defined as 'the perceived capability to derive pathways to desired goals, and motivate

oneself via agency thinking to use those pathways' (Snyder, 2002, p. 249). It is a prospective emotion that reflects a positive outlook for the future and is expressed whenever individuals believe that better outcomes are within reach (Chadwick, 2015; Just et al., 2007; Lazarus, 2001). Given that it is an emotion that entails a positive evaluation of a given situation, higher intensities of hope are expected to be positively linked to a desire to maintain the status quo ('loyalty'), while we expect them to be negatively related to voting for protest parties. Protest parties have been found to often make use of negative rhetoric, emphasizing what is going wrong in society and blaming the (political) elite or other groups (Nai, 2021; Widmann, 2021). They are less attractive to citizens who are not disillusioned with politics and mainstream political actors (Aron & Superti, 2001; Rooduijn, 2018). We therefore expect that:

H2a: High intensities of hope have (a) a positive relationship with voting for mainstream parties, but (b) have a negative relationship with voting for protest parties.

Second, we expect anger to fuel 'voice'. Following cognitive appraisal theory (Roseman, 1991), anger is generally elicited whenever citizens feel their personal privileges or entitlements are jeopardized by an external actor who is considered to be to blame. In this case, citizens feel they should signal this grievance in order to change the situation. Therefore, high intensities of anger are theorized to result in 'voice', directed at repairing a situation. At elections, citizens can voice their anger via supporting political actors that claim to represent the ordinary people and act against the elite, and who promise to change the status quo (Aron & Superti, 2021; Cohen, 2019). This antagonism between the citizens and the elite is a core characteristic of protest parties that often also have a populist component (Mudde, 2004; Rooduijn, 2013). According to this view, populist actors advocate for corrections to the system, which resonates well with the anger component of resentment and voice. The reverse relationship is expected to arise for mainstream parties, as they are seen as defenders of the status quo. Hence, we expect that:

H2b: High intensities of anger have (a) a positive relationship with voting for protest parties, but (b) have a negative relationship with voting for mainstream parties.

Third, we expect apathy, or low intensities of emotions towards politics (Ryan, 2017; Davis 2015), to be related to exit. Citizens who display low intensities of anger and hope towards politics have given up any effort to engage with it. What sets these citizens apart from other angry and dissatisfied voters is that they also have low levels of hope and they do not believe that another political actor (e.g., a protest party) will be able to deliver change and represent them, making them turn away from politics as a whole. Such apathy regarding politics is expected to drive 'exit' behaviours, such as abstention or casting a blank or invalid vote. Exit behaviours signal that citizens perceive themselves to be unable to exert any influence or gain control over a situation, so that their best option is to withdraw. A reverse relationship with voting is expected among supporters of mainstream and protest parties, as both are options that reflect a belief that a vote is still useful:

H2c: Apathy, or low intensities of anger and hope, has (a) a positive relationship with exit behaviour, but (b) a negative relationship with voting for mainstream and protest parties.

Data and method

This chapter focuses on Belgium, using the RepResent Panel Voter Survey 2019 as our main data source (see Chapter 1). We are interested in the first two waves of the panel survey. Wave 1 was pre-electoral and conducted from 5 April to 21 May (3,298 respondents in Flanders; 3,025 in Wallonia; 1,056 in Brussels). Wave 2 was post-electoral and conducted from 28 May to 18 June (1,978 respondents in Flanders; 1,429 in Wallonia; 510 in Brussels). When we compute variables making use of the RepResent dataset, we weight for age, gender and education.

Dependent variables

To grasp respondents' reported participation in protest actions, we made use of the following question: 'There are different ways to improve things in Belgium or to be more politically active. How often did you do any of the following actions in the past 12 months?' (1 = never; 2 = seldom; 3 = sometimes; 4 = often). Nine types of political action were offered, of which we focus on four: a) signing petitions, b) participating

in protest or demonstration, c) boycotting products and d) breaking rules for political reasons. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 report descriptive statistics for the above items and the correlation matrix, respectively.

Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of types of protest participation.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
a) petitions	3,904	1.94	.98	1	4
b) protest	3,904	1.44	.76	1	4
c) boycotting	3,904	1.92	1.07	1	4
d) breaking rules	3,904	1.39	.72	1	4

Table 4.2 Correlations matrix among types of protest participation.

