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In recent decades, neoliberal initiatives have been carried out at the local-community level with the aim of promoting economic and social development. The first objective of this article is to highlight the increasing practical complexity of this new development-oriented configuration based on the triadic model of public, private, and local. Its second objective is to improve understanding of how the incomes generated by this system, which are intended to drive development, are appropriated "from below." Considering the diversity and poorly defined nature of these incomes, the generic term "developmental incomes" is proposed to describe them. The article highlights a gap in the ethnography of developmental-income appropriation at the level of household budgets. A key question is to what extent this model meets (or fails to meet) the initial ambitions of poverty reduction.

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This research program has funded 3 doctoral theses (Ssebaggala, *in progress*; Barry, 2022; Serres, 2021), as well as field research on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the mining sector in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Cogels, *in progress*). See also Ssebaggala and Cloquet (*in progress*). The latter two publications concern the place of DI in household budgets: the DI delivered by CSR and the mining sector's compensation scheme in the DRC, and the DI resulting from the Tourism Revenue Sharing policy in Uganda. The anthropologist Serge Cogels as well as the environmental management researchers James Ssebaggala and Isabelle Cloquet deliver thorough analyses of DI in light of their place in household budgets and their local uses. They demonstrate how DI contribute little to poverty reduction due to their low inputs and poor investment and saving potential.

Keywords: Neoliberal development, neoliberal conservation, developmental incomes, poverty reduction, ethnography, household budgets

JEL Classification: M14, O20, Q01, Z10, Z32

Développement néolibéral, réduction de la pauvreté et revenus à vocation de développement

Des initiatives néolibérales au niveau des communautés locales ont vu le jour au cours des dernières décennies dans l'idée de promouvoir le développement économique et social. L'objectif de cet article est, premièrement, de mettre en évidence la complexité pragmatique croissante de cette nouvelle configuration développementiste basée sur le modèle triadique – public, privé, local. Le second objectif est de contribuer à une meilleure compréhension de l'appropriation « par le bas » des revenus à vocation de développement générés par un tel dispositif. Au vu de la pluralité et du flou relatif à ces revenus, le générique analytique de « revenu à vocation de développement » (RD) est proposé. Un vide à combler en termes d'ethnographie de l'appropriation des RD à l'échelle des budgets familiaux est souligné. La question de savoir dans quelle mesure ce modèle répond (ou ne répond pas) aux ambitions initiales de réduction de la pauvreté est au cœur de la réflexion.

Mots-clés : développement néolibéral, conservation néolibérale, revenus à vocation de développement, réduction de la pauvreté, ethnographie, budgets des ménages

Recent decades have brought profound shifts in the aid landscape, which has progressively taken on a neoliberal dimension. As any neoliberal governmentality, this new orientation of development aid dictates “the necessity of distinguishing between the project intended by the neoliberal rationale and the socio-political consequences of its implementation” (Simon and Piccoli, 2018, 4; citing Hale, 2002; Hilgers, 2013). While the literature regarding this question often interrogates what local populations do with the neoliberal project by appropriating it, diverting it, and finding innovative ways to resist the inequalities and invisibility it generates, the present publication focuses on neoliberal funding intended for local populations and their self-development. The objective of this article is to examine the effectiveness of this funding in terms of fighting poverty.
The text that follows comprises four parts. The first part consists in a brief history of neoliberal development and poverty reduction, and presents the limits to the implementation of this policy which, in reality, do not always turn out to be truly neoliberal. The second part proposes an analytical tool and introduces the notion of “Developmental Incomes” (DI). The third part brings up the many studies criticizing the effectiveness of this policy in terms of poverty reduction. Finally, in the last part, three major difficulties relative to evaluating the effects of DI on poverty are evidenced: the complexity of the situations, the near absence of quantified case studies at the scale of household finances, and the semantic ambiguity relative to DI.

