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# Autocratization as Ethnocratization? How Regime Transformations toward Autocracy Deteriorate Ethnic Relations

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## ABSTRACT

When a country becomes more autocratic, does it affect the relations between ethnic groups in a systematic way? Cross-national and case-based research witnesses how autocratization (the opposite of democratization) is becoming increasingly prevalent, particularly in societies where ethnic relations are politicized and polarized. However, we still lack sufficient knowledge on how autocratization might have an impact on ethnic relations. The paper advances previous autocratization and ethnic studies. It hypothesizes that if a country autocratizes, this further deteriorates its ethnic relations (*ethnocratization*). It substantiates this claim through a mixed-method design. It starts with a longitudinal analysis at the ethnic group-level, to demonstrate how ethnic discrimination and domination are more probable during autocratization episodes. Next, it examines a collection of international reports on the predicament of ethnic majorities and minorities in countries undergoing autocratization episodes, to identify two causal mechanisms as the main incentives and justifications of the incumbent (and autocratizing) elites: *ideological legitimation* and *authoritarian experimentation*. This research encourages scholars on autocratization and ethnic studies to join their efforts, to investigate how democracy and ethnic inclusion can decline in parallel and, thus, to show the reasons why they should advance together.

## Introduction

Today, autocratization (intended here as the general opposite of democratization) is spreading globally in many different forms. This includes the decline of democratic quality in both established and unconsolidated democracies, as well as democratic breakdown or further consolidation of hybrid regimes and autocracies. Most current analyses examine the factors contributing to autocratization, which might stem from economic turmoil, mounting inequalities, societal and political polarization between opposite camps. In most cases, autocratizing governments are led by illiberal or populist parties or leaders, who often seek to gain power through elections and then exploit democratic institutions to restrict democratic safeguards and protections—such as civil rights, accountability or freedom of speech.

The paper asks this research question: when a country autocratizes, does it affect the relations between ethnic (majority and minority) groups in a systematic way? Cross-national and case-based research witnesses how autocratization particularly affects societies whose ethnic relations are politicized and often polarized. However, we still do not

know enough about how autocratization might have an impact on the relations between ethnic groups. This question is significant for several reasons. Above all, contemporary democracy entails more than just mere elections. In fact, among its core tenets, it involves the preservation of minority rights and the protection against the tyranny of the majority. In ethnically divided societies, this can take ethnic forms. In fact, as outlined by numerous research, non-electoral aspects of democratic quality (such as rights and freedom, accountability, and the rule of law) are those more at risk in contemporary autocratization processes. It is thence crucial to focus directly on the condition of ethnic groups—such as the predicament of ethnic minorities, often listed as a test of democratic strength—in times of autocratization. Also, it is essential to examine how ethnic majorities can benefit from the consequences of autocratization.

The paper seeks to enhance academic research on autocratization and on ethnic issues. Typically, the former uses measurements of ethnic relations which risk being imprecise or lack context—such as the ethnic, linguistic or religious fractionalization indexes, formed on very aggregated values at the country level. On the other hand, the florid and consolidated literature on ethnic issues often does not sufficiently consider political regimes under a more dynamic perspective, particularly during autocratization or democratization processes. In the theory section, we describe how this paper advances these previous works, by analyzing the connections between the relations among ethnic groups and autocratization processes. Next, the empirical analysis shall illuminate the hypothesized impact of autocratization on ethnic relations, which we will refer to as *ethnocratization*. Additionally, the paper proposes two possible causal mechanisms, based on the incentives and the justifications of the incumbent (and autocratizing) elites. First, autocratization and the erosion of conditions of ethnic minorities may be linked via the mechanism of *ideological legitimation*. That means, would-be authoritarians or actually autocratizing leaders often need to strengthen their support and appeal to key groups or constituencies. In other words, they might try to convince ethnic majority groups and show them their ethnonationalist rhetoric, in particular in times of systemic crisis or poor regime performance. Second, the discrimination of vulnerable groups such as (but not only) ethnic minorities is often presented as one possible set of democratic defects or flaws, rather than a direct cause of regime transformation toward autocracy. Therefore, even opposition members, resistance or anti-incumbent actors may (more or less directly) accept it, as long as they are not part of these groups. Therefore, an autocratizing government may display its most severe face—by imposing more or less explicit constraints of democratic rights, freedoms or rule of law—for these marginalized groups. These oppressive practices could be potentially extended to the whole political community or other opponents of the establishment (*authoritarian experimentation*).

To support these theoretical claims, the paper uses a two-fold and mixed method design, alternating a large- and small-N approach and various types of data. First, we present the results of a longitudinal study on expert survey data on ethnic groups and political regimes at the ethnic-group-country level. This should demonstrate how the relations between ethnic groups are more likely to deteriorate when a country experiences an autocratization episode. That means, other conditions held constant, if a country's level of democracy declines, ethnic majorities are more likely to dominate while

ethnic minorities are more likely to face discrimination. Second, we thence look at international reports from United Nations (UN) Human Rights Commissions and NGOs on the predicament of ethnic majorities and minorities in countries undergoing autocratization episodes. Across different reports, we focus on those typical cases—nested in the statistical models of the quantitative analysis—of an actual change in ethnic relations during autocratization episodes, to look for the evidence of the hypothesized causal mechanisms.

The conclusion summarizes the findings and proposes some further research opportunities. It indicates that the ethnocratization of the political regime may constitute a favorable condition for a tightening of the autocratization episode. It means, if ethnic relations also deteriorate during an autocratization episode, that might increase the likelihood of ending it with a regime change (instead of restoring the original level of democracy). Finally, the paper urges scholars on ethnic studies and autocratization to bridge their efforts, to investigate how democracy and ethnic inclusion can decline in parallel and, thus, to show the reasons why they should advance together.

### **Bridging autocratization and ethnic studies**

After several years of worldwide democratic growth since the 1990s, autocratization is today acknowledged as the most prevalent type of regime development across various scenarios.<sup>1</sup> To clarify, autocratization—which is the opposite of democratization or liberalization—will be here defined as *any decay of democratic quality* not necessarily overlapping with regime change.<sup>2</sup> Even though it is unclear whether current autocratization processes should be considered as another wave of regime transitions toward autocracy—in the same vein of the waves of autocratization in the inter-war period (when the fascist and communist dictatorships emerged) or between the 1960s and 1970s (with the spread of military autocracies)<sup>3</sup> and overall levels of democracy remain close to their maximum average)<sup>4</sup>—we can observe a variety of resurgences of anti-democratic tendencies across different regions of the world and political regimes. This can involve multiple phenomena: from autocracies becoming increasingly repressive to democracies eroding in some aspects of their regime quality, such as accountability, liberal and civil rights, even in consolidated regimes.<sup>5</sup> In the examinations on the causes of autocratization, scholars have analyzed the structural preconditions (such as economic crisis or inequalities) as well as the main actors (such as antidemocratic parties) who drive these processes.<sup>6</sup> Other contributions have also evaluated the prospects of those actors trying to resist autocratization when it is unfolding or other conditions of democratic resistance or resilience.<sup>7</sup> Nonetheless, the literature is still relatively undeveloped when it comes to the *consequences* of autocratization processes, such as its specific effects on ethnic relations, more in detail regarding ethnic majorities and minorities.

Following the seminal literature on ethnic politics, the paper adopts the widely accepted definition of ethnicity as the *social organization of cultural differences*<sup>8</sup> and of ethnic groups as those (groups of) actors manifesting these differences in the political space (usually, but not only, through political parties or leaderships).<sup>9</sup> However, differently from what some suggest,<sup>10</sup> ethnicity and its boundaries are not static.<sup>11</sup> Contrariwise, various factors can create and alter the ethnic cleavage, its identity

marker(s) and group boundaries, and ultimately modify the relations between ethnic groups. Among them, existing literature has underlined: political institutions which mandate the inclusion of ethnic parties or elites in the central or local government,<sup>12</sup> political movements or parties and their electoral offer politicizing identity-related issues,<sup>13</sup> government's policies favoring ethnic-based mobilization,<sup>14</sup> turbulent state formation processes,<sup>15</sup> inter-ethnic conflict and endemic violence,<sup>16</sup> or the relative economic conditions and grievances between ethnic groups.<sup>17</sup> In brief, how ethnic (majority and minority) groups interact can (and, in some cases, should) be considered not only as the *cause* by also as the *outcome* of a political process.<sup>18</sup> For doing so in a comparative fashion, we need appropriate, context-sensitive data (for example, registering also within-case variation), which are increasingly available today,<sup>19</sup> as we will describe afterwards.