Variables	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
(a) petitions	1.000			
(b) protest	.52	1.000		
(c) boycotting	.55	.46	1.000	
(d) breaking rules	.41	.50	.42	1.000

Operationally, we assembled an additive index that sums up the four items (Cronbach's alpha is equal to 0.8) to collapse the four items into a unique indicator of protest. The resulting variable ranges from 4 to 16: the higher the index, the more often respondents engage in protest actions.

Our second dependent variable is protest voting. We consider exit behaviour (i.e., blank and null votes, abstention), voice behaviour (voting for protest parties) and loyalty behaviour (voting for mainstream parties). The dependent variable is the party that respondents say they voted for in the 2019 federal elections in Belgium, as measured in Wave 2. Mainstream parties include the green (Ecolo, Groen), socialist (PS, Vooruit), liberal (MR, Open VLD), Christian-democrat (cdH, CD&V) and regionalist party families (DéFi, N-VA), while for protest parties we include the radical left party PTB-PVDA and the radical right VB. Some smaller parties (e.g., PP) were excluded from the analysis. We consider voters who did not vote, voted null, or invalidated their ballot

as exhibiting exit behaviour. Table 4.3 below reports the descriptive statistics of the three voting strategies.

Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics of voting strategies.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Mainstream vote	3,917	.66	.47	0	1
Exit vote	3,917	.08	.26	0	1
Protest vote	3,917	.22	.41	0	1

Independent variables

Our measure of respondents’ emotions towards politics is captured by the following question: ‘When you think of Belgian politics in general, to what extent do you feel each of the following emotions?’. Respondents were offered eight emotions (anger, bitterness, anxiety, fear, hope, relief, happiness, and satisfaction), and a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (to a great extent). Previous research discussed in the literature review presented above pointed to the crucial role of two emotions: anger and hope. We made use of the Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to place respondents into emotional groups based on their levels of anger and hope. In this model, a categorical latent (unobserved) variable is used to identify the probability that each individual will belong to a specific category, by means of a Generalized Structural Equation Model. We obtain the best fit when our sample is split into five groups (see Figure 4.1). In light of these results, we define group (1) as neutral (Gasper et al., 2019), when respondents register average scores for both anger and hope; group (2) as apathetic, indicating individuals with low scores for both anger and hope; groups (3) and (4) as high-intensity hopeful and high-intensity angry, respectively, where the former includes people with high rates of hope and low rates of anger, while the latter is the other way around; group (5) as high-intensity emotive, which includes individuals showing high rates of both anger and hope. In the empirical analysis, neutral will represent the baseline category. Note that fear or anxiety have also appeared as factors constraining mobilization. In previous analyses, we considered fear in the latent class analysis, but we did not observe one class that was specifically related to fear.




Fig. 4.1 Distribution of anger and hope across groups (Latent Class Analysis).

In terms of size (Table 4.4), two groups (neutral and high-intensity angry) account for over the 70% of the respondents. Nevertheless, no group contains fewer than 200 individuals. Note that the overall standard deviation of each emotion is consistently larger than that within each group, thus further supporting our modelling choice.

Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics of anger and hope across groups.

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Overall					
<i>Anger</i>	3,909	5.99	2.65	0	10
<i>Hope</i>	3,909	3.85	2.55	0	10
Neutral					
<i>Anger</i>	1,985	5.55	1.65	3	9
<i>Hope</i>	1,985	4.95	1.13	3	7
Apathetic					
<i>Anger</i>	244	1.41	1.40	0	4
<i>Hope</i>	244	0.94	1.05	0	3
High-intensity hopeful					

<i>Anger</i>	251	1.15	1.10	0	4
<i>Hope</i>	251	6.77	1.42	4	10
High-intensity angry					
<i>Anger</i>	1,159	8,17	1.61	5	10
<i>Hope</i>	1,159	1.02	1,02	0	3
High-intensity emotive					
<i>Anger</i>	219	7.84	1.51	4	10
<i>Hope</i>	219	8.33	0.98	7	10

Table 4.5 reports the distribution of protest participation by group. It indicates that protest participation is significantly lower in the apathetic group, and larger in the high-intensity angry and (mostly) the high-intensity emotive groups, when compared to neutral. By contrast, no significant differences emerge among the neutral and high-intensity hopeful groups.

Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics of protest participation split by groups.

Categories	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	p(x, y)
Neutral	1,981	6.63	2.67	4	16	
Apathetic	244	5.77	2.38	4	14	0.00
High-intensity hopeful	250	6.52	2.65	4	16	0.55
High-intensity angry	1,158	6.68	2.79	4	16	0.09
High-intensity emotive	218	8.28	3.42	4	16	0.00

Note: p (x,y) in last column is the t-test of equality of means across the baseline category neutral (x) and other categories (y), under the assumption of equal variances.

Controls

We included standard individual-level socio-demographic variables (gender, age, education) that contribute to determining political engagement (Brady et al., 1995; Marien et al., 2010). Gender is a dummy equal to one for female. Age ('What is your age?') is a continuous variable measured in years, while education is a five-category variable, ranging from 'none or elementary' to 'university degree'.

We also controlled for political attitudes that were identified as important for protest participation and protest voting (Hooghe & Marien, 2013). We included three PCA-based indices measuring respondents' degree of populism, trust in political institutions, and external efficacy, respectively. We measured populism with an index consisting of three items from the RepResent dataset, asking to respondents the extent to which they agree with the following (on a 1–5 scale): 'Politicians must follow the people's opinion', 'Political opposition is more present between citizens and the elite than between citizens themselves', 'I prefer being represented by an ordinary citizen rather than by a professional politician'. Trust in political institutions was assessed by considering the opinion of each respondent towards political parties, federal parliament, politicians, and the European Union, on a 0–10 scale. External efficacy relates to the extent to which political institutions are perceived as responsive to citizens' demands, thus capturing citizens' perception of whether they feel able to influence the political process (Balch, 1974; Niemi et al., 1991). As a result, we measured this by the extent to which respondents agree with the following statements, on a 1–5 scale: 'In general, our political system works honestly', 'Our political decision-making processes are sufficiently transparent', 'In general, our political system works effectively'. Then, we controlled for respondents' left–right self-placement, on a scale 0–10, with 0 meaning left, 5 the centre, and 10 the right. Finally, we controlled for the NUTS1 region of residence of each respondent, i.e., Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 below report the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the set of controls.

Table 4.6 Descriptive statistics of control variables.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	3,909	49.68	15.59	18	91
Gender	3,909	1.46	.50	1	3
Education	3,909	3.54	.96	1	5
Populism index	3,899	0	1.35	-4.71	2.51
Efficacy index	3,904	0	1.54	-2.74	4.20
Trust index	3,908	0	1.84	-3.00	5.03
Left Right	3,904	5.36	2.33	0	10
Region	3,909	2.24	.66	1	3

Table 4.7 Matrix of correlations of control variables.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(1) Age	1.00							
(2) Gender	-0.20	1.00						
(3) Education	-0.10	0.03	1.00					
(4) Populism index	0.13	-0.01	-0.12	1.00				
(5) Efficacy index	-0.04	-0.06	0.09	-0.31	1.00			
(6) Trust index	-0.05	-0.05	0.11	-0.31	0.67	1.00		
(7) Left-Right	0.06	-0.11	-0.01	-0.01	0.05	0.10	1.00	
(8) Region	-0.10	0.06	-0.06	0.01	-0.09	-0.09	-0.08	1.00

Modelling strategy

Empirically, we estimated the following equation:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Emo_Cluster_i + \gamma_r + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where subscript i indicates survey respondent, X is the vector of controls, and are NUTS1 region dummies. *Emo_Cluster* includes our emotional groups, i.e., neutral, apathetic, high-intensity hopeful, high-intensity angry, and high-intensity emotive. Standard errors are clustered at NUTS1 region level.

We used two different econometric techniques to estimate eq. (1), according to the characteristics of the dependent variables. When we investigated the drivers of protest participation, as it is a continuous variable, we employed a standard OLS model. As voting strategies are dummies equal to one if voters cast a mainstream vote, a protest vote, and opts for an exit strategy, we used Logit models.

Analysis and findings

Table 4.8 presents the results of our regression analyses. For each model, we introduced our independent variable, the groups of respondents by type of emotion. Coefficients associated with these groups must be interpreted as differences with respect to the baseline group (neutral emotions). We also introduced our control variables.