1. NEOLIBERAL DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY REDUCTION

Since the emergence of neoliberal development in the 1980s (Hart, 2009), an emphasis has been placed on poverty reduction by means of privatization, Market-Based Instruments (MBIs)[2], market competitiveness and financial deregulation. This new form of development aid has become a normative framework of international aid. It is based on the idea that matters should be kept out of the hands of the State, considered ineffective, and, thereafter, out of the hands of the equally ineffective aid industry (Harford and Klein, 2005). The former notion developed along with the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB)

[2] Regarding neoliberal nature conservation, the main MBIs are ecotourism, the commercialization of Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs), “biodiversity and wetland banking”–based on the conservation of ecosystems in compensation for the intensive exploitation threatening other equivalent ecosystems–and Payements for Ecosystem Services (PES), “in terms of which owners of biodiversity-rich land are paid to keep this land intact rather than converting it to other uses, usually as an offset for destructive development elsewhere” (Flecher, 2020, 4).

were instigated in the 1980s, while the latter idea was sparked by the United Nations' (UN) Millenium Developmental Goals (MDGs) in 2011, followed by the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as of 2015. Between these two trends, the Rio Summit in 1992, followed by the Kyoto protocol in 1997, injected the poverty reduction objective with an "embedded" environmental dimension. The disengagement of the State to the benefit of the private sector, the disengagement of the aid industry under the thumb of the private sector, and the importance of the environmental factor thus constitute the defining characteristics of this new form of development aid.

The decentralization and structural adjustments of the 1980s served as guidelines to the sector reforms of the 1990s. The "Heavily Indebted Poor Countries" (HIPC) initiative launched by the G7 in 1996 and reinforced in 1999 by the "Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative" (MDRI) further accentuated this tendency. Access to aid has henceforth been conditioned by the neoliberalization of the economy. In parallel, among development aid and nature conservation agencies, the participative "bottom-up," "Community Based" (CB) approach has become the new required *modus operandi* (Fletcher, 2020; Cooke and Khotari, 2001).

Since the 1990s, under the UN's influence, economic principles that are favorable to the private sector have progressively come to be thought of as indispensable contributors to aid funding. Furthermore, as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in business or for-profit companies, and Corporate Citizenship in the case of social or nonprofit entrepreneurship–what is known as "Solidarity Economy" and similar "social" approaches to the economy–entered the aid landscape, the social entrepreneur began to emerge as a figure of aid co-funding and cornerstone of social development promotion (Chandra, 2018). Finally, according to "inclusive business models," the poor can be integrated into "market-based activities" (Mukherjee-Reed, 2010, 235). There is consensus to prioritize the eradication of global poverty and the fight against inequality in collaboration with the private sector (Fukuda-Parr and Hulm, 2009). Concurrently, initiatives of this order have also emerged from the "corporate community itself such as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)" (Mukherjee-Reed, 2010, 235). Underlying this policy is the premise of a "win-win" scenario in which including the poor in the market economy is sufficient to obtain positive impacts at the economic, social and environmental level at a low cost. At present, this financialization of aid based on market mechanisms is more dominant than ever. It is on the United Nations' 2030 agenda (Pierre, 2017) with the ambition of making the private sector play a full part in the funding of sustainable development in accordance with the Addis Abeba Action Agenda (AAAA) (Roch, 2021), and has become "evident in neoliberal conservation in 2020" (Fletcher, 2020, 7).

The three elements mentioned above–decentralization, participation and inclusive business models–are key components of development initiatives on the ground. Across all scales, from global to local as well as national, they have become staples of aid design. They are embedded in international performance standards, in particular those of the WB, and engraved in the national laws that were reformed as of the 1990s. Community-Based Conservation (CBC) initiatives, forestry reforms and mining code reforms have restructured the conservation and exploitation of natural resources sectors to include local populations. These reforms grant an unprecedented importance (at least in theory) to the recognition of customary land rights and the involvement of locals.