Admittedly, most of the literature in ethnic politics studies political regimes under a quite static perspective, such as the contributions on power-sharing or consociational institutions. In fact, evidence suggests that political regimes featuring ethnic power-sharing institutions are associated with higher possibilities of democratic survival and better performances in various aspects of democratic quality.<sup>20</sup> More rarely, other scholars working on ethnic politics consider political regimes under a *dynamic* approach, meaning when political regimes radically change (that is, democratic breakdown) or more subtly transform (that is, autocratizing in their quality without changing their regime category). However, in this area of the literature, there is a stronger emphasis on democratization. In fact, some authors claim that democratizing regimes are more vulnerable to ethnic conflicts, ethnic cleansing and wars,<sup>21</sup> even though these findings have been contested and seem to be applicable mainly to turnouts or liberalization in autocratic regimes, rather than democratization *per se*.<sup>22</sup> Recently, however, scholars have found how being in a regime transition (including democratization *and also* autocratization in their framework) can encourage ethnic mobilization.<sup>23</sup> Yet, it remains relatively uncharted whether processes of autocratization might lead to changes in the relations between ethnic majorities and minorities. Therefore, it is necessary to bridge autocratization and ethnic studies a bit more coherently, on the one hand to look at the consequences of autocratization for ethnic issues, and on the other to consider the effect of mutating political regimes on the relations between ethnic majorities and minorities.

### **Autocratization as ethnocratization**

The aim of the paper is to test the empirical validity of the expectation that, in some countries, autocratization can work as an *ethnocratization* of the political regime. This claim is inspired by the debate in the (mostly single case-based) literature on the categories of ethnocratic regime or hegemonic state<sup>24</sup> and the current applications of the concept of ethnic democracy—originally developed for the State of Israel<sup>25</sup>—to contemporary India.<sup>26</sup> In fact, previous literature has defined ethnic democracy as a political regime which—despite maintaining a democratic (read electoral) *façade*—it significantly discriminates ethnic groups which are deemed “not-titular” or “not holders” of the state,<sup>27</sup> such as its ethnic minorities, the “indigenous” population in some contexts, the “not-indigenous” one in others. This definition almost overlaps with the category of

ethnocracy, except for the fact that the electoral dimension is either non-existent or ineffective.<sup>28</sup> More recent works have already re-framed these (symmetrical) concepts, their theoretical strengths and weaknesses and possibility of application.<sup>29</sup> However, these contributions still do not sufficiently examine the evolution of the political regime.

In turn, the paper aims to advance a more specific type or mode of autocratization,<sup>30</sup> which will be called as *ethnocratization*: which means, when countries start autocratizing, or seeing reduced their degree of democratic quality, the relations between ethnic majorities and minorities will in turn decay: *democracies will resemble more and more ethnic-democratic regimes or, if democracy collapses, elections are no longer effective or the regime is already authoritarian, ethnocracies*. In other words, when democracy levels are declining, this process can further encourage the domination of majority groups and exacerbate the discrimination of minorities. Moreover, the paper advances two possible (and not mutually exclusive nor exhausting) causal mechanisms, based on the incentives of the (autocratizing) incumbent elites as well as their motivations for the ethnocratization of the political regime.<sup>31</sup> When autocratization occurs in ethnically divided societies, in fact, autocratizing elites might be determined to justify their actions on ethnic issues and thence encourage a change in ethnic relations.

Developing on how autocratizing elites might legitimize their actions, we propose two causal mechanisms that can explain the reasons why the aggravation of ethnic relations might occur as a result of autocratization. First, leaders attempting to establish a more autocratic regime (such as anti-pluralist parties at the head of the government)<sup>32</sup> might often require ideological legitimation from their core supporters and a large support base. In this regard, ethnic majority groups—which can be mobilized on cultural issues rather than on socioeconomic cleavages—might constitute a valid and relatively stable support group in the electorate. Would-be authoritarian leaders or actually autocratizing actors can then discriminate ethnic minorities, by depicting them as internal enemies, in order to show their majoritarian or exclusivist nationalism to their constituencies.<sup>33</sup> This might be a relevant source of regime *ideological legitimation*—easier to implement than repression or co-optation in autocratic regimes,<sup>34</sup> and available also in democratic regimes—especially during times of uncertainty, systemic crisis or poor government performances. In short, incumbent elites in autocratizing democracies or autocracies might seek the legitimation from ethnic majority groups to solidify their influence and control over the state. Accordingly, they are incentivized to present ethnic minorities as “others” or scapegoats and thus worsen their conditions.

Secondly, even though there is evidence that the discrimination against vulnerable groups (including ethnic minorities but also the poor, migrants, women, and LGBTQ+ individuals) may be connected to hyper-majoritarian, conservative and ultimately elitist conceptions of democracy, would-be autocrats can discriminate minority groups as also a means for *authoritarian experimentation*. In fact, the discrimination of such vulnerable groups may be often presented as one of the possible “defects” or flaws of democratic regimes rather than a factor that could lead to a more or less direct regime transformation toward autocracy. For this reason, even democratic or opposition actors which should resist attempts of autocratization by the incumbent can find more easily acceptable such type of ethnic discrimination, as long as they are not part of the

targeted groups. Or even if some of them are, the opposition against the autocratizer might be divided between people belonging to minority groups and others who do not. Accordingly, an autocratizing government can see an opportunity window to test its most oppressive practices on these groups—for instance, by imposing more or less direct constraints of democratic rights, freedoms or the rule of law—in order to eventually extend them to the entire political community, as a potential tool for suppressing dissidents from all parts.<sup>35</sup>

## How autocratization deteriorates ethnic relations

### Research design

We structure our analysis following a nested and mixed-method design,<sup>36</sup> with quantitative and qualitative data interacted sequentially. Initially, we use observational data from expert surveys to estimate the impact of autocratization episodes on the deterioration of ethnic relations. Autocratization episodes are operationalized as time spells or intervals where there are significant and durable drops in the level of electoral democracy with data from the Episodes of Regime Transformations (ERT) embedded in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project.<sup>37</sup> We also rely on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR)<sup>38</sup> database to get information on ethnic groups and their informal status toward political power. Given our sources, there should be neither circularity bias in having the explanatory variable and outcome measuring similar concepts, nor of indicators coming from the same datasets, nor bias in expert evaluations based on ideology or societal desirability.<sup>39</sup>

Second, we complement the analysis with a qualitative explanation of typical cases of shifts toward more discrimination of ethnic minorities or domination of ethnic majorities in different political regimes. In doing so, we use a corpus of reports by international organizations focusing on countries which are ethnically divided and experiencing autocratization, from which we select those cases which are most representative of the statistical models and most frequently mentioned across these reports. This articulation of quantitative and qualitative data is necessary to test not only *whether* there is systematic evidence for the type of autocratization as ethnocratization, but also to investigate *why* (that is, under which causal mechanisms) autocratization deteriorates ethnic relations in these specific cases.

### Large-N evidence

We shall here assess whether, during or slightly after episodes of autocratization, majority groups are more likely to face more ethnic domination and minorities to suffer more discrimination. We operationalize these concepts as variation or shifts in the ethnic group's political status category, coded by the EPR. In the ethnic-group-level dataset, the original variable (*status-pwrrank*) ranks the status of each ethnic group into categories based on its relative condition in comparison to other groups in the same country: “monopoly,” “dominant,” “senior” or “junior partner,” “discriminated,” or “powerless.”<sup>40</sup> We calculated two dummy variables from this indicator, to analyze two types of outcomes separately. We define *domination status upturn* as *any* change in the condition

of ethnic groups (usually majorities) toward what we consider as a manifestation of increased domination (54 observations in the dataset). This is made up of three dummy variables measuring more specific shifts: “from senior partner to dominant” (41 observations), “from dominant to monopoly” (6 observations) or, finally, “from senior partner to monopoly” (7 observations). Similarly, we have re-coded as *discrimination status upturn* those yearly observations when ethnic groups (usually minorities) experience any variation of their status which we interpreted as an increase in their ethnic discrimination (227 observations). In detail, this variable scores 1 if a group mutates its status “from junior partner to powerless” (125 observations), “from powerless to discriminated” (83 observations) or “from junior partner to discriminated” (19 observations). Note that, while our analysis privileges ethnic groups’ power status over their demographics, considering groups as belonging to the categories of discriminated, powerless or junior partner (i) and those of senior partner, dominant or monopoly (ii) substantially overlaps with identifying them as ethnic minorities and majorities, respectively. As summarized by [Appendix Figure A1](#), the average size of groups which are either discriminated, powerless or junior partner is 9% of the population (3% the median), while the average size of groups which are either senior partner, dominant or monopoly is 59% (60% the median).

Having defined the outcome(s), the main explanatory variable for the occurrence of these shifts is another dummy variable that accounts for presence (1, 0 otherwise) of an autocratization episode in the country where its ethnic groups live, operationalized following the ERT approach. The ERT calibrates country-year episodes of significant and durable variation in a country’s level of democracy.<sup>41</sup> Levels of democracy are measured with the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index (EDI), which indicates to what extent the electoral principle of democracy (or polyarchy) is fulfilled in a given country. In detail, the ERT gauges autocratization episodes as those yearly events coded when there is an initial decrease of  $-0.01$  of the V-Dem EDI or polyarchy index (0–1, as the maximum level of democracy) and total decrease of at least  $-0.10$  throughout the whole episode, ending in the last year of negative change, which should be less than or equal to the initial decrease. Multiplying the country-level observations of the ERT for the number of ethnic groups living in a given country, the ERT used in this paper counts around 4,298 observations of ethnic groups living in countries under autocratization episodes (and 37,228 in democratizing or stable regimes) in the largest version of the dataset.<sup>42</sup>

[Appendix Figures A2](#) and [A3](#) show descriptive evidence of the possible connections between the original ethnic group status variable, political regime types (applying the fourfold categorization of political regimes of the V-Dem Regimes of the World, RoW),<sup>43</sup> and autocratization episodes. There seems to be no evidence for a cross-national association between the distribution of ethnic group power status and whether a regime is undergoing autocratization or its political regime ([Appendix Figure 2](#)). In fact, even though the absolute number of groups which the EPR considers as powerless is increasing recently, together with the number of countries which the ERT codes as under autocratization episodes, the trends for the absolute numbers of discriminated, junior partner, senior partner, dominant or monopoly groups do not present consistent upwards/downwards in the last decades ([Appendix Figure 3](#)). This implies that ethnic relations remain sticky, within political regimes and throughout time.<sup>44</sup> However, even



though it remains a rare phenomenon, the descriptive analysis cannot tell us about whether there might be a *time-related association* between being under an autocratization episodes and a decay of ethnic relations (such as a change in group's status).

