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Discursive Turns and Critical Junctures

Debating Citizenship after the Charlie Hebdo Attacks

Donatella della Porta
Pietro Castelli Gattinara
Konstantinos Eleftheriadis
and Andrea Felicetti

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CHAPTER 1

Discursive turns and critical junctures

An introduction

INTRODUCTION

"On 7 January 2015 at about 11:30 local time, two brothers, Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, forced their way into the offices of the French satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris. Armed with rifles and other weapons, they killed 12 people and injured 11 others. The gunmen identified themselves as belonging to the Islamist terrorist group Al-Qaeda's branch in Yemen, which took responsibility for the attack. Several related attacks followed in the Île-de-France region on 7–9 January 2015, including the Hypercacher kosher supermarket siege where a terrorist held 19 hostages, of whom he murdered 4 Jews.

France raised its Vigipirate terror alert and deployed soldiers in Île-de-France and Picardy. A major manhunt led to the discovery of the suspects, who exchanged fire with police. The brothers took hostages at a signage company in Dammartin-en-Goële on 9 January and were shot dead when they emerged from the building firing.

On 11 January, about two million people, including more than 40 world leaders, met in Paris for a rally of national unity, and 3.7 million people joined demonstrations across France. The phrase Je suis Charlie became a common slogan of support at the rallies and in social media. The staff of Charlie Hebdo continued with the publication, and the following issue print ran 7.95 million copies in six languages, compared to its typical print run of 60,000 in only French." (Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charlie_Hebdo_shooting).

The *Charlie Hebdo* attacks were neither the first nor the last within a wave of political violence with religious, fundamentalist motivations that has

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affected Arab as well as Western countries. In the latter, after the deadly attack on the Twin Towers in New York City on September 11, 2001, the bombs in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 shocked the public. Given the religious beliefs and claims of the perpetrators, the ensuing debate revolved around a predictable cleavage. On one side, the right called for law and order, rallying around the protection of Christian values against invasion by Islam (and migrants in general). On the other side were those defending the values of inclusion and pluralism, as well as migrants' rights overall.

The fact that the target of the January 2015 attacks was a journal long identified with the left challenged the established path of argumentation. The right now had to defend freedom of speech for what was often considered a blasphemous outlet. On the left, the argument now had to consider potential limitations not only on free speech, but also on tolerance and pluralism. The attacks thus produced a short circuit, collapsing the debate on several issues related to various dimensions of citizenship, from freedom to security. They did so in a highly emotional atmosphere in which an in- versus out-polarization tended to rise, with Islam emerging as the core definitional element of the attackers and, therefore, of the problem itself.

Indeed, the Charlie Hebdo attacks signaled a shift in the strategies of Islamist political violence from targeting the symbols of institutions of Western power—as with the September 11 attacks or the disruptive bombings of public transportation, with indiscriminately selected victims—to the targeting of what was perceived as an alternative, libertarian symbol. The attacks certainly triggered increased security measures and more exclusive politics toward migration, with securitarian policies and increased border control. As they were followed by other brutal acts of violence in France in November and in Belgium the following year, they contributed to calls for and practices of states of emergency that further reduced civil and political rights. The attacks also further influenced the reactions to the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016, as fears about the "terrorists" potentially hidden among the asylum-seekers often trumped compassion toward them.

While similar acts of political violence often have important consequences, in particular in terms of the policy responses to them—as frequently represented in the literature on terrorism and counterterrorism—we want to address a specific effect of the Charlie Hebdo attacks by looking at the public debates produced by the event. This perspective seems particularly relevant as acts of clandestine political violence tend to have consequences especially at the symbolic level (della Porta 2015). The forms of action and

its victims are part of the message that the perpetrators want to spread. In fact, they do not aim just at terrorizing, but also at articulating—to a certain extent at least—their claims through their deeds. While the violent actors send signals, their message is filtered and brokered as it enters a complex communication field. Indeed, violent acts work as catalyzers of discursive turns, as they are channeled within public spheres in which words, in addition to deeds, have significance.

In this sense, we conceptualize violent acts that, like the Charlie Hebdo attacks, challenge existing interpretations as endowed with the potential to trigger turning points in debates on various interconnected issues. They certainly bring about media moments, understood as periods of focused mediatized attention on a specific event. In addition, they may also trigger narrative changes, with dis-alignment and then realignment of meanings. Through public controversies, they can produce a polarization of visions but also, eventually, a new convergence based on an emergent consensus. Clearly, as we will see, they push actors toward making claims that are framed in various ways, but which also need to be justified. That is, emotional states interact with cognitive process, which then attribute meanings to a changing reality.

Acts of violence then erupt in a field of communication that is populated by various actors. They force institutions, but also non-institutional actors, to take positions. Indeed, research on acts of political violence has noted the activation of law-and-order coalitions calling for increased security, on the one hand, and civil rights coalitions defending liberties, on the other (see della Porta 2013). Social movements and civil society organizations are often heavily involved in these conflicts, mostly defending freedom, but also sometimes calling for increased security. As research on social movements and media has shown, civil society organizations tend to intervene in the mass-media public sphere but also to create their own fields of communication. In part, they adopt official framings, adapting them at the margins; in part, they produce, instead, alternative framings by triggering debates within alternative public spheres. In addition, social movements often use moral arguments that respond to the imperative of justifying positions in public (Jasper 1997).

Locating our research within social movement studies, we point at the cultural dynamics during discursive critical junctures, showing the ways in which different actors address transformative events which challenge their visions. In particular, we do so by looking at the claiming, framing, and justifying activities by left-wing, right-wing, and religious actors in four European countries. We suggest that the discourses by collective actors are embedded into broader contexts, which provide for opportunities and

constraints, but are far from determining it discourses, that rather evolves through adaptation and innovation, addressing numerous dilemmas.

In this perspective, our analysis of the Charlie Hebdo attacks addresses in particular the claims, frames, and justifications that civil society actors introduce in multiple public spheres. In line with that literature, we want to understand both the content and the forms of these interventions by considering the appropriation of existing discursive opportunities by collective actors, but also their embeddedness within strategies of resource mobilization. Social movement studies on communication have pointed, in fact, at the selective presence of framing from below in the mass-media public spheres, but also at social movements' capacity to produce communicative outlets and complex communicative strategies (Mattoni 2012). Research on contentious politics has also addressed the discursive strategies that emerge on specific issues, such as unemployment or immigration (Giugni 2010; Koopmans and Statham 1999; 2010). Given the shifting focus of the Charlie Hebdo debates from issues of security to the potential risks represented by migrants or even by some religious beliefs (in particular, Islamic fundamentalism), our research also aims at addressing the literature on citizenship rights, including freedom of religion. Beyond social movement studies and communication studies, other fields of knowledge have contributed to our understanding of public debates in changing and intense times. Given the focus of the Charlie Hebdo debate, the sociology of religion, migration studies, and citizenship studies emerge as particularly relevant.

In what follows, we first reflect on the concept of transformative events as triggering critical junctures (as well as subsequent choice points) and on the very conceptions of citizenship that are affected by them. We then move to a discussion of the forms that debates might take in the public sphere (referring in particular to the concept of deliberation). After that, we present our analytic model, followed by a justification of the research design and the methodological choices. We end with a presentation of the volume.

TRANSFORMATIVE EVENTS AND CRITICAL JUNCTURES

The Charlie Hebdo attacks represent a transformative moment in the public debates on several issues concerning national conceptions of citizenship. While traditionally focusing on contentious politics in normal times, and considering Contentious politics as structurally determined, social

movement studies have recently pointed at the transformative capacity of protest events. Eventful temporality has in fact been defined based on movements' potential to change structures, rather than just adapt to them (Sewell 1996; see also McAdam and Sewell 2001). Considering eventful protests as moments of intensified agency and transformed relations (della Porta 2004; 2014), research on movement waves has distinguished extraordinary times from normal times (Beissinger 2002). Like protest events, acts of political violence can work as turning points, triggering accelerated changes—even if mostly not in the direction desired by their perpetrators (della Porta 2013). We address this potentially transformative capacity through the concept of critical junctures, moments in which changes happen suddenly rather than incrementally.

"Transformative event" as a concept points at the capacity of action itself to produce those contextual opportunities and organizational resources that are mobilized in the strategic interactions of various actors (della Porta 2014). When time intensifies, protest events multiply as contentious events trigger new contentious events, clustering within "a punctuated history of heightened challenges and relative stability" (Beissinger 2002, 16). Events themselves change relations as they trigger other events that are linked to each other "in the narratives of struggle that accompany them; in the altered expectations that they generate about subsequent possibilities to contest; in the changes that they evoke in the behavior of those forces that uphold a given order; and in the transformed landscape of meaning that events at times fashion" (Beissinger 2002, 17).

Transformative events can then be embedded in what neonstitutionalist theorists have defined as *critical junctures*, that is, abrupt changes that happen through the activation of chains of interactions and choice points, and that are different from the incremental ones that dominate normal times. Rather, they are sudden, reflecting a moment of crisis in which decisions are required that might drastically diverge from previous patterns. While breaking with the old routine, they may establish a new one (Roberts 2015, 65). Critical junctures are rooted in structures, but also *open-ended*. In fact, rather than being constrained by structures, they are open to contingent diversions, as "the selection of a particular option during a critical juncture represents a random happening, an accident, a small occurrence, or an event that cannot be explained or predicted on the basis of a particular theoretical framework" (Mahoney and Schensul 2006, 461). Structurally underdetermined, they involve high levels of uncertainty in which the range of plausible choices which are available to powerful political actors tend to increase greatly (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 343). While strategic choices still play a role, intense interactions in non-routine

circumstances are characterized by many unintended consequences that push institutional development along unforeseen paths (Roberts 2015, 13). Within a critical juncture, the effects of the initial transformative event are influenced by subsequent events, that represent decisive *choice points*, which are of particular importance in the evolution of a critical juncture, since the responses by different actors to specific challenges tend to reconstitute relations. In these moments, in fact, "uncertainty as to the future of an institutional arrangement allows for political agency and choice to play a decisive causal role in setting the institution on a certain path of development, a path that then persists over a long period of time" (Capoccia 2015, 148).·Once critical junctures produce changes, these tend to be long-lasting, as "[o]nce a process (e.g. a revolution) has occurred and acquired a name, both the name and the one or more representations of the process become available as signals, models, threats and/or aspirations for later actors" (Tilly 2006, 421). After a critical juncture happens, it tends to become path-dependent (Mahoney and Schensul 2006, 462)—until a new rupture or disruptive event happens.

While the Charlie Hebdo attacks are certainly not "protest events," we assume that they have triggered turning points in contentious politics. Their effects are not only material, but also symbolic, as they condense discussions of a series of issues on which different and various actors intervene with words and deeds. While the production of intense symbolic effects is typical of acts of (extreme) political violence, some of them can work as transformative events triggering critical junctures by unsettling existing institutions. Given their brutality, they are expected to produce particularly drastic policy reactions by institutional and other actors—as was the case, for example, with the 9/11 attacks. But they can also be expected to trigger discursive critical junctures when, through their forms or targets, they challenge widespread discursive alignment, requiring new arguments. While not the first of their type, the Charlie Hebdo attacks—with Islamists targeting an outlet long considered as aligned with the left—challenged the traditional left-wing inclusive discourse of tolerance for diversity as well as the right-wing alignment around conservative values. The changes they introduced were indeed abrupt, contingent, and, eventually, path-dependent.

While critical junctures have usually been analyzed by looking at institutional transformations, particularly in policy fields, we focus our attention on the discursive critical junctures. Our research aimed in particular at understanding how events—such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks—challenge pre-existing patterns of argumentation, changing the content of claims-making, framing, and justification of different actors and actor

constellations. Looking at the public sphere, we focus on an exceptional moment—what in media studies has sometimes been labelled as a *media event*. Defined as "high holidays of mass communication" (Dayan and Katz 1992, 1), media events interrupt routines by monopolizing the attention of very large audiences. In fact, as Gabriel Weimann (1990) noted, mass-mediated terrorism can trigger particular media events that focus on conflicts. During media events, media rituals are characterized by forms of communication that build up a myth of the mediated center (Couldry 2003a; see also 2003b). While not of a ritual character, like most media events, the coverage of the Charlie Hebdo attacks allowed for an "extraordinary shared experience of watching events at society's 'centre'" (Couldry 2003a, 61).

DISCURSIVE TURNS ON CITIZENSHIP: BETWEEN FREEDOM AND SECURITY

Our research addressed first and foremost the normative and empirical debate on issues of citizenship rights, with a focus on *freedoms but also security*. This is because we locate the Charlie Hebdo attacks within a struggle over the definition of rights with, on the one hand, those who fight for a more inclusive definition of them and, on the other, those who maintain a more exclusive approach. We ask if those attacks acted as a transformative event that triggered a discursive critical juncture by challenging the arguments put forward in both areas, as well as the forms of communication.

Critical citizenship studies have brought about reflection on the intensification of the struggles for rights: "From aboriginal rights, women's rights, civil rights, and sexual rights for gays and lesbians to animal rights, language rights and disability rights, we have experienced in the past few decades a major trend in Western nation-states toward the formation of new claims for inclusion and belonging" (Isin and Turner 2003, 1). As all of these struggles have been addressed through references to rights and obligations, reflections on citizenship have included all claims to citizenship that, beyond legal status, address issues of social and political recognition as well as economic redistribution (Isin and Turner 2003). In this direction, critical studies on citizenship have looked at the practices through which status has been contested and subjectivities formed, through an analysis of those every-day routines, rituals, customs, norms, and habits through which a subject becomes a citizen (Isin 2008). According to Isin and Nyer (2014), citizenship involves both the combination of rights and duties in

each polity (as it derives as the outcome of social struggle) and the performance of citizenship (as rights and duties ~~which~~ remain inert or passive if they are not performed). Following their lead, we view the debate on the Charlie Hebdo attacks as addressing conceptions of citizenship at large. We expect in fact that intense political debates—such as those around the Charlie Hebdo attacks—reflect the practices used in the making of citizens, affecting substantive conceptions of citizenship.

Acts of citizenship are produced as innovative moments by activist citizens, who act to expand rights (Isin and Turner 2003); but there are also acts oriented toward restricting them. In fact, citizenship itself implies a tension between inclusion (of the members) and exclusion (of the strangers) (Isin and Nyer 2014, 4). Citizenship has been defined~~, in fact,~~ as "a site and a source of struggles over what being a citizen means" (Guillaume 2014, 150). As Huysmans and Guillaume (2014, 24) summarized:

> While citizenship has been an instrument of crafting a people of equals, in which rights are universal and not a privilege, historically it has also been a vehicle for working differentiations within this universal people. On the one hand, citizens comprise a people united around a body of law and rights and/or a set of narratives about its origins. Both allow the people to recognize themselves as a collective unity and a body of individuals with political status. On the other hand, citizenship is constituted in relation to those without rights or limited rights, those who remain outside of the narratives of the people's community of origin. In this continuum between inclusion and exclusion, citizens are actually stratified, rather than dichotomized. Rights are often assigned differentially and citizens do have different capacities to claim rights within the citizenry body.

A discursive critical juncture can be seen as a moment in which controversies intensify, in many cases over the polar positions on inclusive versus exclusive citizenship.

The debate over the Charlie Hebdo attacks was also critical in bridging issues of citizenship with issues of security which, as we will see, are increasingly addressed when talking about migration, but also about citizenship more in general. In recent times, critical security studies have presented security as a technique around exclusion and discrimination, up to the dismantling of subjects' political capacity (Huysmans and Guillaume 2014). Securitization has indeed been defined as "a kind of mobilization of conflictual or threatening relations, often through emergency mobilization of the state" (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 8). Especially after 9/11, "many of the rights of citizenship are being stripped away, often in the

name of 'national security' (too risky to the polity as a whole to guarantee individual rights) or 'responsible citizenship' (some citizens are not worthy of rights because of their perceived behaviours)" (Isin and Nyer 2014, 5).

Securitization develops through a shift from normal to exceptional politics, promoted through statements about the presence of existential threats that require emergency measures. In particular, (neo)liberal states have been said to promote fear in order to claim their role as re-instating security (Watts 2019). Spreading cultures of fear, securitarian politics posits a sharp distinction between the friend and the enemy, and with it a de-politicization, through the priority given to a logic of necessity. The need to unite against the enemy trumps the freedom to argue about diverse positions, with a call to give more power to the executive (Huysmans and Guillaume 2014). At the same time, "cultures of fear make people focus on their own safety and on the many minuscule and big dangers of life, rather than the conflicts and stratifications in society or, more generally, matters of common concern" (Huysmans and Guillaume 2014, 21).

While securitizing aims at de-politicization, the policies of securitizing are often contested, with calls for the defense of freedom and pluralism. In particular:

> The question of exceptionalism has recently become a site of intense political contestation over the legitimacy or illegitimacy of recent transformations in security practices, especially in the context of the "war on terror." On the one hand, policymakers and their supporters have frequently argued that the rules of the game have changed, that this is a new kind of war, and that exceptional times require exceptional measures. The category of the exceptional has been invoked to justify and mobilize an array of violent and illiberal practices, including detention without trial, derogation from human rights law, complicity in torture, "extraordinary rendition," the curtailment of civil liberties and the securitization of migration. On the other hand, critical approaches to security have converged upon the concept of exceptionalism as a means of analysing and contesting these transformations. (Case 2006, 464–65)

As we will see, securitization emerges as a central issue at the core of the debate that followed the Charlie Hebdo attacks, with calls for a restriction of citizens' rights and freedoms, but also counter-calls for increasing freedoms. The very essence of defining the borders between those who belong to the community and those who do not has been influenced by the exceptionalist discourse and the urgency to ensure security. What remains to be addressed is under which conditions we see the extension versus the retrenchment of citizenship rights. Our analysis can then help to address

the question, "If indeed acts of citizenship are fundamental ways of being with others, how do beings *decide* between solidaristic (generous, magnanimous, beneficent, hospitable, accommodating, understanding, loving), agonistic (competitive, resistant, combative, adverse) and alienating (vengeful, revengeful, malevolent, malicious, hostile, hateful) acts towards others?" (Isin 2008, 19).

The focus on a discursive critical juncture allows us to address the issue from the perspective of what intensifies ~~moments of~~ debate around citizenship, broadly understood. In focusing on debates, we share the assumption that "the language itself plays an important role in making issues such as migration, the arms trade, or the environment into security questions upon which security institutions can legitimately act" (Huysmans and Guillaume 2014, 20). In particular, securitization includes processes in which the very labeling of a matter as a security issue justifies extreme moves (Williams 1998, 435). More generally, cultural values and attributes have been considered as embedded in the institution of citizenship by providing the symbolic standards that are used to determine "who is, or is not, part of a political community, who should or should not be, how one has to behave as a good citizen, and how one should behave in order to become a citizen" (Huysmans and Guillaume 2014, 22).

The intense debate over the Charlie Hebdo attacks is therefore an important moment upon which to focus attention, as it constitutes a sort of magnifying lens for looking at the different conceptions and practices of citizenship, which in turn triggered discursive turns.

Traditionally, conceptions of citizenship have tended to polarize. On the progressive pole, social movements and other collective actors have been characterized by inclusive positions, within cosmopolitan visions. Freedom has been conceived as positive freedom, including a call for equality as a fundamental precondition for real liberty. In general, left-libertarian actors have advocated an extension of citizenship rights to those living within a certain polity, also calling for "new" rights and opposing discrimination based on religion, gender, or ethnic belonging. Stressing secularism, they have tended to consider religion as belonging to the private sphere. The right to participate in public life ~~have~~ trumped calls for security, and rights to protest have been considered as prevailing over law and order. Civil rights have been conceived as collective rights, starting with the right to form trade unions. On the regressive pole, in contrast, freedom has mainly been seen as the possession of individual rights—with private property as a fundamental base. Citizenship has been conceived narrowly, with the exclusion of "foreigners." Conservative values have prevailed, within defense

of family, community, religion, or the nation. Security and law and order have been core concerns.

As we argue in what follows, the Charlie Hebdo attacks focused attention on the tensions between negative and positive freedoms, as well as unequal power and selective recognition. In the ensuing debates, conceptions of civil rights were related to laws on freedom of speech, hate speech, blasphemy, anti-discrimination, and freedom of religion, as well as general norms on multiculturalism, secularism, non-discrimination, and religious diversity. Given the characteristics of the perpetrators but also of the target, the neat distinctions were disrupted. On the left, a main challenge is the definition of the balance between liberty and respect for diversity. On the right, it lies in identifying the very values of Western civilization, presented as being in need of protection from fundamentalist Islam.

In the debate on the Charlie Hebdo attacks, arguments about citizenship are linked to the conceptions of *migrants* as well as resident ethnic minorities. Research on the discursive attitudes toward migration has singled out a partial convergence on the distinction between "good migrants"—especially those with a position in the labor market—to be integrated, and "bad migrants"—mainly criminals—to be repressed. Yet, on the left, integration tended to be more valued than on the right, with some attention to differential rights as well, especially at the cultural level. Against this background, the Charlie Hebdo debate addressed the potential ability of transformative events to reconstitute migrants' identification processes, but also to strengthen their "othering" through the spreading of calls for security as potentially dominating over calls for adaptation through inclusion. The extent to which different citizenship regimes vary in their capacity to face the new challenges is an important question for migration studies—which have stressed the impact of nationalization laws on the conception and actual treatment of migrant citizens in terms of recognition of rights—as well as on the effect this has on how these migrants mobilize. Citizenship regimes are supposed to be resilient, and to influence claims-making, framing, and justification by diverse migrant groups.

While attitudes toward migration have always been related to the symbolic dimension of cultural diversity—largely praised on the left and stigmatized on the right—the very nature of the Charlie Hebdo attacks can be expected to focus attention on religion as a central concern for the definition of citizenship rights. In general, religion has often played an important role in protest movements, providing motivations to act as well as bases for collective identification. Religious spaces have sometimes worked as free spaces for mobilization under authoritarian regimes, but religious institutions have also discouraged autonomous organization by

the citizens. The clergy has sometimes supported protests, sometimes repressed them (e.g., Parsa 2000). Nonetheless, social movement studies and religious studies have rarely interacted, as "in contemporary research on social movements and collective action, religion has taken a back seat . . . surprisingly little attention has been given to the ways that specific religious beliefs either increase or diminish an individual's willingness to protest" (McVeigh and Sikkink 2001, 1426). With a long-term focus on secularization, sociology of religion has, on its side, paid little attention to the public expression of religiosity in recent years.

Addressing the relationship between the state and the church, the debates on the Charlie Hebdo attacks saw ~~in fact~~ a participation of religious actors in the controversy as well as the bridging of issues of citizens, migration, and religion. In this sense, the research pointed to the increasing role of public religion (Casanova 1994; Berger 1999) and, conversely, the deprivatization of religion (Berger 1999; Kepel 2005; Roy 2002). At the same time, those attacks seem to reopen a cleavage around the issue of the relations between Church and State, with the meaning of laicity being broadly discussed. Freedom of religion is invoked, but also contrasted with securitization; religious issues become objects of claims-making; freedom of religion is framed in relation to freedom of speech. The different positions are variously justified from a moral point of view, with some expected variation in the ways in which domestic regimes on Church–State relations affect the controversies.

DISCURSIVE JUNCTURES: DELIBERATION AND POLARIZATION IN MULTIPLE PUBLIC SPHERES

In addition to the content of the debate, we are also interested in its forms. At the discursive level, transformative events may trigger critical junctures through processes including polarization but also the (re)building of consensus. The social science literature on deliberative democracy helps in singling out some dimensions that allow investigation of the discursive quality within public spheres with reference to specific controversies. In normative debates, deliberative theories have promoted spaces for communication in which the exchange of reasons should allow for the construction of shared definitions of the public good (Miller 1993, 75; Dryzek 2000, 79; Cohen 1989, 18–19; Elster 1998; Habermas 1981; 1996). However, eventful times are often polarizing, bringing about controversies over the best ways to address the crisis. The interaction between consensus and polarization in the debate related to Charlie Hebdo is crucial to our analysis.

This is indeed an issue that has been addressed—from the normative but also from the empirical point of view—in deliberative theories of democracy that have looked at the ways in which good discursive qualities help finding (better) solutions to problems. Interactions with others, with reciprocal recognition, allows understanding of their reasons, assessing them against emerging standards of fairness. Not only do participants bring in different knowledge and expertise, but interactions tend to transform the perception of one's own preferences, making participants more concerned with the collective good. Rather than focusing on the aggregation of exogenously generated preferences or opinions, (deliberative) democratic debates aim at forming them through communication, as people should be convinced by the strength of the better argument. Horizontal flows of communication, multiple producers of content, wide opportunities for interaction, confrontation based on rational argumentation, and attitudes to reciprocal listening have been considered important conditions for deliberation (Habermas 1981; 1996).

Some deliberative conceptions of democracy consider consensus, at least in the sense of mutual understanding, as an important sign of deliberativeness, as decisions are reached by convincing the others of one's own good argument. Decisions must be approvable by all participants, thanks to the exchange of reasons that are persuasive to all (Cohen 1989). Through argumentation, rather than the display of power, participants in deliberation convince one another and come to decisions. In deliberative democracy, the debate is oriented to finding reasons that might be widely endorsed (Ferejohn 2000). Taking a distance from their self-interest, participants in a deliberative debate are expected to argue about the public good (Cohen 1989, 23–24) by drawing "identities and citizens' interests in ways that contribute to public building of public good" (Cohen 1989, 18–19). Deliberation in public requires participants to make their proposal acceptable to others (Cohen 1989, 33; Elster 1998), reporting "those reasons that others might plausibly be expected to share" (Goodin 2003, 63). Deliberative democracy is therefore a way to address controversies through dialogue (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). Decisions are legitimate insofar as "they receive reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question" (Dryzek 2010, 23).

As mentioned, critical junctures are moments in which achieved order is challenged, with sudden, conjunctural, and open-ended changes. We therefore might expect the intensification of debates to create harsh conflicts, with a polarization of opinions. On the other hand, the perception of a crisis might make the normal expression of diverse opinions more risky—at least in the perception of the actors. There might be, that is, pressure for

a (depoliticized?) consensus-by-default (certainly not a deliberative consensus), with a convergence around the definition of the situation as an emergency. This might be even more likely when—as is the case for the Charlie Hebdo attacks—an intense debate is triggered by an act of extraordinary violence, which is presented as endangering the very existence of the community of reference.

If, in moments of crisis and change, the rhetorical reference is often to a community—one and indivisible—we expect that a discursive critical juncture is likely to bring about different divergences and convergences in a multiplicity of public spheres. The questions of convergence or divergence of opinions should therefore be addressed by taking into account the plurality of the spaces for debate. Research on deliberation initially focused on the main (mass-media) public sphere as a location for deliberative democracy, noting the overwhelming presence of institutional actors and contrastingly low representation of civil society organizations (della Porta 2013). In addition, beyond mass media, historically, subaltern counterpublics (including workers, women, ethnic minorities, and so on) flourished as parallel discursive arenas in which counter-discourses developed, allowing for the formation and redefinition of the identities, interests, and needs of powerless groups. Various publics have always engaged in symbolic struggles: "[N]ot only was there always a plurality of competing publics, but the relations between bourgeois publics and other publics were always conflictual. Virtually from the beginning, counterpublics contested the exclusionary norms of the bourgeois public, elaborating alternative styles of political behaviour and alternative norms of public speech. Bourgeois publics, in turn, excoriated these alternatives and deliberately sought to block broader participation" (Fraser 1997, 75).

While empirical research on deliberative democracy has mainly covered institutional arenas, from parliaments to administrative committees (Steiner, Baechtiger, Spoerli, and Steenberger 2005; Joerges and Neyer 1997), or ~~on~~ the mass media, Habermas (1996) himself has pointed at a double-track process, with "informal" deliberation taking place outside institutions and then, as public opinion, influencing institutional deliberation. Reflections on deliberation have addressed the role of voluntary groups (Cohen 1989; Offe 1997, 102–03)—including social movements (Dryzek 2000)—as enclaves, free from institutional power (Mansbridge 1996). In democracies, counterpublics flourish as "informal deliberative enclaves of resistance in which those who lose in each coercive move can rework their ideas and their strategies, gathering their forces and deciding in a more protected space in what way or whether to continue the struggle" (Mansbridge 1996, 46–47).

Taking into account multiple public spheres also means reflecting on the forms of the debate within them, looking at the use in public deliberation not only of reason but also of emotions (Polletta 2006) within the different grammars that structure the debates (Talpin 2011; Haug 2010; Dryzek 2010). While less heterogeneous, the subaltern public spheres are still plural, allowing for the consideration of different opinions, as a "moral point of view" does not emerge from solitary reasoning but rather from meetings with others who call for their own needs, desires, and perspectives to be recognized (Young 1990, 106). Further, alternative or subaltern public spheres, as distinguished from mainstream ones, are internally diverse: "heterogeneity, otherness, and difference can find expression in multiple associations, networks, and citizens' forums" (Benhabib 1996, 84). Within subaltern public spheres, conflicts are considered as not only unavoidable, but also part and parcel of democratic development (Smith 2009, 11). As Flyvbjerg (1998, 229) noted, "civil society does not mean 'civilized' in the sense of well-mannered behavior. In strong civil societies, distrust and criticism of authoritative action are omnipresent as is resulting political conflict."

The study of discursive critical junctures must therefore investigate to what extent, through which mechanisms, and under which circumstances an event such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks influences communication, affecting a series of dimensions in the public sphere that pertain to deliberative quality (respect for the other, consequentiality, inclusiveness, and so on) as well as those that pertain instead to polarization. Rather than considering deliberation as either present or absent, we address the various degrees of equality, inclusiveness, and transparency, as well as the varying role of reasons, preference transformation, and orientation to the public good (della Porta 2005).

In our research, we have in fact compared *several public spheres* (in plural). While most research on claims-making has considered only the mainstream media, we add so-called alternative public spheres, including those of social movements and other non-institutional collective actors. In line with this focus on deliberation in a plurality of public spheres, we aim to analyze the communication of different actors in different public spheres. Besides mainstream media, the research covers movement-linked media, variously defined as alternative, activist, citizens', radical, or autonomous (Mattoni 2012, 26–29). Studies of ~~an~~ alternative media have pointed at their particular content and rhetoric, linking them to specific forms of news production. These are defined as "media, generally small scale and in many different forms, that express an alternative vision to hegemonic policies, priorities and perspectives" (Downing 2001, v). As social

movement organizations, these alternative media produce a critique of the established media (Rucht 2004) as well as promoting democratization of information (Cardon and Granjou 2003) by broadening the range of covered information and ideas, being more responsive to the excluded, and affecting the participants' sense of self (Downing 2001).

Notwithstanding some limits in reaching out to un-mobilized audiences (della Porta and Mosca 2005), the alternative media provide arenas for the discussion of emerging ideas and the encounter of different actors (Gamson 2004). Characteristics of the alternative media are—together with their critical, counter-hegemonic content—their capacity to involve not only (or mainly) professional journalists, but also normal citizens in news production, their horizontal links with their audience (Atkinson 2010) allowing overcoming distinctions between audience and producers, readers, and writers through co-performance (Atkinson 2010, 41). In complex media environments, different persons intervene and different types of media interact. Playing simultaneously different roles as producers and receivers of news (Mattoni 2009, 34), they do in fact engage in media practices, which define the ways in which "people exercise their agency in relation to media flows" (Couldry 2006, 27). Thanks to an increased capacity of normal citizens and activists to produce information, "people who have long been on the receiving end of one-way mass-communication are now increasingly likely to become producers and transmitters" (Bennet 2003, 34). In fact, the media audience is thus transformed into "a communicative subject increasingly able to redefine the process by which societal communication frames the culture of society" (Castells 2009, 116).

Convergences and divergences in a critical juncture trigger then controversies, not only between mainstream and alternative public spheres, but also within each of them. Considering the Charlie Hebdo attacks as a focalizing moment, we thus expect to observe transformations not only in the mainstream, mass-media public spheres but also within various public spheres that had hitherto been characterized by some shared visions about citizenship rights, inclusion and exclusion, freedoms and security.

COMMUNICATION IN MOVEMENTS: CLAIMING, FRAMING, AND JUSTIFYING

As outlined in the previous section, we developed our research upon the assumption that a transformative event like the Charlie Hebdo attacks can trigger a discursive critical juncture, as it not only produces emotionally intense responses but also symbolically upsets existing alignments on central

issues around citizens' rights. This fuels intense debates, within multiple public spheres, endowed with different degrees of deliberativeness and polarization. In these public spheres, different actors put forward demands and ideas, and argue about them. Building upon social movement studies, we can consider these utterances with the help of three different concepts that broadly—yet differently—refer to processes of communication in the public sphere: claiming, framing, and justifying. In the multiplicity of public spheres, we observe how actors articulate their claims—what they ask for, to whom, where, when, and how—but also how they frame their discourses and how they justify them. We suggest that triangulating the analysis of claims, frames, and justification ~~offers a better~~ understanding of the debate on the Charlie Hebdo attacks.

Social movement studies have invested much energy in investigating protest, considered as a main *modus operandi* for powerless actors (Lipsky 1969). Social movements use unconventional and disruptive forms of action in order to attract attention to perceived problems and suggested solutions. Acts of protests are, however, rarely left unexplained by their promoters: calls, leaflets, press releases, slogans, and petitions accompany them, using words to explain their meaning by explicating their requests. Through these expressions, social movement actors address their own public spheres as well as attempting to enter the mass-media public sphere. In ~~public spheres~~, they are of course not alone in claiming. Several actors engage in political *claim-making*, which has been defined as "a purposeful communicative action in the public sphere" (Koopmans and Statham 2010, 55). Claim-making acts are "public speech acts (including protest events) that articulate political demands, calls to action, proposals, or criticism, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants or other collective actors" (Koopmans and Statham 2010, 55).

Going beyond the simple definition of a claim as a demand, in social movement studies *framing* analysis acquired a prominent role in understanding the ways in which problems are defined, solutions suggested, and people mobilized. Located below the level of (broad and fixed) ideology, *frame* analysis focuses on the ways in which organizations bridge different, specific issues (Snow and Byrd 2007). Addressing the symbolic construction of external reality, frames are worldviews that guide public behavior. The analysis of frames allows consideration of how collective actors involved in the debate construct and communicate their visions of reality. Frame analysis focuses on the process of the attribution of meaning, which lies behind any conflict ~~through~~ diagnostic framing, addressing recognition of certain occurrences as social problems; prognostic framing, aiming at suggestions of possible strategies to resolve them; and motivational framing, spreading

motivations for acting upon these assumptions (Snow and Benford 1988). At the diagnostic level, a crucial step in the social construction of a problem consists in the identification of those responsible for the situation in which the aggrieved population finds itself, through an inevitably, highly selective process of reduction of social complexity (della Porta and Diani 2006). Prognostically, framing also articulates a proposal for change, with various degrees of discontinuity with existing structures. Finally, symbolic elaboration is needed in order to produce motivations and the incentives needed for action. In this direction, frames generalize a problem, indicating the connections with other events or with other social groups as well as the relevance it has in everyday life. Beyond criticizing dominant representations of order and social relations, frames must also produce new definitions of the foundations of collective solidarity, so transforming the collective identity in a direction which favors action (della Porta and Diani 2006). On all three levels, framing also singles out identity and oppositional frames distinguishing us from them ~~(Tilly 2003, 139;~~ Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann 2012).

AQ: Please note that the cross-reference "Tilly 2003" has not been provided in the reference list. Please provide the same.

If framing links claims to broader discourses, making sense of them within general worldviews, an additional task for collective actors is to justify one's own positions in relation to common general values. Claims' content and their framing are, that is, linked to *justifications* (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999). In various arenas, "[o]pposing political parties, interest groups, social movements and other political actors present competing claims, and justify them based on a set of moral principles," by providing answers for questions like "why is the problem you are addressing important?" and "how does the solution you propose contribute to the common good?" (Ylä-Anttila and Luhtakallio 2016).

EXPLAINING CLAIMS, FRAMES, AND JUSTIFICATIONS

Drawing on social movement studies, we are interested in investigating how claiming, framing, and justifying evolve through appropriation of opportunities and mobilization strategies. In our analysis, we bridge attention to context and to strategies. Social movement studies have linked framing to political opportunities and constraints, defined as a set of political conditions that, respectively, facilitate or thwart the capacity of challengers to influence public decision-making.

First, research on claims-making has pointed at the impact of stable opportunities, related to some characteristics of political systems. In

general, the more plural and differentiated a political system, the more it is supposed to favor pragmatic and moderate forms of claims-making. Some characteristics of these regimes are in fact translated into discursive opportunities that either encourage or discourage claimants and claim issues from participation in the public debate. As Bachrach and Baratz (1970) noted, elites and challengers struggle on the "mobilization of biases" that set the rules of appropriateness in each polity, supporting some arguments/issues and excluding others. More specifically, welfare regimes affect the ways in which the unemployed articulate their claims, and citizens' regimes influence claims-making on migration issues (Giugni 2010; Koopmans and Statham 1999; 2010).

Second, prognostic, diagnostic, and motivational frames have been linked to more mutable political opportunities such as the availability of allies and the characteristics of opponents. In developing their frames, actors try to make their discourses appealing to various circles of potential supporters through processes of articulation (connecting and aligning events), amplification (as in the marketing of some ideas), alignment (to audiences' cultural stocks), and bridging (linking frames) (Snow and Benford 1988). At the same time, actors also attempt to differentiate themselves from the discourse of their opponents. Finally, in order to achieve resonance, frames have to appear consistent (through logical complementarity of various aspects of tactics, discourse, and so on); empirically credible (in line with evidence about the world), culturally compatible (that is, making sense within the targeted audience's vision of the world; overlapping with society's cultural stock); and of central relevance (by addressing issues that are essential for the everyday life of the message's targets) (Noakes and Johnson 2005).

Similarly, justifications adapt to some characteristics of domestic public spheres, as they must resonate with deeply embedded norms and narratives (Yla-Anttila and Kukkone 2014). As Boltanski and Thevenot (1999) influentially suggest, the need for justifications increases in "critical moments," defined by unusual conditions and critical visions. Addressing a discursive critical juncture, we can assume that cognitive works tend to intensify in moments of rapid change. First, critical junctures act as catalysts for claims-making, opening windows of attention to specific problems as well as fueling hope for (or fear of) change. Second, in challenging existing assumptions, they push for the framing of new problems, solutions, and motivations. Third, as moments of crisis, critical junctures, by interrupting routines, might increase the need to justify new orientations, often orienting debates toward highly normative arguments. In these moments, reflexivity is prompted by the fact that "people involved in ordinary relations, who are

doing things together . . . and who have to coordinate their actions, realize that something is going wrong; that they cannot get along any more; that something has to change" (Boltanski and Thevenot 1999, 359).