This new manner of organizing development aid is structured in a triad between the State, the private sector, and local populations. Around this gravitates a multitude of actors from the sphere of traditional aid, such as NGOs, and from civil society, such as charities and human rights associations. Funding notably takes place on the basis of "partnerships" between stakeholders, including "private-community partnerships" (Hart, Russon and Sklair, 2021). Under the impulse of SDGs, the transformed landscape of aid is characterized by the disengagement of traditional agencies (Mawdsley, 2015, 340) and the increasing complexity of its configuration. A number of authors underline the growing amplitude of this phenomenon.

2. FROM PARADIGM TO REALITY

In spite of the "neoliberal" designation, this form of development aid, much like neoliberal nature conservation, is not entirely neoliberal. The neoliberal paradigm is indeed present in the model the policies are based on, but its application results in practices that do not necessarily meet all the criteria of neoliberalism. Fletcher (2020, 6) demonstrates this for the case of nature conservation. The PES (Payments for Environmental Services) instrument still gives rise to little market activity and is mostly managed by the State (taxes, benefits). Similarly, development aid funding does not result only from privatization, "Market-Based Instruments" (MBIs), market competitiveness and financial deregulation. There is still dependency on the State through the tax scheme, even if it is decentralized (Yatta, 2009). The market economy does not represent an opportunity for all actors. It is more beneficial to the "top of the pyramid" than to the "bottom of the pyramid." Finally, public interventionism is still in order, whether from the international community or from States (North and South). Poverty reduction essentially depends on the resources of the international private sector and traditional aid, which deviates from the neoliberal philosophy.

Poverty reduction is under the responsibility of local communities. Through new legislation, financial incentives, etc., they are theoretically given the leeway to behave like "a miniature firm" (Ferguson, 2010, 172) according to the principles of neoliberal economic rationality. "Local populations" should be understood as "businesses" (Vargas-Mazas, 2017, 87), and what is called upon is a "philosophy of self-interest as a generator of social well-being" (*Op. Cit.*, 84). Stakeholder theory is dominant in the vision of ecotourism and other MBIs. These projects are considered to be carried out by "rational" economic actors in the neoliberal sense, driven by their personal interests, gains, investments, etc.: "(I)ndividuals (are) understood as self-interested rational actors" (Fletcher, 2020, 9). In what follows, we will see how this premise is not necessarily verified in practice. In the neoliberal scenario, poverty reduction, especially between the hands of the communities in question, gives rise to alternatives. Target groups find "uses of neoliberalism" (Ferguson, 2010) that often unfold in manners that do not necessarily correspond with the neoliberal political vision. Researchers thus have much to gain from focusing on these issues.

3. DEVELOPMENTAL INCOMES

In the context of neoliberal development as it has been introduced above, local development is thus encouraged by neoliberal or market-based financial incentives. Generally considered "donations" and"loans" during the initial period of development cooperation (from the 1940s to the start of the 1980s), new terms emerged to designate funding for aid, such as "rents," "incomes" and "benefits" in the subsequent so-called neoliberal period (from the 1980s to today).[3] It is no longer a matter of "donations" or "loans," common during the earlier period of aid development during which funders were simply aiming to promote development leading to progress. The expression "inclusive incentives" relates to the idea that these funds are designed as incentives to include the poor populations of the South in the market in order to help them out of their condition.

In light of the diversity of lexical processes and strategies, and in the absence of any standardized designation in the literature that can encompass all situations of neoliberal or market-based financial incentives for local development, the present publication will refer to these situations as "Developmental Incomes (DI)." This choice has the advantage of bringing together under one *generic label* a number of funding modalities which have gradually become predominant over the last 40 years in the field of aid, at

[3] Regarding the funding mechanisms of neoliberal conservation, Holmes and Cavanagh (2016, 14) formulate that the "(…) commodification and marketization of nature create new rents and incomes."

least in rhetorical terms: funding aid which aims to support micro-entrepreneurship, serve as a guide for development, and help "domesticate" entrepreneurial performance by devoting some of the profits to social investments. In the proposed expression "Developmental Incomes" (DI), "Incomes" is employed in a fairly broad sense, as a synonym for "returns" (profit, gains, and benefits) whether from a financial, material or symbolic point of view. "Incomes" relates not only to money but also to material goods, equipment, services, and intangible symbolic values such as prestige. Lastly, in "DI," the use of the adjective "Developmental" is to be interpreted in two ways: as something emanating from the world of aid (including projects jointly funded by public bodies, private enterprises, and foundations) and as something which is aimed at social development.