Therefore, in what follows, we illustrate the findings from logistic regression models. The unit of analysis is ethnic-group-country-year (885 ethnic groups in 179 countries) and the models include data since the Second World War (1946) to the last year of measurement of the outcome (2020). The case selection of our units (ethnic groups nested in countries and years) is as large as possible, based on data availability. In addition to the outcomes (ethnic domination/discrimination shifts and specific types thereof) and the main independent variable (whether the country undergoes an autocratization episode), the models present numerous ethnic- and country-level controls. First, we account for the size and the geographical dispersion (1 if concentrated) of ethnic groups as well as whether they are in conflict (1 if they are) and their conflict history (number of previous conflicts; from the EPR) as significant factors that can confound the relationship between ethnic relations and autocratization: for instance, we expect that a status change during an autocratization episode for a dominant group is more likely if the group is territorially compact (and can more easily predate state institutions)<sup>45</sup> and for a discriminated group when the latter is dispersed and less capable to defend itself. Other covariates involve country-specific conditions. First, we include the number of politically relevant ethnic groups in the country (EPR), assuming that the more ethnic groups live in a specific country, the more salient the ethnic cleavage should be. Second, we add the country's level of democracy (EDI), to control whether the relationship can be observed more systematically in democracies or non-democracies. Next, we control for several institutional setups considered as relevant correlates of both autocratization and ethnic relations. This includes whether the country has inclusive institutions in the territory (V-Dem Division of Power Index), at the government (V-Dem Divided Party Control Index, measuring the extent to which executive and legislature are controlled by the same party) and two indicators to account for presidentialism (V-Dem). Additionally, we add other controls for contextual differences: GDP per capita, income from natural resources and overall population (logged, all from the V-Dem).

Only for the controls, missing values have been estimated through linear interpolation. The descriptive statistics of these variable are reported by [Appendix Table A1](#). In the models, all independent variables are one-year lagged ( $t - 1$ ) to address reverse causality. To account for panel auto-correlation, the standard errors are clustered at the country level and time polynomials are included to correct for time dependency.<sup>46</sup>

The models reported by [Table 1](#) are divided in two parallel analyses: Models 1–1.3 for ethnic domination upturns and their specific types, and Models 2–2.3 for ethnic discrimination upturns and their categories.<sup>47</sup> Overall, the results support our expectations. If its country becomes more autocratic, an ethnic majority group has higher chances to experience increased ethnic domination (Model 1). The relation is constant for each specific type, in particular for groups shifting “from senior partner to dominant” (Model 1.1) and “from senior partner to monopoly” (Model 1.3). For Model 1.2, when the outcomes are shifts “from senior partner to monopoly,” the relationship is insignificant but keeps the expected direction. If we exponentiate the log odds to compute the

**Table 1.** Ethnic domination/discrimination shifts and autocratization episodes.

	(1) Ethnic domination upturn	(1.1) From senior partner to dominant	(1.2) From dominant to monopoly	(1.3) From senior partner to monopoly	(2) Ethnic discrimination upturn	(2.1) From junior partner to powerless	(2.2) From powerless to discriminated	(2.3) From junior partner to discriminated
Autocratization episode ( $t$ , $t-1$ )	1.636*** (0.322)	1.602*** (0.368)	0.331 (1.770)	2.213+ (1.219)	0.918*** (0.219)	1.087*** (0.327)	0.749 (0.540)	1.727* (0.818)
<i>Group-level controls</i>								
Ethnic group size ( $t-1$ )	-0.331 (0.533)	1.519+ (0.834)	3.570 (3.224)	3.747 (3.556)	1.061** (0.384)	0.197 (0.709)	-0.274 (0.866)	-5.757* (2.293)
Geo-concentrated group ( $t$ , $t-1$ )	-0.382 (0.367)	-1.189* (0.488)	-2.575+ (1.422)	-2.754 (1.081)	-0.279 (0.240)	-0.263 (0.315)	0.543 (0.876)	-0.550 (0.585)
Group in ongoing conflict ( $t$ , $t-1$ )	-11.711*** (0.804)	-12.974*** (0.809)	-13.378*** (2.133)	-12.294 (1.932)	0.076 (0.430)	-0.078 (0.628)	0.792 (0.838)	2.838* (1.205)
Conflict history ( $t-1$ )	-1.131 (0.938)	-1.513+ (0.843)	-12.758*** (1.498)	-14.171 (1.200)	-0.234 (0.166)	-0.030 (0.202)	-0.219 (0.414)	-0.567 (0.960)
<i>Country-level controls</i>								
Relevant ethnic groups ( $t-1$ )	0.005 (0.034)	-0.005 (0.054)	-0.226 (0.618)	-0.525 (0.410)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.139+ (0.079)	-0.035 (0.039)	-0.241 (0.173)
Electoral Democracy Index ( $t-1$ )	0.705 (0.730)	-0.808 (0.948)	-1.146 (4.049)	-4.600 (4.181)	0.850 (0.777)	-0.273 (0.858)	-0.515 (1.497)	-2.370 (1.963)
Division of Power Index ( $t-1$ )	-0.229 (0.614)	0.028 (0.825)	-1.206 (3.581)	4.436 (3.738)	-0.504 (0.493)	0.080 (0.663)	-0.468 (0.762)	-0.098 (1.764)
Divided Party Control Index ( $t-1$ )	-0.018 (0.162)	0.195 (0.188)	-0.217 (0.529)	-0.720 (0.664)	-0.017 (0.104)	0.146 (0.121)	-0.099 (0.203)	-0.018 (0.217)
Unitary chief executive ( $t$ , $t-1$ )	-0.550 (0.337)	0.006 (0.444)	0.423 (1.262)	-0.584 (1.035)	-0.650** (0.245)	-0.635* (0.321)	-0.926* (0.451)	0.030 (0.796)
Elected chief executive ( $t-1$ )	-0.028 (0.071)	-0.030 (0.096)	0.133 (0.256)	-0.109 (0.269)	-0.173** (0.053)	-0.140* (0.067)	-0.196* (0.099)	0.059 (0.174)
GDP per capita ( $\log$ , $t-1$ )	-0.855* (0.428)	-1.072* (0.472)	0.963 (2.426)	-1.456 (1.622)	-1.515*** (0.452)	-0.953* (0.480)	-0.973 (0.856)	-3.914* (1.862)
Income from natural resources ( $\log$ , $t-1$ )	0.246+ (0.131)	0.351* (0.167)	0.739 (0.452)	0.386 (0.305)	0.098 (0.127)	0.138 (0.115)	0.056 (0.343)	0.061 (0.533)
Population ( $\log$ , $t-1$ )	-0.326 (0.287)	-0.218 (0.305)	-0.047 (1.655)	-0.424 (0.882)	0.109 (0.204)	0.276 (0.385)	0.720* (0.311)	1.011 (0.669)
N	8,655	3,854	2,637	3,820	31,631	7,697	17,572	7,591
Year/year polynomials	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE Clustered	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country
AIC	628.522	432.784	104.791	98.261	2,443.968	1,175.529	910.440	224.966
BIC	755.708	545.407	210.584	210.765	2,594.482	1,300.604	1,050.373	349.791
Log Likelihood	-296.261	-198.392	-34.396	-31.131	-1,203.984	-569.764	-437.220	-94.483

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Logistic models: log odds are shown.

odds ratios of our main explanatory variable—autocratization episode—we get a better sense of the magnitude of this association. For ethnic groups living in autocratizing countries, their odds of shifting their status in the direction of more domination is 5.13 times higher than for those living in stable/democratizing regimes (Model 1). Some control variables (more specifically group concentration, being in an ongoing conflict, and country GDP per capita) reach statistical significance across some models, though without a similar pattern compared to the main explanatory variable. In short, ethnic groups (usually, majorities) seem to become more dominant in countries under autocratization episodes.

The models also show that, when countries autocratize, ethnic minorities become more discriminated on average. In Model 2, when considering as outcome any possible shift toward more ethnic discrimination of ethnic minorities, the log odds of the variable on the presence of an autocratization episode is significant and with the expected direction. Some coefficients of the controls—such as ethnic group size and some country-level institutional variables—reach statistical significance, without a similar pattern of the main independent variable. The same holds true for the rest of the models and more specific types of ethnic discrimination, such as shifts “from junior partner to powerless” (Model 2.1) and “from junior partner to discriminated” (Model 2.3). In the model explaining the change “from powerless to discriminated” (2.2), the relationship is not precisely estimated ( $p$ -value = 0.16) but still in the expected direction. By exponentiating these coefficients, we can see how ethnic minorities shift their status toward more discrimination around 2.5 times more if their country is under episodes of autocratization (Model 1). In short, we have evidence that ethnic groups (in this case, often minorities) can suffer of more discrimination once their country autocratizes.