While the context is certainly important, it does not determine actors' behavior. Rather, actors combine strategic and normative actions (or, in Weberian terms, rationality of the means and rationality of the goals). In line with social movement studies, we in fact expect the material as well as the symbolic resources of various collective actors to influence their presence in public spheres. In this sense, we might assume that communication by different actors is to a certain extent path-dependent, as it is constrained by existing symbolic repertoires. Claims tend to be coherent in time, building upon deeply rooted concerns, with also however some need for innovation (Jasper 2006). Frames are constantly remobilized in order to give meaning to emerging problems by building parallels with old conceptions but also breaking with them. Justifications are even more embedded, as they contribute to the long-term consolidation of collective identities, but also at the constitution of new ones.

In social movement studies, research on claims-making has explained the presence of civil society actors in the dominant public sphere by looking at their resources, but also at the choices they make between different communication strategies: from adaptation to innovation, from insiders to outsiders, from horizontal to vertical. Framing has also been considered as strategic, linked as it is to the efforts of influencing various audiences, including public opinion and decision-makers. Finally, justifications can be articulated in order to make an argument more resonant within different worlds of worthiness (Boltanski and Thevenot 1999). While justifications can be used strategically, however, they are deeply rooted at both the cognitive and the emotional levels:

> [T]he worlds of justification build on general moral principles institutionalized in the modern political imaginary through long historical processes. They are like an available set of tools that constrain and enable action and argumentation in the public sphere. They are also, at least to some extent, internalized by actors. Thus, these principles may also be associated with strong moral sentiments. Invoking moral justifications in public debate, therefore, reflects structures and related cognitive and emotional processes beyond instrumental choices of individual rational actors. (Ylä-Anttila 2016)

In sum, as reported in figure 1.1, we will be looking at claims, frames, and justifications in their interaction with contextual opportunities and collective resources.



Figure 1.1: The research model

Transformative events help in producing new symbolic resources, as they press for innovation by challenging old visions within the complex interplay among various actors linked to each other in cooperative as well as competitive interactions. Noticing that something is not working, people tend to stop their action and express discontent: "The one who criticizes other persons must produce justifications in order to support their criticisms just as the person who is the target of the criticism must justify his or her actions in order to defend his or her own cause. These justifications need to follow rules of acceptability" (Boltanski and Thevenot 2006, 360).

Within a relational approach, we pay particular attention to processes of communicative interactions between the various actors in a time perspective, looking at the development in the claims, frames, and justifications. In the controversy over the publication of the Mohammed cartoons in Denmark, the nature of the debate was transformed as external pressures produced a growth in the use of religiously justified affirmations of values that included tolerance, non-violence, democracy, and freedom of speech (Lindekilde 2009). Changes were connected to the relational nature of the controversy, as each collective action is, historically and spatially, linked to others of a similar type and with simultaneous actions by other actors (Lindekilde 2009). Religious justifications were used to bridge religious worldviews and secular principles, so that Muslims and non-Muslims in the debate seemed to speak different dialects of the same language, converging on the same principles of the secular public sphere even if stressing different interpretations and implications (Lindekilde 2009).

We also expected adaptations in claiming, framing, and justifying in the debate on the Charlie Hebdo attacks, with attempts at bridging various elements, often in tension with each other. In fact, as we will see in what follows, left-wing actors defended the value of inclusion, but with tensions around the degree of reciprocal cultural adaptation that was needed.

Right-wing groups appealed to liberal values, which were in tension with their traditional conservatism; they articulated a securitarian discourse against migrants, but also criticized the implementation of security measures against themselves. In the Charlie Hebdo debate, actors' claims addressed perceived opportunities and constraints that were ~~produced~~ by the attacks, whose meanings were framed in different ways. The emotional tension allowed for the certification of some actors and visions and the decertification of others, challenging previously existing narratives and calling for justification. This contributed to transforming existing symbolic and material resources, through the formation of new categories and the internalization of pressures from outside.

THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

The comparative dimensions

Our research adopts multiple comparative perspectives. Comparative attention is paid to the ways in which different actors mobilize resources in different public arenas in different countries.

First, the research design is based on a small-N *cross-national comparison*, which bridges most-similar and most-different research designs. Within a most-similar design, we assess the impact of different citizenship regimes as well as different regimes in the relations between Church and State on the debate after the Charlie Hebdo attacks. Within a most-different design, we are interested in how robust causal mechanisms (such as actor certification and decertification, brokerage; or appropriation of opportunities) work (similarly) in the different cases. A cross-national perspective allows us to investigate how some contextual characteristics are linked to the evolution of debates. Building upon existing literature, we ~~can~~ ~~consider~~ that citizenship regimes as well as Church–State relations play an important role in setting up opportunities and constraints for the actor strategies. As we specify in Chapter 2, we have selected four countries that varied broadly on both dimensions, thus allowing us to test some specific hypotheses on the influence of political opportunities on the various dimensions of the debate. In line with social movement studies, however, we expect that this effect is not deterministic, but rather filtered by the actors' appropriations of opportunities and constraints (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).

Given our interest in turning points and transformative events, we also introduced a time dimension to the comparison. Through sampling strategies (explained in the Technical Appendix), we covered the period

2010–2016. Specifically, we addressed the four intense weeks of debate after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, but also compared them with previous points in time as well as the debate at their first anniversary.

The debate on the Charlie Hebdo attacks speaks to different topics. A further innovative aspect of the research is in fact that it covers *several issues*. While previous research tended to focus on specific topics, we look in our work at how the debate related to the Charlie Hebdo attacks developed in particular on issues related to the broad understanding of citizenship, addressing related issues such as freedom of speech, civil rights, protection of religion, migration, and security.

Additionally, we adopt a *cross-actor* perspective. While previous research has looked at the effects of critical junctures on specific actors (for example, on claims-making by Muslims in Denmark [Lindekilde 2009]), we covered the claims-making, framing, and justification of different actors—such as institutional and civil society, Muslim and non-Muslim, left-wing and right-wing. As accounted for in the Technical Appendix, in the quantitative part we have analyzed various media outlets, coding various characteristics of the claim-makers. Based on this knowledge, we have then selected some crucial collective actors for more in-depth analysis. While assuming some specificity within each public sphere, we are interested in their internal plurality and, therefore, their internal tensions and contradictions. In the qualitative analysis, we addressed in particular those civil society actors that seemed more concerned with the attacks.

Triangulation of methods

From the methodological point of view, the research is based on a *triangulation* of quantitative and qualitative analysis. We have performed claims analysis of media discourse, and qualitative analysis of framing, justifications, and deliberation through a systematic analysis of selected documents.

Claims analysis . The first part of the research uses (quantitative) claims analysis of selected media sources. Claims analysis builds upon Protest Event Analysis (PEA), but it goes beyond PEA's focus on social movements as actors, and protest as form of action. As such, claims analysis shares some of the strengths and challenges noted for PEA. As Swen Hutter (2014, 335) noted, "Researchers rely on PEA, as a type of *content analysis*, to systematically assess the amount and features of protests across various geographical areas (from the local level up to the supranational level) and over

time (from short periods of time up to several decades)." Claims analysis is an evolution from PEA, by broadening the unit of analysis beyond protest in order to cover a broader group of public claims making (Hutter 2014, 338; see Koopmans and Statham 1999).

Various empirical projects have addressed the various problems of conceptualization (What is a protest? When does it start and end?), but (also and especially) of selection bias. Controlled though other sources—such as local newspapers (Hocke 1998), police records (Fillieule 1996), and protest permits (McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996)—data from newspapers emerged as covering only a small percentage of protest events. Systematic biases were identified, as coverage tended to increase with the number of participants, the radicalism of the forms of action, and the innovative character of the protest. Even more disturbing, issue cycles were found to strongly influence coverage, and a declining newsworthiness (and therefore coverage) of protest was noted (e.g., della Porta and Diani 2004). Finally, even when covered in the press, the information on protest events tended to be superficial, with several relevant variables (for example, the protest organizers) often missing. Other mentioned problems are the descriptive bias (linked to the limited and sometimes unreliable information included in newspapers) as well as the mainly descriptive use of the results (given difficulties in linking them with other macro, explanatory variables).

These limits notwithstanding, PEA has been considered as one of the few instruments that can be used to build systematic, long-term databases on protest. With precautions and many interpretative caveats, press-based PEA allows for controlling, if not the real amount and forms of protest, at least the associations among specific characteristics of protest repertoires, as well as very general trends. Similarly, claims analysis can be considered as a useful (even if partial) instrument to assess the presence of different actors in the (mediatic) public sphere. In claims analysis, the unit of analysis, the claim, consists of the following elements: the actor who initiates the claim; the form of action; the target at whom the claim is directed; an object actor, whose interests are affected by the event; the form it takes; and, finally, the substantive content of the event, which states what is to be done (issue) (Koopmans and Statham 1999; Caiani, della Porta, and Wageman 2012). This part of the research is focused in coverage: a) one main newspaper per country; b) the month after the event, as well as a period before and a period after it (see Technical Appendix for more details).

Frame analysis. The second part of our research is based on a frame analysis of statements found in documents of the selected organizations in each country. As Lasse Lindekilde (2014, 196) summarized,

> both discourse and frame analysis are preoccupied with investigating the relationship between movement "texts" and their broader contexts. In more abstract terms, the combined interest of discourse and frame analysis is the discursive battles over meaning and definition of reality, which play out within and among social movements, and among their friends and foes, often in the public sphere. However, discourse and frame analysis differ in the way they analyse these questions, in the scope of analytical ambition and in the degree of strategic rationality ascribed to actors.

Within a social constructivist perspective, Parker (1992) defined discourse as made of an interrelated set of texts as well as those practices of production, dissemination, and reception, which brings an object into being. So, a discourse is made of an interrelated set of texts filtered through meaning structures, which "may lend meaning to individual texts, but constitute an integrated whole," and "when we talk about 'discourse' and indulge in discourse analysis we are not only interested in the manifest and latent meaning articulated in a text, but also in how practices of production, dissemination and reception helped shape the particular meaning of the text" (Lindekilde 2014, 198). As a method to study discourses, frame analysis as a form of qualitatively oriented discourse analysis allows for a more in-depth analysis of the normative rooting of frames (Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann 2012). Among the main documents, we considered press releases, pamphlets, and calls for action, all of them retrieved online.

Justification analysis. Within discourse analysis, we have been particularly interested in how claims are morally justified (Boltanski and Thevenot 2006). As suggested by Yla-Anttila and Kukkone (2014), justification analysis takes into account the relations of different orders of worth within one argument by using codes that are identified deductively and then confronted with the documentary corpus. A main assumption is that in everyday disputes in the public sphere, actors tend to resort to a relatively limited number of moral principles, which have been elaborated by modern political philosophy (Yla-Anttila and Kukkone 2014).

As for the deliberative qualities of the debate, empirical investigations on discursive engagement in different settings have tended to focus upon interactions taking place within deliberative bodies, from parliaments to an ever growing array of public deliberation experiments (see Steiner 2012). While ad hoc deliberative forums have provided ideal settings in which to study deliberation (Bachtiger et al. 2014), greater attention remains to be paid to the quality of deliberation outside of these assemblies (Chambers 2012). Calls for a better understanding of the media's role in

deliberative democracy (e.g., Mansbridge et al. 2012) have been paralleled by an increasing effort to investigate mediated deliberation (e.g., Xenos 2008; Rinke et al. 2013; Wessler and Rinke 2014) and a decline in the level of attention to once dominating print media content in national newspapers (see Wessler 2008). In order to pin down the complex nature of democratic deliberation and to be able to assess qualitatively the extent to which the discussions under examination were deliberative and democratic, we articulated the notion of deliberation in eleven dimensions. Then, we investigated the extent to which each of these dimensions could be observed in the discussions in each country, one type of actor at a time.

THIS VOLUME

The aim of the next chapter is to provide background information about the political context in which the debate on the Charlie Hebdo attacks developed within the different national contexts.

Besides some general political trends developing at the European level (among which the financial crisis and its political consequences), Chapter 2 presents the main dimensions of political opportunities and constraints that are susceptible to explain cross-national differences in collective actors' claiming, framing, and justifying. In particular, we zoomed on two sets of dimensions that social movement studies have considered relevant: factors that can influence public debates over migration and ethnic relations in general—i.e., national citizenship regimes (Koopmans et al., 2005)—and factors which pertain more specifically to debates about Muslims and Islam in the secular public sphere—i.e., the regime addressing Church–State relations (Statham, 2016).

We then present a quantitative empirical analysis of political claims-making in France, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom, during the first month following the 2015 attacks. The comparative assessment of public debates on Charlie Hebdo addresses questions concerning the extent to which critical junctures can transform public understandings of collective problems. Acknowledging that the effects of national conceptions are filtered by the mass media—who act as gatekeepers over the access to the public sphere—the chapter ~~questions~~ the mechanisms driving this transformation, focusing on the visibility provided by the mass media to different types of actors and messages, and the repertoires used by these actors to access the public sphere. Our results indicate some common patterns of claims-making in critical times. They are overwhelmingly male-centered, and skewed toward actors that the media considers most

legitimate to intervene during national emergencies, notably governments and mass media practitioners. In contrast, civil society actors tended to be marginalized, as the media prioritized coverage of consensual claims about security and freedom of expression, alongside stories about Islam triggering political conflict. While contextual opportunities have some impact on the composition of the public debates, therefore, in the present case they do not seem able to explain much in terms of claim-making. Even though the Charlie Hebdo controversy was predominantly articulated at the national level, in fact, the public spheres in the aftermaths of the attacks display a similar configuration across the different contexts.

Chapter 3 introduces time into the picture, exploring how and to what extent a discursive critical juncture triggered by the Charlie Hebdo attacks changed the nature of public discourse, the tone used to address the different dimensions of conflict embedded in the controversy, and the way in which political actors engaged in the debate. By looking at public debates over time, we are able to observe the potential of critical junctures to change actors' perspectives on contentious issues and to transform interactions among collective actors. Our analysis focuses on three main characteristics of public debates: the type of actors that have access to the public sphere, the issues that they discuss, and the deliberative quality of the debate. Our findings indicate that the critical juncture condensed but also neutralized public debates, in that it increased attention but also reduced political conflict over the issues associated with Charlie Hebdo—at least in the mass media public sphere. In addition, the debate, which hardly met minimum standards of democratic deliberation, further deteriorated during the critical juncture.

Chapter 4 discusses the deliberative qualities of the Charlie Hebdo debate in alternative public spheres. The chapter explains the way in which deliberation has been operationalized for qualitative analysis. It then focuses on the deliberative qualities of the Charlie Hebdo debate among the three main public sphere actors under examination (far right, left wing, and religious groups). We find substantial variation in the deliberative democratic qualities displayed within and across the three public spheres while there is limited variation across countries.

In Chapter 5, we compare the debates that took place among left-wing groups and those engaged in civil rights advocacy after the Charlie Hebdo attacks. We argue that the attacks had a serious impact on reemphasizing differences inside left-wing public spheres, particularly on their unsettled issues with religion and freedom of expression. These tensions refer to racism and the protection of religious minorities as major issues of social inequalities to be addressed on the left. While we observed a consensus on

the stigmatization of racist or state violence, the means to tackle it varied according to the position of the actors in the field, in terms of ideological embeddedness and access to the public sphere, institutional recognition, and social capital. We first map these consensual topics across the different movements in Europe, and across national contexts. We then present the internal tensions in the left-wing sphere concerning diversity and pluralism in current democracies.

Chapter 6 focuses attention on a collective actor that has played a crucial role in migration and identity politics across Europe since the early 1990s: the far right. Relying on frame analysis of their web portals, social media pages, blogs, and websites, we investigate the narrative they constructed on Charlie Hebdo and uncover the patterns of interaction existing between them and other actors, within and across national settings. Our empirical analysis shows that the European far right effectively mobilized as a collective actor in the shadow of the January attacks. While the values upon which these movements mobilized, and the way in which they engaged with new opportunities to access the public sphere, varied considerably across contexts and groups, the patterns of mobilization and the stances taken by these different actors share the goal of depriving migrants, and Muslims in particular, of a common humanity. On the one hand, thus, the Charlie Hebdo juncture brought forth issues that are deeply intertwined with far right politics, and highly embedded in its propaganda. On the other, the far right recognized itself in the collective struggle of opposing multiculturalism and Islamization, and of representing the will of the people against corrupt political elites, at the national and transnational levels.

Chapter 7 addresses the discourses by religious groups, including Christian (both Catholic and Protestant), Jewish and Muslim actors. An important but often neglected part of those debates took place between mainstream actors and religious organizations but also among religious organizations themselves. These debates were embedded within distinct frameworks of institutional and political opportunities that differed greatly among the countries under study. On the one hand, there were different institutional frameworks regulating Church–State relations and diverging historical traditions concerning the place of religion in society and the importance of religion (or lack thereof) in understanding national identity. On the other hand, the countries under study differ in the duration of the presence of minority religious communities and in the political developments related to their acceptance or rejection as parts of the core society. These factors, in turn, influence the recognition (or lack thereof) of religious actors as legitimate partners in the public debates as well as the

attention paid to their views and the frames used for their understanding (from the French *laïcité* to the British multiculturalist model). In all cases, however, religious organizations sought to mobilize available resources and take into account discursive opportunities to reach audiences within and outside their respective religious spheres, and to express their views on a variety of issues ranging from radicalism to peaceful coexistence, from inter-religious affairs to national identity, from Islamophobia and anti-Semitism to integration.

Chapter 8 is devoted to an analysis of the justifications used by the different actors in debating the Charlie Hebdo attacks. Just as ethical issues take prominence in political debates, the empirical study of human morality is also developing in various disciplines, from social psychology and anthropology to political science and sociology. Addressing questions that have emerged within the sociology of valuation and evaluation, we look at the ways in which participants in the public debates use justifications for their claims, which become all the more relevant in "critical moments." Referring to the "imperative to justify," we analyze the moral principles referred to in the everyday debate. Among *religious organizations*, justifications refer to communitarian versus cosmopolitan views, freedom entering in tension with offenses against religion (blasphemy), and liberty with claims about security. Ecumenical arguments are also countered by claims about the superiority of one's own religion. With regard to the justifications in the *radical right*, the Charlie Hebdo attacks certainly functioned as a transformative event. While they do not reverse an existing trend, they do give more leverage to a justification based to a certain extent on civic values—such as defending freedom—but strongly bridged within justifications coming from the traditional world of worthiness. In general, the left addresses the Charlie Hebdo attacks with some difficulty, with tensions between a traditionally inclusive position toward migrants and minorities and the defense of freedom—which is perceived as a collective, rather than individual, right. This tension is visible in utterances, but also in silences. In general, the *left* uses mainly (or even exclusively) justifications linked to the world of civic values, in strong continuity with its own tradition. The expression of tensions on issues such as limits to individual freedom and the position toward religion in general—and Islam in particular—reflects some specific domestic traditions.

The concluding chapter goes back to the theoretical debates presented in the introduction, synthetizing the main empirical results of the various parts of our analysis. Opening up to future research in the field, we will speculate on the impact of the debate we have addressed in structuring the evolving struggle on citizenship and citizenship rights.

CHAPTER 2

Comparing mass media debates in the European public sphere

As discussed in the previous chapter, empirical evidence about the effects and consequences of transformative events, with the eventual development of critical junctures, remains unsystematic, being mainly limited to the ~~presentation~~ of supposedly representative examples. The extent to which critical junctures can transform public debates, and the mechanisms driving this transformation are still to be uncovered. In this chapter, we want to make an empirical contribution in this direction by systematically comparing claims-making in the mass media debates triggered by the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks in France, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

Claims-making has been often linked to available opportunities. Political opportunities as regime characteristics and ~~conjectural alliances~~ tend to resonate with discursive opportunities, setting the rules of appropriateness of a polity and ultimately facilitating (or hampering) the likelihood that certain arguments and issues enter public debates (Giugni 2010; Koopmans and Statham 1999; 2010). Beyond contextual characteristics, we considered, however, the specific ways in which actors filter them (acknowledge or discharge) through their own perceptions, desires, and point of views, with dilemmas between continuity and change, tradition and innovation. In addition, we considered that claims-making in the mass media is affected by assessments about the newsworthiness of arguments and stories (Goodwin and Jasper 2004) but also by their resonance to prevailing cultural views, empirical credibility, and relevance for the everyday life of their audience (Noakes and Johnson 2005).

In our analysis, we therefore build upon but also adjust the notion of political opportunity structures, understood as the main aspects of a political

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system that affect the possibilities of different groups to mobilize effectively (Tarrow 1996). Depending on factors outside the mobilizing groups, available opportunities provide options to collective action which crucially shape the strength and strategies of groups competing to get visibility in the public sphere (Koopmans 2004). In this respect, some general political trends were visible at the European level. Most relevant, the financial crisis was still affecting the eurozone, with an ensuing social crisis that hurt the everyday lives of a large part of the citizens in the four countries under analysis (della Porta 2015). Meanwhile, a gradual process of value change starting in the early 1990s strengthened conservative actors engaged in a full-frontal attack against multiculturalism and immigration (Ignazi 1992; Kriesi 2008). In all four countries, these processes had serious political consequences, triggering a crisis of legitimation, with a widespread contestation of the retreat of the state, and a drastic drop of trust in political institutions, especially the mainstream political parties.

While these were common trends, cross-national differences in the articulation of public debates in the mass media can explain the specific ways in which collective actors competed to shape shared understandings of the issues associated with the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks. In this respect, we assume that issue-specific opportunities could play a relevant role (Berclaz and Giugni 2005), with political claim-making in the public sphere standing in a dialectic relationship with the formal rules ~~and symbolic interpretations~~ that define national belonging (Koopmans et al. 2005). Specifically, previous studies argued that the Charlie Hebdo attacks represented a "generative political event," which fueled conflict around specific values linked to secularism, multiculturalism, and freedom of expression (Titley et al. 2017, 3). ~~Hence, we~~ argue that specific opportunities stemmed from shared understandings of the nation-state and national identities, notably concerning the role of religion in the public space, and state sovereignty in attributing citizenship. Hence, our analysis of political and discursive opportunities focuses on the definition of a) state regimes regulating citizenship and migration and b) national regulations addressing Church–State relations.

The effects of these national conceptions are, however, filtered by the mass media—which act as gatekeepers over the access to the public sphere (Gamson 1988; Koopmans 2004)—as well as by the actors' appropriation of opportunities and challenges (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). This are influenced by the resources available to the different groups participating in a debate, and the mental scripts they use to make sense of reality (Bail 2015). Unlike previous research that tended to focus only on specific issues or actors shaping public debates, we consider ~~therefore~~ not only who

intervenes in the public sphere, but also the issues around which contention takes place, as they become manifest through political claims-making in the mass media. By looking at the different *type of collective actors* that have access to the public sphere, we can trace the "newness-criteria" which introduce biases in the public debate, for instance by privileging stories including known and powerful actors and marginalizing the powerless instead (Lipsky 1969). By looking at the *issues* that these actors carry with their claims in the mass media, we explore actors' shared understandings of the values and beliefs associated to the Charlie Hebdo controversy, ~~so~~ reconstructing the role played by conflictual and emotionally loaded stories in the debate.

Before moving to the empirical investigation of the public debates surrounding the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the first section discusses the main dimensions of political opportunities and constraints whose relevance for claiming, framing, and justifying we wish to assess. Specifically, we look at factors that can influence public debates over migration and ethnic relations in general—i.e., national citizenship regimes (Koopmans et al. 2005)—and factors which pertain more specifically to debates about Muslims and Islam in the secular public sphere—i.e., the regime addressing Church–State relations (Statham 2016). Based on the extensive quantitative material obtained through Political Claims Analysis (PCA), we offer then an overview of the mass-media debate over the first month following the attacks, notably addressing a) the visibility provided by the mass media to different types of actors engaging in claims-making, b) the repertoire of action used by these actors upon participating in the *Charlie Hebdo* debates, and c) the content of the claims in the public sphere, whereby we differentiate the relative importance (or salience) of the issues embedded in the controversy, and the positions and polarization of actors over these. In the final section, we summarize our main comparative findings and reflect upon which collective actors, and what type of claims profit most from the opening of political space~~s~~ resulting from the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

The citizenship regime

The debates on the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks addressed first of all issues of citizenship, at the crossroads between the French concept of *Vivre Ensemble* (to live together) (Diallo, Embarki, and Kaouthar 2016), collective understandings of migration and integration, and public debates on

security and pluralism. In line with previous research, we expect claiming, framing, and justifying to be affected by the dominant conceptions of citizenship in the four countries (Koopmans et al. 2005; Lindekilde 2008; Cinalli and Giugni 2013).

Strongly influenced by historical institutionalist explanations, the national models perspective was established by the work of Rogers Brubaker (1998), and then progressively amended to place increasing emphasis on citizenship regimes rather than on the initial conditions of nation-building (Joppke 1999; Hansen and Weil 2001). In line with this research, we understand citizenship regimes as "institutionalized systems of formal and informal norms that define access to membership, as well as rights and duties associated with membership, within a polity" (Vink 2017, Ch. 12). The regulation of membership in political communities is crucial for our analysis, because citizenship is intrinsically connected with the self-determination of communities, and thus with their ~~political participation and~~ access to the national public sphere. Put differently, we see the type of public debates around *Charlie Hebdo*, with its multiple actors, as crucially influenced by the opportunities and constraints set by national citizenship regimes and integration models.

For the purposes of this study, we focus exclusively on citizenship rules laid down in nationality laws (Bauböck 2014). While these differ enormously with regard to the legal provisions and conditions for acquisition and loss of nationality, they share the fundamental principle of nationality law, which regulates the "automatic acquisition of citizenship status at birth, either by descent from citizen parents or by birth in the territory of the state" (Bauböck 2014, 753). In order to configure "national models," citizenship regimes are understood as internally coherent and relatively stable constructs determined by historic conditions of nation-building (for example, colonial past, revolutionary regime changes, ethno-linguistic national unification, and so on). If long-term change in these models is driven by shifting patterns of migration, short-term variation is generally associated with political factors and government composition, "with left-of-centre governments promoting naturalization, *ius soli* and toleration of dual citizenship and right-of-centre governments resisting or reversing such changes" (Vink, Bauböck, and Shaw 2016, 411).

Going beyond nationhood, human rights legislation has been adopted by all the states in question, giving birth to national anti-discrimination policies that are also influenced by transnational frameworks (see the RACE directive of the EU/2000). But states have been reluctant to recognize that discrimination based on ascription of groups in ethnic identities ("racialization") (Roseneil, Halsaa, and Summer 2012) still occurs and is

promoted through state mechanisms as well (see racial profiling, Roma, and so on). Anti-discrimination policies to that extent fell short, especially after 9/11 and the ensuing anti-Muslim laws in several European countries, which led some scholars to speak of a "racialization of Muslims" in Europe (Garner and Selod 2015). Finally, there has been increasing securitization of citizenship policies, as in the case of citizenship deprivation for terrorist suspects (Macklin and Bauböck 2015). In fact, as stressed in the introductory chapter, beyond formal regulations, citizenship practices seem to be characterized by a move toward increasing exclusion.

In recent years, scholars have suggested that citizenship laws may serve multiple purposes at the same time, thus questioning the opportunity to map on a single dimension all cross-national variation in terms of access to status and rights. Most notably, Vink and Bauböck (2013) have suggested that territorial and ethnocultural criteria are not to be understood as opposites on a unidimensional scale, but rather as two independent dimensions defining territorially and/or ethnoculturally inclusive regimes. Others have argued that regimes vary, not just in terms of citizenship status and rights (individual equality), but also in terms of provisions concerning cultural and religious diversity (Koopmans et al. 2005; 2012). This differentiation is crucial for our analysis in that it enables us to distinguish between rights that are attributed to the individual him or herself, and those attributed to an individual because of his or her belonging to an ethnic or religious group. The first set of rights allows us to differentiate countries with an ethnic understanding of citizenship from those with a civic-territorial citizenship model ("equality of access"). The second, instead, allows the mapping of countries based on their willingness to recognize minority and group rights, distinguishing between a monocultural or a pluralist understanding of cultural difference and group rights (Koopmans et al. 2012, 1210).

Several previous studies have attempted to empirically measure immigrant citizenship rights cross-nationally—among them the 2008 Citizenship Rights for Immigrants Index (ICRI), the 2010 Multicultural Policies Index (MPI), and the 2014 Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (see Migration Policy Group 2010).[1] In terms of *individual equality*,

1. For a full list of the ICRI indicators, see www.wzb.eu/en/research/migration-and-diversity/migration-integration-transnationalization/projects/indicators-of-citizenship. The Multicultural Policies Index (MPI) only measures the cultural diversity dimension, and the most recent data available to date are for 2010 (see Banting and Kymlicka 2012). The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) mainly includes indicators that are situated on the individual equality dimension (see Migration Policy Group 2010).

the data from ICRI show significant cross-national differences in 2008, which are largely confirmed by MIPEX data for 2014.[2] The United Kingdom stands out as the country closest to the civic-territorial pole, whereas Italy is consistently found closer to the lower end, corresponding to an ethnic understanding of citizenship. Germany and France occupy a more ambiguous position. While ethnic considerations prevail over civic-territorial elements for both countries, MIPEX data for 2014 suggests that Germany has surpassed France, and is now situated toward the civic-territorial end of the spectrum.[3]

On *cultural diversity*,[4] Great Britain displays the most culturally pluralist conception of citizenship, with considerably higher scores than Germany, Italy, and France, mainly due to the adoption of provisions for ethnic representation, affirmative action policies, dress-code exemptions, and ethnic-group funding. MPI data shows important changes over time for Germany, which stands out compared to Italy and France for an increasing recognition of immigrant integration as a permanent feature of the country landscape, and for the funding of ethnic group organizations or activities. In France, by contrast, republican universalism is combined with naturalization rules imbued with references to customs, manners, and assimilation, which indicate a tendency toward a culturally monist understanding of citizenship. The only domain of multiculturalism that applies in the French context relates to policies promoting social cohesion for migrant communities, implemented after the Paris riots of 2005 (even if these policies took shape through a territorial rather than an ethnic understanding of inequality). In Italy, instead, multiculturalism applies only to the allowance of dual citizenship, which—as suggested by Vink and Bauböck (2013)—has more to

2. In the ICRI, the country closest to the ethnic pole receives a score of -1.00 whereas the country (or countries) closest to the civic-territorial pole receives a score of 1.00. A country that is situated in between these extremes scores 0 (Koopmans et al., 2005). In the MIPEX, we selected only the indicators corresponding to ICRI's indicators of individual equality. These are measured on a 0–100 scale indicating the extent to which policies are favorable or unfavorable to migrant rights (Migration Policy Group 2010).

3. Individual equality: ICRI scores (2008) UK=0.58; GE=0.18; FR=0.18; IT=0.10; MIPEX scores (2014) UK=46; GE=43; FR=35; IT=31.

4. In the ICRI, a score of -1.00 is given to countries that are closest to the monist-assimilationist pole, whereas a score of 1.00 is attributed to those that are closest to the pluralist-multicultural pole, and a score of 0 for those situated in between (Koopmans et al. 2005). In the MPI, countries can receive a total score of 8 on eight policy areas in which states could develop multicultural forms of citizenship in relation to immigration (Banting and Kymlicka 2012).

Table 2.1: CITIZENSHIP REGIME CONFIGURATIONS

		Cultural diversity	
		Low plurality	*High plurality*
Individual equality	*Low inclusivity*	Italy	Germany
	High inclusivity	France	United Kingdom

do with the desire to include extraterritorial populations than a willingness to integrate immigrant populations residing in the Italian territory.[5]

Overall, therefore, the United Kingdom most closely resembles the model of civic-territorial and culturally-pluralist understanding of citizenship, at least among the countries we address in our analysis. Italy occupies at the polar position an example of a monist regime, in line with previous studies recognizing the ethnic imprint of the Italian legislation on citizenship (Zincone and Basili 2013). Germany and France can be located between these two extremes in terms of the individual equality dimension, as well as cultural diversity—although on the latter they must be considered much closer to the culturally-monist than to the multiculturalist end of the citizenship spectrum.

Table 2.1 below classifies the four countries under observation according to the two dimensions of inclusivity and pluralism, articulating the dimensions of equality and diversity discussed so far.

Church–State relations

Another dimension, part of the stable opportunity structure, emerges as relevant for our debates, given their focus on religious freedoms: the relations between Church and State. While few systematic analyses of public claims-making throughout controversies like the Muhammad caricatures debate exist, extant research suggest that the mobilization of religious minorities changes depending on national understandings of the role of religion in the public sphere (Lindekilde 2008). Research on this topic in Europe has pointed to common trends as well as differences. As for the commonalities, the very specificity of the Christian religion has been singled out, within common trends toward secularization and the withdrawal of religion from

5. Cultural diversity: ICRI scores (2008) UK=0.30; IT=0.00; GE=-0.10; FR=-0.19. MPI scores (2010) UK=5.5; GE=2.5; FR=2.0; IT=1.5.

the public sphere. Differences have also been stressed. First of all, in some European countries a state religion survives, with institutionalized recognition, while other countries follow a "republican" tradition in which laicity prevails. Among the countries we address in our analysis, the United Kingdom is a case of state religion (the Church of England), while France is, at the polar position, the typical example of *laïcité*, with Italy and Germany in between.

Research on the institutional assets of Church–State relations has in fact produced different classifications (see Madeley and Enyedi 2003; Fetzter and Soper 2005; Fox 2008). While all European states recognize freedom of religion—including free practices of religion in the private sphere as well as the ability to promote religious values in public (Stephan 2000, 39)—the degree of religious plurality varies. Christian denominations are the overwhelming majority in all of these countries, with Catholicism predominant in Italy and France, Protestantism in the United Kingdom, and an almost equal presence of Catholics and Protestants in Germany. Muslim minorities vary in size: in 2010, there were approximately 4.8 million Muslims in Germany (5.8 percent of the population); 4.7 million Muslims in France (7.5 percent); 3 million (4.8 percent) in the United Kingdom; and 2.2 million (3.7 percent) in Italy. France contains the largest Jewish community in Europe, with over 450,000 people, followed by the United Kingdom (290,000), Germany (117,000) and Italy (27,000).

In order to assess Church–State relations, many classifications rely mainly on constitutional provisions and legal aspects distinguishing between a close relationship versus a separation of Church and State (Minkenberg and Ulrich 2003). In this direction, Gerhard Robbers proposed three types of relations: state church systems (Denmark, England, Greece, Sweden, and Finland); systems of strict separation (France, the Netherlands, Ireland); and a system of common tasks (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) (Robbers 1996, 324). Similarly, Maurice Barbier (1995) classified Western European countries as laicist (France), quasi-laicist (Italy, Spain, and Portugal), semi-laicist (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), or non-laicist (Denmark, England, and Greece).

In order to measure the degree of regulation versus deregulation, scholars have considered whether or not (1) there is a single, officially recognized state church, (2) there is official state recognition of some denominations but not others, (3) the state appoints or approves the appointment of church leaders, (4) the state pays church personnel salaries directly, (5) there is a system of ecclesiastical tax collection, (6) the state directly subsidizes, beyond mere tax breaks, the operation, maintenance, or capital expenses of churches (Chaves and Cann 1992). Categories are thus

constructed on the basis of the dominance of relations of "deregulation" or "separation" (Ireland, the Netherlands, and France); "partial regulation" or "partial establishment" (Austria, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Switzerland); and "full regulation" or "full establishment" (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden).

Notwithstanding these differences, as Minkenberg (2011a) summarized, there is broad agreement that in Western Europe France is the one end of the spectrum, and Scandinavian countries on the other, with other countries located between the two poles and broad variation even among the Catholic countries.

As for the type of evolution in the relations between Church and State, some convergence has been noted toward increasing freedom of practicing religions but also a privatization of the religious spheres. However, global changes have also challenged long-term political and institutional arrangements toward secularism that had seemed dominant in liberal democracies. 9/11 as well as migrations and growing religious diversity reopened some old issues and let new ones emerge. In particular, debates have emerged both in countries with identification of a state religion (e.g., the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the Scandinavian countries) and those with separation of Church and State (such as the United States and France). The first group displays growing conflict and the progressive realigning of religion in the public sphere, as exemplified by controversies on religious education in Germany, and on the recognition of Muslim communities and the established Church of England in the United Kingdom. Similarly, in countries characterized by separation of Church and State, civil society actors have increasingly challenged the neutrality of the state in religious matters. On the one hand, secularism has been under pressure for its presumed incapacity to guarantee state neutrality or balance between religious forces, notably in France. On the other, debates have emerged about secularism as a political position at the expense of religion or as a political program equivalent to a secularist state religion (Minkenberg 2007).

Besides the formal separation between Church and State, the party system could also introduce elements of privileged access for the dominant religious confessions, in particular through the presence of confessional parties. This is the case in two of our countries, Italy and Germany, both having a tradition of strong Christian Democratic parties. While this tradition is kept alive in Germany through the CDU-CSU, in Italy, after the demise of the *Democrazia Cristiana*, the Catholic Church kept privileged access to both the *Partito Democratico*, on the center-left, and *Forza Italia*, on

Table 2.2: CHURCH–STATE RELATIONS CONFIGURATIONS

		Separation of Church and State	
		Low	*High*
Confessional parties	*Weak tradition*	United Kingdom	France
	Strong tradition	Germany	Italy

the center-right. Crossing the two dimensions, these countries can thus be located as shown in Table 2.2.

While we will refer to these assessments of issue-specific political and discursive opportunities also in the chapters addressing the ways in which some collective actors frame and justify their positions in the debate on the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, in what follows we will look in particular at claims-making in the media, focusing on the collective actors that succeeded in getting coverage for their interventions in the public sphere.

THE *CHARLIE HEBDO* DEBATES IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE

Can critical events like the January 2015 Paris attacks transform public debates ~~at the European level~~? The first step in answering this question is to carefully map the contours of the environment in which public debates take place—that is, all types of collective actors that have access to the mass media after major crises.[6] Using data on public claims-making across the four countries (see discussion in the Technical Appendix), we will scrutinize whether the superior social resources and status of institutional actors enable them to dominate public debates after major junctures, or whether on the contrary such events facilitate the participation of minority and religious groups at the core of the controversy.