These neoliberal or market-based financial incentives–referred to here as "Development Incomes" (DI)–are presented in the context of the MDGs as effective manners of fighting poverty. But the amount of criticism expressed in these last decades, be it in matters of community development at a micro-economic level alone, cast doubt on whether this new form of development is reaching its objective. Academic studies outline a series of issues that tend to raise questions as to whether this approach is as inclusive as it seems. These issues have been picked up and broadcasted by activist organizations and globalized movements (Lewis and Schuller, 2017) which, in a post-development perspective (Escobar, 2004), are calling for "a site of knowledge production" for alternative development (Mukherjee-Reed, 2010, 255).

4. THE NECESSITY OF EVALUATING DI RELATIVE TO POVERTY REDUCTION

Since the 1990s, extensive literature has been published regarding the difficulties encountered in the process of fiscal decentralization. Clientelism, elite capture, as well as the reinforcement of inequality and the exacerbation of tensions within communities are being called out across all sectors. Another blind spot concerns the coercive nature of the dominant stakeholders in the system (across all scales). Neoliberal conservation goes hand in hand with a form of "green militarization" due to the management of these conservation areas (Sandbrook, Luque-Lora and Adams, 2018). The private sector, specifically "extractive companies," uses violence against those who oppose its extension and speak out against abuses in terms of pollution, land grabbing, loss of control of ecological resources, etc. According to Hart, Russon and Sklari (2021), the private sector's intervention in the development landscape aggravates the power imbalance in spite of what a "partnership" might imply as a tool and objective for relationships between stakeholders. The NGOs that have been playing an increasing role in partnership with the

State and other stakeholders are meant to represent the interests of local populations (civil society) but, in reality, contribute to their depoliticization (Simon and Piccoli, 2018, 10). The private sector's façade of deference to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) "fail(s) to sufficiently integrate development, human rights, and environmental standards" (Cohen et *al.*, 2021, 946). Finally, doubts may be raised as to the feasibility of the financialization of aid and regarding the lack of accountability and transparency–particularly on the part of transnational consortiums and charitable foundations (see for instance Bayliss, Romero and Van Waeyenberge, 2021).

Given how this strategy is maintained in spite of inconclusive results, and considering the predominance of discourse to the detriment of empirical reality, the need remains crucial for a critical ethnography based on case studies. This remains the only manner of observing the actual practices taking place in this new development arena. As was already highlighted by Lewis and Mosse in 2006, given the inequality generated by capitalist economic growth and the difficulty of meeting the Millennium Developmental Goals (MDGs) in practice, "the need for a critical ethnography of development policy and practice (is) more and more important" (Lewis and Mosse, 2006, 2). "Ethnographic work has the unique potential to show how change is brought about, not through the logic of official policy intentions, or even through its hidden operation as a discourse of power, but through processes of compromise and contingent action of various kinds" (Ibid.:4). It is best able to reveal the margin between political intentions and practice, and to identify and analyze what "uses of neoliberalism" the groups targeted by this policy make of this development offer. As shown in economic anthropology and socio-anthropological studies on neoliberal development (Olivier de Sardan and Piccoli, 2018 ; Shakya and Clammer, 2017 ; Ferguson, 2015), economic behavior is not necessarily driven only by the economic rationale that underlies this policy. The "win-win" scenario should be confronted with the realities on the ground.