Appendix B reports some replications. Table B1 redoes the models on ethnic domination/discrimination upturns without the controls and then adds year dummies (instead of polynomials) as well as country dummies. Table B2 presents the same models as Table 1 adding Firth’s reduction bias for rare event data, as our dependent variables often take the value of 1 in less than 1% of the observations. As an alternative approach, Table B3 presents linear probability models, with three-way fixed-effect estimators for ethnic group, country and time. This method—albeit disregarding that the outcome is binary—permits to control for other unobserved factors at group, country and time levels, not included in the previous models. Also, it can look more directly at the evolution of ethnic groups throughout time. The results are consistent across different specifications, especially for the models on ethnic domination upturns and ethnic discrimination upturns in their general setups.<sup>48</sup> We can conclude that, mainly for majority groups, autocratization constitutes a window of opportunity to further consolidate their hegemonic or monopoly position and that, in parallel, ethnic minorities face higher risks of discrimination when their country is autocratizing. But how does that occur? And in which cases specifically? In Appendix C we reported the cases explained by the models, such as those cases of ethnic discrimination (Table C1) and domination (Table C2) after/during autocratization episodes ( $t - 1$ ), while Table C3 instead lists all the countries under autocratization episodes coded by the ERT with and without deterioration of ethnic relations, to see the complete universe of cases of autocratization considered in the dataset.

### **Case-based evidence from official reports**

The next part of our study illustrates the results of a qualitative document analysis<sup>49</sup> on reports by international organizations and NGOs, which tackle the predicament of ethnic groups in autocratizing countries. Following the nested framework, we look at those typical cases of shifts in ethnic relations during autocratization episodes, to find evidence of the proposed causal mechanisms. Even though we have some academic contributions on single cases where autocratization produced an aggravation of minority rights,<sup>50</sup> reports from international organizations remain essential sources of information for comparative analysis, especially if scholarly research is not yet systematic. Therefore, the analysis relies on documents by (1) the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHR) Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; (2) the UNHR Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism; (3) the UNHR Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief; (4) the UNHR Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues; and finally (5) the reports by Minority Rights Group International.

In this collection of documents, we focus on those containing information of ethnic groups living in countries under autocratization episodes in the recent years. We have narrowed our focus to those cases which were autocratizing since 2000, regardless of the episode's initial start date. To remain flexible with the ERT definition, we also look at these documents if they mention a country shortly before (after) the start (end) of its autocratization episode. Across the list documents (reported in the [Appendix D](#)), we found mentions of some deterioration of ethnic relations for almost all autocratizing countries. Nevertheless, we will concentrate here on those most frequently mentioned cases where a shift in the EPR status has been coded. When discussing specific cases of deterioration of ethnic relations during autocratization episodes, we will focus on democracies. For the sake of completeness, we also report some evidence from ethno-cratization in autocracies. In both cases, the qualitative evidence is descriptive and should be intended as a corroboration of the previous quantitative analysis: thus, the *starting point* of more complete examinations on these cases under this specific perspective. In fact, instead of relying on a structured and detailed comparison of a few cases, this section privileges the breadth and the description in its approach. More in-depth studies shall (dis)confirm our claims.

We have cases of *liberal democracies* which have encountered a deterioration in ethnic relations, when their democracy level drops. During its autocratization episode (2016-ongoing), the EPR reported that, in the **US**, African Americans (2018), Latinos (2018) and Asian Americans (2015) have experienced a status downgrade from “junior partner” to “powerless” (Model 2.1, [Table 1](#)). Conversely, Whites underwent an upgrade (2018) from “senior partner” to “dominant” (Model 1.1), while American Indians and Arab Americans remained in the “powerless” category. The analyzed documents, similarly, express concern over the worsening conditions of all minority groups in the US, during Donald Trump's presidency (2016–2020). Although American democracy did not collapse, Trump's initial refusal to accept the election results and the Capitol attacks in early 2021 made the decline of democratic quality in the US evident to all observers. In fact, international documentations abound of references to the US under Trump administration and the declining conditions of ethnic groups. Some reports raise concerns about the poor living and working conditions of Indians, who are often victims of

the extractive industry and suffer from higher levels of tuberculosis and, for women, sexual harassment.<sup>51</sup> Others report rising intensities of anti-Semitism as well as anti-Arab or anti-Muslim sentiments.<sup>52</sup> Finally, Minority Rights Group International warns that ethnic minorities in the US have higher poverty rates and are more likely to be exposed to unsafe air and environment, especially in recent times.<sup>53</sup> Also, several reports indicate that state services and resources are provided three times more to white communities on average than to the rest of the population.<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, as Former President Trump readies himself and his supporters for another candidacy, the reports from the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues provides proofs of a rise in far-right propaganda, indirectly supported by the Republican Party, aimed against ethnic minorities.<sup>55</sup> When it comes to the hypothesized causal mechanisms, this evidence from the reports suggests that the US can be an example of ideological legitimation, as mainstream political actors use rhetoric against minorities to justify their actions of democratic backsliding. More moderately, the US can also be a case for studying authoritarian experimentation more in depth, if we consider those attempts by Republican governors to restrict voting rights for ethnic minorities in Southern states—even though the analyzed reports have largely ignored this aspect.

Even *electoral democracies* present a similar association between the autocratization and the ethnocratization of the political regime. During Jair Bolsonaro's presidency (2019–2022), this trend was notable in **Brazil**, which stands out as relevant and populous autocratizing country (2016-ongoing according to the ERT), scoring a change in the EPR for the white population of its status from “dominant” to “monopoly” in 2019 (cf. Model 1.2, Table 1). Although without (at least until the last measurement of the EPR in 2020) a change in the status variables for its minorities, the consulted documents report a worrisome deterioration of the rights of Afrobrazilians, mixed and the indigenous population, after significant improvements under the two Lula's presidencies (2003–2011) and those (violently interrupted) of Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016). Bolsonaro's aggressive nationalist and populist rhetoric targeted Brazil's most vulnerable minorities, such as its indigenous population. In fact, as the reports have traced, after the implementation of public policies favoring indigenous consultation over land and forest administration,<sup>56</sup> Brazil has turned into a highly perilous place for activists advocating human rights and fighting for climate protection, often from an indigenous background.<sup>57</sup> For the Afrobrazilian population, also, the international documents witnesses a concerning setback,<sup>58</sup> consisting in surging discrimination and further deprivation in particular among lower social classes.<sup>59</sup> As autocratization has progressed at a faster pace in this case, we can see evidence of both mechanisms in the violent rhetoric of former president Bolsonaro (ideological legitimation) and his efforts to strip indigenous communities in the country of their land rights (authoritarian experimentation). It is to be monitored whether the country would interrupt its autocratization and ethnocratization path under the new Lula's presidency (2023–).

Another very often mentioned cases across the documents is **India**. The ERT reports the most populous democracy in the globe as autocratizing since 2000, even though most observers concentrate on Prime Minister Narendra Modi's tenure (2014–). India is also exemplification of an EPR status change for the minorities of Kashmiri Muslims and other Muslims from “powerless” to “discriminated” in 2020 (cf. Model 2.2,

Table 1). In fact, the policies enforced by the Modi government have received unanimous criticism for endangering accountability, the rule of law, and electoral integrity. The consulted reports also focus on the increasingly alarming conditions faced by Indian minorities. Some mentions the repression policies against the indigenous Adivasi minorities, protesting against illegal logging and mining in their lands.<sup>60</sup> Similarly, during the Modi's governments, episodes of racist violence and discrimination against the Dalit group or so-called untouchables—particularly affecting women and illiterates—have increased.<sup>61</sup> Also, the Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has frequently targeted the Muslim minority, especially after having removed the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019 and approving the Citizenship Amendment Act in the same year. The Act made it easier for Hindus from neighboring countries to become citizens, while it *de facto* discriminated against Muslim minorities with an immigrant background.<sup>62</sup> In fact, according to the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Indian Muslims (between one-sixth and one-seventh of India's overall population) are perceived by the Hindu majority more likely to commit crimes and, thus, they are more likely to be victims of hate speech and violence, particularly against Muslim women.<sup>63</sup> India stands out as a prominent case of both ideological legitimization in the violent rhetoric of its Prime Minister and authoritarian experimentation in the increased unevenness of democratic quality across its country. This majoritarian nationalism is in fact dismantling the most populous democracy in the world, according to analysts.<sup>64</sup>