Column 1 presents the results of our standard OLS regression for our first dependent variable, protest participation. Results provide very interesting insights. Non-electoral protest participation, as expected, is significantly lower in the apathetic group if compared to neutral category. The same holds but to a lower extent for the high-intensity hopeful group. This denotes that not having strong emotions (or at least the ones we measured) or being high-intensity hopeful when thinking about national politics turns citizens away from protest actions. If we focus on the high-intensity angry group, we observe a positive, albeit not significant, coefficient. Non-electoral protest participation is only significantly larger in the high-intensity emotive group compared to the neutral group, with the value of the coefficient being much larger than that of any other category. In fact, the difference between apathetic

and high-intensity emotive respondents, respectively those registering the lowest and highest probability of protest participation, is over two points. These results provide a relevant message: non-electoral protest participation is mostly driven by the joint action of positive (hope) and negative (anger) emotions towards politics, thus corroborating our hypothesis H1. In other words, people participate most in protest actions if they feel high-intensity angry, but also high-intensity hopeful, and they might believe that political conditions may improve thanks to collective action. Our set of controls confirms that protest activity tends to be higher among younger, male citizens with higher levels of education, and from the more urban area of Brussels, which corroborates existing knowledge (Brady et al., 1995; Marien et al., 2010). Interestingly, protest participation is also driven by high levels of trust in politics, which goes against existing knowledge (Hooghe & Marien, 2013), higher levels of populism, and left-wing attitudes. This finding may be related to the specific context of the 2014–2019 legislature in Belgium led by a right-wing government. Protest actions may have been initiated by the left-wing opposition, which could explain this result.

Table 4.8 Regression results.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Protest	Mainstream vote	Exit vote	Populist vote
EMOTIONS (Ref: Neutral)				
Apathetic	-.7114*	.0744*	.0689***	-.0759***
	(.1753)	(.0386)	(.0069)	(.0132)
High-intensity hopeful	-.3437*	.1014***	-.0412**	-.068
	(.1034)	(.0245)	(.0171)	(.0465)
High-intensity angry	.2604	-.0686***	-.0031	.0555***
	(.1075)	(.0199)	(.0234)	(.0084)
High-intensity emotive	1.3597**	-.0395	.0194	.0387

	(.2201)	(.03)	(.0181)	(.0361)
CONTROLS				
Age (in years)	-.0095*	.0043***	.0001	-.0038***
	(.0028)	(.0007)	(.0001)	(.0006)
Gender (female)	-.6919***	.0071	.0033	-.0297**
	(.0593)	(.0147)	(.0065)	(.0117)
Higher level of education	.2595**	.0672***	-.0228***	-.0438***
	(.0415)	(.0092)	(.0058)	(.0116)
Populism index	.1397*	-.0033	-.0028	.0155**
	(.0445)	(.004)	(.0033)	(.0059)
Efficacy index	-.0564	.0196***	.0026	-.021**
	(.0542)	(.0035)	(.003)	(.0087)
Trust index	.2787***	.0596***	-.0208***	-.0373***
	(.0265)	(.0018)	(.0033)	(.0052)
Right-wing orientation	-.1358**	-.0146***	.0006	.0082
	(.0139)	(.0031)	(.004)	(.0089)
REGIONS (Reference: Brussels)				
Flanders	-.9567***	-.1091***	-.0633***	.1739***
	(.0136)	(.0044)	(.0014)	(.0056)
Wallonia	-.1726***	-.0404***	-.0166***	.0269***
	(.0101)	(.0028)	(.0011)	(.0028)
Observations	3,830	3,837	3,837	3,837
R ²	.114	.125	.124	.126

Note. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by region. Model (1) has been estimated through OLS, and entries are coefficients. Models (2)–(4) have been estimated through Logit and entries are Average Marginal Effects.