The evaluation of 150 field-based initiatives in the Amazon basin of Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia and Peru in the market-based conservation sector shows a small proportion of capital investments and an emphasis placed on the distribution of profits rather than the accumulation of capital (Pokony et *al.*, 2012). Another overview of case studies on Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services (CRES) (Clot et *al.*, 2015), this time in the field of economic psychology[4], reaches the same conclusion regarding the small proportion of capital investments. Where the money comes from, more so than the motivation to invest in capital, is the determining factor in choices regarding spending and saving. This subjective dimension associated with

[4] In the same vein as the substantivist school in economic anthropology.

money, beyond strictly monetary concerns, makes sense of the "irrational" manner–relative to the principles of the market economy–in which local populations appropriate neoliberal incentives for local development. Another observation concerns the low competitiveness of small producers. In these conditions, "attempts to integrate smallholders into markets for tree and forest products has little chance to significantly improve the situation of the rural poor" (Pokony et *al.*, 2012, 399).

5. DIFFICULTIES OF EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF DI ON POVERTY REDUCTION

Three difficulties complicate the task of researchers undertaking a local scale ethnography of this form of development aid: 1) the complexity of the situations, 2) the near absence of quantified case studies at the scale of household finances, 3) the semantic ambiguity regarding DI.

5.1 Complexity of the situations

Holmes and Cavanagh (2016, 8) argue that neoliberal conservation projects involve "high levels of empirical variegation." Having analyzed the social impact of different forms of neoliberal conservation on human well-being based on 42 academic reports of empirical case studies across the 5 continents, they reach the disappointing conclusion that the impact cannot be correctly measured for 3 reasons: the diversity of forms of impact, the absence of comparable data, the presence of managerial formats that precede that of neoliberal conservation. They write that "(…) it is difficult to infer from our review that neoliberal forms of conservation either collectively improve or degrade human well-being, whether absolutely or in relation to other forms of conservation intervention. In large part, this is due to broader difficulties in measuring and comparing very different forms of impact, and the availability of appropriate data. Yet this is also due to the status of neoliberal conservation projects as an evolution or reworked continuation of previous initiatives, which therefore contain within them the legacies of previous iterations of design, function, and social relations (…)" (Holmes and Cavanagh, 2016, 17).

Among the least "conceptual and anticipatory" (Fletcher, 2020, 5) Market-Based Instruments (MBIs) of neoliberal conservation, ecotourism is presented as having positive repercussions in terms of local development thanks to the investment of "new rents and incomes," "additional rents," "rents from ecotourism" and "benefits." However, studies analyzing the social impacts of ecotourism in Uganda, Honduras, Tanzania and Colombia found it difficult to determine the local benefits of this extra income–earnings from private-community partnerships are paid out to local residents in monetary form–when, at the same time, income is reduced due to land evictions and loss of access to the resources in conservation areas, appropriated by private tourism companies (Holmes and Cavanagh, 2016, 10).

This widespread phenomenon is known as "green grabbing." The literature is rich with examples of privatization of farmland and of its provision to NGOs, private companies or private-community partnerships to be made into tourism areas for hunting or wildlife viewing, or into conservation areas. This is the case, for instance, for the Private Game Reserves in South Africa (Snijders, 2012), the Tanzanian Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) (Green and Adams, 2015 ; Benjaminsen and Svastad, 2010), the Private Protected Areas (PPAs) in Chile (Holmes, 2015) and in Sumatra, Indonesia (Wieckardt, Koot and Karimasari, 2020). It is also the case for conservation concessions (Karsenty, 2004). In this manner, farmland comes under the control of national and international nature conservation organizations and private companies (safaris, private individuals), undergoing a shift in its userbase and a productivity upgrade in the process. This course of action, described as "innovative" and "win-win," is carried out in return for the payment of "rent" to the local populations and the opportunity for the latter to find salaried work and develop local entrepreneurship in "partnership" with other stakeholders. In conservationist rhetoric, it goes hand in hand with the double objective consisting in saving the biodiversity while being "livelihood focused" (Holmes and Cavanagh, 2016, 11).