India is not the only case of autocratization in South Asia. The ERT also classifies **Indonesia** autocratizing since 2009. Although the decline in democratic quality (EDI from 0.68 in 2009 to 0.57 in 2022) has been more subtle in this case, previous contributions has already noted the government's amplified control over democratic institutions and its strict suppression of radical Islamist groups, in particular during Joko Widodo's presidency.<sup>65</sup> Additionally, the EPR codes the Bataks, Chinese and Malay groups as shifting from "junior partner" to "powerless" in 2015 (Model 2.1, Table 1). The sources consulted have also reported an increasing persecution against such groups, whose areas are also more frequently affected by internet shutdowns.<sup>66</sup> Minority Rights Group International also mentions that certain groups, including the Acehnese, Chinese, Dayaks, Madurese, Papuans, and religious minorities, face significant risks particularly due to the extensive deforestation resulting from intensive palm-oil cultivation and the development of new hydropower dams on indigenous land.<sup>67</sup> Similar trends have been seen in other cases of autocratization in South Asia, such as Pakistan, Nepal, Thailand and especially **Sri Lanka**. In this case, in 2006 the EPR reported the Indian Tamils and Moors (Muslims) shifting from "junior partner" to "powerless" (Model 2.1, Table 1), the Sri Lankan Tamils from "powerless" to "discriminated" (2.2), and the Sinhalese majority from "senior partner" to "dominant" (1.1), in the years of the autocratization episode and the last conflict between the state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Following this, the documents concentrate on the premiership of Gotabaya Rajapaksa (2019–2022), characterized by the exploitation of the COVID-19 crisis to increase government repression over citizens; at the same time, episodes of violence against minorities indirectly supported by police officers occurred.<sup>68</sup> The UNHR Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues reports also show the dangerous effect of the persistent

caste system, such as on minority discrimination and hate speech.<sup>69</sup> It is unclear how the situation will evolve following the regime crisis in 2022. Similar to the Indian case, anyway, these other examples from South Asia demonstrate how the proposed mechanisms of ideological legitimation and authoritarian experimentation can travel well to explain how the nationalist rhetoric of the incumbent and the repression and discrimination against minorities across the territory are among the most important consequences of autocratization processes.

Autocratization episodes might deteriorate ethnic relations not only in democratic regimes, but also across *electoral autocracies*. The **Russian Federation** represents a pivotal case of a worldwide importance. According to the ERT, the autocratization took place between 1993 and 2005, from the last part of Boris Yeltsin's presidency and the rise and consolidation of Vladimir Putin's rule. Together with a restriction of independent media, opposition channels, and the strong control over state apparatus and the economy by the security sectors, the autocratization in Russia has also had important repercussions on the conditions of its ethnic groups. According to the EPR, while the Russian majority keeps its dominant status, the groups of Mari and Georgians shifted respectively in 2002 and 2006 from "powerless" to "discriminated" (Model 2.2, Table 1). Yet, the deterioration of ethnic relations affects other groups as well. Reports indicate that the industry of extracting gas, oil, coal, heavy metals, and chemicals have harmful effects on the lands where indigenous minorities live, from Siberia to the Scandinavian Peninsula.<sup>70</sup> NGO also cautions against the increasing hate crimes against different ethnic groups, some of them involved in civil wars against the center, such as the Chechens, Ingush and others in North Caucasus, and they also report on the deteriorating conditions of Roma, Jews, Central Asians, and migrants from a non-ethnic-Russian background.<sup>71</sup> Finally, these documents provide massive evidence of governmental leaders increasingly supporting anti-Semitic and far right groups, both during and after the autocratization phase.<sup>72</sup> Recently, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated this situation, as rumors of forced recruitment of people belonging to minority groups have been confirmed by investigative journalists.<sup>73</sup> Therefore, the case of Russia should be better investigated as example of nationalist and authoritarian legitimation of the autocratizing elites as well as the experimentation of techniques of harder repression in specific policy areas against ethnic minorities.

Another frequently mentioned case of autocratization in an electoral authoritarian regime in the analyzed documents is **Cambodia**, which is autocratizing since 2013 until the last measurement, as indicated by the ERT. In Cambodia multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy collapsed during the 2013, 2018 and 2023 elections as a result of Prime Minister Hun Sen's attempts to rig elections and suppress the opposition. While autocratization is ongoing, the EPR coded the Chinese minority shifting from "junior partner" to "powerless" (cf. Model 2.1, Table 1) and the Khmer majority from "senior partner" to "dominant" in 2020 (Model 1.1), with other ethnic minorities stably remaining either powerless or discriminated. The documents we have analyzed corroborate these experts' assessments, by also retracing the tormented story of these minorities in the autocratic regime controlled by the Khmer majority.<sup>74</sup> In a similar vein, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples caution against unlawful seizure of forest lands, rising under the Hun Sen era.<sup>75</sup> The autocratization under Prime

Minister Hun Sen can be seen as a case of ideological legitimization, as the government has been promoting nationalist rhetoric against the Vietnamese community, accused them of being a foreign fifth column of the Vietnamese government. Also, although the authoritarian practices against its minorities are not comparable to the genocide in the second half of the 1970s, there are still grounds to study this case as an example of authoritarian experimentation, as the persecution against minority groups was pivotal to then increase the repression against the opposition forces.

## Conclusion

This paper has advanced previous research in autocratization and ethnic studies. Implementing a mixed-method approach—combining a quantitative examination at the ethnic-group level and a qualitative examination on some cases with materials from international reports—this study has given empirical evidence to the expectation that autocratization has a detrimental impact on ethnic relations. In detail, for majority ethnic groups, autocratization enhances the chances of being more dominant; while for minority groups, it translates into more discrimination on average. Additionally, autocratization might cause a breakdown in collaborative inter-ethnic decision-making or power-sharing for both majority and minority groups. The analysis on specific cases of changes in ethnic relations following autocratization—while brief and descriptive—has also shed light on two possible causal mechanisms, centered on the main motivations or incentives by the incumbent elites. In fact, an autocratizing government might seek the support of large constituencies, such as majority groups, for justifying its actions. Similarly, it might try to experiment its most repressive tools against already vulnerable communities, such as ethnic minorities. In both cases, when autocratization unfolds, it is likely that we will observe a deterioration of ethnic relations.

Even though we have investigated these issues with some qualitative evidence from the cases of US, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Russia and Cambodia, further analysis is required to match the overall patterns with specific experiences. In fact, more research is necessary at both within- and across-case levels to validate these findings, especially on the examination of specific causal mechanisms in cases from different political regimes, using structured comparisons or process-tracing. Moreover, another research question remains unexplored. In the paper, we have defined autocratization as a decline in democratic quality, which does not correspond necessarily with regime change. Therefore, autocratization episodes might be open-ended, and have a variety of different outcomes. However, if they also entail a deterioration of ethnic relations, could there be a feedback or loop effect between the autocratization and the ethnocratization of the regime? In other words, can the decay of ethnic relations during an autocratization episode explain the termination of the episode itself with a regime change, such as democratic breakdown? This and other suggestions remain for further research.



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31. In fact, autocratization processes are rarely unjustified. Specifically for post-colonial contexts and the Global South, scholars have already investigated how a centralization of power in the hands of the incumbent has been justified as conducive to development and in the name of the unity or even the peace of the country, especially after ethnic-based conflicts, cf. Richard L. Sklar, "Democracy in Africa," *African Studies Review* 26, no. 3–4 (1983): 11–24; Hilary Matfess, "Rwanda and Ethiopia: Developmental Authoritarianism and the New Politics of African Strong Men," *African Studies Review* 58, no. 2 (2015): 181–204; Gabrielle Lynch, Nic Cheeseman, and Justin Willis, "From Peace Campaigns to Peaceocracy: Elections, Order and Authority in Africa," *African Affairs* 118, no. 473 (2019): 603–27.
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40. As explained in the codebook, "senior" (usually for majorities) or "junior" (for minorities) "partners" are assigned to ethnic groups included in the political regime with "real influence on decision making." A "dominant" status is given to ethnic groups when they have "dominant power in the executive but there is some limited inclusion of "token" members of other groups who however do not have real influence on decision making"; similarly, "monopoly" status is given to ethnic groups maintaining all the "monopoly power to the exclusion of members of all other ethnic groups." Similarly, the EPR lists as "powerless" those ethnic groups when their "elite representatives hold no political power (or do not have influence on decision making) at the national level of executive power—although without being explicitly discriminated against." Conversely, they give the "discriminated" status to groups of which "members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted

- discrimination by the state, with the intent of excluding them from political power. Such active discrimination can be either formal or informal, but always refers to the domain of public politics (excluding discrimination in the socio-economic sphere)." The category of "self-exclusion"—for example, groups controlling a restricted territory without engaging in central politics—has been excluded from this analysis. Cf. Nils-Christian Bormann, Girardin, L., Hunziker, P., and Vogt, M., *GROWup Research Front-End Documentation RFE Release 2.0* (Zurich: ETH Zurich, 2015).
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  42. To clarify, the EDI is based on a combination of V-Dem small-scale indexes concerning the electoral principle of democracy, such as free and fair elections, freedom of association, and the extent to which public offices are elected. Therefore, this indicator does not include variables on ethnic issues or practices related to social groups—differently from other "thicker" indicators on democracy or democratic quality.
  43. Anna Lührmann, Marcus Tannenberg, and Staffan I. Lindberg, "Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues for the Comparative Study of Political Regimes," *Politics and Governance* 6, no. 1 (2018): 60–77.
  44. We can also rule out the possibility that there are other global factors (not connected to autocratization, such as trends in international economy or globalization) affecting our outcome and making our relationship spurious. Cf. Nils-Christian Bormann, Pengl, Y. I., Cederman, L. E., & Weidmann, N. B., "Globalization, Institutions, and Ethnic Inequality," *International Organization* 75, no. 3 (2021): 665–97.
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  47. Having different dependent variables, the total number of observations for each model changes accordingly: for instance, in the model explaining the shifts of ethnic groups "from junior partner to powerless" (2.1), we only include groups of the same respective baseline status (junior partner).
  48. We exclude the possibility that there might be issues of reverse causality. As we have seen and it can be observed from [Table A1](#), the change in the relations between ethnic groups is a very rare phenomenon (around 1% of the sample), while autocratization episodes are not. This being sad, we do not exclude that other conditions related to ethnicity, such as grievances, or the overlapping between economic and ethnic cleavages might be considered as factors leading to autocratization. Cf. Christian Houle, "Ethnic Inequality and the Dismantling of Democracy: A Global Analysis," *World Politics* 67, no. 3 (2015): 469–505; Lasse Egendal Leipziger, "Ethnic Inequality, Democratic Transitions, and Democratic Breakdowns: Investigating an Asymmetrical Relationship," *The Journal of Politics* (2023): 1–25; Guido Panzano, "Do Mutually Reinforcing Cleavages Harm Democracy? Inequalities between Ethnic Groups and Autocratization," *Democratization* (2023): 1–25.
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
## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).