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

In columns 2 to 4, we considered the results for our second dependent variable, protest voting. First, we expected that high intensities of hope would be positively related to voting for mainstream parties, but negatively related to voting for protest parties. Results indicate that higher intensities of hope are indeed positively associated with voting for mainstream parties, but this does not have a significant relationship with voting for protest parties, which means that H2a is only partly supported. Second, we expected high intensities of anger to have a positive relationship with voting for protest parties, but a negative relationship with voting for mainstream parties. The results support these associations, with higher intensities of anger being significantly related to a protest vote and negatively related to a mainstream vote. Finally, we expected apathy to mainly drive exit behaviour rather than voting for mainstream and protest parties. Again, results provide mixed support for the hypothesis: while apathy is positively associated with exit behaviour and negatively associated with protest voting, we also find apathy to have a significant positive relationship with voting for mainstream parties. Hence, H2c is only partly supported. All in all, these results show that the various emotional clusters (high hope, high anger, and the lack of hope and anger) are significant drivers of distinct types of behaviours (exit, loyalty, and voice). Our set of controls points to different protest dynamics among different demographics. Protest voting shares some characteristics with protest participation, as it is higher among young, male respondents with higher levels of populist attitudes. But protest voting differs from protest participation in that it is higher among citizens with lower levels of education, and lower trust and efficacy, which is more in line with existing studies (Hooghe & Marien, 2013). Exit behaviour is mainly driven by low trust and education, but we find that emotional clusters do offer an independent contribution on top of these sociodemographic factors.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to investigate the affective complexity of resentment and its impact on protest participation. Using the RepResent Voter Panel Survey conducted around the 2019 elections in Belgium, we analysed whether specific combinations and intensities of anger and

hope drive different choices in terms of protest behaviours, understood as non-electoral protest participation and protest voting. The results offer an excellent starting point to reflect on the implications of this affective complexity for protest behaviour and on its challenges and opportunities for representative democracy at large.

Our focus on resentment led us to conceive of emotions not as single discrete concepts, but rather as concepts that can be combined, leading to affective arrangements that we call 'emotional clusters'. More specifically, we have centred our analysis around the combination of various intensities of two core emotions: anger and hope. Our latent class analysis has revealed that citizens can be clustered in five distinct emotional clusters, based on their intensity on the anger and hope scales: apathetic, high-intensity angry, high-intensity hopeful, high-intensity emotive, neutral. This is the first important contribution made by this chapter: we show how emotions can combine simultaneously in diverse ways and 'produce' types of citizens who respond emotionally to politics in very different ways (exit, voice or loyalty). The socio-political consequences of these combinations deserve further attention.

Further, we demonstrated that these emotional clusters drive distinct protest behaviours, thereby connecting the affective/emotional dimension of resentment and the behavioural expression of resentment. We show that apathy drives citizens away from non-electoral protest participation, and increases their likelihood of exiting the electoral process. High intensities of hope deter people from non-electoral protest participation and from voting abstention, and increase the likelihood of voting for a mainstream party. High intensities of anger alone drive protest voting, but not non-electoral protest participation. Conversely, the combination of high intensities of anger and hope drive non-electoral protest participation, but not protest voting.

Overall, these findings attest to the idea that politics is not only rational and evaluative, but also involves a significant affective dimension that should be taken into account (Theiss-Morse et al., 1993). We show that different forms of protest result from different emotional clusters. How emotions combine is an important factor that can enable us to understand the choice between 'voice' or 'exit' on election day, but also the choice to engage in non-electoral protest behaviours. These are important results that help us to better grasp citizens' relations to politics, how they feel about it, and how they act as a result. They provide

important insights for the functioning of representative democracy as a whole. If apathy drives citizens away from protest but also from the electoral process, it means that representative democracy may need to nurture emotions and affect to engage citizens. Yet hope benefits the status quo. Therefore, a certain level of anger may be beneficial, if not necessary, for the functioning of democracy: combined with hope, it can foster critical citizens who can articulate their concerns and initiate change. This finding supports Pippa Norris' claim that credulous trust alone may be detrimental to democracy, and that trust works best when combined with skepticism and verification (Norris, 2022). Similarly, our findings show that there is value in having hopeful citizens who able to feel angry and indignant when dissatisfied. While the broader ramifications for society as a whole need to be addressed in greater depth (and are being assessed elsewhere in this book), these findings invite us to reflect on the normative implications, prompting a reconsideration of what is often viewed as 'positive' (hope) or 'negative' (anger) emotions. This chapter offers insights into the complex dynamics of how distinct emotions interact with distinct behaviours and can act as drivers of 'agency' in a representative democracy.

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