The second step in answering the above question is to assess the substantive content of the debate in the mass media—that is, the media

6. Previous studies suggest that a correct definition of the cultural environment of public debates needs to account for all actors vying to influence public discourse (Bail 2015). In line with the mixed-methods design of the present research, therefore, the current section focuses on the relatively few actors that succeeded in reaching the media, whereas the following empirical chapters (Chapter 5–8) will extend the analysis to the other civil society organizations regardless of whether they receive media coverage.

controversies that followed the attacks. The study of the main problems discussed in the European debate illustrates how political conflict unfolded, and offers detailed analyses of the articulation of support and opposition with respect to the various issues embedded in the controversy around *Charlie Hebdo*. To assess the nature of debates, we analyze the content of eleven issue categories (corresponding to five broad topics; see Technical Appendix) based on three main conceptual components of political conflict: issue salience, issue positions, and issue polarization. Salience pertains to the *visibility* of different topics in the public sphere. Positions determine the *relationship* between one actor and the issue at the core of a claim. And polarization measures the *intensity* of conflict related to an issue (Kriesi et al. 2012; Berkhout et al. 2015; Castelli Gattinara 2016).

Finally, the questions posed above require comparative analysis of the articulation of debates in the four national settings. On the one hand, this means focusing on what types of actors gain visibility and public resonance as claims-makers, based on the different national contexts in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. On the other, this implies interrogating the mechanisms by which specific issues become newsworthy depending on the institutional and discursive framework available for claims-making across countries. Looking at the interplay between opportunity structures and the gatekeeping practices of the mass media, the next sections of this chapter offer an exploration of how critical events shape public controversies and an in-depth analysis of cross-national variation in the nature and content of national debates around Charlie Hebdo.

The visibility of collective actors in the media

We start by addressing the collective actors that appear as the carriers of political claims in the media, looking first at the aggregate European debate, and then at the individual national cases. Table 2.3 displays the percentage shares of claims-making by different types of actors over the first month following the 2015 attacks, aggregated across the four countries.

The right-hand part of the table offers general information about the individual actors carrying the claims—or claimants—in terms of gender, type (collective vs individual claims-makers), and scope (supranational, foreign, national, and subnational). Looking at the scope of claims-making is informative of the level at which the *Charlie Hebdo* debates took place. It shows that the overwhelming majority of interventions pertained to the national, rather than supranational, level. In this respect, the transnational resonance of the attacks did not seem to trigger a debate among European

Table 2.3: COLLECTIVE ACTORS IN THE DEBATE: PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL CLAIMS (2015)

Collective actors	%	N	Claimants	%	N
State and party actors			***Gender***		
Government actors	18.7	478	Male	83.4	1558
Political parties	11.2	286	Female	16.6	306
State executive agencies	10.9	279	*Total*	100.0	1869
Judiciary actors	2.0	52	***Type of Actor***		
EU and supranational actors	1.6	41	Individual actor	23.9	717
Total state and party actors	*44.4*	*1136*	Collective actor	24.0	721
Civil society actors			Member of collective actor	52.1	1563
Mass media	25.7	656	*Total*	100.0	3001
Religious groups	8.0	205	***Scope of Actor***		
Unions and professional groups	4.1	104	Supranational	6.0	173
Left-wing and civil-rights actors	2.9	74	Foreign national	46.3	1339
Radical-right actors	3.7	95	National / subnational	47.7	1379
Experts and commentators	11.0	281	*Total*	100.0	2891
Total civil society actors	*55.4*	*1415*			
Total	100.0	2551			

or supranational actors (unlike in previous debates about immigration or Islam; Koopmans et al. 2005; Cinalli and Giugni 2013). Rather, it activated a series of bilateral exchanges between national actors, as illustrated by the high visibility of foreign actors (46 percent), as newspapers from other European countries hosted interventions by French commentators, and vice-versa.

A second, defining feature of the mass-mediated debate around *Charlie Hedbo* concerns gender. Considering only public interventions for which the gender of the claimant could be identified, the debate was considerably skewed toward male actors, with only 16 percent of claimants being women. This is confirmed across all four countries under study. While the tendency is somewhat more pronounced in Italy than elsewhere (only 14 percent of claims are by female actors), similar trends are confirmed in France, Germany, and United Kingdom, where claims by women are consistently below 20 percent. This finding is likely related to established obstacles to female political participation in Western democracies, which are further reproduced by a media coverage particularly focused on government and executive actors, where women are often underrepresented (Global Media Monitoring Project 2015). Most notably, the type of news stories reported by media, which—as we will see—privileged issues of security and emergency, might have further widened the gender gap. Still, the magnitude

of this result hints at the presence of a bias in the journalistic selection of stories to be reported in the mass media, leading to a chronic disadvantage of women as claims-makers in the public sphere.

The left column of Table 2.3 groups actor types depending on their degree of institutionalization, differentiating state and party actors from civil society ones. It shows that the former (44.4 percent) are somewhat less visible than the latter, in the general debate (55.4 percent). This finding largely depends on the role of mass-media actors and journalists—which by themselves account for over one-fourth of the total mass-media debate (25.7 percent). Other civil society groups were relegated to a more marginal role, including organizations at the right-wing and left-wing edges of the political spectrum (less than 4 percent), as well as religious groups (8 percent). As it appears, the mass media are, by themselves, the main carriers of claims in the *Charlie Hebdo* debates in national newspapers. Since this may have partly to do with our methodological choice to use the mass media as a source of data, we differentiate two forms of claims-making by mass media actors. Out of the total claims reported in the table for mass media actors, editorials and comment pieces by newspaper journalists account for 11.5 percent, whereas claims from other media outlets and journalists (including *Charlie Hebdo*) account for an additional 14.2 percent.

Since the debate focused extensively on free speech and freedom of expression, the media themselves and the practitioners of the sector became an integral part of the story—first, because journalists mobilized. On January 8, French newspaper *LeMonde* reports of the mobilization by journalists, both individually and collectively, who "faced with the horror" felt the need to "give an exceptional response." The French national union of journalists promoted one of the first rallies in support of the victims in Paris, whereas *Reporters Sans Frontières* distributed photos and portraits of the victims. And second, the nature of the attacks led journalists to question the impact of the event on their everyday practice and profession. *Le Monde* for instance expected that the emotional wave generated by the attacks would have brought media practitioners closer to the public, and raised the question if this was an opportunity "to consider the distance between the media and their audience."

Media priorities during times of national emergency also explain the extensive coverage granted to institutional actors. During exceptional times, national governments are expected to provide some guidance as to how reality ought to be understood—so that they often end up by taking the lion's share of public attention. Indeed, governments and state executive agencies account for more than 30 percent of the total claims-making on the *Charlie Hebdo* debates. Other political parties and national assembly

MPs promote 10 percent of the claims. These interventions notably include the calls for national unity by French President François Hollande, but also formal statements like the joint press release by David Cameron and Angela Merkel, condemning the attack "against values that we both defend: freedom of expression, freedom of press." Newspapers also covered the interventions by other members of national executives, such as the French justice minister Christiane Taubira, notably for her public appeal to prosecutors to take tough action against those who condoned terrorism and anti-Semitism, and to crack down on online incitement to terrorism. In general terms, the coverage of government actors in the aftermaths of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks largely outweigh the figures of previous research on the Muhammad cartoons controversy (Lindekilde 2008) and on immigration in general (Koopmans et al. 2005). In this regard, existing studies demonstrated how governments, notably in France, actively engaged to impose their framing of the attacks in the public debate, endeavoring to present stark messages about the nation's particular attachment to freedom of speech (Faucher and Boussauguet 2017). To quote the address delivered by French president François Hollande on Jaunary 7, 2015: "[T]he Republic equals freedom of expression; the Republic equals culture, creation, it equals pluralism and democracy. That is what the assassins were targeting."

To observe these dynamics more closely, Table 2.4 reports the coverage of the different types of actors in each of the four countries under observation.[7] Overall, the findings show that there is more cross-national similarity than difference, and confirm the privileged position of mass-media practitioners and government actors in a debate located at the crossroads between national security interests and conflicts over freedom of speech. Among civil society actors, the mass media stands out in the debate across all four countries, with scores ranging from a minimum of 20 percent in Germany, to a maximum of 29 percent in Italy. As for state and party actors, their coverage ranges from a minimum of 41 percent in Italy and France, to a maximum of 55 percent in Germany. While the specific type of actors within this category varies to a certain extent, probably because of the decisiveness of executive intervention and government-opposition

7. In order to test the significance of cross-national variation and strength of the association between categories, we performed Chi-Square tests of goodness of fit and Cramér's V measures of association on the values reported in the table. The results of the tests indicate that the presence of different collective actors in the debate is statistically different across countries, but the association is weak: X2 (30, N = 2,551) = 225.2, $p < 0.01$ (Cramér's V = 0.17).

Table 2.4: COLLECTIVE ACTORS BY COUNTRY: PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL CLAIMS (2015)

Collective actors	France	United Kingdom	Germany	Italy
State and party actors				
Government actors	14.9	19.9	25.4	19.4
Political parties	14.0	7.9	17.8	6.8
State executive agencies	8.6	15.7	8.6	11.4
Judiciary actors	2.2	3.1	0.5	1.8
EU and supranational actors	1.6	0.4	3.1	2.0
Total state and party actors	*41.3*	*47.0*	*55.4*	*41.4*
Civil society actors				
Mass media	23.5	27.8	20.7	29.4
Religious groups	9.6	5.5	9.7	7.5
Unions and professional groups	7.2	4.9	2.4	0.5
Left-wing and civil-rights actors	3.8	4.6	2.0	0.8
Radical-right actors	4.9	2.5	2.7	3.8
Experts and commentators	9.6	7.5	7.1	17.4
Total civil society actors	*58.6*	*52.8*	*44.6*	*59.5*
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	893	546	382	730

interaction, government actors take the lion's share in all national contexts under observation.

The political opportunity structure perspective would lead us, however, to expect important cross-national differences regarding other types of actors, as their opportunity to get visibility in the media depends—at least to a certain extent—on the resonance of their claims with the issues embedded in the Charlie Hebdo debates. As regards citizenship regimes, the table shows that the mainstream media in the four countries provided relatively little coverage to radical right parties as well as to actors promoting minority and civil rights, irrespective of the patterns of opportunity within their respective national systems. If radical right actors often enjoy advantages after major crises, and journalists are influenced by the emotional appeals of fringe organizations (Bail 2015), these parties and movements were largely ignored by the media in France (4.9 percent), and even more so in Italy (3.8 percent), Germany (2.7 percent), and the United Kingdom (2.5 percent). Left-wing and civil-rights actors are even less visible than radical-right ones, obtaining some coverage only in the United Kingdom (4.6 percent), while being virtually missing in the Italian debate (0.8 percent). This can partly be explained by the fact that

the communication space in the first month after the attacks was already crowded by other actors—such as the media and national governments—perceived as more legitimate in the cultural environment. As regards religious groups, the national configurations explored earlier would lead to expect that religious and minority groups are more likely to intervene in the public sphere in countries promoting separation between Church and State or displaying a tradition of confessional parties. Indeed, religious groups are least visible in the United Kingdom (5.5 percent) and most visible in France (9.6 percent), which represent opposing configurations of Church–State separation. While this might indicate privileged access to the public sphere for dominant religious confessions, the differences with countries with strong tradition of confessional parties like Germany (9.6 percent) and Italy (7.5 percent) are rather small. This suggests that the visibility of religious groups after major crises depends as much on the recognition of their status, as on other factors related to their resources and potential allies within the system, including the mass media themselves—which ultimately decide what voices are newsworthy.

Repertoire of action in the *Charlie Hebdo* debates

Since the visibility of actors in the media is deeply intertwined with the repertoire by which they intervene in the public sphere (Castelli Gattinara and Froio 2018b), Table 2.5 below displays the action forms adopted by claimants. As noted in the previous section, the vast majority of claims

Table 2.5: ACTION FORMS IN THE CHARLIE HEBDO DEBATES (2015)

Actions	%	N
State intervention		
Political decisions	2.7	78
Repressive measures	7.4	212
Public statements	67.2	1920
Conventional actions	6.4	180
Protest actions		
Demonstrative protests	4.2	121
Confrontational protest	0.3	8
Violent protests	4.9	142
Online campaigns	6.9	197
Total	100.0	2858

covered in the newspapers are public statements (67 percent), such as press conferences, interviews, written statements, and declarations, which is in line with previous content analytical work (Eurislam 2010; Koopmans et al. 2005). Yet, our data also shows that actors intervene in the public domain in other ways: More than 10 percent of the action forms that were retrieved are state interventions, most of which repressive measures by the police and other law enforcement agencies. This includes the French police crackdown on speech that glorifies terrorism, with newspapers reporting of young boys being questioned by the police for refusing to pay respect to the victims at school, or people being sentenced for publicly condoning the attacks and the perpetrators. Other forms of intervention include parliamentary actions and other conventional forms of intervention by private actors and civil society organizations, such as the publication of reports and commemorations (6.4 percent). Protest actions account for an additional 10 percent of the total claims-making. This form of intervention is further differentiated in terms of demonstrative (4.2 percent), confrontational (0.3 percent), and violent protests (4.9 percent). This figure is much lower than the one of previous research on public debates on immigration in 1992–1998 (Koopmans et al. 2005).

Table 2.6 disaggregates these findings for each individual country. Albeit confirming that verbal public statements are the primary form of intervention in the public sphere across the four contexts, the figure ranges from a maximum of over 70 percent in Italy and France, to about 55 percent in the

Table 2.6: ACTION FORMS IN THE CHARLIE HEBDO DEBATE, BY COUNTRY (2015)

Actions	France	United Kingdom	Germany	Italy
State intervention				
Political decisions	2.6	1.3	3.6	3.9
Repressive measures	2.7	11.3	5.9	7.0
Public statements	72.5	55.4	67.6	73.6
Conventional actions	5.3	5.8	10.4	5.9
Protest actions				
Demonstrative protests	4.1	4.6	7.5	2.3
Confrontational protest	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.4
Violent protests	3.2	6.9	4.1	5.3
Online campaigns	7.1	14.7	0.5	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	877	829	386	766

United Kingdom. The results also highlight a certain variation as regards the importance attributed by the media to state ~~intervention~~ measures, which are considerably less visible in France (5 percent) than in the United Kingdom (12 percent), and to online campaigns, which are covered in the United Kingdom (14 percent) and France (7 percent) much more than in Germany and Italy. If we take the percentage of extra-institutional protests (demonstrative, confrontational, and violent actions) as an indicator of the radicalism of the action repertoire in a given country, we find the most moderate repertoire in France (7.6 percent), closely followed by Italy (8 percent), Britain (11.6 percent), and Germany (12 percent).

These ~~demonstrations~~ include the rallies organized in Paris after the attacks, as well as the vigils that took place outside of France, such as the one in Trafalgar Square in London gathering more than a thousand people. In addition, the debate on *Charlie Hebdo* also permeated discussions on events taking place at a later stage and/or focusing on other issues. In the United Kingdom, the issue of free speech and the Paris attacks featured in newspaper reports of students contesting the visit of Israeli ministers at universities. In Milan, social movements protested against the municipality with the hashtag *#jesuishypocrite*, accusing the local administration of being supportive of freedom of expression for *Charlie Hebdo*, while denying ~~them~~ a voice on crucial decisions about the city. In Germany, Islam and the attacks were at the core of the protests that took place in Dresden, where local mosques where sprayed with anti-Islam slogans in support of *Charlie Hebdo*.

Overall, France stands as less contentious that the other cases. This might be related to the climate of shock that characterized the country in the aftermath of the attacks, and the centralization of most mobilizations around the Sunday rally. At the same time, this might be linked to disincentives toward public gatherings and protest linked to the higher levels of securitization that followed the attacks—which would culminate in the declaration of the state of emergency after the November 13 terror attacks. In this respect, our data shows that France was characterized by lower levels of state intervention in the newspaper coverage of the *Charlie Hebdo* debates, but also by lower levels of extra-institutional protest. Conversely, in countries where state intervention and repression was highest, most notably in the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Germany, so also were protests and violence.[8]

8. Overall, the results concerning forms of action across countries are different at a statistically significant level: X2 (21, N = 2,858) = 233.4, $p < 0.01$ (Cramér's V = 0.16).

The content of the debate: Issue salience, positions, and polarization

In addition to analyzing who intervenes in the public sphere and how, another crucial aspect lies in the issues that are addressed by political claims-making—that is, the substantive content of the messages conveyed by such interventions. As introduced earlier, we focus on issue salience, positions, and polarization as the three main conceptual components of political conflict in public debates. For each issue category addressed in the mass media debate on *Charlie Hebdo* in January 2015, the columns of Table 2.7 report the corresponding values for the five broad topics under study. Salience is expressed in percentage points, where 100 percent indicates that attention focused on a single issue. Average issue positions (AP) can range from -1 to +1, depending on the extent to which actors hold positive or negative attitudes toward a given issue. Finally, polarization (Pol.) varies on a 0–1 scale, where 1 indicates a situation of full disagreement between actors and 0 a situation of complete consensus. As can be noted, while salience and positions vary considerably across issues, polarization tends to cluster around 0, indicating the prevalence of consensus among most of the actors.

Table 2.7: ISSUE SALIENCE, POSITIONS, AND POLARIZATION IN THE CHARLIE HEBDO DEBATES (2015)

Issues	%	*A.P.*	*Pol.*	*N.*
Security affairs				
State security	22.9	0.59	0.03	872
International security	7.2	0.69	0.04	275
Migration politics				
Immigration and asylum	0.9	–0.22	0.17	34
Integration and minority rights	5.8	–0.01	0.05	220
Church–State relations				
Freedom of speech and religion	18.4	0.51	0.05	702
Secularism	2.0	0.66	0.02	76
Islam as a religion	17.9	0.08	0.01	684
Discrimination				
Islamophobia	7.5	0.17	0.13	286
Racism and anti-Semitism	10.8	0.48	0.04	413
Identity politics				
European identity	1.4	0.62	0.04	55
National identity	5.2	0.61	0.04	197
Total	100.0			3814

The table shows that the most salient issues in the mass-media debate are those belonging to security affairs and Church–State relations. State security is the single most important issue in the newspaper coverage of the debate, accounting for 22.9 percent of claims-making on *Charlie Hebdo*, with an additional 7 percent concerning international security. For average issue positions on security affairs, the tone is relatively positive (above 0.5), meaning that a clear majority of interventions recognize the presence of security threats at the national or international level and are supportive of increased security measures. What is more, polarization is remarkably low (0.03 for state security and 0.04 for international security), indicating that positions across actors on security affairs are generally consensual and supportive of further security. Faced with journalistic reports about terrorist network working throughout Europe for attacking sensitive targets, most government actors agreed on the need to better coordinate national security services. Italy's Prime Minister Matteo Renzi stated that he would engage to develop a EU-wide security system to tackle the Islamist terrorist crisis. More radical positions emerged in France, where Marine Le Pen, president of the National Front, called for a referendum on reinstating the death penalty, and local union leaders demanded to arm municipal policemen. In the United Kingdom and Germany, the debate focused extensively on the request by intelligence agencies for increased surveillance powers in the aftermaths of the attacks, but also on the potential consequences of special measures and on the risk of repressing political dissent.

For Church–State relations, most attention is devoted to issues of freedom of speech and religion (18.4 percent), and religious aspects of Islam (17.9 percent), whereas secularism accounts for only 2 percent of the debate in the mass media. While positions on secularism are generally consensual (with average positions equal to 0.66, and a polarization score of only 0.02), the other two issues differ considerably in positions and polarization. Positive average positions on freedom of speech and religion (0.51) indicate that actors oppose limitations on such freedoms, and the polarization score indicates that this is also quite consensual across actors (0.05). Islam as a religion combines very poor scores in terms of issue positions (0.08) and in terms of polarization (0.01), which is related to the fact that the mass-media debate hosted quite negative evaluations of Islam and its religious precepts. Somewhat surprisingly, therefore, secularism does not appear as the most crucial aspect of public debates on the accommodation of religious diversity in liberal democracies. In all countries, the actors who participate in the media debate are mainly interested in approaching these themes in terms of individual and collective freedoms. Most claims focus

on the protection of free speech and the free press, as well as the legitimacy to publish the Muhammad cartoons, with a clear majority of actors sharing the same supportive position. When it comes to Islam as a religion, positions tend to be consensual and critical, focusing on the unwillingness of Muslim communities to condemn terrorism, or on the distinction between the alleged "radical" and "moderate" versions of Islam.

A similar scenario is found for discussions of discrimination: Islamophobia and racism/anti-Semitism receive approximately the same amount of attention in newspaper coverage (7.5 and 10 percent, respectively) but differ considerably in the positions expressed and in the degree of polarization. Islamophobia displays low positional scores. Indeed, the media gave much visibility to actors challenging either the very concept of Islamophobia, or at least the extent and diffusion of the phenomenon. Still, the polarization scores indicate some disagreement among actors on this issue (0.17), with journalists reporting dissenting views and alternative opinions. Similarly, while migration and identity politics received less attention in newspapers, both issues were addressed in a predominantly negative tone. They also triggered a certain polarization among actors expressing opposition to migration and those challenging the presumed connection between the inflow of migrants and terrorism.[9] If stories about Islamophobia were considerably more heated ~~and conflictual~~ than those on other issues related to ethnic, religious, and racial discrimination, and most notably anti-Semitism, mass-media debates on migration prioritized stories focusing on failed integration policies or underlining the negative consequences of uncontrolled migration.

Analysis of issue salience and positions in the individual national settings can help shed further light on how public debates around *Charlie Hebdo* were shaped by specific opportunities stemming from shared understandings of the nation state and national identities. The overarching expectation is that the importance attributed by the media to different issues (Table 2.8), and the degree of conflict over these (Table 2.9), differs depending on national institutional framework and discursive opportunities for claims-making.

The mass-media salience of the three issues related to Church–State relations (freedom of speech, secularism, and Islam as a religion) varies considerably across national contexts. Newspapers in France address these topics much less (27 percent) than in the United Kingdom (48 percent)

9. While in absolute terms these values are closer to neutrality (0) than to full opposition to migration (-1), it is hardly ever the case that one type of actor, or group of actors, displays completely negative views without facing an opposing reaction by other actors in the system.

Table 2.8: ISSUE SALIENCE OF THE CHARLIE HEBDO DEBATES, BY COUNTRY (2015)

Issues	France	United Kingdom	Germany	Italy
Security affairs				
State security	22.7	19.9	29.6	22.4
International security	9.3	6.3	3.4	7.8
Migration politics				
Immigration and asylum	0.8	1.1	0.5	1.0
Integration and minority rights	8.6	4.8	2.8	5.1
Church–State relations				
Freedom of speech and religion	11.6	31.1	11.5	17.1
Secularism	2.9	0.2	0.2	3.7
Islam as a religion	12.5	17.9	24.8	20.2
Discrimination				
Islamophobia	7.3	6.1	13.5	5.8
Racism and anti-Semitism	13.5	9.4	9.4	10.1
Identity politics				
European identity	1.0	0.8	1.1	2.8
National identity	9.6	2.4	3.2	4.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1156	1040	564	1054

The results reported in table for the four countries are significantly different at a statistical level: X2 (30, N = 3,814) = 411.8, p < 0.01 (Cramér's V = 0.19).

or Germany (35 percent). While in France newspaper stories covered statements released by French author Michel Houellecq about the role of Muslims in European societies, in the United Kingdom these themes were also approached via interviews with Imams, representatives of religious organizations, and supporters of dialogue between Christians and Muslims. In this regard, the media seem keener to deal with Church–State relations in contexts characterized by little separation than in institutional settings where the divide between the religious and the public is stronger. Indeed, the issue of secularism obtains some importance only in Italy and France (3.7 and 2.9 percent, respectively), that is, in the countries which display the most separation between Church and State, and where it is also associated with a certain degree of political conflict. Conversely, freedom of speech and religion is considerably more visible in the United Kingdom (31 percent) than in the three other countries, especially Italy and Germany where the issue seems to be non-divisive, unlike in France (0.13) and the United Kingdom (0.12).

Table 2.9: AVERAGE ISSUE POSITIONS AND POLARIZATION, BY COUNTRY (2015)

Issues	France		United Kingdom		Germany		Italy	
	A.P.	Pol.	A.P.	Pol.	A.P.	Pol.	A.P.	Pol.
Security affairs								
State security	0.46	0.02	0.51	0.01	0.72	0.03	0.70	0.01
International security	0.61	0.03	0.68	0.06	0.89	0.00	0.80	0.02
Migration politics								
Immigration and asylum	–0.17	0.22	0.00	0.06	–0.67	0.05	0.41	0.45
Integration and minority rights	–0.01	0.04	0.15	0.12	–0.43	0.13	–0.11	0.16
Church–State relations								
Freedom of speech and religion	0.34	0.13	0.56	0.12	0.56	0.06	0.57	0.04
Secularism	0.47	0.08	0.75	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.79	0.03
Islam as a religion	0.07	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.11	0.06	0.17	0.02
Discrimination								
Islamophobia	0.02	0.07	0.30	0.09	0.39	0.13	–0.03	0.11
Racism and anti-Semitism	0.42	0.03	0.58	0.02	0.30	0.02	0.57	0.08
Identity politics								
European identity	0.79	0.01	0.68	0.09	0.25	0.14	0.63	0.08
National identity	0.47	0.06	0.84	0.01	0.83	0.06	0.74	0.05
N	*1156*		*1040*		*564*		*1054*	

With regard to newspaper coverage of Islam, Germany stands out (24 percent), followed by Italy (20 percent) and the United Kingdom (18 percent), whereas France comes last (12 percent). These findings are hardly coherent with figures on Muslim populations in Europe, which show that the largest Muslim communities are in Germany and France (about 5 million); whereas Britain and—in particular—Italy fall far shorter (Pew Research Center 2016). One explanation for this finding emerges if we compare the actual data on Muslim residents with information on public views about Muslims. Data from the Pew Research Center indicate that while public opinion in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France indicates favorable views about Muslims, in Italy negative views prevail, which might explain the overrepresentation of Islam in the Italian mass media. In fact, Table 2.9 shows that, in terms of Islam as a religion, issue polarization follows the same trend as issue salience, with scores in Germany and Italy being considerably higher than in France and the United Kingdom, albeit still generally quite low.

Newspapers in France gave more importance to migration and integration issues (9.4 percent) than did the media in Italy and the United Kingdom (6 percent) and Germany (3 percent). Hence, migration tends to be most salient in countries with a more restrictive definition of national citizenship and identity. Furthermore, migration politics tend to display less conflict when the configuration of cultural diversity and individual equality is more inclusive: Issue positions are in fact most positive and polarization is lowest in the United Kingdom, whereas positions are negative and polarization highest in Italy—the most restrictive case under study—and France. The deviant case is Germany, which scores high on political conflict but low on issue salience, indicating that anti-immigration actors tend to be ignored at least by most other actors in the system. While the findings seem to indicate that inclusive regimes provide less chances for anti-immigration groups to intervene in the public sphere, exclusive ones tend to feature more polarizing debates, and cross-national differences are rather limited.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The aim of this chapter has been to map the context in which the debate on *Charlie Hebdo* is located, by zooming in on two sets of dimensions that social movement studies have considered as particularly relevant for the analysis of public debates. For France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy, we have sketched some specific political and discursive opportunities paying attention to the two aspects that we deemed most relevant for the debates under study: citizenship and Church–State relations. While these dimensions will have some impact on the framing and justification by different actors, even if filtered by their own ideologies and narratives, in our cases they do not seem able to explain much in terms of claim-making.

At the most general level, the analysis of mass-media reactions to the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks shows that the controversy was predominantly articulated at the national level. Despite the transnational resonance of the terror attacks, European and supranational actors were not involved in public discussions. At the same time, cross-national differences in the nature and content of the debates were—overall—rather limited. This is partly explained by the fact that debates often involved bilateral exchanges between national and foreign actors (notably from France). When it comes to the selection of news stories and issues at the core of the controversy, however, our findings support the idea that the composition of public debates follows the mass media's logic of newsworthiness and of news

selection. Given the similarity we observed in country profiles, the *Charlie Hebdo* debates in the mass media seems to be only partly shaped by structural factors related to national political opportunities for mobilization for different groups in the society.

As for the type of actors involved in the debate, mass-media and state institutional actors came to dominate the public sphere, resulting in the relative marginalization of most civil society actors, both on the left-wing and right-wing sides of the political spectrum—and particularly so for women as claims-makers. Practitioners of the mass-media sector enjoyed much visibility and legitimacy in a debate that directly involved them, and their intellectual freedom and professional practice. In addition, members of national governments seized the opportunities provided by the climate of national emergency that sparked after the attacks, and acted as promoters of state security and guidance in difficult times. Combined, these results indicate that journalistic reports of public debates in critical times tend to be not only overwhelmingly male-centered, but also skewed toward actors that are considered as most legitimate to intervene during national emergencies, or whose nature resonates with the main issues at the core of the controversy.

Indeed, the analysis of the content of the debate in the European public sphere showed that most of the mass media's attention was devoted to the issues of security and freedom of expression, which triggered much less political conflict than stories about Islam, discrimination, and migration. Most notably, the analysis could identify three main components of the newspaper coverage of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks at the aggregate level. A first component of the debate refers to issues on which most actors agree, which are highly visible in the media and generally non-divisive in terms of main interpretations. This includes security issues, freedom of speech and religion, and racism and anti-Semitism, which score high on salience and low on polarization. The second component comprises issues that most actors consider important—and are therefore salient in the media—but on which they tend to disagree—and notably polarizing issues related to Islam and Islamophobia. These types of stories met the demand of journalists for entertaining narratives about opposing camps, covering multiple sides and reporting of dissenting views. The third component instead relates to the issues that polarize actors' positions, but receive little attention in the media. This is mainly the case of migration and integration, which are addressed by a minority of actors in the public sphere, yet created considerable conflict among opposing views and interpretations, especially concerning topics such as a presumed link between immigration and terrorism, and the crisis of multicultural societies.

CHAPTER 3

The evolution of the debate

Polarization and deliberation over time

Next we introduce time into the picture, looking at how public debates on the issues discussed so far evolved before, during, and after the January attacks. The idea here is that the critical juncture might have changed the discourses related to Charlie Hebdo. Accordingly, this chapter compares the cross-national data on debates taking place in January 2015 with data on the Charlie Hebdo controversy in earlier periods (2010–2014). Furthermore, in order to shed some light on how national public spheres settle into a new status quo after major crises, we compare the January 2015 debates to the ones that took place on the first anniversary of the attacks, in January 2016, in the four countries.

In the cross-national comparison developed in the previous chapter, we investigated how the evolution of the debates in the first month following the attacks was linked to contextual characteristics and opportunities, and to the role of the mass media as gatekeepers for actors seeking to access to the mainstream public sphere. In this chapter we observe the development of the debates in three different periods and assess whether and to what extent the Charlie Hebdo attacks actually represented an eventful moment of transition (Sewell 1996). We will assess how critical junctures may produce rapid change, influence the relations between elites and challengers in the public sphere, and redistribute symbolic resources for mobilization. To what extent and in what ways can critical junctures shape collective actors' participation in the mass-media public sphere, and the way in which they interact with one another?

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To answer this question, our analysis focuses on two main aspects of public debates related to Charlie Hebdo. In the first part of the chapter, we address the composition and content of claim-making in the public sphere, as an expansion and an extension of the issues debated in the previous chapters. In the second part, we introduce our discussion of deliberation and report on the main trends observed in our analysis. The concluding section combines these two strands of analysis and summarizes the main diachronic comparative findings concerning public debates on Charlie Hebdo and the Muhammad cartoons controversy in Europe.

CHANGING DISCOURSE ON CHARLIE HEBDO: 2010–2016

We start by considering variables relating to the substantive content of the discourse on Charlie Hebdo. Whereas we used claim-making data in the previous chapter, we now look at data variation over time, rather than across countries, and therefore present the data aggregated across the four ~~countries.~~ Similar to the previous discussion, we again zoom in on issue salience, issue positions, and issue polarization as the three main conceptual components of political conflict.

We start the analysis by looking at issue salience and average positions. These are likely to vary over time because the actors participating in public debates and the journalists acting as gatekeepers tend to adapt to changing circumstances and opportunities in the wake of critical junctures. Highly emotional moments have in fact the potential to transform existing symbolic and material resources, paving the way for the emergence of new categories. They may reactivate existing meanings and produce new threats and opportunities, which should result in variation in the relative importance of certain issues and topics. In this respect, if the Charlie Hebdo attacks can effectively be considered as a turning point producing intense symbolic effects, they might have condensed the discussion on a limited series of issues. As suggested earlier, the brutality of acts of political violence can either produce discursive reactions by institutional and civil society actors (for example, drastic shifts from pro- to anti-immigration positions), or result in a widespread process of discursive realignment, introducing narrative changes that are abrupt but path-dependent (for example, by increasing the salience ~~or intensity~~ of preexisting claims on security). Thus, variation over time might concern not only the relative salience of certain issues vis-à-vis others, but also the positions on these issues of the actors covered in the mass media.

In this respect, the Charlie Hebdo attacks may have forced some actors to change their discourse more than others, depending on the resources they possessed before the attacks, as well as on the opportunities to access the public sphere made available in the aftermath of the crisis. In terms of issue salience, the juncture may have forced actors to address issues they would otherwise avoid; in terms of issue positions, it may have forced them to change their attitudes toward issues they were already addressing in their discourse. To explore these mechanisms in detail, we shall first present variation over time in issue salience and issue positions, and then disaggregate these data by actor and discuss the development of polarization for each topic.

The columns in Table 3.1 report the salience and average positions of the different issue topics, aggregated across the four countries, but divided by period. As observed in the previous chapter, security stands out as the crucial issue in the Charlie Hebdo debates in 2015. The importance attributed to this issue varies considerably over time: Increasing importance is attributed

Table 3.1: ISSUE SALIENCE AND AVERAGE POSITIONS IN THE DEBATES (2010–2016)

Issues	2010/14		2015		2016	
	%	*A.P*	%	*A.P*	%	*A.P*
Security affairs						
State security	15.2	0.77	22.7	0.59	37.2	0.62
International security	9.2	0.61	7.2	0.70	2.7	0.60
Migration politics						
Immigration and asylum	2.3	–0.39	0.9	–0.23	4.3	0.01
Integration and minority rights	9.4	0.07	5.8	–0.03	8.4	–0.02
Church–State relations						
Freedom of speech and religion	27.6	0.26	18.4	0.52	11.7	0.48
Secularism	4.1	0.12	2.0	0.65	4.1	0.56
Islam as a religion	14.4	0.00	17.9	0.09	11.5	0.23
Discrimination						
Islamophobia	6.3	0.39	7.5	0.17	5.8	–0.02
Racism and anti-Semitism	9.7	0.44	7.5	0.48	5.8	0.37
Identity politics						
European identity	0.6	–0.27	1.4	0.63	0.4	0.25
National identity	2.0	0.55	5.2	0.61	3.4	0.73
Total	100.0		100.0		100.0	
N	1.782		3.814		556	

NOTE: Tests on the significance and strength of overtime associations confirm that variation is significant at a statistical level: X2 (20, N =6,152) = 343.4, p < 0.01 (Cramér's V = 0.17).

to internal state security (which grows from 15 percent in the period 2010–2014 to over 37 percent in 2016), whereas the opposite is observed with respect to international affairs (which decreases from 9 percent to less than 3 percent of the attention). Furthermore, this data confirms that security remains a highly consensual issue through time. Actually, most actors agree on both dimensions of security affairs, expressing overwhelmingly positive attitudes toward increased security measures, at all time points.

The second-most-important theme concerns Church–State relations. In debates taking place before the attacks, issues related to freedom of speech and religion are considerably more important (27.6 percent) than in either 2015 (18.4 percent) or 2016 (11.7 percent). Still, actors converge in supporting these rights especially in 2015, whereas the scores in either 2010–2014 and 2016 are considerably lower, as newspapers covered discussions on whether there should be a limit when freedom of expression goes too far or exacerbates tensions. While secularism does not play a role at any point in time, it is associated with increasingly positive ~~average issue~~ positions from 2015 onward. Combined with the figure indicating a decreased importance of secularism in 2015, this finding suggests that negative attitudes toward secularism—for instance claims suggesting that secularism could have a negative impact on the relationship between the West and Islam—are progressively less accepted in the debate. Critical actors prefer abstaining or are denied access to the mainstream public sphere.

On the contrary, the salience of Islam as a religion is highest in 2015, but positions remain generally close to zero, indicating that a considerable number of actors hold either neutral or negative positions on this issue category. In this sense, the 2015 juncture plays a role in pointing at Islam as a core element of the debate. In the aftermaths of the attacks, the mass media covered issues pertaining to Islam and its religious precepts more often than during similar debates taking place in earlier years or on the occasion of the anniversary of the attacks. This includes public interventions calling the attacks a betrayal to "true" Muslim values, statements about the role of Muslims in Western societies, as well as claims suggesting that "true" Muslims ought to do more than simply condemn the attacks. Similarly, the salience of Islamophobia is highest in 2015, but average positions decline over time, indicating that actors less and less recognize it as a problem.

Finally, identity politics appear to be closely linked to the attacks. Even though the ~~values~~ remain generally low ~~in absolute terms~~, European and national identity issue categories peak in importance in 2015, when claim-making focused on how the attacks could cement a sense of belonging among French and European citizens. Interestingly, ~~while~~ average positions converge toward positive values in 2015—indicating that most actors promote

positive assessments of national and European identities—~~the~~ trends diverge for the two issue categories by 2016. While positions grow increasingly positive for national identity issues, they return to a very low level in the case of identification at the European level. The contingency of the mobilization of European values in the wake of the attacks is confirmed by the increase in the interventions by actors arguing that the streak of terrorist attacks throughout 2015 would testify to a crisis in European identity. In a similar way, the over-time comparison also shows that issues of international migration and asylum, ~~albeit marginal,~~ become increasingly relevant in 2016. Issue positions are generally critical, and in the case of integration they deteriorate after the January attacks. These findings, combined with those on security affairs, point to the presence of other events taking place throughout the period under observation which had an impact on public debates on issues related to cultural and ethnic diversity.

Overall, the analysis conducted so far indicates that the issues gathering most public attention are those on which there is also the most convergence. A thorough account of the mechanism in question, however, requires that we look at the combined effect of issue positions and salience, in terms of issue conflict. In this respect, increasing issue salience should be associated with decreasing polarization. To account for this, Figure 3.1 presents the polarization scores for each of the five main themes that we



Figure 3.1: Development of polarization by country (2010–2016)

observe, at the three points in time. Since a high score indicates that the issues are more polarized at the aggregate level, Figure 3.1 suggests that conflict remains generally low, below 0.2. Still, it also shows that for all themes that are debated, polarization decreases considerably in 2015 and then increases again in 2016. Although not displayed here, our analyses confirm this trend for most issues in all countries under observation.