## Notes on contributor

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## Appendix A1: Descriptives



**Figure A1.** “Minority” and “majority” ethnic groups.



**Figure A2.** Ethnic group status across political regime developments and types.




Figure A3. Evolution of ethnic group status and countries under autocratization episodes.

Table A1. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	NotNA	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Ethnic domination upturn	8,825				
... 0	8,771				
... 1	54				
From senior partner dominant	3,940				
... 0	3,899				
... 1	41				
From dominant to monopoly	2,670				
... 0	2,664				
... 1	6				
From senior partner to monopoly	3,906				
... 0	3,899				
... 1	7				
Ethnic discrimination upturn	32,120				
... 0	31,893				
... 1	227				
From junior partner to powerless	7,793				
... 0	7,668				
... 1	125				
From powerless to discriminated	17,748				
... 0	17,665				
... 1	83				
From junior partner to discriminated	7,687				
... 0	7,668				
... 1	19				
Autocratization episode	41,526				
... 0	37,228				
... 1	4,298				
Ethnic group size	42,340	0.2	0.28	0.0001	1
Geo-concentrated group	42,675				

(continued)



**Table A1.** Continued.

Variable	NotNA	Mean	SD	Min	Max
... 0	8,798				
... 1	33,877				
Group in ongoing conflict	42,675				
... 0	41,128				
... 1	1,547				
Conflict history	42,675	0.17	0.56	0	8
Relevant ethnic groups	42,675	11	13	0	53
Electoral Democracy Index	42,084	0.36	0.26	0.008	0.91
Division of Power Index	42,097	0.36	0.35	0	1
Divided Party Control Index	42,097	-0.082	0.98	-1.7	1.7
Unitary chief executive	42,097				
... 0	26,306				
... 1	15,791				
Elected chief executive	42,088	4.9	2.4	0	8
GDP per capita	42,097	0.68	0.47	-0.51	1.9
Income from natural resources	42,061	1.4	1.1	0	4.8
Population	42,033	7.3	0.83	5.3	9.1

## Appendix B: Replications

**Table B1.** Models without controls and with year/region dummies.

	Ethnic domination upturn			Ethnic discrimination upturn		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Autocratization episode ( $t, t-1$ )	1.740*** (0.307)	1.661*** (0.307)	1.628*** (0.307)	1.008*** (0.253)	0.897*** (0.253)	0.944*** (0.253)
N	8,683	8,683	8,683	31,693	31,693	31,693
Year dummies		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Region dummies			Yes			Yes
SE Clustered	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country
AIC	612.533	692.061	694.909	2,585.452	2,464.915	2,418.174
BIC	626.671	1,229.314	1,267.508	2,602.179	3,100.568	3,095.646
Log Likelihood	-304.266	-270.030	-266.454	-1,290.726	-1,156.458	-1,128.087

<sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Logistic models: log odds are shown. Dummies for world regions (Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, The Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Western Europe and North America, Asia and Pacific) and years (1946–2020) omitted.

**Table B2.** Ethnic domination/discrimination shifts and autocratization episodes: Models with bias reduction.

	(1) Ethnic domination upturn	(1.1) From senior partner to dominant	(1.2) From dominant to monopoly	(1.3) From senior partner to monopoly	(2) Ethnic discrimination upturn	(2.1) From junior partner to powerless	(2.2) From powerless to discriminated	(2.3) From junior partner to discriminated
Autocratization episode	1.617*** (0.276)	1.551*** (0.308)	0.473 (0.546)	1.657*** (0.466)	0.918*** (0.205)	1.082*** (0.306)	0.757 (0.486)	1.644** (0.522)
N	8,655	3,854	2,637	3,820	31,645	7,698	17,578	7,592
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years and year polynomials	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE Clustered	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country
AIC	631.262	435.991	113.857	111.218	2,444.472	1,176.293	911.741	229.334
BIC	758.448	548.614	219.65	223.682	2,594.994	1,301.37	1,051.68	354.161
Log Likelihood	-297.631	-199.995	-38.928	-37.609	-1,204.236	-570.146	-437.870	-96.667

+ $p < 0.1$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Logistic models: log odds are shown.

Table B3. Linear probability models.

	(1) Ethnic domination upturn	(1.1) From senior partner to dominant	(1.2) From dominant to monopoly	(1.3) From senior partner to monopoly	(2) Discrimination upturn	(2.1) From junior partner to powerless	(2.2) From powerless to discriminated	(2.3) From junior partner to discriminated
Autocratization episode ( $t, t-1$ )	0.0222** (0.00771)	0.0408* (0.0167)	0.0046 (0.0055)	0.0064 (0.0050)	0.0120** (0.0037)	0.0301 <sup>+</sup> (0.0152)	0.0016 (0.0035)	0.0073 (0.0054)
Ethnic group size ( $t-1$ )	-0.0414 (0.0272)	-0.0578 (0.0522)	-0.0205 (0.0495)	-0.0208 (0.0217)	0.0561 (0.0717)	0.2026 <sup>+</sup> (0.1215)	-0.0345 (0.0621)	-0.0264 (0.0936)
Geo-concentrated group ( $t, t-1$ )	-0.0189 (0.0185)	-0.0040 (0.0059)	-0.0014 (0.0068)	-0.0059 (0.0089)	-0.0005 (0.0039)	0.0365 <sup>+</sup> (0.0188)	-0.0069 (0.0044)	0.0017 (0.0060)
Group in ongoing conflict ( $t, t-1$ )	-0.0068 (0.0057)	-0.0003 (0.0086)	-0.0742** (0.0219)	-0.0059 (0.0089)	0.0038 (0.0040)	0.0087 (0.0144)	0.0044 (0.0056)	0.0183 (0.0156)
Conflict history ( $t-1$ )	-0.0002 (0.0050)	-0.0040 (0.0059)	-0.0392 (0.0241)	-0.0055 (0.0039)	-0.0036** (0.0013)	-0.0077 (0.0112)	-0.0019 (0.0027)	-0.0067 (0.0046)
Relevant ethnic groups ( $t-1$ )	0.0007 (0.0008)	-0.0013 (0.0029)	-0.0008 (0.0013)	-0.0010 (0.0015)	-0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0026 (0.0050)	-0.0002 (0.0004)	-0.0029 (0.0024)
Electoral Democracy Index ( $t-1$ )	0.0093 (0.0101)	-0.0104 (0.0225)	0.0191 (0.0127)	-0.0066 (0.0061)	0.0122 <sup>+</sup> (0.0072)	-0.0315 (0.0301)	0.0023 (0.0091)	0.0068 (0.0077)
Division of Power Index ( $t-1$ )	0.0015 (0.0079)	0.0099 (0.0123)	-0.0100 (0.0076)	0.0007 (0.0032)	0.0013 (0.0057)	-0.0259 (0.0206)	0.0014 (0.0087)	0.0009 (0.0085)
Divided Party Control Index ( $t-1$ )	-0.0005 (0.0015)	0.0021 (0.0041)	-0.0014 (0.0015)	-0.0026 (0.0016)	-0.0002 (0.0009)	-0.0010 (0.0032)	-0.0001 (0.0009)	-0.0003 (0.0006)
Unitary chief executive ( $t, t-1$ )	-0.0031 (0.0039)	0.0031 (0.0057)	-0.0020 (0.0022)	-0.0003 (0.0013)	-0.0043 (0.0030)	-0.0089 (0.0096)	-0.0042 (0.0033)	-0.0013 (0.0039)
Electing chief executive ( $t-1$ )	0.0004 (0.0008)	0.0008 (0.0018)	-0.0013 (0.0013)	-0.0003 (0.0006)	-0.0015* (0.0007)	-0.0024 (0.0030)	-0.0006 (0.0009)	-0.0006 (0.0011)
GDP per capita ( $\log, t-1$ )	0.0005 (0.0078)	0.0143 (0.0193)	0.0016 (0.0081)	-0.0067 (0.0057)	-0.0133 (0.0104)	-0.0586 <sup>+</sup> (0.0347)	-0.0287 (0.0183)	0.0024 (0.0065)
Income from natural resources ( $\log, t-1$ )	0.0008 (0.0020)	0.0011 (0.0027)	0.0043 (0.0034)	0.0023 (0.0014)	-0.0008 (0.0020)	0.0120 <sup>+</sup> (0.0066)	0.0005 (0.0031)	-0.0034 (0.0032)
Population ( $\log, t-1$ )	-0.0166 (0.0103)	-0.0258 (0.0189)	-0.0237 (0.0203)	-0.0123 (0.0093)	0.0050 (0.0074)	-0.0245 (0.0332)	0.0137 (0.0117)	0.0088 (0.0068)
N	8,655	3,854	2,637	3,820	31,645	7,698	17,578	7,592
R2	0.045	0.167	0.168	0.139	0.046	0.145	0.120	0.109
R2 Adj.	-0.010	0.086	0.075	0.054	0.017	0.092	0.083	0.054
SE Clustered	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country
FE: ethnic group	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FE: country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FE: year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Geo-concentrated group variable removed because of collinearity.