Other aspects contribute to the complexity of neoliberal development situations observed on the ground. As we have seen, these financial arrangements involve a multitude of actors around the State-private sector-populations triad. The tangle of actors on different scales–international, national and regional–leads to the coexistence of different sources of local development funding, from the macro-economic to micro-economic level. These simultaneous pluralistic sources are not embedded in a concerted investment plan for local development. This observation applies to the entire range of neoliberal operations that generate DI: neoliberal conservation, agro-business, extractivism of natural resources, and any development aid arrangement that involves a Public-Private Partnership (PPP)[5].

In matters of neoliberal conservation, there are 5 funding mechanisms–marketization, commodification, privatization, financialization and decentralization–which operate on different scales and play out in various manners (Holmes and Cavanagh, 2016, 17). It is these combinations of mechanisms, rather than each mechanism in isolation, that create (or supposedly create) the new rents and incomes aimed at local development.

[5] See for instance the analysis of a green energy program in Mali by Gautier et *al*. (2013).

The financial arrangement of what we call "Developmental Incomes" (DI) is complex. It can involve at least 5 sources of funding on behalf of actors on different scales, and at least 7 different forms of DI, ranging from monetary resources to technical support. It is targeted towards "local communities" which are roughly located within a given perimeter but which vary from one source of funding to another. The projects, independent from each other, also vary depending on the source of funding. Given these elements, evaluating the effects of DI in terms of development is no easy task.

The exploitation of natural resources sector provides a good example of the type of DI arrangement to consider when evaluating local development. Since the 1990s, mining and logging by multinational extractivist companies and transnational consortiums–in partnerships between the private sector, the public sector (including "traditional" public development aid) and the local populations–has bolstered the funding of local development by way of DI. DI are essentially generated by the private sector as well as by funders.

Mining companies pay the populations compensation for involuntary resettlement in accordance with the social and environmental performance standards enacted by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank Group (WBG) and the World Bank (WB). Decentralized taxes to fund local development paid by the private sector are returned (or are supposedly returned) to regional administrations and local communities. Development funds that fall under Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) stipulated in private operators' contractual requirements are invested into local development. Infrastructure work is also carried out in line with the social obligations and the maintenance of social peace in place since the colonial era (Karsenty, 2010). Small business ventures among community concessions are meant to generate wages, revenue and capital gains either directly, or via private operators. This local form of marketing natural resources is either effective (m^3 of wood authorized for sale, hunting quotas), virtual (tourism wildlife viewing) or fictional (carbon credits, see REDD+ initiatives). The Amazonian forests in Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia and Peru are hosts to Sustainable Forest Management (SFM), involving the practice of community forestry, agroforestry and tree planting (Pokony et *al.*, 2012). The following generation of programs–Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES)–involves "carbon offset forestry payments to smallholding farmers" (Holmes and Cavanagh, 2016, 14-15). These result not from the wood or hunting markets, but from the carbon credit market. Finally, traditional aid provides financial, technical or logistical support as well as services, which helps oversee the investment of DI. This arrangement helps (or is supposed to help) small producers and poor families link their entrepreneurship to interior and exterior markets.

An ethnography of this form of local development aid therefore ideally requires integrating the multitude of hybrid and heterogeneous types of DI funding and actors that implement them. Evaluating the supposed impact of DI on local development requires researchers to reflect upon the entirety of the neoliberal development arrangement and to take its variability into consideration. However, such an approach proves difficult in terms of practicality. Comparing three case studies in the field of Corporate Community Development (CCD) in Fiji, South Africa and Papua New Guinea, with varying involvements of the private sector, the State and the community level[6], McEwan et *al.* (2017) are able to demonstrate that the objectives are not met for a number of reasons, among which the lack of coordination between actors and the lack of consistency in terms of the targeted "local level." Due to issues with governance and the misappropriation of DI, other aspects of the situations leave researchers simply unable to access such information as the detailed amounts of DI meant to be paid up-stream, meant to be collected by local communities, and meant to be invested by the latter in development matters. In consequence, researchers wishing to analyze the effects of DI on local development find themselves restricted to a fragmentary evaluation and obstructed working conditions.