While the pattern is the same across the various issues that we observe, some variation is also worth mentioning. To begin with, the most contested topic *before* the attacks is identity politics, which instead becomes the most consensual aspect of the debates *after* the attacks, in 2016. On the contrary, Church–State relations, which attracted little polarization *before* the attacks, becomes one of the main areas of disagreement in 2016. Combined with the findings outlined earlier, this indicates that conflict over freedom of speech and religion decreases in the public sphere, as actors participating in public debates increasingly share the view that this type of rights should be subject to some limitations. Instead, conflict on migration politics remains higher than conflict on other issue categories at all points in time, including 2015.

As noted earlier, the impact of transformative events may not be equal for all actors participating in the public scene, challenging established positions of, and power relations among, collective actors. They can give new meaning to issues on which certain types of actors enjoy more credibility than others and remobilize the interest of the media on alternative understandings of preexisting problems.

The goal of the next part of the analysis is thus to assess the impact of the changing circumstances on the different actors participating in public debates. Accordingly, Table 3.2 reports the over-time variation in the salience of the different aspects of the Charlie Hebdo debates for each group of collective actors, whereas Table 3.3 reports actors' positions on these topics. The two tables provide some empirical evidence supporting the idea that the impact of the critical juncture varied across groups of actors.

Among state and party actors, government and executive agencies dominate public debates on security affairs, with government standing out in 2015. Whereas the January attacks increased the relative importance of similar concerns for all actors, governments monopolize the issue of security right after the Charlie Hebdo events. Members of the executive and state officials publicized the increase of security at national ports, or the introduction of precautionary measures concerning armed patrols and controls in railway stations. Civil society actors—apart from journalists commenting on the above measures—are instead de facto excluded from this part of the debates.

Table 3.2: THEMATIC SALIENCE BY TYPE OF COLLECTIVE ACTOR: PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL CLAIMS (2010–2016)

Issue	Security affairs			Migration politics			Church–State relations			Discrimination			Identity politics		
	2010/14	2015	2016	2010/14	2015	2016	2010/14	2015	2016	2010/14	2015	2016	2010/14	2015	2016
State and party actors															
Government actors	22.7	26.9	20.3	11.7	8.5	28.9	12.1	12.5	9.1	12.8	18.7	11.4	13.3	22.6	0
Political parties	4.5	11.7	10.5	10.9	21.2	31.6	5.7	4.8	2.6	9.3	11.2	11.4	20	30.4	16.7
State executive agencies	32.6	22.9	29.3	8.6	5.1	2.6	4.3	7	1.3	7.7	4.7	0	0	1.7	0
Judiciary actors	10.6	2.7	9	0.8	1.7	0	3.4	3.6	2.6	0.6	0.6	0	0	0	0
EU and supranational actors	0.8	3.6	0	3.9	0	0	1.8	0.7	0	0	0.3	0	6.7	1.7	0
Total state and party actors	71.2	67.8	69.1	35.9	36.5	63.1	27.3	28.6	15.6	30.4	35.5	22.8	40	56.4	16.7
Civil society actors															
Mass media	18.2	17.4	15.8	14.8	16.9	21	31.8	35.9	42.8	19.9	15.6	25.7	33.3	27	33.3
Religious groups	4.2	0.9	1.5	29.7	6.8	10.5	16.7	14.5	14.3	17.3	14	31.4	6.7	2.6	0
Unions and professional groups	0.4	4.1	4.5	0	10.2	2.6	3	2.3	7.7	4.5	3.4	0	0	1.7	0
Left-wing and civil-rights actors	0.8	1.1	2.3	3.9	2.5	0	3.7	2.7	0	7.7	5.6	17.1	0	2.6	0
Radical right actors	0.4	2.9	2.3	2.3	9.3	2.6	1.4	2.3	1.3	9.6	10.3	0	6.7	0.9	0
Experts and commentators	4.9	5.6	4.5	13.3	17.8	0	16	13.8	18.2	11.5	15.6	2.9	13.3	8.7	50
Total civil society actors	28.9	32	30.9	64	63.5	36.7	72.6	71.5	84.3	70.5	64.5	77.1	60	43.5	83.3
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	264	746	133	128	118	38	437	703	77	156	321	35	15	115	6

Table 3.3: POSITIONS BY TYPE OF COLLECTIVE ACTOR (2010–2016)

Issue	Security affairs			Migration politics			Church–State relations			Discrimination			Identity politics		
	2010/14	2015	2016	2010/14	2015	2016	2010/14	2015	2016	2010/14	2015	2016	2010/14	2015	2016
State and party actors															
Government actors	0.75	0.77	0.83	−0.17	0.45	0.45	0.01	0.30	0.31	0.10	0.63	0.00	0.75	0.87	–
Legislatives and parties	0.58	0.41	0.32	0.00	−0.28	−0.20	0.26	0.12	0.50	0.27	0.47	0.38	0.50	0.54	−0.50
State executive agencies	0.92	0.81	0.84	−0.18	−0.16	−1.00	−0.23	0.24	0.50	0.25	0.20	–	–	0.50	–
Judiciary actors	0.91	0.50	0.92	−1.00	−0.50	–	−0.13	−0.01	0.00	1.00	0.25	–	–	–	–
EU and supranational actors	0.75	0.76	–	0.60	–	–	0.37	0.60	0.60	–	1.00	–	1.00	0.75	–
Average state and party actors	0.78	0.65	0.72	−0.15	−0.12	−0.25	0.05	0.25	0.38	0.40	0.51	0.19	0.75	0.66	−0.50
Civil society actors															
Mass media	0.37	0.53	0.50	0.08	−0.20	−0.37	0.56	0.57	0.39	0.63	0.58	0.78	−0.30	0.68	1.00
Religious groups	0.18	0.57	−0.75	0.37	0.00	0.75	−0.30	0.11	0.18	0.44	0.67	0.59	0.00	0.66	–
Unions and professional groups	0.50	0.27	−0.16	–	0.37	−0.50	0.15	−0.09	0.67	0.71	0.77	–	–	0.75	–
Left-wing and civil-rights actors	−0.50	−0.56	−0.33	0.60	0.17	–	0.69	0.79	–	0.79	0.64	0.67	–	−0.33	–
Radical right actors	1.00	0.79	1.00	−0.50	−0.50	−1.00	0.50	−0.40	0.00	−0.73	−0.79	−0.38	1.00	1.00	–
Experts and commentators	0.61	0.30	0.58	0.41	−0.12	–	0.44	0.54	0.50	0.47	0.13	1.00	0.00	0.45	0.67
Average civil society actors	0.36	0.32	0.14	0.19	−0.05	−0.28	0.34	0.25	0.35	0.38	0.33	0.53	0.17	0.53	0.83
N	264	746	133	128	118	38	437	703	77	156	321	35	15	115	6

Interestingly, data on issue positions confirms that ~~while~~ consensus toward increased security measures tends to prevail at all time points, ~~positions~~ vary across type of actors. Government and other executive agencies display growing support for security, justifying the need for increased controls and more effective preventive measures. Left-wing and civil rights organizations are the only category of collective actors holding consistently negative positions on these topics. Civil society actors become increasingly critical toward security over time, suggesting that security measures stigmatize Muslims as ~~terrorists and~~ extremists and denouncing the effects of profiling and securitization on social cohesion.

Conversely, we note very little engagement by state actors with regards to Church–State relations. Remarkably, only governments participate substantially in this part of the debates, whereas most claims-making on these issues was promoted by civil society actors, especially the mass media, religious groups, and—notably—experts discussing the nature of the secular public sphere, the effectiveness of religious bans, and the broader relationship between the public and the religious. Contrary to what we expected, the extent to which the different actors engaged on these issues did not vary much over time, meaning that the 2015 events did not have a strong impact on the relative importance attributed to Church–State relations by the various groups of actors.

While the juncture had little influence on issue salience, positions among most of the actors became increasingly positive over time; actors progressively recognized and appreciated in their public claims-making values such as freedom of speech and religion, and secularism. This is most notable for state actors, especially government, but also for religious ~~actors~~ calling for striking a better balance between freedom of speech and freedom of religion. Interestingly, the position of the far right turned critical on issues concerning civil rights in 2015. On the one hand, this is explained by the need of the far right to differentiate its positions from the ultra-secularist values promoted by *Charlie Hebdo* and endorsed by most governments and elite actors. On the other, the far right called on "true" free expression, and on the right to criticize Islam and migration. Thus, it campaigned simultaneously against the moral relativism promoted by Charlie Hebdo, and in support of free speech for anti-establishment and far-right actors.

As observed earlier, migration does not feature among the most debated aspects of the events under observation. Yet, the data reported above indicate that the way in which migration politics is addressed varies substantially over time. Until 2015 migration is approached primarily by civil society actors, most notably religious groups and the mass media speaking on behalf of Muslim and migrant minorities. At the time of the attacks, in

2015, the radical right increases considerably the attention devoted to this issue with the goal of creating a connection between immigration to France and the increased risk for terrorism and violence. By 2016, the composition of this part of the debate had changed radically, as the mass media covered extensively state actors, particularly government members and political parties dealing with migration affairs, when discussing Charlie Hebdo and the Muhammad cartoons controversy. At the same time, the tone in which migration is approached deteriorates considerably over time, among both state and civil society actors. These findings highlight state actors and national governments' progressive criminalization of migration in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo events, and following the outbreak of the European migration policy crisis and the November 2015 attacks in Paris.

Finally, aspects related to discrimination and identity politics follow a similar trend over time. For both, the year of the attacks is characterized by the increased participation of state and party actors, most notably governments, to the detriment of civil society actors. In both cases, moreover, the peak is confined to 2015, whereas by 2016 the distribution of attention had already returned to the scenario observed before the attacks. For state and party actors, increased attention to discrimination and identity politics in 2015 is associated with minor variations in average positions, albeit generally in the direction of recognition of racism, Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism in society. For civil society actors, instead, decreased attention to identity politics is associated with a leap in support for national and European identities, which seems to persist through 2016 as well, especially among the mass media.

Overall, the analysis conducted so far provides some initial confirmation that transformative events challenge the established positions of ~~competing actors.~~ While several mechanisms might explain these transformations, our explorative analysis illustrated the coverage of ~~public~~ debates in the mass media changed considerably in the wake of the attacks.

Besides explanations focusing on available opportunities and journalistic practices, the fact that the 2015 juncture generally advantaged government and state actors over civil society ones is in line with the results of previous studies highlighting the capacity of ~~state actors~~ to deploy sophisticated communication strategies ~~to seize further visibility~~ during exceptional times (Boussaguet and Fauchet 2016).

Two main lessons can be drawn from the analyses so far. On the one hand, the findings on the politicization of public issues indicate that political conflict on the Charlie Hebdo attacks was generally low, at least in the mass media. In line with the findings of the previous chapter, our analysis shows that the media prioritized coverage of consensual issues and of

actors sharing similar interpretations of the phenomena at stake. On the other hand, our findings indicate that the public emotion caused by the massacre in Paris further contributed to neutralizing political conflict over ~~Charlie Hebdo and~~ the publication of the cartoons. The January attacks produced not only an increase in the visibility of state and institutional actors to the detriment of civil society ones, but also a widespread discursive realignment, since the mass media turned their attention toward a restricted set of issues on which most actors converged. In this sense, our findings support the idea that the Charlie Hebdo attacks marked a turning point, in that they had intense symbolic consequences that condensed and neutralized public debates in the media. Already in January 2016 a certain degree of polarization resurfaced and the debates largely returned to the pre-Charlie Hebdo standards in terms of distribution of public attention and diversification of issue positions.

THE DELIBERATIVE QUALITIES OF THE CHARLIE HEBDO DEBATES

We explore the extent to which developments we discussed above are paralleled by a variation in the deliberative democratic quality of the debates. Our analysis represents a circumscribed yet much-needed contribution to a wider and more systematic exploration of deliberation in the public sphere.

Before moving to the presentation of our findings, we introduce briefly research on the deliberative and democratic qualities of newspapers. We do not intend to engage in theoretical discussions about deliberative ideals. Also, elsewhere in the book we provide an extensive justification for the focus on three measurements of deliberation: lack of coercion and disrespect, extent of justification, and reciprocity in making claims (see Technical Appendix). Here, we limit ourselves to present some findings from previous research that inform our own investigation.

The study of the discursive qualities of print media have been characterized by efforts to translate highly theoretical notions about deliberation into empirically measurable indicators. In particular, several studies based on interpretations of the Habermasian idea of deliberative communication (Bennett et al. 2004; Ferree 2002; see also Wessler 2008; Wessler and Schultz 2007) and have tended to converge toward the identification of some main process variables. Jürgen Gerhards' (1997) pioneering study of deliberation in the media investigated the deliberative properties of two

high-quality German newspapers in the debate on abortion, concluding that both newspapers fell considerably short of the Habermasian ideal speech situation. In addition, Ferree (2002) observed substantial shortcomings in the deliberative qualities of articles in elite newspapers in both Germany and the United States. Similarly, Bennett and colleagues (2004) have reported on highly exclusive access to newspapers, with coverage generally biased toward the position of elites. Thomas Häussler's (2011) investigation of deliberation in the media, including five British newspapers covering six issues between 1960 and 2005, found that highly deliberative articles were rare.

A stream of research then focused on the quality of newspaper coverage on the occasion of referendums. Marquis et al.'s (2011) research on "fair" coverage of the campaigns on the welfare state referendum in Switzerland found reasonably positive characteristics, though far from optimal.[1] Marcinowski and Donk's (2012) investigation of referendum coverage in Swiss direct democracy found examples of deliberative journalism arguing that although they might still play an important role in enabling deliberation, newspapers articles often fall short of a substantial deliberative performance. Pilon (2009) also observed major flaws in the deliberative quality of newspapers in their contribution to the 2007 debate on the Provincial Referendum on the voting system of Ontario, Canada.[2] Following an approach similar to Pilon's, Renwick and Lamb (2013) analyzed the quality of debate on the 2011 UK electoral reform referendum as represented in the print media. The quantity of coverage was comparable to other electoral reform referendums, even though few claims were grounded in reasons and backed by either evidence or logic. Interestingly, they also find that one-quarter of the reasons given during the debate they examined were actually incompatible with established knowledge. Somewhat more positive findings emerge from Maia's (2009) study on the 2005 referendum campaign for banning firearm sales in Brazil. Newspapers displayed rather positive deliberative qualities. As she argued, through newspaper articles, major news media organizations provided balanced spaces for expressing relevant views and enabled an agonistic engagement between arguments and counterarguments. Finally, Schlaufer's (2016) study of

1. The notion of "fair coverage" as articulated by the authors goes beyond notions from deliberative democracy, and it is largely influenced by concepts from media ethics. While this work is worth mentioning, its empirical operationalization of deliberation is not relevant to the ends of this chapter.

2. As confirmed by more qualitative studies (Hoff 2008; LeDuc et al. 2008). For an extensive debate on the work of Pilon, Häussler and please refer to Steiner (2012).

Swiss direct-democratic campaigns on school policy between 2000 and 2012 moved research one step further by investigating what journalistic device may bolster deliberation. In particular, she found that in media debates the use of evaluation reports (illustrating the way in which policies in the ballots had performed when adopted in other cantons) correlated to discourse quality indicators. Articles containing evaluations showed less storytelling but higher levels of justification, reciprocity, respect, and references to the common good than those without evaluations.

Our effort to assess the deliberative qualities of very vast and far-reaching debates as reported on mainstream media in four countries entailed some specific choices in the research design. In particular, the scope of our research is wider than those of previous studies. This implies that we take selected national newspapers as the very sources of our analysis. Thus, we do not see them as components of wider processes of mediated deliberation referring to nation-wide deliberative systems. This latter approach, which may be suitable when focusing on smaller debates, seems exceedingly ambitious given the breadth of our study. Likewise, we do not endeavor to suggest ways in which the Charlie Hebdo debates in print media may be made more deliberative. Rather, we engage in a more limited effort to observe the deliberative qualities of the debates based on some specific indicators of deliberativeness over time, before, during and after the critical juncture. As the bulk of these studies suggest, debates on newspapers tend to feature only limited deliberative quality.[3] Accordingly, we expect that the debates under observation, when tested against our variables, will display only limited quality. As already mentioned, the effect of critical junctures upon the deliberative qualities of debates seems to have been overlooked in empirical research on deliberation.[4] Thus, rather than hypothesis testing, our analysis intends to develop a much needed exploratory

3. Whereas we do not question Marcinowski and Donk's (2012) as well as Maia's (2012) argument that even limited qualities may still be important and conducive to system-wide deliberation, we note that in a far-reaching debate such as the one on Charlie Hebdo it is already interesting and ambitious enough to assess its deliberative democratic qualities, in a necessarily schematized way. Indeed, we think that such work is an important first step in allowing future research to understand the effects of different levels of deliberation in different media on the deliberative system.

4. We note, however, that Jaramillo and Steiner (2014) and Steiner et al. (2017) have referred to the idea of "transformative moments" as a refinement to the DQI to capture the passages in which the quality of small-group deliberation turns from low to high. In deliberative theory, Dryzek (2015) has referred to the idea of critical junctures in his discussion of the unfolding environmental crisis.

effort clarifying whether, to what extent, and in what ways the deliberative qualities of newspaper articles vary specifically in relation to critical junctures.

Finally, it is worth remarking that empirical and theoretical insight is particularly limited with regard to the possible differences in the quality of debate on mainstream newspapers across countries, and there is no clear indication about the expected difference in deliberativeness in the four countries under examination (Ferree 2002; Wessler 2008). Accordingly, hypothesis testing about the way in which deliberative qualities may vary across countries seems unwarranted. Indeed, a cautionary note in this respect can be found in deliberative theory. Sass and Dryzek (2014) have convincingly argued that, when it comes to deliberation in the public sphere, it may be exceedingly simplistic to assume that aspects of a national culture may naturally lead to more or less deliberation (cf. Gambetta 1998). As we will see in the next chapter, we will indeed engage in nation-level analysis of the deliberative qualities of the debates. However, we will do so by adopting a qualitative approach and by focusing specifically on the debates taking place after the attack. This latter approach seems better suited for exploratory investigations of deliberative qualities of the public sphere (Ercan, Hendriks, and Boswell 2016; Felicetti 2016) and is instrumental in the formulation of a more precise hypothesis than we currently have concerning the deliberativeness of public debates in different countries.

Moving on shaky ground: The deliberative qualities of the Charlie Hebdo debates

Consistently with our expectation, the Charlie Hebdo debates as reported in the four mainstream newspapers under examination seem to only partially meet some basic standards of deliberation we consider in this chapter: lack of coercion and respect, extent of justification, and reciprocity in making claims. Whereas coercion disrespect is limited, the situation is considerably more problematic in terms of reason giving and reciprocity.[5]

Looking specifically at coercion and disrespect, we observe that the use of disrespectful language (for instance, insults and derogatory tones) and coercive content (for example, threatening violence or illegal use of state force) is not particularly high throughout the debates. Claims containing

5. For a detailed discussion of the methodology employed to quantitatively assess the deliberative democratic qualities of our case studies, see the Technical Appendix, in particular the section on Measurement of Deliberative Qualities.

Table 3.4: LEVELS OF COERCION AND DISRESPECT OVER TIME (2010–2016)

	2010/14 %	2015 %	2016 %
Coercive content			
Coercive	8.2	9.3	5.8
Non-Coercive	91.8	90.7	94.2
Total coercive content	100%	100%	100%
N	945	2,134	291
Disrespectful language			
Disrespectful	9.6	8.8	9.4
Non-Coercive	90.4	91.2	90.6
Total disrespectful language	100%	100%	100%
N	932	2,114	275

these forms of coercion never amount to more than 10 percent of the total. The number of claims containing coercive content also is at similarly low levels (Table 3.4). Ultimately, the Charlie Hebdo debates as reported by mainstream newspapers are not characterized by any substantial form of coercion and disrespect: This is a necessary though insufficient condition to achieve deliberative engagement.

Instead, the situation in terms of extent and type of justifications provided in the debates is more concerning from a deliberative democratic standpoint. Claims backed by no arguments at all are minimal, but the bulk of claims that express a position without any justification or only an inferior justification amount to almost two-thirds of the total. On the other hand, claims backed by a more solid justification (qualified or superior) are low, consistently around one-third or one-fourth of the total (Table 3.5). In other words, the debates under examination are more oriented to affirming

Table 3.5: EXTENT OF JUSTIFICATION

	2010/14 %	2015 %	2016 %
Extent of justification			
No argument	2.0	8.1	1.1
None or inferior justification	65.4	65.4	62.7
Good or very good justification	32.6	26.5	36.2
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	920	2,122	276

Table 3.6: EXTENT OF RECIPROCITY

	2010/14 %	2015 %	2016 %
Extent of reciprocity			
None or negative acknowledgement	79.0	82.0	80.4
Neutral or positive acknowledgement	21.0	18.0	19.6
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	920	2,122	276

the actors' views than to exchanging the reasons underpinning different positions.

The last variable, reciprocity, also is low (Table 3.6). In particular, claims that simply acknowledge or positively appreciate other actors or their views are largely a minority, around 20 percent of the debates. Instead, the vast majority of claims simply fail to refer to other actors or ideas, or refer to them in a degrading way.

In order to engage with another aspect we are concerned with in this research, the variation of the deliberative qualities of the debates after the critical juncture, it is necessary to pay greater attention to a uniform message that emerges. By all accounts and in all respects, in moving from the period before the attacks to their aftermath, there is a decline in the values of the deliberative variables. In moving from the aftermath of the attacks to the first anniversary, there is an improvement of these qualities, to different degrees and with exceptions.

In looking at the way in which the three variables change, we observe they either stay stable or decline in the periods under examination. In particular, coerciveness, in terms of both language and contents and disrespect remain, remains essentially the same over time (Table 3.4). Instead, change is more substantial in terms of justification and reciprocity. Although claims with inferior justification stay steady during the critical juncture, well-justified arguments decrease further, and claims with no argument increase. At the time of the anniversary, the situation goes back to the pre-critical juncture period. Overall, in the aftermath of the attacks, about 26 percent of the claims are backed by a substantial justification, whereas in the period before and after it the percentage is well above 30 percent. As argued in Chapter 1 the need for justification is most pronounced in the aftermath of the critical juncture. Nonetheless, the contraction in the extent of justification we observe suggests that that it is particular difficult for the public debates to feature this important but scarcely present function

of deliberation (Table 3.5). In terms of reciprocity, the number of claims that display positive or neutral acknowledgment of others' positions from an already small value (about 20 percent) in the first and the third period further shrinks to about 18 percent in the aftermath of the critical juncture (Table 3.6). The lack of high-quality justifications and reciprocity suggests that during critical junctures, calls to unity around shared values may amount more to temporarily overlap in individual strategies than a genuine effort to engage with others in substantial and mutually acceptable terms. Indeed, the ability to engage in this latter type of exercise seems hampered by the critical juncture.

Research on critical junctures has highlighted that these are sudden events during which old routines and patterns may be replaced by new ones (Roberts 2015, 65) and that the outcomes of a critical juncture endure over time (Mahoney and Schensul 2006, 456). Our research does not question these observations. Indeed, as seen in other chapters, the Charlie Hebdo attacks did provide a moment of transformation in the justifications and framing of actors engaged on a number of issues. Nonetheless, our investigation of deliberativeness in mainstream media seems to highlight a yet overlooked aspect of critical junctures, that is, what we call the discursive infrastructure of debates. This idea refers to the fact that the content of public debates is bound to evolve based on discussions that might be more or less open to deliberative democratic engagement. Generally, when we observe the way in which the content of a debate changes during a critical juncture we observe only one, more immediately visible part of the debates under study. We do not usually strive to understand whether changes in the content of debates correspond to an evolution in the way debate occurs. According to our observations, debates in mainstream newspapers, from a deliberative standpoint at least, is rather weak; during critical junctures we do not observe the emergence of a different quality of engagement but just a mild and provisional worsening of it. The communicative infrastructure is affected only marginally and briefly by the critical juncture, and the normal levels of deliberativeness tend to be quickly reestablished. The observed change in terms of framing and justification cannot be understood as the result of a moment of deep deliberation. Rather, it represents the provisional outcome of minimally deliberative or non-deliberative interactions.

An encouraging insight from our data is that during critical junctures, debates on newspapers seem to further improve upon one aspect they already seem to deliver consistently: refraining from featuring coerciveness and disrespectful language. Preventing political debate from taking an overtly coercive and derogatory tone is certainly an important quality from a deliberative democratic standpoint. However, the rise of populist leaders

to the central stages of political life in the West might threaten newspapers' ability to avoid debates characterized by coerciveness and disrespect. Another important element from our analysis regards the fact that the entire Charlie Hebdo debate unfolds in a way that features neither substantial reason-giving nor reciprocity. During critical junctures, this problem emerges all the more clearly. Our research suggests that, though the content of a debate, as seen, may change over time, the deliberative qualities of public debates may vary little before, during, and after critical junctures. Interestingly and relatedly, we also observed that the critical juncture affected very marginally, but generally never in positive ways, all of the deliberative qualities under examination with respect to all the discussions under examination. Overall, though the critical juncture does not represent a moment of deliberative breakdown, our societies seem poorly suited to perform what is generally invoked on these occasions and what might be reasonable to hope for: to turn critical junctures into moments of collective reflection and into opportunities for envisioning a better course.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In ending this chapter, we would like to reflect upon some insights from our investigation of over-time trends in deliberation and polarization. Our empirical analyses indicate that transformative events challenge established positions in the public sphere, restructuring relative power relations generally to the advantage of state and government actors. Moreover, the public emotion caused by the attacks seems to have further neutralized political conflict on most issues concerning the Charlie Hebdo debates. While our explorative analysis could not confirm that the consequences of exceptional events are able to consolidate in the long run, it enabled us to identify some crucial features of public debates in the aftermath of critical junctures.

If we consider that access to mainstream media was highly selective and that the deliberative qualities were rather modest, then, at least from a deliberative and democratic standpoint, the Charlie Hebdo debates seem to be weak. Far from an ideal arena where a variety of actors engage in deliberation, mainstream newspapers tend to provide a superficial back and forth between elite, state, and party actors in particular (see also Bennett et al. 2004). Our research shows that in the aftermath of a critical juncture, these concerning trends might well worsen, at least temporarily. To improve the democratic credentials of these debates and the ability to bolster deliberation after critical junctures calls for efforts toward coverage that

is more inclusive and open to a larger section of societal actors and less superficial.

With respect to polarization, its course seems to parallel that of deliberation. In the aftermath of the critical juncture, polarization levels and deliberative qualities both decrease. In our view, this speaks to a very important immediate effect that critical junctures may have on public debates: a tendency to converge on a superficial consensus. The latter is not the result of greater engagement among actors with different views. On the contrary, it stems from the momentary bracketing of differences. While we do not claim that in the aftermath of a great shock the ability to put aside differences is negative in itself, we argue that this is not an ideal moment of democratic life either—far from it. The bracketing of differences is based on a lack of engagement, not on the reflexive debate among different actors. As for deliberation in small groups, a good degree of agonism, whereby participants do not quickly put aside their different opinions for the sake of a shallow effort toward consensus, may be central to developing a healthy societal debate (Bächtiger 2011).

Ultimately, our research suggests that critical junctures, far from providing a unique opportunity to advance participation in the public sphere, represent a challenging moment for public debates. More research is needed to better grasp the evolution of large debates in the aftermath of critical junctures and, in particular, under what conditions these events might have long-lasting impacts. On the basis of our investigation, however, we envisioned neither a virtuous reaction nor a breakdown of the public debates in the aftermath of a critical juncture. Interestingly, as argued by Rostbøll (2010), as public controversies unfold, societal actors (particularly those who are directly affected by certain debates and struggle to affirm their views) should contribute to a recursive process of democratic reinterpretation of shared norms. In his investigation of the Danish cartoon controversy, however, Rostbøll found evidence of dominant actors adopting exclusionary appeals. Similarly, our study shows that exclusionary and non-deliberative tendencies were moderately, but not negligibly, amplified. Whereas negative effects were not exceedingly pervasive and, over time, the debate tended to go back to its normal proprieties, during the critical juncture, a few empowered actors seized the attention of the mainstream media, thus constraining the debate on a limited number of consensual arguments. Turning special, spectacularized moments into opportunities to enhance democratic debate, or at least in limiting their possible negative effects on public debates, remains an important objective for our societies (see Curato 2019). We agree with Wessler et al. (2016, 318), who, in their theoretical analysis of the Charlie Hebdo debate, highlight the importance

of political discourse culture in this regard. That is, the extant "patterns of production, reception, and appropriation of political communication" are fundamental for deliberative, democratic-mediated debate. The ability to establish societal deliberation when conflict erupts might depend fundamentally on our everyday efforts to establish public debates more firmly on democratic ground than we currently do.

CHAPTER 4

The deliberative qualities of the debates from a comparative perspective

THE QUALITY OF DEBATES IN PUBLIC SPHERES

In this chapter we investigate the deliberative and democratic qualities of the Charlie Hebdo debates in alternative public spheres. We identify and assess from a deliberative democratic standpoint the main overall features of these debates and the principal characteristics of the different types of actors under examination. Our goal is to shed light on what happens to public debates in the three public spheres under examination in this book (radical right, left-wing, and religious groups), and in particular to their deliberative democratic qualities, in the aftermath of a critical juncture.

Our research effort resonates with traditional concerns of early deliberative theory. Since its inception, deliberative democracy has given great centrality to the role of discursive processes in society at large, and Habermas's (1989) seminal analysis, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, famously moved the study of the discursive qualities of the public sphere to the forefront of democratic research agenda. Landmark deliberative works have continued this critical effort, shaping our understanding of the role that public sphere discursive processes play in democratic societies (Dryzek 1990; Young 2000; Chambers 2009).

The importance of these contributions notwithstanding, research on deliberative democracy has tended to focus on the study of the micro-dynamics of deliberation in an ever-growing range of deliberative assemblies. For anyone in the field, it has been nearly impossible to resist

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the temptation to look closely at the working of deliberation in carefully designed environments. After all, in those contexts it is possible to approximate the ideal conditions for deliberative exchange more closely than in everyday interactions. This type of investigation has led to a far better understanding of the meaning and potential of democratic deliberation in democratizing contemporary societies (Gronlund, Bachtiger, and Setälä 2014). However, the tendency to focus on micro-deliberation has also contributed to neglect of the daunting but much needed effort to systematically investigate discursive politics in different public spheres.

Recent works in deliberative democracy embraced this endeavor. The obvious reference is to some of the studies adopting the so-called systemic approach to deliberative democracy: In order to promote the prospect of deliberative democracy, we need to look beyond deliberative assemblies and grasp the complex role of deliberation in society at large (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012). Though the idea of deliberative systems can be articulated in different ways (Owen and Smith 2014), at its core, "a deliberative system is one that encompasses a talk-based approach to political conflict and problem-solving—through arguing, demonstrating, expressing, and persuading" (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 5). Researchers have begun to investigate deliberative engagement in public spheres with regard to various issues such as, for instance, climate change governance (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014), representation of women in the media (Curato and Ong 2015), international trade agreements (Kuyper 2016), and local environmental campaigns (Riedy and Kent 2015). Such contributions, usually based on in-depth single-case studies, have started to shed light on how public sphere deliberation may affect deliberative systems. Our aim is different. We do not adopt the deliberative system framework. Instead, our goal is to provide a sufficiently nuanced account of what occurs from a discursive standpoint in various public sphere debates in the presence of a critical juncture.

The idea of investigating the deliberative qualities of the public sphere without adopting the language of the systemic approach is not unique to this study. Other comparative investigations of the deliberative democratic qualities of the public sphere have adopted a similar approach, in work at the crossroads between deliberative democracy and social movement studies (della Porta 2015; della Porta and Rucht 2013) as well as studies on religious minorities in Europe (e.g., Cinalli and Giugni 2013). This type of research has been fundamental in understanding the deliberative qualities of specific components of the European public sphere, respectively progressive social movements and Muslim minorities. However, these studies fall short of providing a more global view of the deliberative qualities of

different types of actors within public spheres in Europe. In this chapter, our goal is to provide this kind of analysis through our investigation of public sphere discussions in the context of the Charlie Hebdo critical juncture. First, a methodological note is in order.

COMPARATIVE DESIGN AND CASE STUDIES

This chapter is based on a vast qualitative investigation of far-right, leftist, and civil-rights movements as well as religious groups in four European countries: France, Germany, United Kingdom, and Italy. We consulted the online platforms of about 100 groups for each category (far-right, left-wing, and civil-rights, as well as religious groups) in the four countries. Our main sources for our analysis are comment pieces, press releases, pamphlets, and calls for action, which we retrieved online from over 1,500 web pages of movements and networks. We analyzed the deliberative qualities of these sources based on a shared understanding of democratic deliberation.

In order to pin down the complex nature of democratic deliberation and to be able to assess qualitatively the extent to which the discussions under examination were deliberative and democratic, we articulated the notion of deliberation in eleven dimensions. Then, four experts investigated the extent to which each of these dimensions could be observed in the discussions in each country, one category of groups at a time. Based on the experts' qualitative reports, we developed the comparative analysis reported here.

The eleven dimensions employed in this study refer to concepts that are usually understood as being important in deliberative democratic processes. We grouped them in three domains to shed light on relational, rational, and consensual qualities in the discussions under examination. Judgments on the relational quality of discussions were based on the following five dimensions: first, the extent to which discussions were characterized by coercion, rather than persuasion (Dryzek 2000, 1); second, the presence among actors of a minimum of mutual respect, taking the form, for instance, of a civilized discussion and an acknowledgement of each other's position (including in cases of disagreement), rather than a hostile or dismissive attitude (see Thompson 2008); third, the effort to establish an inclusive discussion where engagement with "relevant" actors, interests, or discourses—from those of the group members to those of political adversaries—is valued, rather than dismissed (see Dryzek 2009, 1382); fourth, the tendency of actors to engage in an egalitarian way rather than by appeal to authority or with communication structured along hierarchical lines (see Haug, Rucht, and Teune 2013); and fifth, the degree of

reciprocity, that is, the effort to relate to others in terms that others can accept (see Gutmann and Thompson 2009, 141).

Judgments on the quality of rational exchange during discussions were based on four dimensions: first, the extent to which discussions feature a substantial exchange of arguments, rather than being dominated, for instance, by slogans or purely emotional appeals (see Dryzek 2000, 167–68); second, the degree of critical scrutiny in a discussion, that is, the tendency to question each other's claims rather than affirm them on the basis of unquestionable technical expertise or authority, for instance (see Knight and Johnson 1997, 288); third, the tendency of actors involved in discussions to show signs of reflection on their views, interests, and preferences on the basis of engagement with others, rather than engaging in discussion dominated by the unremitting reiteration of an individual's views (see Cohen 1989); and fourth, the presence of claims that make reference to general (democratic) principles, rather than only or mainly to personal preferences (Dryzek 2009, 1328).

Consensual qualities are assessed on the basis of two concepts: first, the emergence, after democratic and deliberative discussions, of a consensus among actors on how to resolve a problem at hand; or, second, the emergence of at least a degree of meta-consensus on the nature of a problem, though actors may retain different views about ways to address it (see Bächtiger et al. 2010). This chapter reports on the main features we observed in each category of actors and provides excerpts to illustrate some of our observations.

THE DELIBERATIVE QUALITIES OF THE CHARLIE HEBDO DEBATE AMONG DIFFERENT PUBLIC SPHERES

Three overall aspects emerge from the comparative qualitative analysis of the debates. First, the overall deliberative quality of the debates varies substantially, from very poor to good. Second, and relatedly, performance tends to depend on the category of actors under examination: very poor across the whole spectrum of far right actors, and good for left and civil rights as well as religious groups, though differences within some categories can be observed. Third, deliberative qualities do not vary substantially across countries; they are similar for the same categories in different countries.

The divide is deep between far-right actors, on the one hand, and leftist and civil-rights groups as well as religious actors on the other. The former are clearly non-deliberative, while the latter show more substantial

deliberative and democratic qualities. Right-wing actors fall short of a good performance on virtually all of the eleven conceptual dimensions of democratic deliberation, in all four countries. In contrast, although with some limitations, leftist and civil-rights groups, together with religious actors, tended to display good or at times very good qualities on many of the conceptual dimensions being considered.

There is some variation in deliberative quality within each of the three types of actors under examination, mainly with regard to relational aspects. To begin with, on the far right, there is a difference between radical-right actors and extreme-right ones, with the latter faring even more poorly than the former. Borrowing from Mudde (2000), here the distinction between these two actors refers, at its core, to the difference between those hostile to liberal democratic principles but still engaged in democratic politics (radical right), and those that, instead, oppose the democratic constitutional order (extreme right). In the leftist and civil-rights category, we observe a difference between moderate left and civil-rights actors, on the one hand, and radical-left and libertarian civil-rights organizations, on the other (see Chapter 5). Finally, the religious category shows no substantial variation in terms of deliberative qualities across Christians, Jews, and Muslims. However, in each of the three religious groups, it is possible to distinguish between more progressive components, on the one hand, and more conservative and radical ones on the other. The former actors tend to display higher deliberative qualities than the latter.

A striking feature of the Charlie Hebdo debate is that these observations seem to apply almost uniformly across all four countries under investigation. With minor exceptions, which will receive due attention, deliberative qualities do not vary substantially across countries. No country stands out for the deliberative qualities of its public sphere actors, and different actors in one country tend to behave similarly to their counterparts in the other countries. This can be observed clearly in the discussion on each category of actors.

Shunning deliberation: Right-wing actors in the Charlie Hebdo debate

In all four countries under examination, the Charlie Hebdo debate has seen a surge in far-right actors' engagement. These actors have been able to influence national debates on civil rights, religion in the public sphere and, in particular, immigration. Thus, it is especially interesting for us to analyze the behavior of far-right actors in order to assess their deliberative

qualities. As anticipated, far-right actors display poor or very poor deliberative democratic qualities (Table 4.1).