## Appendix C: Cases

**Table C1.** Ethnic discrimination and autocratization episodes ( $t - 1$ ).

Ethnic group	Country	Year	Ethnic discrimination shift type
Indigenous peoples	Argentina	1976	Powerless to discriminated
Quechua	Bolivia	2020	Junior partner to powerless
Turkish	Bulgaria	2010	Junior partner to powerless
Turkish	Bulgaria	2015	Junior partner to powerless
Kachins	Burma/Myanmar	1959	Junior partner to discriminated
Shan	Burma/Myanmar	1959	Junior partner to discriminated
Cham and Malays	Cambodia	2020	Junior partner to powerless
Chinese	Cambodia	1971	Junior partner to discriminated
Chinese	Cambodia	2020	Junior partner to powerless
Vietnamese	Cambodia	1971	Powerless to discriminated
Thai-Lao	Cambodia	1971	Powerless to discriminated
Yakoma	Central African Republic	2002	Junior partner to discriminated
Sara	Chad	2018	Junior partner to powerless
Mapuche	Chile	1974	Powerless to discriminated
Bakongo	Democratic Republic of the Congo	1966	Junior partner to powerless
Mongo	Democratic Republic of the Congo	1966	Junior partner to powerless
Indians	Fiji	1988	Junior partner to powerless
Maya	Guatemala	1955	Powerless to discriminated
Kashmiri Muslims	India	2020	Powerless to discriminated
Other Muslims	India	2015	Junior partner to powerless
Other Muslims	India	2020	Powerless to discriminated
Bataks	Indonesia	2015	Junior partner to powerless
Chinese (Han)	Indonesia	2015	Junior partner to powerless
Malay	Indonesia	2015	Junior partner to powerless
Shi'a Arabs	Iraq	1964	Junior partner to powerless
Hmong	Laos	1975	Junior partner to discriminated
Lao Sung (excl. Hmong)	Laos	1975	Junior partner to powerless
Creoles	Mauritius	2017	Junior partner to powerless
Franco-Mauritians	Mauritius	2017	Junior partner to powerless
Adibasi Janajati	Nepal	1961	Junior partner to powerless
Newars	Nepal	1961	Junior partner to powerless
Madhesi	Nepal	1961	Junior partner to powerless
Toubou	Niger	2010	Junior partner to powerless
Toubou	Niger	2017	Junior partner to powerless
Igbo	Nigeria	1984	Junior partner to powerless
Baluchis	Pakistan	2000	Powerless to discriminated
Sindhi	Pakistan	1978	Junior partner to powerless
Sindhi	Pakistan	2000	Junior partner to powerless
Lari/Bakongo	Republic of the Congo	1998	Junior partner to powerless
Vili	Republic of the Congo	1998	Junior partner to powerless
Georgians	Russia	2006	Powerless to discriminated
Mari	Russia	2002	Powerless to discriminated
Indian Tamils	Sri Lanka	2006	Junior partner to powerless
Moors (Muslims)	Sri Lanka	2006	Junior partner to powerless
Sri Lankan Tamils	Sri Lanka	2006	Powerless to discriminated
Druze	Syria	1958	Junior partner to powerless

(continued)

**Table C1.** Continued.

Ethnic group	Country	Year	Ethnic discrimination shift type
Druze	Syria	1970	Junior partner to powerless
Sunni Arabs	Syria	1970	Junior partner to powerless
Alawi	Syria	1958	Junior partner to powerless
Christians	Syria	1958	Junior partner to powerless
Christians	Syria	1970	Junior partner to powerless
Kurds	Syria	1958	Junior partner to powerless
Basoga	Uganda	1967	Junior partner to powerless
South-Westeners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)	Uganda	1967	Junior partner to powerless
Latinos	United States of America	2018	Junior partner to powerless
African Americans	United States of America	2018	Junior partner to powerless
Northern Shafi'i	Yemen	2016	Junior partner to powerless

**Table C2.** Ethnic domination and autocratization episodes ( $t - 1$ ).

Ethnic group	Country	Year	Ethnic domination shift type
Whites	Brazil	2019	Dominant to monopoly
Bulgarians	Bulgaria	2010	Senior partner to dominant
Bulgarians	Bulgaria	2015	Senior partner to dominant
Bamar (Barman)	Burma/Myanmar	1959	Senior partner to dominant
Tutsi	Burundi	1966	Senior partner to dominant
Khmer	Cambodia	2020	Senior partner to dominant
Ngazidja Comorans	Comoros	2019	Senior partner to dominant
Fijians	Fiji	1988	Senior partner to dominant
Sunni Arabs	Iraq	1964	Senior partner to monopoly
Caste Hill Hindu Elite	Nepal	1961	Senior partner to monopoly
Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	Nigeria	1984	Senior partner to dominant
Sinhalese	Sri Lanka	2006	Senior partner to dominant
Sunni Arabs	Syria	1958	Senior partner to dominant
Alawi	Syria	1970	Senior partner to dominant
Thai	Thailand	1977	Senior partner to dominant
Whites	United States of America	2018	Senior partner to dominant

**Table C3.** Autocratization episodes and ethnic domination/discrimination upturns.

Country	Autocratization episode (ERT)	Autocratization episode onset (ERT)	Autocratization episode end (ERT)	Ethnic domination upturn (EPR)	Ethnic discrimination upturn (EPR)
Afghanistan	AFG_2016_2022	2016	2020		
Algeria	DZA_1965_1966	1965	1966		
Algeria	DZA_1992_1993	1992	1993		
Argentina	ARG_1950_1956	1950	1956		
Argentina	ARG_1962_1962	1962	1962		
Argentina	ARG_1966_1967	1966	1967		
Argentina	ARG_1975_1977	1975	1977		Yes
Armenia	ARM_1994_1997	1994	1997		
Armenia	ARM_2020_2022	2020	2020		
Azerbaijan	AZE_1993_1996	1993	1996		
Bahrain	BHR_1974_1976	1974	1976		
Bahrain	BHR_2011_2017	2011	2017		
Bangladesh	BGD_1975_1976	1975	1976		
Bangladesh	BGD_1981_1983	1981	1983		
Bangladesh	BGD_2002_2007	2002	2007		

*(continued)*

Table C3. Continued.

Country	Autocratization episode (ERT)	Autocratization episode onset (ERT)	Autocratization episode end (ERT)	Ethnic domination upturn (EPR)	Ethnic discrimination upturn (EPR)
Bangladesh	BGD_2011_2022	2011	2020		
Belarus	BLR_1995_2001	1995	2001		
Benin	BEN_1964_1966	1964	1966		
Benin	BEN_1970_1973	1970	1973		
Benin	BEN_2018_2020	2018	2020		
Bolivia	BOL_1964_1965	1964	1965		
Bolivia	BOL_2006_2020	2006	2020		Yes
Botswana	BWA_2015_2022	2015	2020		
Brazil	BRA_2016_2022	2016	2020	Yes	
Bulgaria	BGR_2001_2018	2001	2018	Yes	Yes
Burma/Myanmar	MMR_1958_1963	1958	1963	Yes	Yes
Burundi	BDI_1965_1967	1965	1967	Yes	
Burundi	BDI_1987_1988	1987	1988		
Burundi	BDI_2009_2016	2009	2016		
Cambodia	KHM_1970_1975	1970	1975		Yes
Cambodia	KHM_2013_2022	2013	2020	Yes	Yes
Central African Republic	CAF_1963_1967	1963	1967		
Central African Republic	CAF_1999_2004	1999	2004		Yes
Chad	TCD_2017_2022	2017	2020		Yes
Chile	CHL_1972_1974	1972	1974		Yes
Colombia	COL_1947_1950	1947	1950		
Comoros	COM_1999_2000	1999	2000		
Comoros	COM_2015_2022	2015	2020	Yes	
Costa Rica	CRI_1948_1948	1948	1948		
Croatia	HRV_2013_2022	2013	2020		
Cuba	CUB_1951_1953	1951	1953		
Cuba	CUB_1959_1961	1959	1959		
Democratic Republic of the Congo	COD_1965_1966	1966	1966		Yes
Ecuador	ECU_1960_1964	1960	1964		
Ecuador	ECU_1970_1973	1970	1973		
Ecuador	ECU_2007_2013	2007	2013		
Egypt	EGY_1952_1953	1952	1953		
Egypt	EGY_2013_2014	2013	2014		
El Salvador	SLV_2018_2022	2018	2020		
Equatorial Guinea	GNQ_1971_1973	1971	1973		
Estonia	EST_1991_1992	1991	1992		
Fiji	FJI_1987_1988	1987	1988	Yes	Yes
Fiji	FJI_2000_2001	2000	2001		
Fiji	FJI_2006_2007	2006	2007		
Ghana	GHA_1958_1966	1958	1966		
Ghana	GHA_1972_1973	1972	1973		
Ghana	GHA_1981_1982	1981	1982		
Ghana	GHA_2019_2022	2019	2020		
Greece	GRC_1962_1968	1962	1968		
Guatemala	GTM_1954_1955	1954	1955		Yes
Guatemala	GTM_2018_2022	2018	2020		
Guinea	GIN_2019_2022	2019	2020		
Guinea-Bissau	GNB_2012_2013	2012	2013		
Guyana	GUY_1968_1974	1968	1974		
Guyana	GUY_2019_2022	2019	2020		
Honduras	HND_1955_1955	1955	1955		
Honduras	HND_1973_1973	1973	1973		
Honduras	HND_2006_2010	2006	2010		
Hungary	HUN_1947_1949	1947	1949		
Hungary	HUN_2006_2022	2006	2020		