In addition to this difficulty, it is worth mentioning the lack of data and the vagueness as to what DI specifically encompass.

5.2 Near absence of quantified case studies at the scale of household finances

The near absence of quantified case studies at the level of household economies is a paradox with regards to the SDGs' poverty reduction objectives. At present, little is known about DI within the current field of neoliberal aid–notably regarding how they reach target groups, and in particular the manner in which the latter appropriate them. Precise data dedicated to how neoliberal and market-based development funding is employed in the implementation of projects is still insufficient. Publications dealing with field experimentation within development projects are found lacking with regards to reporting on investments made at a local scale, and on the tangible impacts in terms of development. The real effects of this policy on community or household finances therefore cannot be evaluated. Publications also rarely give any precise mention of the sums invested into local development. Most do not specify or only vaguely evoke what they actually represent on the scale of community or family budgets. Material

[6] With examples of a large-scale mining operation in Papua New Guinea, in which CCD is driven by the private sector, a renewable energy procurement program in South Africa in which CCD is driven by the State and a tourist corporation in Fiji in which "individual corporations determine the nature and extent of (…) CCD activities" (McEwan et *al.*, 2017, 4).

goods, equipment, services, and most importantly intangible symbolic values such as prestige systematically go unmentioned. Often, it is not specified whether DI are paid in cash or in kind. Even in cases where sums are specified, the specifics regarding payments to community funds or household budgets are often lacking. The semantic ambiguity regarding DI (see below) makes it impossible to determine the DI's exact nature. Finally, the rare quantified studies are difficult to compare due to the fact that they often stem from different theoretical or methodological approaches. With regards to neoliberal conservation, Holmes and Cavanagh (2016) state that there are often "(…) different frameworks and approaches used to study the impacts of conservation, including cost-benefit analyses, institutional approaches, livelihoods frameworks, and political ecology studies" (Holmes and Cavanagh, 2016, 5).

5.3 Semantic ambiguity relative to DI

The last major issue researchers come up against in evaluating the actual effects of neoliberal development at a local level is the semantic ambiguity surrounding DI.

This issue is more indicative of the development intentions of policy makers than it is of their actual implementation. As demonstrated in the deconstructivist work surrounding development discourse such as that of Della Faille (2015) and Cornwall and Eade (2010), initiated by Sachs (2019, 1988, *Third Edition*), lexicons and discursive strategies reveal insight into political intentions regarding the implementation of development. In the current configuration, terms and lexical strategies used to designate DI bring to our attention the policy-rationality that underlies the main instruments of implementation of the neoliberal development scenario. The term "revenue" is a prime example of this. Using the term "revenue" to designate DI does not imply that it is necessarily actual revenue. On the contrary, it precisely underlines that, in the neoliberal model of development, the funding of aid is no longer *seen as* finding its source in the "donation" or "loan" of sponsors, but rather in a market-based approach, in activities generating revenue in which the target groups are invited to participate as economic operators.

The diversity of terms and lexical strategies used to designate DI from one aid development sector to the next, and even within the same sector, illustrates the lack of precision that is due to the ambiguity characterizing this lexical field. Does "rent" refer to "compensation?" Is it always a matter of the same micro-economic phenomenon? How can we take stock of this question in order to understand this policy's effects in terms of development, and the way in which "target groups" appropriate funds? A reviewof some case studies on these neoliberal financial incentives for local development shows that the projects receiving this type of financial support span all sectors of neoliberal development. However, a closer look reveals that the terms used by the authors to designate this financing and the meaning given to these words vary from one author to another, regardless of the sector, as if dealing with an ambiguous semantic field. What do these diverse terms mean? Are they synonyms? Or, on the contrary, do they have different meanings and, thus, stem from different approaches towards development? Nonetheless, despite their diverse designations, these terms appear to follow along the same lines. They share a common image of the world, in which the market represents the motor of development. Implementing aid to help include the poor in the market economy is seen as the solution to the problems of development, through a body of related neoliberal development measures.