Far-right actors fall short of good performance on all of the eleven dimensions considered in the experts' qualitative assessments. This data is uniformly spread across countries. The Italian and French far-right actors fare even more poorly (on five dimensions) than do the German and the UK cases (three). However, this does not seem to represent a substantial difference within the European far right, which emerges as a block of squarely non-deliberative actors. Observed variations across countries seem related to some specific aspects. The first refers to the internal dynamics of the far right. In Italian and French discussions, far-right actors showed high levels of divisiveness and competition accompanied by little or no display of respect even toward other far-right groups. Debates in France and Italy tended to be hinged on the (more or less rigorous) adoption of the views connected to a few authoritative figures.[1] In contrast, discussion seemed more "open" in Germany and, in particular, in the UK case.

Coercion deserves special mention, as the one dimension in which all cases display major failures. Radical-right actors tended to refrain from using some of the most offensive and racist terms and draconian measures voiced by the extreme right. Nevertheless, discussions in the far-right category usually remained Islamophobic, often anti-Semitic, and generally coercive, especially toward members of elites and minorities. A few excerpts can be provided as an illustration of the tone emerging in discussions among extreme-right actors. In remarking upon the BBC's decision not to use the word "terrorist" for Charlie Hebdo news, a participant in the Storm Front UK forum remarks: "Do not call Charlie Hebdo killers 'terrorists,' says head of BBC Arabic Tarik Kafala. Ok then, I won't. I'll call them 7th century, unwashed, uncivilised Muslim filth instead."[2] In France, reference to "Islamo-racailles" (Islamic-scum) to describe all those practicing Islam and living in the suburbs is not uncommon among far-right organizations. In Italy, in numerous events, *Forza Nuova* (FN) referred to Islam as "a bloody culture that has nothing to do with the millenary history of

1. In Italy, these figures include: Oriana Fallaci, whose views are engaged with by all actors except the most radical; "former Muslim" Magdi Cristiano Allam; Holocaust denier and academic Robert Faurisson; and emeritus Pope Benedict XVI, purportedly an opponent of multiculturalism in opposition to Pope Francis. Several French personalities are also central, including: Alain de Benoist, Michel Houellebecq, and Jean Marie and Marine Le Pen. Such figures are certainly taken as important ones in French debates, together with more national personalities such as Alain Soral from *Egalité et Reconciliation* and Fabrice Robert from the *Bloc Identitaire*.

2. http://www.patria-uk.org/bbc-wont-call-a-spade-a-spade/

Table 4.1: DELIBERATIVE QUALITIES OF THE FAR RIGHT ACROSS THE FOUR COUNTRIES

	Coercion	Respect	Inclusion	Equality	Reciprocity	Reason-Giving	Scrutiny	Reflexivity	Principles	Consensensus	Metaconsensus
France	X	X	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	X	X
Germany	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	X
Italy	X	X	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	X	X
United Kingdom	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	X

NOTE: Legend: "X" very poor; "-" poor; "+" good; "✔" very good.

Europe." In Germany, racist comments were used to address a multitude of actors, from US President Barack Obama, referred to as "the black man from overseas," to Muslim people, derogatorily called "Mohammedaners."

The qualities of rational exchange are uniformly poor throughout the case studies, though some clarifications are necessary in this respect. First, the bulk of the discussions were characterized by some degree of reason-giving and arguments. Nonetheless, at the same time, debates often hinged on conspiracy theories and tended to ignore counter-evidence or dissenting arguments. Such theories varied and included references to "New Global Order"-inspired strategies of tension, to the organization of the Charlie Hebdo attacks by US and Israeli secret services, to Eurabia, to the Grand Replacement, just to mention some of the most popular. Thus, *Italy NoReporter*, one of the main platforms for neo-fascist information, confidently argued that: "irrespective of whether or not we are facing a war of religions, the real problem we face today is . . . the ongoing replacement of European populations with inflows of exogenous people, with the sponsorship of the UN and all global players." The substantial presence of conspiracy arguments underpins our choice to give a negative assessment to the discussion.

Similarly, debates on the far right showed some degree of critical scrutiny. However, this effort was aimed at the positions of political opponents rather than at fellow participants in the debate. Again in Italy, Magdi Allam, a former Muslim convert to Christianity and leading anti-Islam voice argued, like most other groups in this area, that there is no distinction within Islam: "[T]he massacre of Charlie Hebdo symbolizes the contiguity and consequentiality of thinking and acting by moderate Muslims and terrorists." General principles were mentioned systematically in most debates, and specific claims were often connected to such principles. The negative assessment, in this case, is related to the fact that the principles evoked more often than not referred to non-democratic or non-deliberative values. According to the UK National Action blog, for instance: "National Socialism . . . condemns Neo-Conservatism, integration, Charlie Hebdo, and invasive counter terror legislation—all we believe is that these islands are the ancestral property of the white European race, sub-ethnic wasters have no place here regardless of their religion."[3]

Finally, whatever degree of agreement may be found on the nature of a problem or the ways to solve it, in order to qualify as meta-consensus or consensus, has to originate from a process of deliberation. Given that

3. http://national-action.info/2016/02/20/war-plans-2016/

deliberation was not observed in the far-right discussion we investigated, we gave a negative assessments on the two dimensions of consequentiality for these actors.

The quest for rational and relational engagement: Leftist and civil-rights organizations

The dramatic events connected to the terrorist attacks of January 2015 fueled debates on some of the topics around which progressive actors have been active for a long time, such as immigration and coexistence, the role of religion in a democratic society, structural oppression, freedom of expression, security, and protection of minorities. Within this category, we adopt the distinction between leftist and civil-rights actors in order to observe specifically how actors in each camp engaged in these discussions. In general, an analysis of the deliberative qualities of leftist and civil-rights organizations reveals a rather positive picture across all countries (see Table 4.2).

A first element that emerges from our analysis concerns the ability with which these actors engage in rational debates. Leftist and civil rights actors feature quality engagement on almost all dimensions of rational engagement across the four countries. The only exceptions are the debates in Germany and the United Kingdom. In the former case we observe discussions where, in spite of good quality engagement, actors tend to systematically reject opponents' claims, showing little or no willingness to reconsider their own stance. In the UK case, instead, although actors seem willing to reflect on their own views, they do so on the basis of discussions in which critical scrutiny is limited to the views of those with whom they disagree, rather than their own. The actors' tendency to engage more with "friendly" voices than with dissenting ones limits the rational quality dimensions without, however, precluding good discursive engagement generally. Instead, the tendency to oppose actors with different views has a greater impact on the relational qualities of civil-rights and leftist actors in particular.

Relational qualities were more problematic. In order to properly understand the relational domain, it is necessary to look at the difference between leftist and civil-rights actors. On all dimensions of relationality, civil-rights actors fare as well or better than leftist actors (see Table 4.3). In particular, leftist groups tended to behave rather antagonistically in debates. This is particularly true for anti-fascist and anti-capitalist groups but was observed in general in the more radical groups. For example, as we read

Table 4.2: DELIBERATIVE QUALITIES OF LEFTIST AND CIVIL-RIGHTS ACTORS ACROSS THE FOUR COUNTRIES

	Coercion		Respect		Inclusion		Equality		Reciprocity		Reason-Giving		Scrutiny		Reflexivity		Principles		Consensensus		Metaconsensus	
France	+	✔	−	−	−	−	+	+	−	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	−	−	+	+
Germany	+	✔	X	+	−	+	+	+	−	+	+	+	+	+	−	−	+	+	+	+	+	+
Italy	−	✔	−	+	+	+	+	+	−	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−
United Kingdom	−	−	−	−	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	+	+	−	−	+	+
	L	CR	L	CR	L	CR	L	CR	L	CR	L	CR	L	CR	L	CR	L	CR	L	CR	L	CR

Legend: L=Left; CR= Civil–rights actors

Table 4.3: RELATIONAL QUALITIES OF LEFTIST AND CIVIL-RIGHTS ACTORS

Left	Coercion	Respect	Inclusion	Equality	Reciprocity	Civil Rights	Coercion	Respect	Inclusion	Equality	Reciprocity
France	+	−	−	+	−	***France***	✔	−	−	+	+
Germany	+	X	−	+	−	***Germany***	✔	+	+	+	+
Italy	−	−	+	+	−	***Italy***	✔	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	−	−	−	+	−	***United Kingdom***	−	−	−	+	−

in Stop the War UK, conservative actors mobilizing for freedom of speech are "bigots [that] aren't defending 'civilisation' or 'free speech'—they are debasing these terms and weaving them into their own 'war.'"[4] Most civil rights actors displayed, instead, less confrontational tones to express their disagreement with the other actors' views. This phenomenon accounts for the difference in performance among leftist and civil-rights actors.

The leftist scene in the United Kingdom stood out as the most unyielding in debates, as actors tended to refuse engagement with alternative views. As in other cases, however, people participating in the debate treated each other in rather equal terms. The Italian and French leftist scenes fare only slightly better than the UK one. In Italy, unlike the other cases, dissenting views were allowed in debates; but they were not engaged with in reciprocal terms. In France, leftist actors refrained from adopting coercive tones. Nonetheless, they still did not always show due respect to actors with different views. A similar phenomenon characterizes Germany. Here, contempt for far-right actors and the PEGIDA movement, in particular, is much stronger than can be observed in other cases. Nonetheless, this stance only rarely takes the form of offensive language or coercive content. Finally, it should be noted that substantial forms of reciprocity did not appear in any case: When differences in actors' views emerged, the irreconcilability of positions was quickly acknowledged.

Civil rights actors, who tended to adopt a less oppositional stance in the debates, satisfactorily met most relational dimensions, although the LGBT component of the British civil rights organizations represents a substantial exception. These actors tended to present markedly non-deliberative attitudes during debates, which often took anti-religious and Islamophobic overtones. For instance, in the comment section of the LGBT news outlet Pinknews, we read: "Islam is pure evil. I don't remember european muslims who condemned islamic countries in the Middle East and Africa for their inhuman cruelty toward LGBT people. Islam must be banned in Europe."[5] The distinction between leftist and civil rights actors' relational qualities is most clear in Germany, where the latter performs better than the former in all dimensions, with the exception of equality, which is good in both cases. In Italy, as well, civil rights organizations tend to outperform leftist ones in those three dimensions where the latter show poor qualities (coercion, respect, and reciprocity). In France, instead, the only difference between

4. http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/941-how-islamophobes-wage-a-holy-war-against-muslims-in-the-name-of-free-speech.

5. http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2015/01/07/gunmen-massacre-staff-at-paris-magazine-that-published-islamic-gay-kiss/comments/.

the two groups regards the coercion dimension, where leftist actors, in any case, seem sufficiently good.

Interestingly, leftist and civil-rights actors fare similarly in their ability to reach consensus and meta-consensus. This seems to suggest that differences in the relational qualities between the two types of actor did not ultimately affect their ability to reach consensual outcomes. Meta-consensus on the nature of the problems at hand in the Charlie Hebdo debates is beyond the reach of the Italian actors. Here, the different components belonging to the category under investigation do not seem to formulate widely shared ideas about the challenges the Charlie Hebdo debate entails. Of course, differences are all the more pronounced with respect to how to address these different problems. Indeed, disagreement on the solutions to common problems is deep across the various actors in this category. The only exception is the German case, where actors are united in envisioning an urgent need to counter the rise of xenophobic and racist movements.

Deliberative qualities seem generally similar across countries. The only aspect in which uniformity is not observed concerns the relational qualities among leftist groups in Europe. As seen, this phenomenon is related to how radical-left actors position themselves in debates. Our analysis suggests that the main divide in terms of deliberative qualities of progressive actors is not just between civil-rights and leftist actors. More specifically, it occurs between moderate left and civil-rights actors, on the one hand, and radical-left and libertarian civil-rights organizations, on the other.

Deliberative actors across religions: Christians, Jews, and Muslims in the Charlie Hebdo debates

Charlie Hebdo naturally placed religious actors in a central position in the debates that followed the attacks. Muslims, Jews, and Christians were involved in in very different ways. Nonetheless, they also shared a common religious background that put them in a distinct position vis-à-vis the rest of society. It is therefore interesting to see how these actors were affected by this critical juncture from a discursive standpoint. The observation of religious actors' deliberative qualities shows a rather positive overall situation across all major religious actors, in all countries (see Table 4.4).

The similar performance of the three religious groups is the first element that deserves attention. Along the eleven dimensions examined, there is partial variation among the three religious groups only with respect to the degrees of coercion and mutual respect in the United Kingdom and in Italy.

Table 4.4: DELIBERATIVE QUALITIES OF RELIGIOUS ACTORS ACROSS THE FOUR COUNTRIES

	Coercion			Respect			Inclusion			Equality			Reciprocity			Reason-Giving			Scrutiny			Reflexivity			Principles			Consensus			Metaconsensus		
France		–			+			+			+			–			+			+			–			+			+			+	
Germany		+			+			+			+			✔			+			–			+			✔			+			+	
Italy	+	–	+	+	–	–		–			–			+			+			–			X			+			+			+	
United Kingdom	+	+	–	+	+	–		–			–			–			+			+			+			+			+			+	
	C	**J**	**M**	**C**	**J**	**M**	**C**	**J**	**M**	**C**	**J**	**M**	**C**	**J**	**M**	**C**	**J**	**M**	**C**	**J**	**M**	**C**	**J**	**M**	**C**	**J**	**M**	**C**	**J**	**M**	**C**	**J**	**M**

Legend: C=Christians; J=Jews; M=Muslims

In the British case, variation is related to the presence of radical Muslims expressing markedly coercive and disrespectful views. These are aimed not only toward other religious groups but also to Western societies more generally, and we found actors overtly expressing support for the killing of those who insult their religion. We need to mention two caveats. First, such behavior does not characterize the bulk of Muslims, who tend to refrain from adopting coercive tones. Second, some web platforms of more radical Muslims had already been closed down at the time of our investigation. This may account for the impossibility to record substantial coercive claims by radical Muslims in other national cases.

In the Italian case, the analysis of the online discussions of the Jewish community in Rome showed a high degree of coercion, in a way that could not be observed in other Jewish communities across the country and abroad. The failure to convey mutual respect in the Italian case is connected to the open hostility between Jews and Muslims that was apparent in some discussions. Christians and Catholics in particular, seemed excluded from these hostilities. Having discussed the exceptions, it is worth restating the importance of the fact that the three major religions we studied performed similarly. Actually, variation in deliberative qualities tended to occur within each religious group, along the progressive/reactionary divide, rather than across the religious groups.

In terms of national performance, the landscape also appears remarkably uniform. Certainly, in the German case religious groups tended to engage in more deliberative terms than in other countries. At the same time, in the Italian case, deliberative engagement seems weaker as compared to the other cases. Yet, overall, religious groups in all countries tended to perform rather positively in the domain of rational deliberation and consensual outcomes. Limitations, instead, occurred with respect to their relational qualities.

In both Italy and the United Kingdom, the dynamics affecting the low performance in mutual respect and coercion seem to account for the lack of inclusion as well. Quite unlike what we observed in France and Germany, UK and Italian religious actors tended to stylize other groups, and attempts to engage directly with them were more timid. For instance, the *Unione Italiana della Cominità Ebraiche* stated: "To say that the problem with Jihadi terrorism is Islam is deeply wrong. Yet it is true that Islam has a problem and it seems that the Muslim world does not want to realize it. . . . [T]he problem is exclusively internal to Islam and the solution to radicalism must come from Islam itself and by those who reject the image of their religion provided by Isis, Al Qaeda and Hamas."

French religious actors displayed similar limitations with regard to coercion and mutual respect. However, in the French case, our positive assessment of the degree of mutual respect was related to the major efforts that the overwhelming majority of religious actors undertook to show respect for members of all religious groups. To the contrary, in the United Kingdom and Italy, the presence of more conservative or radical groups that tend to address members of other religions in explicitly coercive ways was substantial and negatively affected the performance of religious groups in terms of mutual respect.

Egalitarian engagement was present in all countries, though in Italy the Pope's views tended to be taken as authoritative to an extent that seemed detrimental to the egalitarian nature of most debates, especially in Christian circles. In Jewish and Muslim Italian groups, actors with different views tended to neglect each other in a way that showed far from equal concern for everyone's voice. Finally, in Italy and Germany, we found a tendency (more robust in the German case) to appeal to ideals such as tolerance and the value of cooperation that went beyond those specific to a particular religious group, in a way that could not be substantially observed in France and Britain. In the Italian case, reference to general ideas was paralleled by a concern with group-specific issues (the rise of anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and religious intolerance respectively for Muslims, Jews, and Christians). In the British case, instead, no clear effort to engage in reciprocity could be observed among different actors belonging to the same religious group or across religions.

In the rational deliberation domain, there are few exceptions to a generally positive engagement. These concern the degree of critical scrutiny and reflexivity in some countries (Italy, France, and Germany). The Italian case contains both flaws: Scrutiny appears to be low and reflexivity minimal. The first problem refers to the observation that critical remarks were overwhelmingly aimed at other actors. The second is connected to the (possibly related) tendency of actors to almost mechanically restate their preferences without substantial indication that a change in views would be possible. Finally, sufficient levels of consensus or meta-consensus appeared in each country. This is not to deny that different actors also had distinct approaches to complex problems. Rather, we refer to the emergence of some agreement over the nature of challenges religious groups faced and to their ability to envision at least some solutions that could be accepted by all groups.

HOW DELIBERATIVE QUALITIES VARY (OR STAY SIMILAR) ACROSS DIFFERENT ACTORS

Based on these observations, we can make some general remarks. First, at least two of the three categories of actors under examination seemed capable of engaging in good democratic deliberation. This observation seems at odds with studies that portray public sphere actors as fundamentally incapable of engaging in deliberation (Conover and Searing 2005; Mutz 2006; Jacobs, Cook, and Carpini 2009). Our investigation also presents a more positive outlook on deliberation and web debates than previously studies noted (Kies 2010; Steiner 2012, Ch. 8). The ability of public sphere actors to engage in deliberation that we observe in this research is consistent with findings from studies on deliberation in social movements (della Porta 2015; della Porta and Rucht 2013). These investigations call into question caricatured accounts of public spheres composed of actors with little interest or ability to engage in deliberation; they show that deliberation is often actively pursued and attained, for instance, by social movements.

Across continental European countries there exists an impressive variety of progressive actors (such as those belonging to the leftist and civil society category), which are not just capable of but seem comfortable with engaging in deliberative discussion. Similarly, in the four countries under examination, religious groups, far from being unable or unwilling to engage in deliberation, stood out as actors that seem rather well suited for deliberative engagement. This seems to support recent developments in deliberative theory, which acknowledge the role of religious actors and to religiously based arguments in deliberative democracy and deliberative systems (see Hertzberg 2015). It is certainly less encouraging to note that one of the voices to which the Charlie Hebdo debate gave prominence—that of far-right actors—seems to be firmly non- or even anti-deliberative, raising concerns about the prospects for a deliberative democratic society that includes non-deliberative actors (Owen and Smith 2015; Felicetti 2017).

The existing divide in deliberative quality between right-wing actors, on the one hand, and other members of the public sphere, on the other, suggests that the lack of engagement in deliberative and democratic discussion may relate largely to an ideological aversion to deliberative democratic values. This is certainly the case for radical-right actors we examined to the extent that they seem opposed to egalitarian and rationalistic principles underpinning deliberative conceptions of democracy. This applies all the more to extreme right actors that reject democracy altogether. Among the actors we examined, a similarly deliberation-averse attitude could be

observed only among some of the most reactionary religious actors.[6] Our research suggests that the extent to which different actors' ideals resonate with deliberative and democratic values greatly affects their ability to develop deliberative qualities. This is consistent with findings from studies of the deliberative qualities of social movements (e.g., Polletta 2002). Our study, however, extends the scope of this observation to the far-right public sphere. Our observations about the rejection of deliberative democratic ideals seems consistent with insight from a wealth of social psychology literature on right-wing authoritarianism (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981; Mallinas et al. 2019).

The second overall aspect we observe is that within each category (far-right, leftist, civil-rights, and religious groups), more moderate actors fare better than their more extreme counterparts. This observation seem to align public-sphere deliberation with the same dynamics that emerge in institutional politics (Wyss, Beste, and Bächtiger 2015), where a more tolerant attitude is found to be more conducive to deliberative behavior than a more adversarial stance. In our investigation, from a deliberative democratic standpoint, extreme-right actors fare even worse than those of the radical right; civil-rights and more moderate leftist organizations tend to fare better than radical-left organizations; and moderate religious groups tend to outperform ultra-conservative and radical religious groups. Attitudes toward deliberative and democratic norms may be just one of the factors accounting for the gap in deliberative performance between actors belonging to the same category. The deliberative performance of actors within the same category also seems affected by the distance between their views and those of the rest of the political system of which they are part. The greater the divide with the rest of the system, the less likely we will observe good relational qualities or a need for quality discursive engagement. Briefly, extreme right actors, more so than those on the far right, discard the possibility of engaging outside their circles as an essentially meaningless effort. Radical-left groups tend to call for direct action to shatter the mainstream political system and the rising wave of right-wing politics—unlike the bulk of civil rights and more moderate leftist organizations which, instead, see value in and often make an effort to engage with other actors. Finally, among all religious groups, in addition to an overwhelming majority of actors that engage in debates with most other political actors,

6. As seen, the radical left represents an exception to the deliberation-friendly approach characterizing the bulk of the groups under study. However, this is generally not rooted in anti-democratic attitudes but related to a preference for more radical and agonistic forms of participation (see Young 2001).

there are illiberal and anti-democratic minorities that firmly reject such a possibility.

The observation above invites us to reflect on inclusive engagement broadly. Our investigation shows that there are three stages of inclusive engagement. In the first, high exclusionary stage, actors involved in a debate fail to engage substantially with anyone holding dissenting opinions. This situation is most often seen in the extreme right actors. Among these actors, engagement with dissent, even when coming from far-right actors, is rejected as a meaningless and potentially dangerous undertaking. Radical or reactionary religious actors display a similar attitude, which occasionally can also be observed also in radical-right and radical-left groups. In the second stage, partial inclusion, actors involved in a debate engage with likeminded people who may have different views on some specific issues. This appears to be the most common position in the public spheres we observed. In fact, this approach emerges clearly among some radical-right actors, the bulk of leftist and civil-rights groups, and religious actors. In the final, fully inclusive stage, actors involved in a debate engaging widely and constructively beyond the circles of likeminded individuals is rarely observed. This attitude, of which there seems to be no substantial trace on the far right, can occasionally be observed among moderate-left and civil-rights groups as well as among more progressive religious actors.

Group polarization seems related to inclusion and exclusion dynamics. Following Sunstein's (2002) classic definition, by group polarization we refer to the tendency of group members to "move toward a more extreme point in whatever direction is indicated by the members' predeliberation tendency." Our investigation clearly indicates that the holders of extreme views belong to highly exclusionary groups. Such actors are not the oppressed groups within the public sphere for which group polarization might be desirable to generate solidarity and help them to enter public debates with confidence (see also Mansbridge 1994, 56–59; Jasper 2010; cf. Sunstein 2005). To the contrary, they hold some of the most intolerant and anti-democratic sentiment in the public spheres under examination. Interestingly, Wessler et al. (2016, 316) argue that such societies dealing with the eruption of these crises of moral conflict in mediated public spheres would benefit from a "robust public process of working out differences between groups" (mediated contestation) based on inclusion and moderation. Our investigation suggests that inclusion and moderation, though sorely lacking in the extreme groups, are present in other public sphere actors.

A final general observation concerns the homogeneity of deliberative performance across countries. Each of the three categories of actors

under examination displays similar deliberative qualities to those of their counterparts in the other countries. In all four countries within each category of actors we observe the same divide between the deliberative performance of more moderate and more extreme components. This homogeneity is particularly interesting in light of two dynamics, which characterize the Charlie Hebdo debate generally: first, the negligible level of transnational activity among our case studies; and second, the varying nature of political and opportunity structures faced by different actors in different countries. Taken together, these two phenomena suggest that public sphere actors participate in the Charlie Hebdo debate within national contexts that can vary substantially from case to case. How can we account for the homogenous deliberative quality of actors across countries? Our answer to this question is based on two considerations: one concerns the nature of critical junctures specifically, and the other relates to insight from deliberative dynamics in social movements.

With regard to the first part of our answer, our study suggests that critical junctures have a tendency to homogenize public debates, which affects the quality of deliberation among different groups. In particular, critical junctures weaken differences in the political and discursive opportunity structures across nations. As we will see throughout the book, in the Charlie Hebdo debate there seems to be a tendency for similar groups to be subjected to similar variations of the discursive and opportunity structures across countries (opening up for the right, closing down for the left, and selective opening for religious groups). The defining feature of the context in which engagement occurs is thus much more related to the political arena in which groups take action than to the country in which they find themselves.

We can make a related point with respect to the second part of our answer. The importance of the context in which groups take action should not be overstated in understanding the ability of actors to engage in democratic deliberation. This is particularly true with regard to a generic idea of national context. Our study suggests that national differences neither jeopardize the possibility of deliberative democratic engagement for actors whose views resonate with deliberative and democratic values, nor enable deliberative democratic engagement for actors whose views do not resonate with or even directly oppose deliberative democratic ideals. Our investigation supports the idea that the disposition of actors toward deliberative engagement determines their deliberative performance more than context-related factors. This view is in line with findings from studies on the deliberative quality of social movement organizations (e.g., Felicetti 2016). With the exception of those who staunchly oppose deliberative and

democratic values, all others may be able to engage in democratic deliberation. From this standpoint, it makes sense that extreme or far-right activists, be they Italian, French, German, or from the United Kingdom, do not actually engage in democratic deliberation. On the other hand, civil-rights activists or religious advocates, regardless of their national provenience, can certainly engage in democratic deliberation, although there is no guarantee that they will do so satisfactorily.

This observation leads us to question the idea that deliberation is a rationalistic practice whose performance is more suited for certain national cultures. This line of reasoning was first adopted by Gambetta (1998), who claimed that deliberation is more likely to emerge among the "analytical" Continental and Anglo-Saxon cultures (of Northern Europe and North America) than in the "indexical" cultures of Southern Europe and Latin America. A perspective that sees deliberation as an intrinsic human capability (Sen 2003) seems better suited to interpreting the situation we observed in our research. This capability takes different forms or, following Sass and Dryzek (2014), manifests itself in different "deliberative cultures." We fully agree with Sass and Dryzek's remark that deliberative cultures do not necessarily overlap with more or less identifiable national cultures. Nationality as such seems to explain little of the ability of public sphere actors to engage in deliberation. Instead, our findings suggest that ethical and political divides, such as those occurring between right, left, and religious groups, are more substantial contextual factors affecting public-sphere deliberation than has thus far been granted.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has investigated the deliberative qualities of three categories of public sphere actors: far-right, leftist and civil-rights, as well as religious actors. It has focused on online discussions taking place in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, which we conceptualize as a critical juncture. Discussions in four European countries (France, Germany, United Kingdom, and Italy) have been analyzed qualitatively and then compared. In particular, we assessed these discussions against eleven dimensions related to the idea of democratic deliberation and referred to three different aspects: relational, rational, and consensus-related outcomes. We then determined the deliberative qualities displayed by each category of actors during discussions. Four main findings emerge from our investigation. First, while actors in the far-right milieu emerge as deeply non-deliberative, leftist and civil-rights as well as religious actors often display good

deliberative qualities. Second, within each category there are differences in deliberative qualities, which are particularly evident with respect to the actors' relational qualities. The divide between more radical and more moderate actors within the same category is the main factor accounting for such differences. Third, our research strongly suggests that among the alternative public spheres, limited inclusivity of those with dissenting views often seemed to relate to extreme views and anti-deliberative democratic engagement. Finally, the performance of the various actors under examination is remarkably similar across the four countries. This has been explained with reference to dynamic characteristic of critical junctures and to the way in which public-sphere actors develop their deliberative capacity.

CHAPTER 5

Left-wing movements facing dilemmas

One week before the French presidential elections of April 23, 2017, *Charlie Hebdo* published a special issue called "Touche pas à la loi de 1905" (Don't touch the 1905 law), referring to the law "on the separation of the churches and the state."[1] *Charlie Hebdo* wrote to all the presidential candidates, asking them to commit on three points: i) not to modify the 1905 law; ii) not to create special arrangements for religious communities; iii) not to create a blasphemy offense. All candidates from the right and the left subscribed to these points—apart from Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right FN party, who was not addressed. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the radical-left candidate, voiced the need for more secularism, while the Trotskyist candidate, Nathalie Artaud, stigmatized a "Catholic lobby," funded by the state. The only candidate from the left who did not reply was another Trotskyist, Philippe Poutou, about whom *Charlie Hebdo* sarcastically wrote that he probably did not receive "the authorization from the revolutionary court of NPA (New Anticapitalist Party, Poutou's party) to respond to a social-traitor, Zionist and Islamophobic newspaper." Humoristic as it seems, *Charlie Hebdo* pointed to an issue that divides the left in France and beyond: secularism and the accommodation of cultural and religious minorities in public life.

How embedded in the left-wing debate was *Charlie Hebdo* after all, and what did the attacks of January 2015 tell us about its divisions? Since the Global Justice Movement, left-wing movements have been confronted

1. *Charlie Hebdo*, No. 1290, April 12, 2017. All following references are from this issue.

Discursive Turns and Critical Junctures: Donatella della Porta, Pietro Castelli Gattinara, Konstantinos Eleftheriadis, and Andrea Felicetti, Oxford University Press (2019).
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190097431.001.0001

with issues of intersectionality, promoted by groups working on gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and protection of minoritarian cultural identities (Eleftheriadis 2018), often facing resistance from Marxist-oriented and post-communist movements which tend to focus more on issues of socio-economic inequalities (Lopez and Garcia 2014). The January 2015 attacks present a particularly interesting case in that regard, as they created a strategic dilemma for the left: Does the support for the libertarian anti-religious values of *Charlie Hebdo* potentially contribute to further marginalization of vulnerable ethnic and religious minorities? And does this support translate uniquely through economic framings of exploitation, or should left-wing movements take it one step further to include cultural domination as well? Left-wing and civil-rights groups were called to address these questions in a context of "immense emotion" (D. Fassin 2015) characterized by a decrease in polarization, meaning that the actors found it difficult to address complex arguments in a debate tending toward consensus, which put differences aside. Moreover, the surging of the far right in both electoral terms and in terms of its capacity for agenda-setting in the public debates has marked the context of the attacks and the constraints for left-wing actors to address their claims in the public sphere.

This chapter analyzes and compares the debates that took place in left-wing spheres in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom after the Paris attacks of January 2015. It does so by looking at their framing activities over the roots and the targets of these terrorist attacks, and the prognosis as well as the motivations for future collective action, in a context of increased securitization and the marginalization of vulnerable social groups. In line with the main argument of the book, we ask whether the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks functioned as a critical juncture for left-wing movements. We expect that the attacks provided actors with a great opportunity to take a position on a question that keeps dividing the left: Should the cultural domination of ethnic and religious minorities in Western societies be considered on an equal footing with economic exploitation? We assume that the attacks allowed an intensification of left-wing movements' framings toward a firmer position on issues of "culture" and "minorities."

This chapter is structured as follows. First, we provide some contextual information on the opportunities for left-wing movements within their national arenas. Specific political and conjunctural opportunities, and actors' perceptions on those, influenced the ways in which movement organizations seized the attacks in order to introduce into the debate and frame their issues. In this part, we set some hypotheses that guide the analysis to follow. Second, we discuss the way in which the debate took place in the movements' national arenas and see how these movements seized the

opportunities in order to address specific *issues* and advance *frames* on the origins and the consequences of the attacks on marginalized populations. For this part, we draw upon empirical material from the publications of left-wing and civil-rights organizations in the aftermath of the attacks. In the concluding section, we focus on cross-national differences. We argue that the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks functioned as a catalyzer in an already existing process within left-wing movements: disagreements over the "primary role" of cultural injustice toward ethnic and religious minorities in the struggles for social justice. The "Charlie dilemma" pushed left-wing movement organizations, historically anchored in materialist framings, to address diagnostic frames of cultural exclusions, and to synthesize their traditional position of hostility against religion with protection of cultural and religious minorities. The bridging of cultural questions and social issues, although varying across movement groups and countries, runs parallel to debates among far-right actors. In fact, as we show in the chapter on far-right movements, some far-right actors in a similar vein found themselves locked within a contradiction between, on the one hand, supporting *Charlie Hebdo* as such, and on the other hand defending its libertarian values.

OPPORTUNITIES IN THE LEFT-WING AND CIVIL-RIGHTS MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE: RECOGNITION VERSUS REDISTRIBUTION?

Political and conjunctural opportunities

The attacks took place at a moment when radical left parties and movements, which traditionally address issues of economic exploitation, had been losing power in political arenas. Furthermore, the center-left parties have not provided left-wing movements with opportunities for mobilization. In fact, the weakness of political institutional allies is due to governmental configurations (center-left and -right coalitions in Italy and Germany) and to the reluctance of parties in power to engage with progressive and anti-austerity mobilization (both the center-right in power in the United Kingdom and the center-left in France). So, although center-left parties were expected to offer alliances to progressive movements, their shift toward neoliberal policies and support for stronger securitarian measures prevented left-wing movements from turning them into allies. The PS in France, the SPD and the Greens in Germany, the PD in Italy,

and the Labour Party in the United Kingdom have progressively embraced anti-welfare types of policies and gone against movements' claims for more equal distributions of resources (Della Porta 2015). In addition, and especially after 9/11, center-left parties shifted toward support for securitarian policies (Haubrich 2003), supporting antiterrorist laws and further policing of protests. For example, two months before the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, the French socialist government adopted a bill that provided the executive and the police with increased powers. Political opportunities are relatively closed for left-wing movements advancing social justice claims in all countries, although perceptions of opening were initially present in France and the United Kingdom (Cinalli 2016).

The decrease in institutional allies for left-wing movements coincided with an increase in the visibility of "cultural" issues (Jasper 1997). Since the 1990s, anti-racism, LGBTQI rights, and Islamophobia have polarized the public in Western European states and given birth to a series of mobilizations from both supporters (Gay Pride, anti-racist mobilization) and opponents (Manif pour tous, PEGIDA, and so on) (Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens 2010). Actors from new "new social movements" (Neveu 2011) fighting against (not so) new inequalities came to the forefront of these political struggles. For Nancy Fraser, these claims address cultural or symbolic injustice that:

> is rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication. Examples include cultural domination (being subjected to patterns of interpretation and communication that are associated with another culture and are alien and/or hostile to one's own); nonrecognition (being rendered invisible via the authoritative representational, communicative, and interpretative practices of one's culture); and disrespect (being routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypic public cultural representations and/or in everyday life interactions). (Fraser 1995, 71)

Social movements' battles for multiculturalism and human rights have been growing everywhere (Fraser 2013, 160), although an anti-multicultural rhetoric has been observed in these countries as well during the last few years. In fact, statements on the "end of multiculturalism" (Titley 2014) have been quite prominent, affecting how movements address issues of cultural domination (Bertossi 2016).

Within this transformation of the left in the recognition of marginalized groups' identities, several traditional left-wing movements have worked against the cultural domination in their framings. Respect for minority religious groups (particularly Muslims), as well as the misrecognition

of migrants and ethnic identities, have been addressed in left-wing and social-justice spheres, although with internal conflicts. These conflicts have pointed to the economic or symbolic character of minority groups' claims and at the primary or secondary role of culture in the mechanisms of oppression.

In this chapter, we consider these contextual transformations in order to explore how left-wing groups debated the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, but we also add a strategic social movement perspective. Left-wing movements "play" in the arena according to a "bundle of rules and resources that allow or encourage certain kinds of interactions to proceed, with something at stake" (Jasper 2015, 14), and within which actors are conscious that they participate in practices, obey principles, and target causes different from those governing the other social domains (Mathieu 2012, 17). Within such a perspective, we expect left-wing actors to push their claims primarily in their national arenas, choosing issues and framing them in a way that resonates most with current left-wing debates—especially in framings of recognition of multiculturalism over those of redistribution.

France presents a relatively closed opportunity structure for left-wing movements, despite perceptions of opening after F. Hollande's election in 2012. The strong presence of the Global Justice Movement has created a large convergence between various protest actions (Sommier 2003), despite disagreement over the role of cultural injustice in left-wing mobilization, especially after the 2003 European Social Forum. This divide has also been exacerbated by accusations of "color-blindness" against traditional left-wing movements, given their lack of recognition of racial inequalities and their relegation to a secondary issue (E. Fassin 2009). We therefore expect high polarization regarding the acknowledgment of cultural injustices as a prognostic framing of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks. Furthermore, in countries with a dominant traditional discourse of social justice on the left, such as Italy, we expect the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks to be rooted in a discourse of economic exclusion of marginalized groups, rather than issues of cultural injustice. At the same time, the strong presence of historically rooted criticism of the interference of the Catholic Church and the Vatican in Italian politics might have mobilized strong support for secularism, aligning with the *Charlie Hebdo* libertarian stance, with less sensitivity toward the protection of religious minorities.

In the United Kingdom, where the Global Justice Movement had a strong influence on the movement scene—especially on issues of injustice in the Global South—and where anti-war protests revitalized mobilization in 2004, we expect movements to have resorted to issues of imperialism and global war as factors of the current situation in Europe. Finally, in

Germany, we expect a clear distinction in the framings of redistribution versus recognition, as reflected in tensions between horizontal and hierarchical movements. In fact, horizontal new social movements have been at the forefront of mobilization, bringing in issues of environmental justice and other cultural identity claims (Offe 1985). Hierarchical trade unions, on the other hand, have at times advanced claims against neoliberalism. We therefore expect left-wing movements in Germany to have taken positions relating to the above tension, with new social movements translating it into support for rights of recognition of religious minorities on the one hand, and with union movements translating it into economic injustice on the other.

The tensions in the left-wing framings: Redistribution versus recognition?

How were the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks framed inside left-wing public spheres? In order to address this question, we incorporated movement organizations representing institutional and ideological diversity. In terms of institutionalization, we included both grassroots left-wing organizations and civil-rights associations, which are endowed with different institutional resources and social capital. Left-wing movement organizations usually prefer informal and often horizontal modes of organization and membership. Civil-rights organizations tend instead to be more institutionalized organizations with bureaucratic rules and legal recognition (Jasper 2015, 15).[2] We addressed both types in our analysis, as they promote a progressive transformation of society toward more egalitarian distribution of power and affirmative actions opposing discrimination and violence against subordinated groups.