(continued)

**Table C3.** Continued.

Country	Autocratization episode (ERT)	Autocratization episode onset (ERT)	Autocratization episode end (ERT)	Ethnic domination upturn (EPR)	Ethnic discrimination upturn (EPR)
India	IND_1971_1975	1971	1975		
India	IND_2000_2022	2000	2020		Yes
Indonesia	IDN_1957_1966	1957	1966		
Indonesia	IDN_2009_2022	2009	2020		Yes
Iran	IRN_1953_1954	1953	1954		
Iraq	IRQ_1958_1968	1958	1968	Yes	Yes
Ivory Coast	CIV_2000_2000	2000	2000		
Ivory Coast	CIV_2020_2022	2020	2020		
Kuwait	KWT_1976_1976	1976	1976		
Kuwait	KWT_1986_1986	1986	1986		
Kyrgyzstan	KGZ_2012_2022	2012	2020		
Laos	LAO_1959_1965	1959	1965		
Laos	LAO_1975_1976	1975	1976		Yes
Liberia	LBR_1980_1981	1980	1981		
Liberia	LBR_2003_2004	2003	2004		
Libya	LBY_2014_2014	2014	2014		
Madagascar	MDG_1972_1973	1972	1973		
Madagascar	MDG_1997_2002	1997	2001		
Malawi	MWI_1999_2005	1999	2005		
Malaysia	MYS_1969_1970	1969	1970		
Mali	MLI_1964_1969	1964	1969		
Mali	MLI_2007_2013	2007	2013		
Mali	MLI_2017_2022	2017	2020		
Mauritania	MRT_1978_1979	1978	1979		
Mauritius	MUS_2014_2022	2014	2020		Yes
Moldova	MDA_1998_2005	1998	2005		
Moldova	MDA_2013_2017	2013	2017		
Mongolia	MNG_2015_2022	2015	2020		
Nepal	NPL_1961_1961	1961	1961	Yes	Yes
Nepal	NPL_2000_2003	2000	2003		
Nepal	NPL_2012_2013	2012	2013		
Nicaragua	NIC_2006_2022	2006	2020		
Niger	NER_1996_1996	1996	1996		
Niger	NER_1999_1999	1999	1999		
Niger	NER_2009_2010	2009	2010		Yes
Niger	NER_2016_2022	2016	2020		Yes
Nigeria	NGA_1983_1984	1983	1984	Yes	Yes
North Macedonia	MKD_2000_2000	2000	2000		
North Macedonia	MKD_2005_2012	2005	2012		
Pakistan	PAK_1977_1978	1977	1978		Yes
Pakistan	PAK_1999_2000	1999	2000		Yes
Panama	PAN_1964_1969	1964	1969		
Papua New Guinea	PNG_2007_2013	2007	2013		
Peru	PER_1948_1949	1948	1949		
Peru	PER_1968_1969	1968	1969		
Peru	PER_1990_1992	1990	1992		
Philippines	PHL_1966_1973	1966	1973		
Philippines	PHL_2001_2005	2001	2005		
Philippines	PHL_2016_2022	2016	2020		
Poland	POL_2016_2022	2016	2020		
Republic of Vietnam	VDR_1963_1964	1963	1964		
Republic of the Congo	COG_1962_1968	1962	1968		
Republic of the Congo	COG_1994_1998	1994	1998		Yes
Russia	RUS_1993_2012	1993	2005		Yes
Rwanda	RWA_1973_1974	1973	1974		

*(continued)*

**Table C3.** Continued.

Country	Autocratization episode (ERT)	Autocratization episode onset (ERT)	Autocratization episode end (ERT)	Ethnic domination upturn (EPR)	Ethnic discrimination upturn (EPR)
Rwanda	RWA_1993_1995	1993	1995		
Serbia	SRB_2010_2022	2010	2020		
Sierra Leone	SLE_1967_1968	1967	1968		
Singapore	SGP_1964_1965	1965	1965		
Slovenia	SVN_2011_2021	2011	2020		
Sri Lanka	LKA_1970_1983	1970	1983		
Sri Lanka	LKA_2005_2006	2005	2006	Yes	Yes
Sudan	SDN_1958_1959	1958	1959		
Sudan	SDN_1969_1969	1969	1969		
Sudan	SDN_1989_1990	1989	1990		
Sudan	SDN_2019_2022	2019	2020		
Suriname	SUR_1975_1975	1975	1975		
Suriname	SUR_1980_1981	1980	1981		
Suriname	SUR_1991_1991	1991	1991		
Syria	SYR_1949_1952	1949	1952		
Syria	SYR_1958_1959	1958	1959	Yes	Yes
Syria	SYR_1963_1970	1963	1970	Yes	Yes
Tajikistan	TJK_1992_1995	1992	1995		
Tanzania	TZA_2015_2022	2015	2020		
Thailand	THA_1976_1977	1976	1976	Yes	
Thailand	THA_1991_1991	1991	1991		
Thailand	THA_2005_2007	2005	2007		
Thailand	THA_2013_2014	2013	2014		
The Gambia	GMB_1993_1995	1993	1993		
Togo	TGO_1967_1968	1967	1968		
Turkey	TUR_1954_1961	1954	1961		
Turkey	TUR_1970_1971	1970	1971		
Turkey	TUR_1980_1981	1980	1981		
Turkey	TUR_2005_2017	2005	2017		
Uganda	UGA_1966_1972	1972	1972		Yes
Uganda	UGA_1985_1986	1985	1986		
Ukraine	UKR_1996_2004	1996	2004		
Ukraine	UKR_2010_2014	2010	2014		
United States of America	USA_2016_2022	2016	2020	Yes	Yes
Uruguay	URY_2015_2022	2015	2020		
Venezuela	VEN_1998_2022	1998	2020		
Yemen	YEM_2013_2016	2013	2016		Yes
Zambia	ZMB_1969_1974	1969	1974		
Zambia	ZMB_2010_2017	2010	2017		
Zanzibar	ZZB_1964_1964	1964	1964		
Zimbabwe	ZWE_1978_1978	1978	1978		

## Appendix D: Document analysis.

The following list contains the documents mentioned in the paper:

Minority Rights Group International

- Minority and Indigenous Trends—Focus on climate justice. 2019.
- Minority and Indigenous Trends—Focus on work. 2022.
- Peoples Under Threat. 2020.
- Peoples Under Threat. 2021.

U.N. HR Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance



- E/CN.4/1996/72. 1996.
- E/CN.4/1997/71. 1997.
- E/CN.4/1998/79. 1998.
- E/CN.4/1999/15. 1999.
- E/CN.4/2000/16. 2000.
- E/CN.4/2001/21. 2001.
- E/CN.4/2002/24. 2002.
- E/CN.4/2003/24. 2003.
- E/CN.4/2004/18. 2004.
- E/CN.4/2006/16. 2006.
- A/HRC/4/19. 2007.
- A/HRC/7/19. 2008.
- A/HRC/17/40. 2011.
- A/HRC/35/41. 2017.
- A/HRC/41/54. 2019.
- A/HRC/44/57. 2020.
- A/HRC/50/60. 2022.

U.N. HR Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief

- A/HRC/31/18. 2015.
- A/HRC/43/48. 2020.

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- A/HRC/25/56. 2014.
- A/HRC/28/64. 2015.
- A/HRC/31/56. 2016.
- A/HRC/37/66. 2018.
- A/HRC/43/47. 2020.
- A/HRC/46/57. 2021.
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- A/HRC/4/32. 2007.
- A/HRC/30/41. 2015.
- A/HRC/39/17. 2018.
- A/HRC/42/37. 2019.
- A/HRC/45/34. 2020.
- A/HRC/51/28. 2022.