A careful analysis of the description of community forestry projects in Nepal (Iversen et *al*., 2005), of decentralized fiscality programs respectively in Cameroun and in the Democratic Republic of Congo–logging concessions (Cerruti et *al*., 2010) and mining concessions (Mazalto, 2005)–and of conservation concessions (Karsenty, 2004) shows that the same term "rent" is used in five different ways and is given five different meanings: initial capital grant, profit margin, fiscal resource, financial resource received by the populations, and revenue coming from a property. Therefore, the same term has a number of meanings.

The texts analyzed also contain examples of double meanings: the term "rent" denotes i) an "initial capital grant" as well as a "profit margin;" ii) a "fiscal resource" and a "financial resource" received by the populations. The double meaning seems to be able to be used in a diachronic fashion to designate the stages of a process towards integrating the market-based economy, the first meaning designating the first stage and the second meaning designating the second stage. This is the case for the term "rent" as employed by Iversen et *al*. (2005) regarding community forestry in Nepal. The "rent" is 1) what is given by the private sector as initial capital to stimulate profitable and competitive economic activity; and 2) that which must then give rise to a profit margin to benefit the target group. The meaning attributed to the term "rent," therefore, has a descriptive and procedural scope relative to the application stage of the considered neoliberal development model.

The vague vocabulary due to the diversity of the lexicon and lexical strategies designating DI limits the analysis of neoliberal development. Even in cases where sums are specified, the diversity of the authors' lexical processes and strategies makes it impossible to determine the exact nature of the neoliberal or market-based financial incentives for local development in question.

CONCLUSION

The neoliberalization of development cooperation which began in the 1980s occurred progressively, through the joint action of a number of development instruments. The State-private sector-populations triad and the actors in its periphery have established themselves as a new configuration of aid. Because it involves a growing number of actors with diverging interests, the implementation of neoliberal development policies has become extremely complex to analyze. Whether it be neoliberal in practice or not, the claimed objective is to fight poverty by mobilizing “market-based” funding, “inclusive incentives”, meant to foster the self-development of local populations. The shift from the traditional paradigm of bilateral and multilateral development cooperation to the neoliberal cooperation paradigm has thus gone hand in hand with a new form of funding.

The current publication refers to them as “Developmental Incomes” (DI) because the notion covers the range of funds that align with the technicist neoliberal idea of “market-based” funding and “inclusive incentives.” This allows us to encompass the diversity of terms used in the literature, to compare funding modalities, draw their distinctions and characteristics, and overcome the analytical difficulties that arise from the semantic ambiguity surrounding them. As we have seen, it also allows for a cross-sector perspective, a decompartmentalized analysis, since all the sectors of this new development configuration are governed by the same neoliberal principles with regards to the fight against poverty.

Mobilizing this central notion of DI opens up new perspectives both in theoretical terms regarding development and in terms of research practices. Staying in line with the neoliberal conception of “market-based” funding and “inclusive incentives” traps the analyst in the technicist “win-win” vision that the notion relates to. In contrast–and this is what is proposed here–providing the analyst with an analytical notion such as that of DI removes the neoliberal notion from its technicist dimension and places it on an analytical level, relative to its empirical reality. This touches on the research question of whether the tools used to implement neoliberal policy (“market-based” funding, “inclusive incentives”) do in fact meet their objective of promoting local development. In terms of research practices, mobilizing the notion of DI allows for the most elementary research methodology, namely outlining the object and comparing, rather than focusing on seemingly distinct funding on a case by case basis. In this matter, as we have seen, empirical and ethnographic data is still much needed. The crucial question of whether this new form of development policy is effectively able to meet the challenges of the fight against poverty requires documentation by precise field data based on the realities experienced from below by the targeted communities.

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