For both groups, we consider their preexisting ideological embeddedness. The social movement literature tends to distinguish left-wing groups according to ideologies and strategies that emerged within two broader "movement families" (Della Porta and Rucht 1995, 230): the (old) labor movement versus the "new social movements" of the 1960s and onwards (Piotrowski and Wennerhag 2015, 847). Building upon this distinction, we examine left-wing and civil-rights movements through an approach that considers their position on the "recognition/redistribution dilemma"

2. See, in France, the *Association loi de 1901*, which regulates the formation and function of associations.

(Fraser 1995, 74). In particular, we use the framework developed by Nancy Fraser, who defines this dilemma as follows:

> Recognition claims often take the form of calling attention to, if not performatively creating, the putative specificity of some group, and then of affirming the value of that specificity. Thus they tend to promote group differentiation. Redistribution claims, in contrast, often call for abolishing economic arrangements that underpin group specificity. (An example would be feminist demands to abolish the gender division of labour.) Thus they tend to promote group de-differentiation. The upshot is that the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution appear to have mutually contradictory aims. (Fraser 1995, 74).

Although we acknowledge that redistribution and recognition are not necessarily in opposition to each other but are often intertwined, we analytically distinguish left-wing movement organizations in these two categories. We look, moreover, at their diagnostic framings (where does the problem lie?) but also at the remedies they propose (prognostic framings), as well as their expression of motivation for collective action (motivational framings). This distinction will help us to single out the bridging of cultural framings with economic frames.

Looking at these frames, in the next section, we explore the debate of left-wing movements in their national arenas, focusing on the ways in which these movements responded to political and conjunctural opportunities, how they defined the attacks, and finally the remedies they suggested. We shall first address the debate in each of the four countries and then develop some comparisons.

A POLARIZED DEBATE ON THE LEFT IN FRANCE

Left-wing actors in France faced a lack of responsiveness of the socialist government to their claims. Moreover, movements struggling for the recognition of ethnic and religious minorities have for many years been marginalized in the social movement scene, which has largely been dominated by traditional redistributive justice frames, trade unions, and global justice included. Regarding *Charlie Hebdo,* although the journal has historically been associated with the left, given its anticlerical and libertarian values, the publication of the Danish cartoons in 2006 opened up

an internal debate on the left over the protection of religious freedoms. Recognition justice movements challenged the anti-religious content, seen by some groups as a sign of Islamophobia (Hajjat and Mohammed 2013).

In the aftermath of the attacks, although all left-wing movement organizations condemned them, degrees and expressions of support for unlimited freedom of expression and assessments of *Charlie Hebdo's* values varied. The groups also polarized around the frames of "national unity" and "republican values" of the march of January 11, questioning the role of the State as an institution for reproducing inequalities, versus one that guarantees and protects freedom of expression. Therefore, left-wing movement organizations divided around the dilemma between the protection of freedom of expression for a left-wing libertarian journal, and the defense of religious and ethnic groups facing discrimination. The differences in the framing were linked to the various actors' ideological positions but also to their degree of institutionalization.[3]

Movement organizations privileging distributive justice, such as Ensemble! and ATTAC, viewed the attack on *Charlie Hebdo* as an offensive against freedom of expression embedded in a series of attacks upon "equality and freedom," as the primarily republican values constituting the French national citizenry. As one member of Ensemble! put it:

> It violates one of the fundamental democratic principles of freedom of expression. Moreover, these fallen journalists and policemen embodied the Republic, its motto, its values. This is how I understand it. It's a part of us that they wanted to assassinate. . . . It is equality and freedom that we will have to address from now on. Inequalities have never been stronger. Who does not experience or feel it? It is solidarity and fraternity that will have to guide us. We have no time for withdrawal, stigmatization or anger. The time has come for exchange, understanding and questioning. A great brain-storming is needed to build a more humane, more just, more supportive society everywhere and as collectively as possible. Our secular and democratic Republic must, I am firmly convinced, inevitably take another step . . . a 6th Republic will be at the end of this road.[4]

3. For instance, anticapitalist movements prioritized class struggle in their framings. Antiracist movements, more embedded in their local milieus, were more sensitive to race relations, police violence, colonial histories, and intersections of struggles.

4. https://www.ensemble-fdg.org/content/je-suis-charlie-dimanche-je-ferais-cap-sur-une-autre-socit-un-autre-monde.

Given the perceived betrayal of the central values by elites, the diagnostic frame pointed to the need for a re-foundation within a 6th Republic—a claim that finds an echo in the program of the radical left leader of La France Insoumise, Jean-Luc Mélenchon.

Secularism, in its strong version as laicité was not challenged in the framing of the redistributive justice movement organizations. Religiosity was instead perceived as the refuge for people who were exploited by capitalism and global inequalities, with a perceived risk of religious fanaticism. Thus, ATTAC argued that terrorists exploit injustice to enhance religious beliefs in subordinate social groups and to direct them against supposedly Western values:

> Placing Muslim-background populations against "Jews and non-believers," terrorists hope to capitalize on the feelings of injustice and revolt, accurately raised by discrimination and social relegation that immigrant populations suffer from, and transform the legitimate sympathy toward the Palestinians as hate against Jews and the "West."[5]

Within this narrative of religion as a byproduct of economic injustice, some grassroots organizations, privileging distributive positions, described the terrorists as "religious fascists,"[6] adopting a controversial concept later used by former prime minister Manuel Valls to denounce the Copenhagen attacks of February 2015.[7] In this respect, religious fanaticisms were seen as reactions to the state violence and to capitalism's power in regulating society.

With regard to the January 11 demonstration, most distributive justice movement organizations called for participation, framing their call within the need for protection of "French cultural values." ATTAC was particularly explicit in promoting this motivational framing as a way to support the value of freedom of expression:

> [T]he time has come and many people became more aware. To give meaning all together at the Republican motto is, whatever people say, *deeply rooted in French culture*. It is freedom that these fanatics are trying to murder. It is for

5. https://france.attac.org/actus-et-medias/salle-de-presse/article/apres-l-assassinat-de-charlie-non.

6. https://paris-luttes.info/desertons-l-union-nationale-et-son-2430?lang=fr.

7. http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2015/02/16/manuel-valls-prone-l-unite-pour-combattre-l-islamo-fascisme_4577055_823448.html.

> that that we stand up today. It's equality and freedom that they (terrorists) want us to question tomorrow.[8]

In this sense, organizations that privileged distributive justice used some *culturalized* rhetoric (Duyvendak, Geschiere, and Tonkens 2016) by embedding the problem and its remedies in national cultural values. In that respect, they contributed to the general climate of the French debate on the importance of cultural norms and values in the French citizenship, by rooting freedom of expression in the national narrative, as had previously been the case with secularism too (Scott 2007).

To sum up, the organizations that stressed distributive justice saw the attacks on *Charlie Hebdo* as an attack on freedom of expression. On the one hand, they refused the narrative of a "clash of civilizations," although some viewed the attacks as offensive to French values. On the other hand, they privileged framings against economic inequalities and social exclusion. Their participation in the march was divisive: While most movement organizations supported it, grassroots groups displayed some reticence.

In contrast, recognition justice organizations stressed the need to respect minority rights, promoting two sets of framings for the understandings and the remedies of the attacks. First, movement organizations such as the Parti des Indigènes de la République (Party of the Indigenous of the Republic, or PIR) were critical of the Republic and its "indivisible" character. These movements, anchored in postcolonial rhetoric, stigmatized the "national unity" framing promoted by the government and the media. They certainly condemned the attacks, but they also called for the immediate establishment of effective religious pluralism. In a similar vein, the Collectif contre l'islamophobie en France (CCIF) asked the authorities to show "real" national unity without stigmatizing Muslims further:

> We strongly denounce and condemn the horrifying and hateful attack, Wednesday January 7, against the French magazine *Charlie Hebdo*. Our thoughts are with the victims and their families. We obviously expect from our State representatives strong discourses calling for national unity and avoiding any inappropriate stigmatization of Muslim citizens in an already very tense context full of hate and prejudice.[9]

8. https://france.attac.org/actus-et-medias/salle-de-presse/article/apres-l-assassinat-de-charlie-non.

9. http://www.islamophobie.net/articles/2015/01/08/ccif-press-release-charlie-hebdo-attack.

These groups not only highlighted their suspicion of state ideologies, but heavily criticized the presence of conservative leaders in the January 11 demonstration in Paris. Moreover, they perceived the march as an indirect promotion of republicanism, of which they disapproved, linking the conception of the *République* with further security measures, stigmatization of Muslim populations, and the strengthening of the far right. Suburb-based movements, such as the feminist group Femmes en lutte 93, also addressed issues of stigmatization of Muslims, warning of further repression of their communities:

> The calls to avoid amalgamation are vain and their "national unity" has liberated even more Islamophobia. We denounce the multiplication of Islamophobic acts: attacks of mosques, attacks of veiled women, call to the "death of the Arabs." This climate also strengthens the stigmatization of working-class districts with the repression of young people in schools and the call for the militarization of neighborhoods. The increase in police checks creates a climate of terror among our undocumented brothers and sisters.[10]

Therefore, some of the organizations stressing recognition aligned against republican values and universalism, in a different direction from the previously examined redistributive movements.[11]

Established recognition movement organizations, however, such as the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme and SOS-Racisme, supported unconditional freedom of expression as a republican value par excellence, as they asked governments to guarantee the "fundamental values of democracy." Together with other organizations (such as LICRA and MRAP)[12], they published a joint statement on January 9, 2015, in which they used the

10. http://www.femmesenlutte93.com/article-rassemblement-dimanche-18-janvier-contre-le-racisme-et-l-islamophobie-125385607.html.

11. https://mars-infos.org/l-attentat-contre-charlie-hebdo-l-020. The analysis is also published on the website of the Parti des indigenes de la République, http://indigenes-republique.fr/lattentat-contre-charlie-hebdo-loccultation-politique-et-mediatique-des-causes-des-consequences-et-des-enjeux/. Critical antiracist groups used justifications referring to intellectual figures (sociologists and historians of the left) such as Said Bouamama and Sophie Wahnich. The above article discussed the role of mobilizing people's emotions for the January 11 march: "What we are experiencing today is media and dominant political discourse's confinement in the emotion which totally obscures the real and concrete analysis. Any attempt at real analysis of the situation as it is, or any analysis attempting to offer another explanation than the one provided by the media and the political class, becomes an apology for the attack."

12. http://ancien.mrap.fr/restons-charlie-refusons-le-racisme-et-la-haine/?searchterm=charlie.

republican frames of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, arguing that it is up to citizens to lead the debate and create an efficient *Republic* for everyone:

> We are attached to each founding term of the Republic—Liberty, Equality and Fraternity—we decided to declare it in the streets on Sunday, January 11, without slogans or banners, simply to spell it together with our pain but also our adhesion to a Republic in which everyone can, without distinctions, meet up with themselves. That is the meaning of our call.[13]

These actors saw republican and secularist values as sufficient to fight racism, while they saw the state's responsibility as secondary. Although differing in their prognostic framings, these anti-racist movement organizations, like those mentioned, asked the government to limit further security measures in the name of the fight against terrorism.[14]

In sum, among French left-wing movement organizations, freedom of expression and national unity were at the core of the debate after the attacks, prompting polarization. The dilemma between redistribution and recognition reflected the position of left-wing actors in relation to republican values and national unity, but it was also affected by their degree of institutionalization. Organizations more sensitive to redistributive justice framed religious fanaticism as a product of economic exploitation. Freedom of expression was often presented as resonant with French national identity. Organizations privileging recognition focused instead on issues of cultural injustice and stigmatization of Muslims. In the latter case, effective protection of all religious expression was called for. As for the demonstration of January 11, institutionalized organizations of both types called for participation in the march and support for republican framings, identifying with the slogan "Je suis Charlie." Less institutionalized actors, on the other hand, were explicitly opposed to the march and the unifying slogan. Thus, the movements' degree of institutionalization strongly influenced their motivational framings for participating (or not) in the demonstration, and their justification of "national unity" as a remedy to the attacks. The various narratives therefore point to preexisting tensions inside the French left movements' scene, which the attacks exacerbated. These tensions relate to the role of the State and the Republic in dealing with discrimination and exclusion and the traditional left's "color-blind" position on minorities (E. Fassin 2009).

13. http://www.ldh-france.org/republique-effective/.
14. http://www.ldh-france.org/declaration-laedh-lattaque-contre-charlie-hebdo/.

ITALY: A PLURALIST LEFT?

The political opportunity structures in Italy presented unfavorable conditions for left-wing movements to engage in the *Charlie Hebdo* debate. Issues of religiosity and secularism in particular have been highly politicized over the years with debates on ethical issues and on Church–State relations, resulting in the presence of numerous organizations mobilizing for the preservation of the secular nature of the Italian state (Ozzano and Giorgi 2016). Moreover, several civil-rights groups were already discussing the appropriateness of printing the cartoons at the time of their first publication.[15] Most debates in the years before the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks linked the condemnation of blasphemy by Islam to practices of censorship applied in Italy by organizations close to the Catholic Church in the previous decades, including recent cases.

Social movement organizations focusing on redistribution in Italy are characterized by a high degree of fragmentation and organizational heterogeneity. At the time of the attacks, one of the main platforms gathering actors of this category was L'Altra Europa con Tsipras, an expression of the Italian anti-austerity movement and other organizations close to political parties, Rifondazione Comunista, Sinistra-Lavoro, and SEL. Like their French counterparts, these groups expressed solidarity and identified with the slogan "Je Suis Charlie"—stressing that the newspaper opposed all forms of extremism. In this context, freedom of expression and satire were thus perceived as left-wing values. Moreover, the groups criticized far-right politicians who capitalized on anti-Islamic tendencies and condemned neo-colonial rhetoric and discriminatory agendas. Still, in contrast to their French counterparts, a number of Italian groups in this area openly criticized the "republican model" which, according to them, neglects the idea that freedom of expression is inextricably linked with the recognition of social rights to minorities. As the association ARCI stated:

> We must ask ourselves what motivates young people who are born and brought up in France to identify with an ideology of suicide and death. In many ways, they are the "orphans of the République," possibly the most terrible and tragic consequences of the fact that the French democracy has never come to terms with its colonial and imperial past.[16]

15. A vast majority of mainstream newspapers had already reproduced the vignettes at the time of their first publication by *Charlie Hebdo*, when the controversy erupted.
16. https://issuu.com/arcinazionale/docs/arcireport_n_40_-_2015.

In this view, the French republic has evolved into an exclusionary system breeding radical Islam. The problem is located in the lack of recognition by the *République* that culturally dominated groups suffering from cultural injustice as well as economic exclusion.[17] Along the same lines, these groups stated that freedom of expression should not turn into "freedom of insult," because only intolerants fail to make the effort to understand the others' point of view. Most Italian movement organizations embedded in redistributive narratives thus bridged redistribution and recognition.

Groups focusing on recognition—most notably the Radical Party network[18]—have historically promoted strong anticlerical positions in favor of liberal values, such as LGBTQI rights and divorce. These groups framed the massacre as an attack against both freedom of expression and secularism. They not only downplayed Islamophobia as a major social problem, but they also accused other left-wing movements of mobilizing around anti-Islamic racism instrumentally. According to the Radical Party, supporting Muslims draws upon a hidden agenda that aims at limiting free expression and secularism in the public sphere. In this respect, their framings aligned more with some of the French recognition justice movements (SOS-Racisme and the like). For this movement's area, recognition of Islamophobia equals the dismantlement of secularist policies as they have been claimed by progressive movements over the past decades:

> Islamophobia has become a despicable cliché, from which European culture should break free. The French laws against the wearing of Islamic headscarf in schools and of the burqa in public places have been branded as Islamophobic by Martha Nussbaum, Charles Taylor, and by most French public opinion. "Even *Charlie Hebdo* has been accused of racism and Islamophobia"—recalled in a recent interview of Finkielkraut—The minimum would be, today, to do away with this shameful label.[19]

In contrast, similarly to their German counterparts, other recognition justice organizations focused their attention exclusively on "freedom of speech" for journalists. Right after the attacks, Aricolo21 promoted a

17. This became even more evident with the publication of the vignettes on Aylan Kurdi by *Charlie Hebdo* on January 16, 2016. Groups in this category underlined how the satirical journal contributed to constructing a racist imagination that finds its origins in French colonialism.

18. This network is composed of a variety of organizations and groups, such as the Associazione Luca Coscioni, CertiDiritti, Anticlericale.net, Non c'è Pace Senza Giustizia, EXIT, Fondazione Veronesi, Unione degli Atei e Agnostici Razionalisti (UAAR).

19. http://notizie.radicali.it/node/8443.

demonstration in solidarity with the *Charlie Hebdo* victims which gathered several peace organizations (Tavola per la Pace; Coordinamento Nazionale degli Enti Locali per la Pace e i Diritti Umani), providing unconditional support for *Charlie Hebdo's* journalists and freedom of expression. Together with Libera Informazione, they called upon all Italian newspapers to republish the cartoons.

Overall, the debate among left-wing organizations in Italy displayed considerably less conflict than the French one. As expected, both recognition and distributive justice organizations articulated their framings in opposition to the presence of religious organizations in the public sphere, and were thus mainly concerned that the protection of the rights of a religious minority (that is, Muslims) would end up paving the way for further interference by the Catholic Church in secular affairs and politics. As we show in the chapter on mobilization by religious actors, this framing is also related to the informal discursive alliance that Catholic and Muslim organizations formed in the aftermath of the attacks. While some groups simply accused "all religions" of conservatism, the discussion on civil rights was also influenced by the strict secularist model promoted by French left-wing actors, which (at least on paper) applies equally to Christians and Muslims. Furthermore, while there was consensus on unconditional freedom of expression as a universal value, some redistributive justice groups were open to concessions for the protection of oppressed minorities, aligning more with French grassroots recognition movements. Stressing the lack of recognition for ethnic and religious minorities in France, these groups understood it as the other side of economic deprivation. Thus, although economic frames were largely mobilized (especially against austerity), left-wing groups in Italy were careful to locate injustice in both redistribution and recognition, acknowledging the limits of the republican model of equality for culturally marginalized groups.

UNITED KINGDOM: BRINGING IMPERIALISM BACK INTO THE DEBATE

Left-wing movement organizations' debate on *Charlie Hebdo* in the United Kingdom was unique in mobilizing framings linked to wars and imperialism in the Middle East as one of the main diagnostic frames of terrorists' radicalization in Europe. In this respect, the debate adopted an original

framing in comparison to other national cases, although some similarities were observed too.

As in debates in other countries, for instance, groups focusing on redistributive justice showed unconditional support for freedom of expression. Left Foot Forward, a left-wing blog stressing redistributive justice, staunchly supported *Charlie Hebdo's* satire, defending the journal against accusations of Islamophobia:

> Literally every word that ends in "-phobic" has been used to describe *Charlie Hebdo*. . . . We should commemorate these courageous cartoonists by daring to keep laughing and making people laugh, at everyone and everything. We should continue to draw, to write and to speak our minds.[20]

In that respect, freedom of expression was framed as a value to be supported and *Charlie Hebdo* as a brave representative of it to be honored. In contrast to the French movements, freedom of expression was not linked explicitly to European or other Western national identities.

Moreover, redistributive justice movements adhered to the traditional libertarian values that *Charlie Hebdo* was allegedly promoting. The freedom of satire against any religion was considered part of the right to criticize power in all its forms, whether economic or political. Often, vulnerable groups were not understood as *Charlie Hebdo's* targets. Left Foot Forward promoted unconditional freedom of expression, even if this targeted Islam (and not Muslim minorities)—since the latter, like Christianity, can equally represent an authority:

> There is a profound difference between racist or anti-religious hate-speech and satirical cartoons. While the former attacks and incites hatred against ethnic, cultural and religious minorities, the latter mocks powerful elites which are henpecking societies and cultures, as well as the abstract concepts to which they adhere. Power can come in many forms: political, commercial and religious. *Charlie Hebdo's* favourite targets therefore reach from right-wing politicians and manifestations of capitalist doctrines to authorities of the two most popular and hence powerful religions on the planet: Christianity and Islam.[21]

In addition, other organizations with a strong emphasis on redistributive justice mentioned imperialism and wars in their diagnostic framing.

20. http://leftfootforward.org/2016/01/charlie-hebdos-critics-still-dont-understand-french-satire/.

21. Ibid.

Counterfire, close to Labour, and anti-war groups like Stop the War, stressed military interventions in the Middle East as the main diagnostic framing of the terrorist attacks in Paris:

> Partners in terrorism: United States, Islamic State and the *Charlie Hebdo* killers. . . . The partners in terror are rallying, capitalizing on isolated acts of evil to expand their power, relying on a simplistic media to keep "us" carefully separated from "them."[22]

Seizing the opportunity of the French attacks, the redistributive justice movements asked the State to rethink its foreign policy on the Middle East as the only way to prevent future terrorism and a spiral of aggression. Just after the attacks, Counterfire published a statement arguing that:

> The failure to acknowledge the role of British foreign policy in the Middle East as a radicalising factor is a continuing blind spot of the current government. Opposition to military intervention comes from all sections of British society regardless of ethnicity, gender or class. The continuing "War on Terror" is the elephant in the room when trying to assess threats to our national security.[23]

The fear of increasing Islamophobia was bridged into these movements' diagnosis. In a statement published after the attacks, Stop the War argued:

> The latest attack will lead to a greater backlash and greater levels of Islamophobia. But it is not Muslims who are the problem but the foreign policies that have helped create terrorism. That is what needs to change.[24]

Like in Italy and unlike in France, redistributive justice movements in the United Kingdom did attempt to bridge economic and cultural exclusion in their framings, by recognizing Islamophobia as a social issue. Moreover, although overall *Charlie Hebdo's* libertarian values were not challenged, British and European imperialism was stressed as a main contributor to instability in the Middle East and to terrorism in Europe.

22. http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news/1867-partners-in-terrorism-united-states-islamic-state-and-the-charlie-hebdo-killers.

23. http://www.counterfire.org/articles/opinion/17924-cameron-s-response-to-radicalism-we-need-cooperation-not-mccarthyism-says-rabina-khan.

24. http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/lindsey-german/568-paris-massacre-lessons-that-need-to-be-learned-by-our-war-making-governments.

Organizations more focused on recognition justice advanced claims of imperialist wars too. Liberty Human Rights, one of the main representative organizations of this area, targeted UK/US war interventionism. Moreover, it warned against the calls for further security measures, accompanied by increasing Islamophobia. The group stigmatized excessive surveillance in the aftermath of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks:

> In the wake of such a barbaric attack, it's easy to belittle or dismiss concerns about state snooping on innocent members of the public—"this civil liberties stuff," as Mayor of London Boris Johnson put it. But, looking past hysterical headlines, hyperbole and rhetoric—will giving our spies more powers make us any safer? And does anything about the Paris attacks suggest an urgent need for yet more sweeping surveillance? Nothing about the Paris attacks points to a need for more blanket surveillance powers: The UK security services already have extensive powers: But mass surveillance doesn't work.[25]

In fact, securitization emerged as an important issue of concern for recognition justice movements. Against the calls for increasing security among institutional, media, and religious actors in the "official" debate after the attacks, movement organizations argued against what they considered excessive security measures.

Islamophobia was, moreover, employed as a main diagnostic framing, with condemnation of the role of the far right as an entrepreneur of a xenophobic position that would exacerbate the conflicts. Tell Mama, an organization working on anti-Muslim hate crimes, emphasized the role of the populist party UKIP in attacking Muslims in the public debate:

> While UKIP is not classified as "far-right" in the classic sense, Farage's rhetoric in Brussels repeats Islamophobic, neo-conservative arguments about Islam and Muslims. The claim that Muslims are some kind of fifth column, sneakily waiting to take control of European governments, is textbook Islamophobia. Anders Breivik used the same language in his manifesto claiming that "pro-Islamic networks that have been built up by stealth over the decades" are part of a "fifth column without any loyalty to the state" . . . . The next paragraphs calls for an end to all Muslim immigration and "presenting the Muslims already [in Europe with] the options of adapting to our societies or leaving if they desire sharia law." It's as if Breivik would offer some kind contract for Muslims to

25. http://www.liberties.eu/en/news/surrendering-values-uk.

sign that ensures that they will renounce their purportedly inevitable plans for installing Sharia law in Europe.[26]

To sum up, British organizations with a focus on redistribution and those with a focus on recognition justice did not polarize, but developed similar and compatible framings. In particular, military interventions and Islamophobia were advanced by almost all left-wing movement organizations in their diagnostic framings in the debates after the attacks. The British presence in the Middle East and its diplomacy were considered as causes of instability in that region, but also in Europe. Second, Islamophobia was acknowledged as a problem per se, and fears of its increase were largely shared. The libertarian values of *Charlie Hebdo* were not challenged, and freedom of expression was supported by all movements. Finally, prognostic framings of preventing further security measures were advanced by recognition movements fearing state intervention in civil rights. This represents a specificity of the British left-wing sphere, indicating some ongoing influence of the antiwar mobilizations of 2004 in their current debate. Furthermore, with the election of Jeremy Corbyn as the leader of the Labour Party, a relative opening of opportunities might have allowed left-wing actors to focus on the issue of military intervention and ask for withdrawal of European and US armies from the Middle East.

GERMANY: AGAINST ISLAMOPHOBIA AND WESTERN IMPERIALISM

In Germany too we find different framings among left-wing organizations. This divergence underlies the clear-cut divisions of left-wing movements in this context. In fact, new social movements have had a great impact in introducing recognition justice into the public sphere. On the other hand, trade unions and hierarchical Marxist movements have aligned more with redistributive justice claims. After the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, however, bridges formed between the framings of these movement areas. The role of Western military intervention in the Middle East as a factor of instability in Europe has been an illustrative case of a common framing, advanced by both recognition and redistributive justice movements.

For those movement organizations focusing more on redistributive justice, the causes for the attacks in Paris lay in the politics of neoliberalism

26. http://tellmamauk.org/ukip-islamophobia-charlie-hebdo-bharath-ganesh/.

and imperialism. Like their British counterparts, these groups mentioned, in particular, Western countries' wars in the Middle East as diagnostic framings of the terrorist origins in Europe. The attackers were characterized as recruited from within Islamist forces in Syria and Iraq.[27] Like their French counterparts, they at times framed the perpetrators as "Islamo-fascists." In addition, these groups warned of a strengthening of far-right forces in Germany and France, including PEGIDA and the Front National (FN). Calling for outlawing "all fascist organisations—including 'Islamist-fascist' ones—and their propaganda,"[28] redistributive justice movements in Germany promoted "antifascist–anti-imperialist" activity in the form of counter-demonstrations against PEGIDA marches.

At the core of the diagnostic frame, neoliberalism was also described as responsible for the social, economic, and political marginalization of minority groups who became terrorists, fueled by the lack of recognition of the "true" social, economic, and political causes of religious radicalization. Although mostly adopting the *Je suis Charlie* slogan, these movement organizations criticized the participation of some political leaders in the march in Paris on January 11, 2015, and condemned the securitization debates in the aftermath of the attacks.

The left-wing groups with a greater focus on recognition justice have been very vocal in the call for protecting freedom of expression in Germany and worldwide. Freedom of the press was framed as an "endangered human right that needs to be constantly defended, even in established democracies."[29] Like their Italian counterparts, several organizations stressed that there should be no taboo issues in media coverage—including religious, personal, and political issues—thus taking a clear position on universalistic freedom of expression. Consideration of the sensitivities of minority groups should therefore be at the discretion of journalists and editors alone, within the limits set by established legislation and ethics. Among them, Reporters Ohne Grenzen (ROG), the German branch of the

27. https://www.mlpd.de/2015/kw02/breite-empoerung-ueber-faschistischen-terroranschlag-in-paris.

28. Ibid.

29. https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/meldung/pressefreiheit-erkaempfen-und-verteidigen/. The common statement was signed by the following organizations: ARD, ZDF, Deutsche Journalistinnen- und Journalisten-Union (dju) in verdi, Deutscher Journalisten-Verband (DJV), Freelens Freischreiber—Berufsverband freier Journalistinnen und Journalisten, Journalistinnenbund, netzwerk recherche, n-ost—Netzwerk für Osteuropa-Berichterstattung, Reporter ohne Grenzen, Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger (VDZ), Verband Cartoonlobby, Verband Privater Rundfunk und Telemedien (VPRT), Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger (VDZ), and Weltreporter.net.

international non-governmental organization (NGO) Reporters Without Borders, framed the attacks as "a black day for freedom of the press in Europe," and European governments were called upon to do everything in their power to prevent self-censorship of journalists and media as a result of the Paris attacks.[30]

Some of the groups focusing on recognition justice criticized the discourse on the supposed "Islamization" of the country. Some feminist groups were particularly vocal in this respect. In the debate about women's rights and Islam, quite present today in Germany (Gole 2013), these groups advanced framings of economic exclusion as one of the main factors of women's inequality, more than inherent patriarchy in Muslim communities. Like redistributive justice movements, these feminists saw religious patriarchal values as resulting from the demolition of the welfare state, and not as linked to Islam as such. The Feminist Party of Germany stated that:

> [w]earing the headscarf or a total body cover will retreat if every woman is provided with a residence permit independently of a man, with a drastic reduction of working time and with an increase of subsidence-guaranteeing job. Tolerance should not mean abandoning our own values. In a patriarchal society like the German one, all women are oppressed, and to this there is no need to wear a headscarf or a full body cover.[31]

Finally, recognition justice movements shared the prognostic framing of the need to block the German government's intention to reintroduce legislation on the saving of personal data for security purposes. The motivational framings raised in this context opposed securitization and attempts to capitalize on fear, anxiety, and social tension.[32]

Overall, as expected, German left-wing organizations remained attached to their traditional framings and the movements' internal divisions. The hierarchical union-oriented groups focusing on redistributive justice blamed the excesses of neoliberalism and the imperialist wars in fueling terrorism in Europe. Moreover, the far right was perceived as another enemy to be fought. On the other hand, organizations more concerned with recognition justice and new social movements favored unconditional freedom of expression, asking governments to support their claims. Moreover, they

30. https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/meldung/schwarzer-tag-fuer-die-pressefreiheit-in-europa/.
31. www.feministischepartei.de/startseite.html
32. https://blog.campact.de/2015/03/selbst-ein-eingezaeunter-zebrastreifen-ist-sinnvoller-als-gabriels-vorratsdatenspeicherung/

raised the issue of increasing Islamophobia in Germany, although this was not as explicit as in movements in the other countries. Finally, they pointed to the risks of excessive securitization. Between the two family groups, some bridges were identified too. These were mainly addressed in the need to tackle Islamophobia not as a cultural, but as a social problem, meaning that Muslim populations are targeted with economic exclusion as well. This last framing is a pattern that we have identified, in variations, in the other national spheres as well. This finding points to our initial hypothesis that the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks have pushed movements to bridge their framings so that they address cultural exclusion as part of social injustice.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has analyzed how left-wing movements framed the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks in the four countries under investigation. In all of them, we pointed to movements' internal divisions, distinguishing in particular between groups that privileged redistributive justice and those who focused more on recognition issues (Fraser 1995). We argued that the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks urgently pushed movements to position themselves between universalistic freedom of expression and the protection of minority rights—both issues being traditionally at the core of progressive movements, but at the same time dividing them over the importance of cultural injustice versus class exploitation. This dilemma was evident in the judgment about *Charlie Hebdo's* character as a newspaper of the left wing, traditionally promoting (and provoking) libertarian values over respect for cultural minorities.

In assessing how left-wing *Charlie Hebdo* was, progressive movements debated how to bridge the different concerns into a coherent narrative. In this sense, the reactions to the attacks were far from uniform. Rather, the attacks introduced harsh debates between the most secularist and anticlerical actors, on the one hand, and those with more pluralistic understandings and internationalist visions, on the other. At the same time, by addressing these issues, many groups bridged issues of redistribution and issues of recognition, often framing cultural domination as directly descending to a social problem.

Left-wing movements shaped their framings in ways that resonated with their national public debate. This was evident in where they located the roots of the attacks. In the United Kingdom and Germany, movements connected terrorist attacks with Western military interventions in the Middle East and economic exploitation of the South. In these countries,

bridges between economic and cultural injustice were made. In contrast, in contexts in which the role of cultural exploitation is highly disputed, Italian and French movements further polarized on the definition of Islam as a source of conflict in European societies. This had its impact on identifications with *Charlie Hebdo* that became another contentious issue. *Charlie Hebdo's* official posture as a left-wing newspaper placed French and Italian movements in the delicate position of having to justify their support or criticism of *Charlie Hebdo*. Here, larger, institutionalized groups were more supportive, while grassroots groups were more critical.

Movements from both sides built framing bridges joining economic and cultural injustice in all four countries. Organizations focusing on redistributive issues often addressed cultural injustices, in particular through a critique of the French republican model and through the acknowledgment of Islamophobia as a social problem. In their prognostic framings, the attack against freedom of expression was highlighted by all movement organizations, and often balanced with the recognition of minority rights. Finally, groups focusing on both recognition and redistribution justice opposed excessive securitization, fighting against European governments' intentioned anti-terrorist measures, which were seen as endangering civil liberties.

But the attacks also polarized the internal debate of left-wing actors, by catalyzing pre-existing tensions regarding the conceptualization of inequalities. First, there was uneasiness relating to religious pluralism and freedom of expression, manifested in the debate on freedom of the press and securitization. Second, while most groups expressed solidarity with the January 11 demonstration in Paris, others severely criticized the state intervention and the participation of ambiguously democratic leaders in it.

In sum, the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks functioned as a critical juncture for left-wing movements, as highlighted by the cleavages observed inside their spheres, the issues they mobilized, and the ways in which these were framed. The recognition of stigmatization of cultural minorities and the bridging of claims for economic redistribution and symbolic recognition found a more central place within left-wing narratives. In particular, the opening of the debate of supporters of distributive justice toward cultural minorities' claims, those of Muslims in particular, is illustrative of this trend after the attacks. Indeed, although the debate on the role of ethnic and religious minorities and their protection had already started, *Charlie Hebdo* accelerated this dynamic by urging actors to take clear positions on the matter. In this sense, the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks not only reactivated, but consolidated a preexisting tension inside the left-wing arenas, both at the national level and across movements, opening some opportunities for the emerging of shared framings.

CHAPTER 6

Multiculturalism backlash and anti-establishment politics

The far right

In this chapter, we shift our attention to a collective actor that has played a pivotal role in configuring public debates on multiculturalism, national identity, and Islam in Europe since the early 1990s: the far right (Mudde 2013; Betz 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005).[1] To trace how far-right movements participated in the *Charlie Hebdo* debates, we focus on how they framed the controversy within and across each national setting, and on the patterns of interaction between them and other actors. To what extent and how did far-right movements contribute to the construction of the *Charlie Hebdo* debates? Who were their main allies and opponents? What have been the main traits of far-right collective action at the national and transnational level?

The analysis focuses on three main aspects. First, we look at cross-national variation and expect the structure of political opportunities, and

1. With regard to the far right, the definition of this family has generated much conceptual disagreement among scholars, resulting in a "war of words" on the definition of right-wing fringe organizations (Mudde 1996). This impasse has been partly resolved by differentiating between "extreme" organizations that openly oppose the democratic constitutional order, and "radical" right groups that are simply hostile toward its liberal democratic principles (Mudde 2000). In this volume, we opt to focus on the discourses of both types of organization, placing them under the broader umbrella of "far-right" politics which identifies, at a minimum level, actors sharing three core ideological features: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (for a detailed overview, see Mudde 2007).

Discursive Turns and Critical Junctures: Donatella della Porta, Pietro Castelli Gattinara, Konstantinos Eleftheriadis, and Andrea Felicetti, Oxford University Press (2019).
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190097431.001.0001

most notably the availability of potential allies and the configuration of citizenship models, to shape the mobilizing messages promoted by far-right movements. Second, we compare different types of far-right actors, expecting their framing of the *Charlie Hebdo* controversy to be determined by their respective ideological traits (Castelli Gattinara, 2017). Third, we address far-right collective identities, and investigate whether and to what extent the *Charlie Hebdo* events triggered the emergence of a European, transnational identity, shared by ~~different types of~~ far-right ~~movements~~ across national settings.

Our findings show that far-right movements successfully took advantage of the new opportunities opened by the critical juncture. As the controversy escalated, they were able to take on their privileged role of entrepreneurs of fear; they actively engaged in stoking feelings of threat to national security and identity; and they contributed to the activation of a social process of moral panic on issues connected to migration and Islam. Far-right organizations gained visibility in the public sphere by taking advantage of the resonance of specific liberal values in the wake of the Paris attacks, and actively mobilized to target cultural relativism and political correctness in their respective countries and at the European level (see Mondon and Winter, 2017). Hence, while the values upon which different actors mobilized varied across countries, the European far right effectively mobilized as a collective actor with a shared identity and a common agenda.

FAR-RIGHT MOBILIZATION DURING CRITICAL JUNCTURES

In line with the broader theoretical framework of this volume, we integrate opportunity-based approaches explaining social movement behavior with more dynamic models for understanding how public debates unfold in times of intense change. As outlined in Chapter 1, eventful transformations are expected to produce new relations and meanings that, in turn, can trigger mobilization even when external circumstances would not normally allow for it. Concerning values and issues such as migration, security, and the management of ethnic and religious diversity, the debate following the January attacks had the potential to reshape the available political space for the far right, providing opportunities ~~for mobilization~~ well beyond those that determine its visibility, resonance, and legitimacy in ~~the public sphere~~ in normal times.

In addressing the relationship between far-right politics and the *Charlie Hebdo* debates, we look at three main determinants of ~~mobilizing messages~~

~~or frames~~. First, we look at political opportunities to investigate how discursive strategies vary *across countries*, expecting the far-right discourse to be facilitated by resonance with prevailing configurations of citizenship at the national level. Then, we elaborate more specifically on critical junctures as periods of strain that expand the choices available to political actors (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 343). As a result, the way in which the far right engages in the *Charlie Hebdo* debates might vary, not only across socio-political contexts, but also *across types of far-right actors*, depending on their specific ideological features. Third, we analyze the exceptionality of critical junctures, which might alter internally driven dynamics of problem definition, facilitating the forging of new collective identities and political perspectives. In our understanding, the attacks constituted a transformative event, which crucially contributed to consolidating a shared far-right identity, paving the way to a *transnational far-right discourse* on the Charlie Hebdo debates.

The cross-national perspective: Political opportunities and configurations of citizenship

In social movement literature, grievance theory argues that objective conditions shape subjective grievances and that these, in turn, determine mobilization and protest (see, e.g., Gurr 2015; Turner and Killian 1987). Applied to the case of the far right, this approach suggests that xenophobic mobilization follows economic downturns, as well as the creation of marginalized and socially excluded groups of people (Koopmans 1996; Mudde 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005). Similarly, ethnic competition theory sees far-right activism and violence as the result of the competition between different ethnic groups over the same scarce resources (Barth 1998; Nagel and Olzak 1982; Olzak 1994). Opportunity theories, in contrast, suggest that social movements stem from the available political opportunities on which they can count at a given time, including the relative openness of the institutional system, the presence of elite allies, and the propensity for repression by state authorities (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995; Tarrow 1998; McAdam 2010). In our case, this view argues that far-right politics take place only insofar as political opportunities are favorable for the rise of this type of actor.

Developing upon insights from the opportunity approach, previous studies focused on the interplay between national configurations of citizenship and opportunities in the political system (Koopmans et al. 2005). While a country's model of citizenship is defined by the criteria for

inclusion in and exclusion from the national community and by the cultural obligations to become a member of that community, political opportunities in the system are defined by institutional or electoral constraints, patterns of partisan alignment, and the legal constraints regulating anti-racism and anti-fascism in each country. The main argument is that these two contextual factors form a structure of opportunities that shapes and channels the activity and discourse of the far right, because they both determine the political space available to far-right actors within and outside the parliamentary arena and define the extent to which far-right arguments resonate with prevailing configurations of citizenship, thus making them legitimate and acceptable in the public domain. From this theoretical framework, previous scholarship developed typologies of citizenship regimes and specific opportunity structures for the far right, using them to explain cross-national variation in the extent and nature of ~~far-right~~ mobilization.

~~As observed earlier in this volume, the~~ four countries under observation have quite different political opportunity structures, yet they all display a prominent far-right actor in the electoral arena, which catalyzes significant portions of public support, and legitimizes far-right claims-making in the public sphere. Still, at the time of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, this trend is considerably better established in the electoral arena in France and Italy than in Germany and the United Kingdom, which instead have a more developed extra-parliamentary far-right network. Moreover, only in Italy does the far right have a significant record in building alliances with the political mainstream.

After political opportunity structures, a second factor defining the viability of frames are the cultural constructs of citizenship regimes. Countries characterized by less inclusive understandings of individual equality and monist understandings of cultural diversity (such as Italy) might be more accessible to far-right actors than systems that are more inclusive and display more plural configurations of cultural diversity (such as the United Kingdom). In each country, we expect the structure of opportunities for mobilization, in particular the availability of potential allies and the predominant cultural constructs on citizenship, to affect the development of mobilizing messages ~~or frames~~ by the far right. These frames, in turn, might shape the collective identities of the groups engaged in the *Charlie Hebdo* debates, determining their strategies and discourse.

The ideological perspective: Defining the target

At the time of the *Charlie Hebdo* shootings, far-right parties polled high in France and Italy, and anti-refugee movements were gaining prominence in both the United Kingdom and Germany (Castelli Gattinara and Froio, 2018b; Golder 2016; Charalambous 2015). The *Charlie Hebdo* controversy represented a further opportunity for far-right movements to access the public sphere (Fassin 2015), being intertwined with issues upon which the far right had long mobilized, including migration, security, and cultural diversity.

Accordingly, our second explanation focuses on the capacity of different types of far-right actors to seize the emerging opportunities made available by the critical juncture. We expect different groups within the far-right family to deploy divergent strategies to access the public sphere. Our focus is particularly on their preexisting ideological playing cards, since these are the crucial interpretive schemes used to give meaning to the new events. In other words, we expect the content of far-right discourse on *Charlie Hebdo* to be related, at least to a certain extent, to the ideological resources available to the different types of far-right organizations.

This calls for a further differentiation of far-right actors based on some crucial ideological features (see Castelli Gattinara and Pirro, 2018). We classify actors based on the way in which they identify target groups. Put differently, we differentiate actors belonging to the far-right family according to the main groups that are targeted for exclusion in their discourse. On the one hand, in fact, the identity of the far right results from processes of outgroup differentiation (Brewer 1999; Tajfel 1982; 2010). On the other, the identification of the "enemy" is paramount for the far right, since it justifies the rejection of diversity within the state and the desire for national homogeneity (Froio, 2018; Mudde 2007; Taggart 2000; 2002).

Following previous research, we classify the far right in four variants (Minkenberg 2011; see also Pirro and Castelli Gattinara 2018). *Autocratic-fascist* groups are the ones that openly support interwar regime ideologies, such as subcultural or non-party organizations enjoying little public resonance and often prone to the use of violence in their protest campaigns. *Ethnocentric right-wing* actors are defined by the promotion of an agenda of ethnic superiority or "ethno-pluralism",[2] albeit not openly endorsing

2. The multicultural theory of "ethnopluralism" or "cultural differentialism" was developed by Alain de Benoist and the European New Right (Bar-On 2012) as a response to liberal multiculturalism. While different ethnic, racial, and cultural groups are considered equal, ethnopluralism views cultures as homogeneous entities bound to

racism. The *authoritarian-populist* category refers to the breed of right-wing actors promoting populist exclusionist narratives and generally organized in the form of political parties. Finally, *ultra-religious* actors are right-wing groups who mobilize primarily in defense of the purity of national culture defined in terms of religion. While this choice clearly does not exhaust all possible elements that build up the complex family of far-right politics, and it does not exclude possible alliances and intersections across these categories, it helps us to link different types of actors to the constitutive dimensions of the *Charlie Hebdo* debates, and thus to emerging opportunities for far-right mobilization in the aftermath of transformative events.

The first group, the autocratic-fascist right, strives for congruence between an ethnically and culturally defined nation and a politically defined state (Mudde 2007). Their political doctrine is characterized by proximity to Fascist and Nazi ideologies, and thus is located outside the constitutional boundaries of the state. Accordingly, the main target of their propaganda in the post-Charlie Hebdo scenario is likely to be the State itself, considered as the true culprit of the decay of the nation. In particular, they target the foundations of the liberal democratic state, which allow for the inclusion of people who do not belong to the nation.

In contrast, ethnocentric right-wing actors promote ethnic segregation and oppose globalization and multiculturalism as a way to preserve the national culture and identity. This is either justified on the basis of ethnic superiority and national preference, or by means of ethnopluralist ideals that consider nations and cultures as "equal but different" (de Benoist 1985; O'Meara 2013). In either case, ethnocentric actors are likely to connect the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks with migration and the failure of multiculturalism.

Third, we consider authoritarian-populist actors. We define authoritarianism as a belief in a strictly ordered society where infringements to authority are punished severely. Populism includes a Manichean worldview dividing societies in two opposing camps: "the pure people" and the "corrupt elite" (Mudde 2007; Taggart 2000). This category thus includes most radical-right populist parties (Minkenberg 2011). In the wake of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, these actors are likely to address two main targets, considered as responsible for socio-economic, cultural, and physical insecurity: the political/cultural establishment at the national level, and the European Union.

specific geographical locations, and calls on a "right to difference" by means of ethnic separatism and racial separatism (Spektorowski 2003).

Finally, we address ultra-religious actors who defend the purity of the nation and its people.[3] If the criterion for exclusion for authoritarian-populists is cultural and that of the ethnocentric right is ethnic, the exclusionary politics of ultra-religious actors is primarily religious.[4] It follows that the main target will be Islam, as the presence of Muslims is considered a direct threat to the nation. In addition, these groups oppose secularism, which—like multiculturalism—is understood as a self-defeating form of cultural and moral relativism.

Transnational perspective: The quest for a pan-European movement

Our third perspective considers the exceptional nature of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks. Because transformative events are sudden, they break the dynamics of incremental change that dominate normal times. Being "unexpected," a transformative event breaks the routine, and can be considered "external" to the way in which conflict was articulated before the event itself took place. In other words, exceptionality means that a juncture has the potential to break internally driven dynamics of mobilization and produce new resources for action. The emotional, cognitive, and relational processes emerging in the wake of critical junctures might drastically diverge from previous patterns.

In a similar fashion, Beissinger (2002; 2007) pointed to the importance of extraordinary times in the development of new collective identities and most notably nationalism. Within the accelerated time that sparks from exceptional events, action and protest tend to cluster because they are linked in shared "narratives of struggle, in the altered expectations that they generate about subsequent possibilities to contest; in the changes that they evoke in the behavior of those forces that uphold a given order; and in the transformed landscape of meaning that events at times fashion" (Beissinger 2002, 17). In this sense, mobilization itself can represent a site of cultural transaction producing new relations, favoring further mobilization and new processes of identification.

3. Please note that, while ~~a number of~~ ~~ultra-~~religious actors are ~~also~~ addressed in Chapter 7, we focus here on a subsample of organizations that share at least two of the three crucial dimensions of far-right politics identified earlier, that is, nativism and authoritarianism.

4. As per autocratic-fascist actors, exclusion is generally justified in ethnic and cultural terms at the same time.

In our case, this means a rupture in the way in which political actors approach public debates on issues such as immigration, secularism, and Islam. Considering the specific challenges emerging after the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, we expect that this rupture allowed far right movements ~~not only~~ to become more ~~active within European countries, but also to grow in terms of trans-European cooperation~~. If in the age of globalization and digitalization most social problems have become transnational (Froio and Ganesh, 2019), this is particularly true for the specific problems embedded in the critical juncture under research. In normal times, far-right movements overwhelmingly approach migration and identity politics within national or subnational frameworks, but we would expect a major event at the European level—such as the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks—to change this perspective and pave the way to forging new collective identities of the far right at the transnational level.

We use the term transnationalism, understood as the flow and pattern of relationships across national boundaries, to denote those movements, organizations, and networks that engage in practices of emulation, organization, or identification beyond the level of the nation-state. More precisely, we look at three dimensions of the transnationalization of far-right politics: emulation, organization, and identification. Transnational emulation defines a situation in which a far-right actor imitates the forms of mobilization of far-right ~~actors~~ in other countries. Transnational organization, instead, involves the development of common structures for mobilization on issues that transcend national boundaries and national politics. Finally, by transnational identification, we indicate ~~the process of identifying with a group that implies~~ the development of collective feelings of solidarity, belonging, and agency as a ~~group~~.

Based on this framework, we anticipate that the *Charlie Hebdo* events triggered the emergence of a European transnational identity, shared by different types of far-right movements across national settings. Considering the main issues embedded in public debates, we expect this identity to be rooted in a set of common ~~European~~ values, defining a shared history and culture in reaction to the increasing presence of new migrants. In this way, a consolidated transnational identity defines itself primarily in antagonism to the cultural hegemony of multiculturalist values, in a struggle that unites the peoples of Europe against ruling elites at the national and supranational levels (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010).

THE FRENCH FAR RIGHT AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ISLAM

~~Unsurprisingly, the~~ *Charlie Hebdo* attacks triggered debates on issues largely embedded in the French context. The far right had long mobilized on the alleged "double standard" of French society in freedom of expression, arguing that the silent majority of French citizens holding negative opinions about Islam and migrants is excluded from the public sphere. More specifically, the accusation against the ruling elite is that the mass media only grant free expression to public intellectuals who support multiculturalism, while it denies it to those who challenge the mainstream consensus (Castelli Gattinara and Bouron 2019). ~~While~~ united in opposing multiculturalism, the French far right is divided on secularism. This became most evident during the 2005 riots in Paris, when some far-right actors supported the *laïcité* of the French state, while others simply addressed Muslim citizens as traitors to the nation, ~~reproducing~~ the interwar stigma of the Jew. The most widespread narrative thus targeted the *Islamo-racailles* (Islamic-scum) represented by those French citizens practicing Islam and living in the suburbs.[5]

The fragmentation characterizing the French far right, however, has also to do with ~~actors'~~ political strategies and degree of ~~institutionalization.~~ The most institutionalized network, the *Rassemblement Bleu Marine* (Marine Blue Gathering RBM), was formed by FN's leader Marine Le Pen ahead of the 2013 Presidential elections. Its goal was to unite individual militants ~~of the FN~~, alongside unaffiliated supporters and other so-called "sovereigntist" local organizations and parties.[6] The group is inspired by a conspiracy theory according to which Europe is undergoing a process of "replacement" of its native populations by people originating from other continents (Camus 2015; Castelli Gattinara 2018). After the January attacks, RBM condemned both terrorism and the *Je Suis Charlie* campaign, reproducing the arguments of FN's leader Marine Le Pen. First, RBM accused the elites of hypocrisy for accepting the participation of Saudi Arabia to the republican rally, while excluding the FN. Second, the group called for the protection of the integrity of the nation, which must unite to defend its

5. http://ripostelaique.com/se-debarrasser-islamo-racailles-emmerdent.html.

6. The sovereigntist doctrine is particularly influential in France, defining movements that aim at a Europe of nations, where every country could preserve its independence and ensure that its difference is respected. More broadly, the term is used to differentiate far-right actors that focus on economic patriotism and political independence from the EU, from movements that engage more directly in identity politics, opposition to Islam, and migration.

values under attack. Third, RBM identified the internal enemy, calling on all French Muslims to take a position against violence.

The establishment and Islam are at the core of the approach of other nationalist right-wing groups, such as the *Bloc Identitaire* (BI), which are rooted in the French youth extreme-right subculture,[7] and the online platform *Action Française* (AF) (Bouron 2015; Castelli Gattinara and Froio, 2018a). BI blames the Paris attacks on political elites and their policies of uncontrolled Islamic immigration, calling on a popular uprising to wipe out the French intelligentsia. Furthermore, the target is metropolitan upper-middle classes (the "bourgeois bohemians" or *bobos*) who—being unaffected by the everyday life of degraded suburbs—reproduce the multiculturalist rhetoric of *vivre ensemble* (living together). This interpretation resonates with ethnocentric claims-making in Italy and Germany, in that it calls for the geographic separation of incompatible cultures, in line with ethnopluralist ideals. Similarly, the focus on *laïcité* and the suburban areas that have become no-go zones for white French allows BI to coordinate with other authoritarian-populist actors such as the ultra-secularist, Islamophobic *Riposte Laique* (RL).[8]

An isolated, albeit influential, voice in the French far-right milieu is that of Alain Soral's political association *Egalité et Reconciliation* (ER). The group defines itself as "left nationalist" and promotes an agenda that is allegedly "left-wing on labor issues and right-wing on values."[9] Its positions are set apart from the rest of the French far right by the group's strong anti-Zionist stances, which come along with favorable attitudes toward Islam. While ER also opposes the French cultural and political establishment,[10] it criticizes the use of *laïcité* as a way to discriminate against Muslims and promote Zionist propaganda.[11] ER's critical narrative thus condemned the attacks on *Charlie Hebdo* but also reproduced Pope Francis's argument that "when you slap someone's mother in the face, you should expect reactions."[12]

To summarize, the French far-right milieu displays very different views on crucial issues concerning secularism and Islam, but also a number of

7. See, for instance, http://www.bloc-identitaire.com/files/file/plaquette_bloc.pdf.

8. http://ripostelaique.com/charlie-hebdo-gouvernement-et-caste-mediatiques-coupables.html.

9. http://www.egaliteetreconciliation.fr/Du-communisme-au-nationalisme-itineraire-d-un-intellectuel-francais-Venissieux-2-mars-2007-2164.html.

10. http://www.kontrekulture.com/video/rappel-qui-cree-et-quoi-sert-charlie-hebdo.

11. http://www.egaliteetreconciliation.fr/A-l-ombre-du-minaret-en-flammes-2978.html.

12. http://www.egaliteetreconciliation.fr/Badinter-Ne-pas-avoir-peur-de-se-faire-traiter-d-islamophobe-37062.html.

very consensual frames that are shared by most actors in the debate. In particular, our analysis identified four principal frames, mobilized strategically by the far right to challenge mainstream consensus and access the public sphere.

The "Great Replacement" diagnostic frame interprets the attacks as confirmation that Europe is becoming "Eurabia." White nations are progressively repopulated by non-European migrants, and European cultural values, including secularism, are replaced by foreign norms and faiths. While this frame is very consensual in the far-right milieu, actors disagree as to whether this is the result of negligence by the establishment, or the consequence of a conspiracy by international elites.

Other diagnostic frames focus more specifically on the establishment and mainstream consensus. The elites are blamed for lax immigration policy, for a "double standard" on free expression, and for denying the risks of multiculturalism. While some actors hold Europe responsible for the pro-immigration consensus, others focus on the French multiculturalist middle classes, or *bobos*, including the Charlie Hebdo journalists.

Prognostic frames call for the exclusion of Muslims from the republican consensus. Based on sovereigntist ideals, far-right actors believe that every nation should preserve its "right to difference," and demand strict control of national borders, suspension of the Schengen treaty, and the introduction of restrictive measures concerning the construction of mosques and the wearing of the veil in public.

Motivational frames mainly call on the national unity of the "real people" in opposition to the call for ~~"national unity"~~ by French elites. This popular opposition shall not take place by electoral means, but either in the form of a sudden popular uprising, or progressively through the replacement of mainstream culture and values (meta-politics).

The diffusion of these frames in the far-right milieu was facilitated by the presence of a number of recognized brokers, connecting the activities of most actors in this area, at the national and transnational levels. First, the arrest of the comedian and activist Dieudonné M'bala M'bala gave momentum to claims of a "double standard" in how the French state treats nonconformist views. On January 13, 2015, the French police charged and later arrested him for publicly supporting terrorism, for writing on his Facebook page *Je me sens Charlie Coulibaly*, with a reference to the kosher supermarket gunman Amedy Coulibaly. The ban and arrest sparked a

discussion concerning the perceived hypocrisy on the part of the French government for seemingly punishing the same free expression it celebrated following the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre. Like Italian actors who strategically mobilized around freedom of speech to demand legitimacy for Fascist ideals (see later), the French far right reinforced its argument that free expression in France is selective. Second, the FN acted as a reference point for most far-right actors, especially after Marine Le Pen was ~~"excluded"~~ from the republican rally. While several ideological differences remained, far-right actors always interacted with the discourse of the FN. Third, the far right reacted to the aggressive anti-clericalism of *Charlie Hebdo* in the months following the attacks, forging a counter-narrative composed of anti-Charlie and anti-establishment sentiments. Far-right discourse thus catalyzed on opposition to the *Je Suis Charlie* slogan and on the feeling of belonging to the silent majority.

At the same time, disagreement persisted on crucial issues in the debate, most notably *laïcité,* which represents a crucial element of conflict in the French far-right identity. ~~But~~ the majority of actors refer to secularism only marginally, and almost exclusively as a pretext to target Muslim and Jewish minorities. Furthermore, the relationship between the French far right and Europe is contested. While some actors address Europe as a set of national entities all similarly threatened by Islamization, others mainly see Europe as a threat to national identity.

THE FAR RIGHT IN GERMANY: FROM PARIS TO *PEGIDA*

While in France the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks built upon issues strongly embedded in the far-right political discourse, in Germany the debate had a critical impact on the discursive opportunities that led to the emergence of the *Pegida* movement. Like other European far right actors, *Pegida* addressed the event as a confirmation of the dangers associated with the presence of the "misogynist, violent political ideology" of Islam in Europe. Supported by numerous ethnocentric and far-right online platforms (e.g., Politically Incorrect and *Zuerst!,* but also *Achse des Guten, Blaue Narzise*, and *Eigentümlich Frei*), the group blamed the German political establishment for supporting immigration and social welfare policies for foreign migrants instead of increasing the security of German citizens. *Pegida* called for a radical change in German immigration policy, including the expulsion of (radical) Muslims from Germany and the call to Muslim communities to

denounce Sharia law, the notion of jihad, and the supremacy of Islam over other religions, in order to certify their "compatibility with Europe."

Similar stances were also promoted by authoritarian-populist actors like *Die Freiheit* (The Freedom) in Bavaria, which underlined the incompatibility between the German democratic constitutional order based on the values of equality and individual freedom, and the basic provisions of Islamic law. *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) highlighted the problem of Muslims in Europe, calling on mainstream political parties to reconsider their stance vis-à-vis the grievances made public by the supporters of *Pegida*. AfD's positions oscillate between blaming the attacks on Muslim communities as a whole, and more moderate statements calling for a reaction against Islamist fundamentalism with all means provided by the rule of law.

While autocratic-fascist groups *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (NPD) and *Junge Nationaldemokraten* (JN) paid less attention to the event, they also interpreted it as evidence of the nexus linking immigration, Islam, and terrorism. Unlike most other actors observed in this study, these groups criticized the introduction of new security measures against extremist activism on the web introduced by the government. These are described as "circumcising our European understanding of freedom" and result from the government's willingness to control the Internet ("a place of freedom") in order to neutralize German and European nations.

Ultra-religious organizations in Germany used considerably more discriminatory language: *Pax Europa* (PE) defined migrants as infectious diseases ("pest" or "cholera") and attacked the "unholy alliance" between "agents of multiculturalism" supporting a pro-Muslim agenda, Christian churches, and left-liberal actors. Similarly, the messages promoted by forthright neo-Nazi websites such as *Der Dritte Weg, Europäische Aktion, Bund für Gesamtdeutschland*, or *Junge Freiheit* called for the expulsion of "all Muslim refugees and immigrants" based on the argument that immigration to Germany "is the functional continuation of World War II with other means" and "a very old and efficient method to genetically extinguish a nation without weapons."[13]

Most far-right actors rejected identification with the *Je Suis Charlie* slogan, also because of the slogan *Wir sind Charlie—Wir sind nicht Pegida* ("We are Charlie, we are not *Pegida*"),[14] coined by German civil and left-wing movements in opposition to *Pegida*.[15] In general, *Charlie Hebdo* was portrayed as a poor-quality leftist magazine that made a mockery of

13. "Das Schlagen der Seismographen"January 8, 2015, *Junge Freiheit*.
14. https://blog.campact.de/2015/01/nach-paris-attentat-aufstehen-gegen-hass/.
15. https://jungefreiheit.de/kommentar/2015/das-schlagen-der-seismographen/.

conservative right values: family, religion, and the nation.[16] Yet, far-right positions were more ambivalent on the appropriateness of publishing the Muhammad cartoons, as a few actors (for example, the blog *Sezession*) support the journalists and their choice to refuse to submit to Islamist threats.[17] The blame was attributed to the mainstream media (in Germany and abroad), which hypocritically defended the freedom of the press while refusing to publish the cartoons based on self-defeating multiculturalist values.[18]

In addition to these specific positions, the following four frames recur most often in the German far-right context:

The main diagnostic frame draws from conspiracy theories: It accuses German elites of manipulating public debates on immigration, multiculturalism, and Islam. The slogan *Je Suis Charlie* is used by the establishment and mainstream media to drive public sentiment against the far right, increase security measures, and silence the majority of German citizens who oppose de-nationalization and multiculturalism.

A second diagnostic frame connects terrorism with the uncontrolled welcoming of masses of Muslims immigrants in European societies. On the one hand, this "immigration brings terrorism" frame suggests that radical Islamists take advantage of floods of refugees to enter Europe. On the other, it implies that Muslim immigrants are, in general, prone to radicalization and violence.

The main prognostic frame takes on anti-establishment values and opposition to securitization. Political and cultural elites must be overthrown because of their selective understanding of freedom of expression, in the name of which they further curtail the rights of native citizens and censor the opinions of those opposing Islamization and multiculturalism.

A predominant motivational frame calls for popular mobilization for the defense of individual freedoms against the threat posed by Muslims and Islamization. Mobilization is necessary because Islamic norms and values are incompatible with Western liberal democracy, and because the multiculturalist establishment turns a blind eye to Islam's intolerance of liberal freedoms.

16. https://jungefreiheit.de/politik/ausland/2015/wacht-auf/#comments.
17. www.sezession.de/47823/charlie-hebdo-und-berthold-kohler.html.
18. www.pi-news.net/2015/01/charlie-hebdo-stand-allein-was-sagt-das-ueber-unsere-freie-presse/.

Overall, the far-right debate on Charlie Hebdo in Germany had much to do with the activities of *Pegida* and with the issue of liberal freedoms of German native citizens. Because of these framing choices, right-wing discourse resonated well with the general debate. On the one hand, Islam and immigration were already high on the agenda before the attacks, mainly due to the ~~refugee crisis~~. On the other, *Pegida* became the core of public debates, polarizing positions between open hostility (by left-wing and civil-rights organizations of the liberal milieu) and benevolence (by other right-wing groups who shared *Pegida*'s critique of the German mainstream media). In between, mainstream conservative circles dealt with *Pegida* with skepticism, yet recognized the legitimacy of at least part of its concerns. In sum, the *Charlie Hebdo* debates ultimately provided the far right, and especially ethnocentric right-wing groups, with considerable leverage in the debates over immigration and integration.

THE ITALIAN DEBATE: NO ONE IS CHARLIE

Three crucial elements of the debate on Charlie Hebdo were embedded in the Italian far-right milieu well before the January attacks. First, ~~there was~~ a constructed antagonism between, on the one hand, the desire for security of the common people and, on the other, the multiculturalist "do-goodism" of mainstream culture.[19] More broadly, multiculturalism is regarded as self-defeating, anti-Italian, and elitist. Second, ~~there was~~ the issue of the freedom to self-define as "Fascists" and challenge mainstream consensus. In this regard, neo-Fascist movements had long mobilized on the freedom to express opinions that deviate from mainstream notions, and anti-fascism. Third, ~~there was a~~ mobilization on "freedom of expression" during the first Muhammad cartoons controversy.[20] While authoritarian-populist actors (e.g., *Lega Nord*) supported the publication of the cartoons,[21] several

19. *Buonismo*- which we translated here as "do-goodism," is a recurring concept in Italian far right politics. The term is used derogatorily to refer to political correctness, and to the behavior of people willing to help society by championing oppressed minorities through philanthropic or egalitarian means. Do-gooders are accused of imposing a progressive agenda on issues such as gender equality and multiculturalism, while at the same time denying free speech to anyone who does not share this political paradigm.

20. Three mainstream Italian newspapers republished the vignettes and some weeks after one Italian priest was murdered in Trabzon, Turkey, by a young fanatic in the wake of the anti-cartoons protest.

21. The crucial event took place on February 15, 2006, when Roberto Calderoli (*Lega Nord*, Northern League) appeared on television wearing a T-shirt reproducing some of

ultra-religious and autocratic organizations condemned the "blasphemous" and "offensive" nature of the vignettes targeting the Pope.

The most prominent interpretation of the massacre drew on conspiracy theories shared among neo-fascist actors such as *NoReporter* (NR) and *CasaPound Italia* (CPI). ~~Accordingly,~~ the attacks are part of a "strategy of tension" by which Western governments impose a "fanatic anti-identitarian ideology," distracting public opinion from the social and political bankruptcy of Europe.[22] Similarly, governments deny freedom of expression to historical revisionists (e.g., ~~Faurisson~~) and to people who challenge the mainstream consensus (e.g., Dieudonné), demonstrating that "the right to a free opinion only works one way."[23] While challenging the idea of a clash of civilizations,[24] CPI and NR share the rhetoric of anti-white racism observed among the French far right, and the idea that European populations are being progressively replaced by foreigners (Castelli Gattinara 2017a; Froio et al. 2020). These are the foundations of a differentialist narrative asserting a "right to difference" for all ethnocultural groups in their own specific geographical locations, so that migrants "must be helped in keeping a link with their own history and land."[25] By contrast, *Forza Nuova* (FN) and other autocratic-fascist networks like *Veneto Fronte Skinhead* (VFS) and *Stormfront* (SF) promote much more openly Islamophobic and exclusionary narratives, which, ~~as already mentioned,~~ describe Islam as "a bloody culture that has nothing to do with the millenary history of Europe" and call for the deportation of all Muslim citizens.[26]

Authoritarian-populist actors promoted a milder version of this interpretation. *Fratelli d'Italia* (FdI), *Lega Nord* (LN), and *la Destra* (lD) described Western societies as oppressed by the will of a small elite imbued with a conformist, dysfunctional ideology of multiculturalism, which oppresses all forms of alternative thinking. Taking inspiration from the writings of Magdi Allam and Oriana Fallaci, the focus is primarily on challenging the "hegemony of political correctness." Yet, some organizations criticized the blasphemous nature of *Charlie Hebdo*'s humor (e.g., FdI, lD), while others

the cartoons. Two days later, the Italian consulate in Benghazi, Libya, was attacked by a mob and set on fire, while the police shot on the crowd, killing eleven demonstrators.

22. http://www.ilprimatonazionale.it/cronaca/bruxelles-soros-42185/.

23. http://www.ilprimatonazionale.it/esteri/arresto-comico-dieudonne-charlie-hebdo-13926/.

24. http://www.ilprimatonazionale.it/esteri/attacco-charlie-hebdo-11-settembre-francia-13202/.

25. http://www.noreporter.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=23820:il-sont-charlie&catid=8:storiaasorte&Itemid=19.

26. http://www.radiofn.eu/fioreavviare-umano-rimpatrio-immigrati-provenienti-paesi-islamici/.

openly supported the magazine to target Islam and Muslims (LN). Ultra-conservative and ultra-religious actors mobilized around two frames. On the one hand, they called on the Judeo-Christian identity of Europe, suggesting a special relationship between Islam and violence, which culturally relativist Western countries are unwilling to recognize.[27] On the other, they appropriated the debate on freedom of expression to claim the right of public servants to oppose perceived mainstream values such as "homosexualism" and the "theory of gender."

As could be observed, the *Charlie Hebdo* juncture did not mark a significant rupture in the far-right debate, as most actors mobilized around the same arguments as before the attacks. The most relevant issues of Islam, freedom of expression, migration, and integration were treated in light of four main frames comprising slightly different arguments and justifications:

The main diagnostic frame is conspiratorial. It considers the attacks as a strategy of tension orchestrated by international elites promoting multiculturalist societies and aiming at rebalancing powers within the Western world.

The predominant prognostic frame demands going beyond multiculturalism, which has led to dysfunctional interracial societies. While all actors challenge the do-goodism by which mainstream elites and the media justify migration, some suggest ethnopluralist solutions,[28] while others call for the forceful repatriation of all Muslim citizens, irrespective of their legal status.

Another prognostic frame challenges the idea that *Charlie Hebdo* is a symbol of freedom. Rather than truly confronting mainstream culture, it only amused it (*épater le bourgeois*). A truly liberal society would not ban historical revisionism and fascism, but allow all forms of contestation of mainstream ideologies and values.

The main motivational frame is grounded in the rediscovery of Europe. European peoples shall mobilize for a Europe of Nations, in defense of European values and against "suicidal" values of mainstream culture such as cultural relativism and multiculturalism.

27. https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=929638360380022&id=176831138994085&substory_index=0

28. For a definition of the multicultural theory of "ethnopluralism" or "cultural differentialism," see footnote 1.

In sum, while the far-right arena in Italy is highly fragmented and no single actor stands out as a recognized broker, shared narratives transcend intergroup boundaries, stimulating debates across different groups and building the infrastructure of the "intellectual field" of the far right, especially as opposition to "do-goodism" and multiculturalism. Intergroup boundaries are blurred by a shared paradigm of opposition to mainstream culture and the ideology of political correctness, against which the peoples of Europe ought to revolt. At the same time, Oriana Fallaci's theories about Islam acted as a catalyst of far-right discourse, dividing the field into two camps. On the one hand, authoritarian-populist and ultra-religious actors bridged with mainstream-right discourse on Islam, suggesting that only war and the closing of borders can provide a solution to the threat of Islamization. On the other, ethnocentric and autocratic-fascist actors challenged this narrative based on an ideology of cultural differentialism, which combines pan-European nationalism and support for the strongholds of secular Islam outside of Europe.

CHARLIE HEBDO DEBATES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: IDENTITY AND SOVEREIGNTY

Compared to the other countries, the far-right debate on Charlie Hebdo in the United Kingdom was limited, even though issues like Islamization and the failure of multiculturalism have long been embedded in the British far-right milieu. Yet, there were multiple adaptive events that gave the far right an opportunity to address multiculturalism and Islam, and to accuse Muslims of representing a fifth column in the United Kingdom. Most notably, on January 8, 2015, thousands of British Muslims gathered in London to protest cartoons showing the prophet Muhammad and to remind observers that freedom of speech is "regularly utilised to insult personalities that others consider sacred."[29] While the Muslim Action Forum expressed deep regret at the Paris terror attacks, the demonstration was interpreted by far-right actors as a confirmation of the internal threat posed by Muslims in the United Kingdom. Similarly, the New Year's events in Cologne were regarded as a manifestation of the tendency of Muslim gangs to assault women.[30]

29. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/08/british-muslims-london-protest-against-muhammad-cartoon-charlie-hebdo.

30. http://www.bnp.org.uk/news/national/religion-permanent-outrage; http://www.libertygb.org.uk/news/assembly-menaces.

While opposition to immigration characterizes all far-right actors, autocratic-fascist groups (National Action, StormFront Britain, Blood & Honour) based their claims on nativist and racist considerations, whereas ethnocentric-right ones like the English Defence League (EDL) focused more on cultural aspects, describing immigration as a threat to identities, values, and lifestyles. Authoritarian-populist parties like UKIP, instead, tended to adopt relatively milder positions focusing on the economic unviability of migration. For all actors, the above issues became all the more problematic when immigrants were non-Western and intolerable in the case of Muslims. In this sense, Sharia Watch (SW), a website documenting the advancing of Sharia law in the United Kingdom, acted as a broker networking UKIP, EDL activists,[31] and other groups of the counter-jihad movements in the United Kingdom.[32]

The most vocal network coalesced around the radical anti-Islamic EDL and its by-product Pegida UK, which organized several marches against Islamization and so-called "rape culture." In particular, three main arguments were advanced in addressing Islam as undemocratic and incompatible with human rights.[33] First, Muslims are members of an inherently domineering culture more or less openly committed to the conquest of the West "by sheer brutality and willingness to kill."[34] Second, Muslims have no respect for the individual, particularly women, which is why they engage in the "systematic rape and abuse of thousands of vulnerable white girls."[35] Third, Muslims are intolerant of anything that is not Islam and the Islamic way of life, so that "as long as we have a significant number of Muslims here, we may never be able to regain our freedom of speech." [36]

Other dominant targets of far-right propaganda (National Front, Britain First, and the British Democratic Party) are multiculturalism and state socialism, embodied by political and banking elites, and which are accountable

31. https://www.britainfirst.org/press-release-britain-first-distances-itself-completely-from-cartoon-plot-to-ferment-civil-disorder/.

32. For example, the Victims of Islamic Cultural Extremism (VOICE) and Mothers Against Radical Islam and Sharia (MARIAS). See www.libertygb.org.uk/news/islamization-britain-2015-sex-crimes-jihadimania-and-protection-tax.

33. http://www.bnp.org.uk/news/national/5-awkward-questions-about-islam-politicians-don%E2%80%99t-want-you-ask-daren%E2%80%99t-answer.

34. http://www.libertygb.org.uk/news/west-after-charlie-hebdo-massacre. See also British National Party's "You reap what you sow—Islam and the growing terror threat" http://www.bnp.org.uk/news/national/you-reap-what-you-sow-islam-and-growing-terror-threat.

35. www.PEGIDAuk.org/v1/news/26-why-i-m-joining-PEGIDA-in-birmingham-on-6th-february.

36. www.PEGIDAuk.org/v1/news/26-why-i-m-joining-PEGIDA-in-birmingham-on-6th-february.

for the decay of the British society. As in the other cases, western elites are accused of pursuing a "multiracial utopia" that simultaneously suffocates the will of the people and empowers Muslims. Actors like the British National Party and LibertyGB blame elites for having invented the ~~myth of "Islamophobia,"~~ for indoctrinating the public, and for repressing any criticism of Islam in France and in Britain.[37] At the same time, "people are beginning to rumble the 'free speech' scam" and have understood "that 'insulting minorities' isn't the real crime, but white people consequently reclaiming and asserting their own identity certainly is."[38]

Overall, the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks were perceived by the far right as marking a rupture, showing the consequences of the multiracial society ruled by corrupt elites. The Paris attacks provided discontinuity in continuity, offering considerable evidence in support of preexistent arguments, but also a new sense of urgency in terms of narratives and strategies of contention. The main way in which the far right made sense of the events is as follows:

The main diagnostic frame builds on the idea that Islam and the West are incompatible. It argues that the righteous but decadent West is under siege by hordes of Muslim migrants.[39] The Paris attacks showed what awaits the West as Islamization unfolds: barbaric violence and the dismantling of its statutory rights and freedoms.

A second diagnostic frame is more openly anti-establishment: British elites are misled by a hegemonic multicultural ideology, which blinds them with respect to the failures of the multiracial society and empowers Muslims in imposing their way of living.

At the heart of the far-right prognostic framing stands the "war for survival" between white/Western people and Muslims, migrants, and the elites. Autocratic-fascist and ethnocentric groups call for direct action by the oppressed people against the establishment. Authoritarian-populist actors, instead, condemn violence and focus on the electoral mobilization of the silenced majority.

The main motivational frame calls on fighting for British identity and sovereignty. The people have the mission of overthrowing the elites,

37. http://www.libertygb.org.uk/news/isis-didnt-radicalise-them-they-were-already-radicalised.

38. http://www.bnp.org.uk/news/national/french-free-speech-scam-exposed. See also http://www.libertygb.org.uk/news/camp-saints-meets-eurabia.

39. http://www.bnp.org.uk/news/national/cameron-s-hypocrisy-threatens-british-people.

> in order to build a Europe of the Peoples that respects the diversity of its constituent nations. Toward this goal, collaboration with other European nationalists is possible and to be welcomed.

In sum, far-right rhetoric in the United Kingdom resonated with the main framing of the events that emerged in other countries, especially France and Italy. This is most straightforward in the diagnosis of the problem (the replacement of native populations) and the allocation of responsibility (corrupt, multiculturalist elites), but also in the identification of far-right actors with the silenced majority engaged in reversing the downward, suicidal trend of Western societies. Furthermore, most anti-Islamic campaigning in the United Kingdom is catalyzed by a few recognizable brokers, such as the British National Front, the EDL, and PegidaUK, which offered platforms of connection for actors of the British far right, including UKIP.

This contributed to successfully upgrading the far-right discourse from the ghetto to the mainstream. In particular, counter-mobilization against marches for equal rights and freedom of religion raised attention by mainstream conservative actors and the mass media, providing visibility and endorsement for at least some of the far-right arguments. Most notably, the January attacks paved the way to a moral panic on security in the United Kingdom, which granted further space and resonance to far-right actors engaged in the Brexit campaign. Shortly after the attacks, and increasingly so after the subsequent terror attacks in Brussels and Paris, the leaders of the Leave campaign started drawing links between the EU's open borders and the threat of terrorism, blaming terrorism on the EU's allegedly lax border controls and on the Schengen system of free movement.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE FAR RIGHT, CHARLIE HEBDO, AND TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES

In this chapter, we showed that the *Charlie Hebdo* debates brought forth issues deeply intertwined with far-right politics and resonating with their nativist, authoritarian ideologies. This facilitated the interpretation of the events in terms of preexisting far-right campaigns on immigration and security. Furthermore, the analysis illustrates that the European far right effectively mobilized as a collective actor, despite variation in the specific idioms that were used by the various ideological breeds in the four countries. Different groups recognized themselves within a common identity,

as a bulwark against multiculturalism and Islamization. Antagonizing corrupt political elites to an exclusionary understanding of the *will of the people*, these actors could combine secularist, pluralist and pseudo-liberal arguments to reject the presence of Muslims in Western countries and extend the reach of their nativist messages in the public sphere.

The first question that we set out to address in this chapter had to do with how the far right approached the *Charlie Hebdo* debates, within its milieu, and in interaction with other actors in the public sphere. While our analysis undeniably confirms that the attacks were a crucial moment for far-right politics, the extent and nature of mobilization in the four countries varied considerably. On the one hand, far-right movements took advantage of the multiplicity of public issues involved in the debate, and strategically focused their attention on the aspects, and frames, that resonated the most with the context in which they acted. On the other, the degree to which they were successful in having an impact on the broader debate varied substantially across ~~countries,~~ since the more favorable opportunities available in some countries facilitated the development of ~~common narratives by different types of actors~~ and ~~the~~ breakthrough ~~of far-right discourse~~ in the broader public sphere. The mainstreaming of far-right politics was crucial in Italy and in the United Kingdom, where the far right learned the language of liberal values and was able to determine its own intellectual field. The champion of this tradition, however, is the French *Front National*, which mobilized in defense of liberal and republican values to rule out Muslims from the national community, configuring a critique of the establishment that gained considerable legitimacy in the public sphere. Differently, the far right suffered from isolation in countries where political opportunities were less favorable, whether because of counter-mobilization waves or due to repressive moves by the government.

Second, we focused on the targets of far-right propaganda, investigating whether the incidents were given the same meaning across different types of far-right actors. We find that diagnoses were shared by most actors irrespective of their ideological differences. Ten years after Britain's *Daily Mail* headline "Multiculturalism is dead" (July 7, 2006), the European far right is united in the belief that a multiculturalist liberal ideology dominates European politics, supported by the economic and political establishment, and the mainstream media. As such, the allegedly naïve, relativistic, and elitist nature of the politics of multiculturalism are held responsible for the dangerous social condition, and the related decay, of contemporary European societies. Disagreement, however, prevails concerning the proposed solutions and motivations for action. While no clear-cut pattern could be identified for any specific group of actors, a few trends emerged

from our analysis. First, most ethnocentric and autocratic-fascist actors propose to replace multiculturalism with differentialist ethnopluralism, which implies the rediscovery of the nation state, within a Europe of the Peoples that respects the truly European values of sovereignty and identity. Second, the ultra-religious right agrees in suggesting that Europe ought to restore its Judeo-Christian identity to challenge Islam. Finally, authoritarian-populist actors, being primarily focused on office-seeking, concentrated their attention on the need to replace the political establishment.

The third perspective focused on the transnational nature of far-right mobilization. We identified three related mechanisms of transnationalization in ~~far right~~ politics. *Transnational emulation* emerged with the diffusion of Pegida-like organizations, where preexisting groups labeled their activities according to the internationally recognized "brand" of Pegida-politics to increase their recognizability and legitimacy. Similarly, several far-right actors imitated the mobilization and narratives of their French counterparts, and applied them in their own context without building any concrete platform for cooperation or transnational agendas. Instances of *transnational organization* were less recurring, despite the Alliance for Peace and Freedom's attempts to build common structures for mobilization against Islam and terrorism in Europe, including an international campaign to stop the construction of mosques, and the repatriation of Muslim citizens. Similarly, while the network of the European Solidarity Front for Syria tried to unite ethnopluralist movements in Europe, its efforts mainly took place within preexisting structures of cooperation, rather than setting up new ones. *Transnational identification,* instead, built upon the idea of fighting a common struggle at the European level. Recognizing this common belonging, far-right actors often renounced to the language of national superiority in favor of ethnopluralist understandings advocating respect for the struggles of other nations against cultural homologation. Far-right actors thus identified a collective enemy—the international elites, mainstream culture and the EU~~, at home and abroad~~—and a collective broker—the *Front National*, which emerged as a veritable reference point for the far-right field as a whole.

In conclusion, far-right movements took advantage of the new opportunities opened by the *Charlie Hebdo* events, and performed their role as entrepreneurs of fear. They anticipated that the events had set in motion a moral panic, and acted to increase the feeling of threat to society from moral deviants. To antagonize Islam, some groups mobilized on liberal values such as secularism, pluralism, and freedom of expression, while others on more essentialist understandings of the nation based on religion and ethnicity. Despite these differences, the European far right effectively

mobilized as a collective actor. Collectively, it recognized itself as a bulwark against multiculturalism and Islamization, and as the true representative of the will of the people against corrupt political elites. Building upon decennial campaigns on these issues, the far right targeted cultural pluralism for being too permissive and used the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks to demonstrate that relativism disadvantages the democratic citizen, fostering moral disorder and tolerating barbarism. Through the deliberate mobilization of pseudo-liberal values, and the strategic targeting of cultural relativism and political correctness, far right messages drifted among mainstream audiences, reaching well beyond the restricted milieu of far-right politics.

CHAPTER 7

Religious organizations

Strategies and framing

One week after the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, Pope Francis told Italian journalists that "there is a limit.[1] Every religion has its dignity. I cannot mock a religion that respects human life and the human person."[2] At the same time, the Pope condemned the Paris violence. "One cannot offend, make war, kill in the name of one's own religion, that is, in the name of God. To kill in the name of God is an aberration." The Pope's statements went viral, shaping the terms of the debate on the role of religious actors in the aftermath of the attacks, and the way in which freedom of expression, blasphemy, and violence were discussed. Meanwhile, the Pope's statements brought forward something largely absent from the general debate: a form of empathy with Muslim communities. As the Pope justified his claim by demonstrating a particular understanding of the terrorists' motivations, other religious actors utilized him as a broker to advance their claims or to challenge dominant understandings of the role of religion in European democracies, thereby creating cross-confessional alliances or criticizing these alliances. In light of these interventions, we must analyze religious actors' understandings and interpretations of the attack in order to understand the *Charlie Hebdo* controversy in its full breadth.

The role of religious actors is important in analyzing the *Charlie Hebdo* debates because of the multiple links between the attack and religious

1. We are grateful to Georgia Mavrodi for her comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

2. Retrieved from time.com, http://time.com/3668875/pope-francis-charlie-hebdo/. All future quotes are from this statement.

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issues. First, like previous attacks in which Islamist terrorists have been involved, the attack on *Charlie Hebdo* brought forward issues of secularism and the role of religion in European societies (Gole 2013). The attacks placed Islam in European democracies at the core of the debate, setting values and norms at the heart of the arguments and encouraging (if not forcing) Muslims and their communities to condemn the attacks. Second, a satirical newspaper, with a history of controversies over blasphemy, took center stage in this debate. Both Catholic and Muslim groups had already taken *Charlie Hebdo* to court on several occasions to address offenses to religion (Hajjat and Mohammed 2013). Third, the mass media quickly remarked upon the "religious" character of the attacks, in that the perpetrators claimed a religious belonging (to Islam) and some of the victims were targeted because of their religious affiliations (Jews in the *Hyper Cacher* supermarket). Finally, discussions of the limits of freedom of press and, in particular, the relationship between freedom of expression and freedom of religion took a central role in the *Charlie Hebdo* debate.

Religious groups and organizations played a prominent role after the attack. In particular, they had a strong part in structuring the debate in their own arenas. We define an arena as "a bundle of rules and resources that allow or encourage certain kinds of interactions to proceed, with something at stake" (Jasper 2015, 14). In this respect, the debate among religious organizations is characterized by some distinct rules and norms that not only respond to the broader public sphere, but are also specific to those structuring their own arena. The discursive production by religious groups after the attacks revealed a tension. On the one hand, religious organizations needed to address the broader public, by condemning the attacks even if the latter were directed against a newspaper hostile toward religions, and thus by embracing, even partially, support for *freedom of expression* (including blasphemy). On the other hand, for religious organizations it was important to claim *freedom of religion*, including the protection of the sentiments of their believers, who were often disturbed by the *Charlie Hebdo* cartoons.

This tension was articulated in a context in which religious communities and their presence in European societies have been challenged in multiple ways. In general, they have faced trends toward secularization, with frequent calls for withdrawal of religion from the public sphere (Roy 2010). Moreover, while Christian churches are historically and institutionally embedded in European states, minority religions have faced distrust and their members have been often exposed to discrimination. In particular, suspicion of Islam has increased in Europe, especially since 9/11 (Sniderman, Petersen, and Slothuus 2014). Furthermore, despite Jewish

denominational groups' relative recognition through the institutionalization of the Holocaust memory (Dreyfus 2011), anti-Semitism has been a steady source of discrimination in European countries. How, therefore, did religious groups discuss the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks in their arenas, and how did they appropriate the different opportunities open to them in such a context?

In this chapter, we are guided by two expectations. First, critical junctures are moments of strain that unsettle the positions of social actors. We expect that the way in which religious groups engage in the *Charlie Hebdo* debates within their national contexts might vary *across types of actors*. Different confessional groups might face different opportunities and constraints within institutions and the public sphere (*cross-group variation*). Although the relations between the different religious groups and the state are not explicitly discussed, we will single out instances in which such conversations occur. Second, specific political opportunities within each national context might have influenced religious actors' framing activities. These potential variations will allow us to analyze the debate across countries, assuming that religious groups seize preexisting configurations of Church–State relations and adapt them respectively (*cross-national variation*). In this part of the analysis, we expect that the exceptionality of terrorist attacks might alter the definition of the problem, by facilitating the forging of new collective identities and political perspectives. In our cases, the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks may have fostered a more inter-religious sense of identity.

The chapter proceeds with a discussion of the actors we covered in our analysis. We also provide an overview of our expectations on religious groups' framings, depending on their national political opportunity structures. Then, we present the main traits of religious organizations' participation in public debates after the attacks, country by country (covering France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom), paying particular attention to variations in terms of confessional groups and their positions within their arenas. In the conclusion, we move on to discuss commonalities and differences in prognostic, diagnostic, and motivational frames across countries and confessional groups.

THE CROSS-GROUP AND CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS: SOME EXPECTATIONS

We addressed a number of actors in our analysis, covering Christian, Muslim, and Jewish organizations in each of the four countries under

study. Within each confessional group, we analyzed established actors—those holding privileged or recognized relations with the institutions—but also grassroots religious organizations. This choice allowed us to consider a broad spectrum of organizations with diverse ideological and organizational logics and institutional affiliations. We emphasize individual organizations, discussing in detail their framings and strategic relations to each other.

As far as *cross-group variations* are concerned, the internally differentiated positions of the religious actors might have significantly influenced their interactive readings of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks. In particular, Christian and Jewish groups, which have embedded relations with the State, are expected to align their prognostic framings with dominant ones in the public sphere. Calls for balanced relations between freedom of expression and freedom of religion are likely to have shaped their prognostic framings as well. In addition, we expect Christian and Jewish groups to adopt polarized framings vis-à-vis Islam and its alleged links with terrorism. Vice-versa, since they are the primary targets in the debate, we expect Muslim groups to be more nuanced with regard to universalistic freedom of expression, by asking for an efficient regulation of satire. Moreover, we expect Muslim and Jewish groups to stress the risks they face as minority religious groups, pointing out anti-Semitism and Islamophobia (Bunzl 2005) and asking for further protective measures from the State.

Religious groups' interactions within their arenas were not unique to the period after the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks. Actors are diachronically "constituted in a series of interactions—they have some stability, they embody a certain continuity" (Duyvendak and Fillieule 2015, 308). In this respect, the diachronic aspect of actors' interactions will help us to explain *cross-national variations*. In fact, religious actors have long been interacting within regimes that regulate the relations between Church and State in various ways. This differentiation might have an influential role in how actors have built their framings. In *open universal regimes* (Messner 1999)—France being the exemplary case—we expect religious organizations to call for effective regulation of religion in the public space (funding mosques and private religious schools, training imams, deploying additional security forces out of confessional schools and so on). We expect that in *hegemonic regimes* (Germany and Italy included), in which the Christian churches hold a privileged position and cooperation between church and state institutions is historically embedded (Amir-Moazami 2005, 270), Jewish and Muslim groups might have called upon public authorities to include them in their cooperation system on a par with Christian churches. Finally, in closed regimes—represented in our study by the United Kingdom, in

which an official state church exists (Soper and Fetzer 2007)—we expect Muslim and Jewish confessional groups to use minority language in order to gain protection from the State.

In the next sections, we analyze the debates that took place among religious actors, focusing on their national arenas. Within each section, we refer to the debate within Jewish, Muslim, and Christian organizations, focusing on their prognostic, diagnostic, and motivational framings. We incorporate comparative evidence when appropriate within each section.

FRANCE: BEYOND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, URGE FOR INTERVENTION

In France, in the aftermath of the attacks, religious actors framed their arguments around a universal-laïcist model of Church–State relations. None of the religious groups took radical stances against *laïcité*; what religious actors mostly debated was the reinterpretation of secularism. In other words, they asked for a return to a more pragmatic approach on *laïcité*, similar to the one applied during the first period of the 1905 law. According to this approach, the State should provide individuals with the necessary conditions and resources to support the free practice of religion without discrimination, thus acting as guarantor in the organization of religious life. Second, religious groups recognized the importance of discrimination that an affiliation to a minoritarian religion might entail. Thus, issues of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism were largely present in the framings of religious actors, who moreover asked for further preventive and repressive measures by the State.

In France, an open universal system affecting the different religious actors unequally (Messner 1999) was set up by the 1905 act that established the separation of the churches from the State. However, this separation did not prevent links with some religious institutions—mostly Catholic—for instance by providing funding for private religious schools (Debré Act, 1959) or restoring Catholic churches, recognized as national monuments and therefore eligible for public funding (Perrin 2007). Moreover, Christian groups—both Catholic and Protestant—have benefited from historical embeddedness and political legitimation.[3] Muslim communities, on the

3. The center-right candidate in the 2017 presidential elections, François Fillon, stated in January 2017 that he was "a Gaullist and a Christian," in order to support the public health care system. http://www.francetvinfo.fr/politique/je-suis-gaullisteet-chretien-fillon-plaide-pour-sa-reforme-de-la-securite-sociale_1999623.html.

other hand, face rather unfavorable opportunities, both in the political arena and in the public sphere. In fact, after the 1980s, politicians and the media built the narrative of a "Muslim problem" (Hajjat and Mohammed 2013), which progressively led to laws restricting religious expression in the public space (see the anti-veil law of 2004, anti-burqa law of 2010, anti-burqini decrees of 2016). As for Jewish organizations, during the past decades, they have acquired some legitimation in the political arena and the public sphere, for instance through the institutionalization of the memory of the genocide (Dreyfus 2011) and their symbolic recognition through the acceptance of their cultural practices.[4]

In the debate on the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, *Jewish* groups were rather supportive of the country's Church–State system and largely stressed their attachment to the republican citizenship model. Some divergence emerged on the opportunity to express solidarity with Charlie Hebdo given its antireligious values. On the one hand, the Mouvement Libéral Juif (MLJ) explicitly stated "being Charlie" and praised the "generous values of France." In a similar vein, the Union des étudiants juifs de France (UEJF) co-organized with SOS-Racisme a projection of the controversial documentary "C'est dur d'être aimé par des cons" ("It's hard to be loved by idiots") on January 10, in a Parisian theater, expressing complete solidarity with the journal's values. On the other hand, the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France (CRIF), the main representative body of Jewish groups in France, was much more restrained in expressing universalistic support for *Charlie Hebdo,* focusing more on the anti-Semitic character of the *Hyper Cacher* attack.

An external event that structured Jewish organizations' framings was Netanyahu's call to French Jews to move to Israel (Aliya) on January 10, 2015.[5] Highlighting their French citizenship, MLJ criticized Netanyahu, stressing ideological differences with the conservative Israeli PM and emphasizing their attachment to their French citizenship:

> I feel like the diplomat, Hungarian and Jewish patriot who, in 1947 just before the creation of the state of Israel, had been offered a position in the future state. He answered: "I love the state of Israel. The minute it will be created I will support it and I will be delighted to become its first ambassador in Budapest".

4. « M. Valls : Les juifs de France "peuvent porter avec fierté leur kippa"! », *Le Point*, 24 September, 2012.

5. « M. Valls : Les juifs de France "peuvent porter avec fierté leur kippa"! », *Le Point*, 24 September, 2012.
tanyahou-aux-juifs-de-france-apres-les-attentats-terroristes_793959.html.

> [. . .] Yes, I am a Jew from France, because it's decided: I'm Jewish, I stay in France.[6]

In a more critical tone, the Union juive française pour la paix (UJFP) censured the "masquerade" that allowed Netanyahu to be presented as chief of the Jews of Israel and of those in France. The CRIF, in contrast, declared itself open to debates with the Israeli PM.

In general, Jewish groups called for participation in the demonstration on January 11, 2015, using frames of national unity. They invited Jews to continue attending synagogues, while also stressing the importance of universal education on anti-Semitism. The CRIF, in particular, requested further repressive and preventive measures from the State, as well as stronger protection for Jewish communities. Furthermore, some of the organizations called for inter-religious unity and dialogue, inviting imams into their synagogues to debate issues together.

Muslim organizations, like their co-confessionals in other countries, attempted to distance themselves (and Islam) from terrorism. The main organizations—such as the Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM) and the Union des organisations islamiques de France (UOIF)—condemned the attacks, stressing their distance from terrorism. They called upon French Muslims to remain vigilant against the rise of Islamophobia, and invited public authorities to take further repressive measures against hate crimes. Particularly CFCM, as the officially recognized body of Muslims in France, used national unity frames, calling everyone to respect them and avoid provocations in order to avoid pouring oil on the fire. Moreover, they called for unity of Muslims (a current problem in the highly fragmented French Muslim community, where mosques show relative autonomy from centralized authorities), stressing the need to avoid provocations from terrorist groups: "Faced with this tragedy on a national scale, we call the Muslim community to exercise the utmost vigilance against possible manipulations from groups referred to extremists of any kind."[7] In particular, the CFCM pointed out the "universal and humanistic" character of the Quran. Other, smaller Muslim organizations (Islam et laïcité; Participation et spiritualités musulmanes) condemned the attacks as well, stressing their respect for democratic values while also highlighting the fear of "amalgames." Other humanitarian Muslim associations such as BarakaCity, representing a more spiritual approach to Islam, criticized the

6. http://www.mjlf.org/component/content/article/1686.html.

7. http://www.lavie.fr/actualite/france/les-religions-condamnent-l-attentat-contre-charlie-hebdo-07-01-2015-59227_4.php

"national mourning" that "splits the country into a dangerous climate of a worrying horizon."[8]

Christian groups clearly condemned the attacks, discussing the events as impinging upon "freedom of expression,"[9] and calling for peace and national unity.[10] The statement of the bishops' reunion of France perceived the attacks as affecting freedom of expression, as a national value:

> Such terror is obviously unqualified. Nothing can justify such violence. It affects freedom of expression, a fundamental element of our society. This society, which consists of all sorts of diversities, should continually work to build peace and brotherhood. Barbarity as expressed in this murder hurts us all.[11]

Christian organizations frequently used "republican" frames, although stressing the risk of the exploitation of religion for terrorist and political purposes. Protestant groups similarly expressed their solidarity with *Charlie Hebdo*, highlighting their commitment to the "secular Republic," which guarantees freedom of conscience and of the press.[12] Catholic solidarity groups, such as Caritas and Secours Catholique, discussed the events as an "attack on freedom of expression," calling for the construction of a "fraternal France."[13] In contrast, more conservative Catholic groups such as Aide à l'église en détresse (AED)[14] and Civitas distanced themselves from "Je suis Charlie" and accused the newspaper of using freedom of expression without limits. This stance did not signify solidarity with Muslims, however. These groups used the "clash of civilization" frame to highlight either the accelerated process of Islamization of France, or the "sacrilege of republican secularism."[15]

Overall, the main religious groups stressed their loyalty to the narrative of national unity and to the French citizenship regime. However, France's open, universal Church–State system was also challenged. In their

8. https://www.facebook.com/BarakaCity/photos/a.437611432368.204374.223871557368/10153053345692369/?type=1&theater.

9. http://www.eglise.catholique.fr/conference-des-eveques-de-france/textes-et-declarations/388599-attentat-charlie-hebdo/.

10. http://www.aeof.fr/articol_51741/attentat-charlie-hebdo---communique-des-eveques-orthodoxes-de-france-.html.

11. http://www.eglise.catholique.fr/conference-des-eveques-de-france/textes-et-declarations/388599-attentat-charlie-hebdo/.

12. http://www.protestants.org/index.php?id=23&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=2829&tx_ttnews[year]=2015&tx_ttnews[month]=01&cHash=1d87c31f60.

13. http://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/qui-sommes-nous/la-vie-de-l-association/attentat-de-charlie-4860.

14. http://www.aed-france.org/charlie-charia-charite-reaction-de-marc-fromager/.

15. http://www.civitas-institut.com/content/view/1242/2/.

diagnosis of the problem, Jewish and Muslim groups argued that religions in France are not protected enough by the state. Jewish groups, for instance, highlighted a "double standards" logic, with more solidarity expressed for the victims of *Charlie Hebdo* than for those of the *Hyper Cacher*. Muslim organizations, in turn, pointed to Islamophobia, manifested in the rising number of acts (vandalism of mosques) but also in politicians' statements. Moreover, Muslims felt that they had been stigmatized after the attacks, given that their communities were asked by all authorities to condemn the attacks. In light of this invitation, Muslim organizations criticized the dominant narrative which linked Islam inextricably with terrorism. Christian organizations instead affirmed their privileged position within France's secular system, although they also pointed at times to the decline of Christian spirituality and the excesses of secularization, which leaves people without moral values.

In terms of solutions to the problems, religious groups' *prognostic* frames highlighted the need for the state to provide religious communities with more efficient protection. Pointing to the fallacies of open universal systems, in which the state refuses to take an active role, religious organizations asked for an effective presence of public authorities in regulating religious life and freedom of religious practice. Moreover, solidarity with victims was a main *motivating* frame for participation in the January 11 march, pointing to the voluntary inclusion of the main confessional groups in France's democratic life. All organizations, finally, were motivated by the need for further unity among their own confessional members. Jewish groups asked their believers not to be afraid of attending synagogues, and took relatively critical stances in response to the Israeli PM's call for Aliya. Muslim groups called for solidarity between Muslims and official Muslim organizations. To a lesser extent than in the other countries, cross-confessional solidarity and inter-religious dialogue was promoted by some Jewish and Muslim groups.

GERMANY: SOCIAL PEACE, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, AND COUNTERING RADICALIZATION

In Germany, religious actors expressed their support for the existing system regulating Church and State relations, although with variations according to their positions vis-à-vis stable and conjunctural opportunities. They stressed, however, the need for the State to create more measures to protect all religious communities in the public space. Moreover, religious

groups argued at times that freedom of expression was equal (or at times even superior) to freedom of religion. Christian (both Catholic and Protestant) and Jewish groups supported in particular the German model of coexistence. Christian churches asked for cooperation between confessional groups, expressing the need for inter-religious dialogue. Jewish groups, on the other hand, pointed to the alleged anti-Semitism of German society in general and of the Muslim communities in particular. Muslim organizations asked for a rethinking of Germany's model of Church–State relations in order to put them on an equal footing with the other religious groups.

The German landscape of religious communities is, in fact, characterized by the predominance of the coexistence of Catholic and Protestant churches. These churches have long established links with state institutions and, along with Jewish communities, currently enjoy the status of corporations under public law.[16] In comparison, the Muslim presence is relatively recent, and characterized by low-skilled labor immigrant communities established since the 1960s (Amir-Moazami 2005, 269). Therefore, many Muslim organizations have links with immigrants' countries of origin (Haug, Mussig, and Stichs 2009, 174) and present a higher degree of fragmentation when compared to the other religious communities. In terms of representation, the main Muslim religious organizations in Germany account for a clear minority of the overall 4 million Muslim inhabitants:[17] Only 33 percent are organized, one way or another, in the main Muslim associations.[18] By contrast, the Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland (ZJD) represents at least half of Jewish inhabitants (of 200,000 inhabitants with Jewish religious affiliations, about 110,000 are organized in Jewish communities), while the Deutsche Bischofskonferenz and the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland have a prominent role for their respective Christian (Catholic and Protestant) denominations.

Jewish groups highlighted the alleged anti-Semitism of Muslim communities and asked for repressive interventions by the state. Their umbrella organization, the ZJD, openly condemned the violence against *Charlie Hebdo*, framing it as an attack against democracy and freedom of the press and emphasizing the Jewish origin of the victims (both the caricaturists

16. Universität Trier—Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, "Religions—und Weltanschauungsgemeinschaften mit öffentlich-rechtlichem Körperschaftsstatus," https://www.uni-trier.de/?id=26713.

17. *Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland*, 11.

18. http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Wer-spricht-fuer-die-Muslime-in-Deutschland-article14309876.htm.

of *Charlie Hebdo* and the clients at the *Hyper Cacher* supermarket in Paris). Their framings pointed at the threat against the security of Jews in France, Europe, and worldwide. Such accounts depicted the events in Paris as yet another episode in a long list of attacks against Jews.[19] There was also sharp criticism of German society for its failure to express clear solidarity with the *Hyper Cacher* victims, as it did for the *Charlie Hebdo* cartoonists. As the Rabbi in the Jewish community of Frankfurt argued,

> [e]veryone has expressed solidarity with the *Charlie Hebdo* journalists and the quest for freedom of expression and freedom of the press, but only a few have expressed solidarity for the four victims at the Jewish supermarket. I wish that everyone would carry the sign "Je suis Juif" on our lapels, because attacks against Jews are attacks against all of us.[20]

In terms of solutions, Jewish organizations differentiated themselves from the other religious communities by including calls for (more) security measures or a reevaluation of existing ones.[21] Finally, the most important communities accused Muslim religious organizations in Germany of harboring anti-Semitic positions and called on them to take a clear and active stance against anti-Semitism, youth radicalization, and religious extremism.[22]

As in the other countries, the *Muslim groups* tried to distance themselves from accusations of terrorism. They did not radically challenge the existing hegemonic system of Church–State relations, but instead used the opportunity to ask for Islam to become a legitimate partner in the cooperative system between the other religions and the state. The Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland (KRM) (an umbrella organization representing both Sunni and Shia Muslims) as well as the conservative Sunni *Muslim* organizations framed the attacks as a crime and a treason against the values and principles of Islam. Similarly to the French actors, German Muslims presented Islam as a religion of peace and brotherhood.[23]

19. http://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/article/view/id/21212/highlight/Charlie&Hebdo.

20. Ibid.

21. http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article136536365/Wir-Juden-muessen-einen-kuehlen-Kopf-bewahren.html.

22. http://www.zentralratdjuden.de/de/article/5248.j%C3%BCdisches-leben-in-deutschland-ist-es-gef%C3%A4hrdet.html?sstr=Charlie|Hebdo.

23. http://koordinationsrat.de/detail1.php?id=160&lang=de; http://koordinationsrat.de/detail2.php?id=47&lang=de; http://www.vikz.de/index.php/freitagspredigten/items/id-09-januar-2015-18-rebiulevvel-1436-der-islam-heisst-frieden.html; http://www.vikz.de/index.php/freitagspredigten/items/id-19-september-2014-24-zilkade-1435-der-islam-heisst-frieden.html.

Other Muslim organizations went beyond condemning extremism and violence in the name of Islam and framed Muslims as themselves victims of the Islamist terrorist attacks. The Liberal-Islamischer Bund (LIB) declared its full support for freedom of expression, freedom of the press, rule of law, and the importance of freedom and pluralism in the German society; it stressed the responsibility of Muslims themselves for devising solutions against radicalism and terrorism. The LIB also expressed public condolences and solidarity to the Jewish community and initiated joint public actions with other actors in favor of social unity, the rule of law, and democratic pluralism.[24]

With regard to solutions, Muslim groups criticized the calls directed at them to take a public stance against terrorism. The Deutsche Muslim Liga attributed such calls to prejudice, stigmatization, and discrimination against Muslims.[25] Along similar lines, other organizations called for disconnecting religion from terrorism in the public understanding. Among them, some claimed that the perpetrators of the Paris attacks as well as terrorist organizations were products of the actions of external political forces and not [real] Muslims. They also called Muslims in Germany to an open critique of terrorism.[26] Overall, however, Muslim organizations did not identify with *Charlie Hebdo* or with the slogan "*Je Suis Charlie*."

Christian groups (Catholic and Protestant) have been the most vocal in support of the existing hegemonic system of Church–State relations in Germany. Moreover, these groups displayed relative support for universalistic freedom of expression. Contrary to the Pope's official position on the attacks, the leadership of the German *Catholic* Church (the Deutsche Bischofskonferenz) framed the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks as an attempt to "destroy the peaceful coexistence of different social groups and different religions in France and beyond."[27] In addition, the Chairman of the Deutsche Bischofskonferenz called upon Muslim leaders in Germany to

24. At the same time, civil society in Germany was called upon to join in the efforts to counter extremism from all sides. See http://www.lib-ev.de/index.php?c=72151; http://www.lib-ev.de/index.php?c=72153. These actors joined forces to sign a declaration titled "Wir stehen auf!" ("We revolt!"), which received attention and was published in the Christian magazine supplement of the newspaper *Die Zeit*. "Pressemitteilung: Wir stehen auf!," *Christ und Welt /Die Zeit*, 15.1.2015, http://www.christundwelt.de/detail/artikel/wir-stehen-auf/.

25. http://www.badische-zeitung.de/deutschland-1/muslimische-verbaende-verurteilen-terrorismus-in-aller-form--98514745.html; http://www.muslim-liga.de/dml-aktuell/.

26. http://izhamburg.de/index.aspx?pid=99&articleid=66094.

27. http://www.dbk.de/presse/details/?suchbegriff=Charlie%20Hebdo&presseid=2713&cHash=c784c63337aa7c87052059ef872f2b05.

engage with the reasons that made "some young Muslims susceptible to extremist and misanthropic understanding of their own religion."[28] This was the case for other more conservative Catholic groups, which denounced the incompatibility of Islam with Western values.

Debates among Catholic groups included claims in favor of respecting freedom of expression as a "non-exchangeable right," even at the expense of religious sentiments. As the official Catholic Church of Germany stated: "Every religion and confession remains open to attack, remains non-understandable in some things, and thus invites satirical comments and contemplations. Jesus himself had to face this on this way to the cross."[29] Moreover, the German Catholic church stressed its links with the German-Jewish community.[30]

Protestant debates[31] framed freedom of expression as a central value of Protestant identity. The Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD) understood freedom of expression as complementary to freedom of religion rather than antithetical to it.[32] Thus, freedom of expression within the wider context of liberal democracy was seen as an integral part of the German system of Church–State relations and beneficial to all individuals and religious communities, including Muslims. The Paris attacks were framed as a "catastrophe" and a non-justifiable crime that caused anger, anxiety, and insecurity and endangered the efforts of the Protestant churches and other civil society actors to support freedom and peaceful coexistence.[33] As a response to the events in Paris, the EKD asked for inter-religious dialogue and mutual respect for religious beliefs.[34]

Beyond their diversity, in their *diagnosis* of the problem, all religious communities understood the Paris attacks as endangering social peace and unity in Europe and in Germany, but each of them focused on different dimensions. Muslim organizations framed the attacks as acts of terrorism and a crime to be condemned, stressing the peace-loving and

28. Ibid.

29. http://www.katholisch.de/video/14856-rtl-bibelclip-terrormorde-in-paris.

30. http://www.katholisch.de/aktuelles/aktuelle-artikel/ich-bin-vorsichtiger-geworden.

31. For the purposes of this study, we considered the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD) as a representative of mainstream Protestant actors.

32. http://www.ekd.de/english/News-news_2015_01_22_kaessmann.html.

33. http://www.evangelisch.de/inhalte/112232/08-01-2015/deutscher-pfarrer-paris-wir-beten-fuer-opfer-und-taeter. Also http://www.evangelisch.de/videos/112240/08-01-2015/wut-entschlsosenheit-charlie-hebdo.

34. http://www.ekd.de/aktuell/96980.html; http://www.ekd.de/download/20150109_fuerbitte.pdf; http://www.ekd.de/aktuell_presse/pm_2015_01_20_14_nordkirche_nichtinmeinemnamen.html.

law-abiding profile of Muslim communities. Jewish organizations understood the attacks as yet another incident in a series of events that point to rising anti-Semitism in Europe as well as endemic anti-Semitic opinions and attitudes within conservative Muslim communities. Finally, Christian churches interpreted the events as an attack against social peace, the liberal democratic order, and inter-religious peaceful coexistence, portraying themselves as the main defenders of the existing church-religion system in Germany.

With regard to *prognostic* frames, Muslim actors redeployed an already existing claim of further integration into the current hegemonic system of Church–State relations, asking the state to "expand its informal religious establishment to include Islam" (Soper and Fetzer 2007, 938). Jewish organizations called for more securitization and state measures for the protection of Jewish communities and institutions against Islamist attacks. Christian churches called for intensified dialogue and respect for fundamental individual freedoms as a remedy to heal the scars caused by the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks. Catholic and Protestant churches were unequivocal in invoking fundamental values and norms of Western liberal societies to *motivate* public action, most importantly those related to freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Some Christian actors even considered these two freedoms as superior to respect for freedom of religion. Jewish actors tended to ask for equal respect of both freedom of speech and freedom of religion. Finally, Muslim organizations urged action by de-Islamizing the attacks, framing their perpetrators as not true Muslims or even traitors to Islam and its values. This last frame found some resonance in the Italian debate too.

ITALY: A POLARIZED DEBATE?

At the most general level, and differently from the other countries, the Italian religious debate featured an "informal" discursive coalition between Catholic and Muslim groups asking for the protection of the religious sensitivity of believers. While their calls rarely made explicit reference to blasphemy per se, the two groups called for restrictions on unlimited freedom of expression when this could be considered offensive to different religious and cultural groups. Thus, Catholic organizations—which represent the predominant religious community in Italy and thus generally support the status quo concerning the system regulating Church–State relations—aligned with Muslim communities demanding that the State introduce further regulations on offensive speech. This led to the isolation

of Jewish groups, which promoted considerably more radical views: Several organizations accused Muslim communities of harboring anti-Semitism, whereas others explicitly addressed Islam as culturally "incompatible" with European values. In this respect, if Jewish communities in France mobilized on the sense of national belonging and were critical of Netanyahu's calls to migrate to Israel, groups in Italy expressed considerably more supportive positions on Aliya and seemed relatively less prone to mobilize on national identity.

Italian Church–State relations are characterized by the privileged position of the Catholic Church, which was recognized in the Patti Lateranensi of 1929. In a similar fashion, Jewish organizations are highly institutionalized, enjoying tax benefits and the regional public financing of synagogues (Ferrari and Ferrari 2012). Muslim groups benefit less from this system, not only because the community suffers from high internal fragmentation (Angelucci, Bombardieri, and Tacchini 2014, 31), but also because it is weakly represented at the national level, and its recognition rests on "discretionary decisions at the local level" (Frisina 2014, 115).

The main representative bodies of *Jewish* communities in Italy are the national Unione delle comunità Ebraiche Italiane (UCEI) and the Jewish Community of Rome (Comunità Ebraica di Roma—CER). While UCEI interpreted the attacks as part of growing anti-Semitism in Europe, CER focused primarily on the war on terror and the Israel–Palestine conflict. The two groups, however, agreed in claiming that Islam "has a problem" with violence, and in arguing that it is the responsibility of Muslims to address it.[35] The magazine of the Jewish Community of Rome went as far as to state that "it's very unlikely that the fight against Islamic fundamentalism will succeed if Europe does not come back on [its refusal] of mentioning the Judeo-Christian roots of European civilization."[36] The decay of Europe is considered a byproduct of political leaders' unwillingness to recognize that Judaism and Christianity are the continent's original culture and values, due to their fear of being accused of racism or prejudice against Islam.[37] In terms of solutions, UCEI asked the government to intervene with stricter measures punishing anti-Semitism. In urging unconditional freedom of expression and religion, it claimed that Europe should not allow any form of intolerance and Islamic extremism. The CER, instead, demanded stricter migration and refugee regulations and advocated further security

35. http://moked.it/blog/2015/01/22/time-out-la-risposta-dellislam/.

36. Giorgio Isreal, "Davanti al fondamentalismo islamico, quanta retorica, quanta confusione mentale," *Shalom*, nr2/XLVIII (Feb. 2015).

37. Ibid.

measures, pointing to Israel as a successful model of democracy and war against terror.

Like their co-confessionals in the other countries, *Muslim* groups in Italy tried to distance themselves and Islam from terrorism. Among the most active organizations, UCOII (Unione delle Comunità Islamiche in Italia), considered the most prominent network in the country, is close to the Muslim Brotherhood (Pacini 2000). It regroups more than 120 associations across the country, with the ambition of becoming a main intermediary between Italian Muslims and the state. A second association enjoying considerable leverage in interacting with the state is COREIS (Comunità Religiosa Islamica Italiana), which promotes inter-religious and peace dialogue and activities. In the *Charlie Hebdo* debate, UCOII argued that terrorism cannot be justified on any grounds, and that it could not be attributed to any religion. Moreover, the organization pointed to the risks of Islamophobia, arguing that French and European Muslims should not be subject to yet another unfair criminalization by the mass media and political parties.[38] COREIS, instead, stressed Pope Francis' statement that freedom of expression must be "exercised in accordance with the beliefs and the dignity of peoples, and can in no way become a right to offend and insult."[39] In this respect, the group launched a universal appeal to believers, calling for more dialogue between confessions. More marginal groups, mainly active on Facebook, openly took critical stances to *Charlie Hebdo*, including the slogan *Je ne suis pas Charlie*. These groups justified this choice based on the idea that freedom of expression could not be used to insult others' beliefs and that the offence against the Prophet should be considered a crime against humanity.[40] In sum, the main organizations representing Islam in Italy took considerably different stances on the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks. This can be attributed—at least to a certain extent—to long-lasting divisions within the Italian Muslim community, which have been associated to the unwillingness of the Italian state to regularize Islamic representation systematically (Angelucci, Bombardieri, and Tacchini 2014).

The main type of frames promoted by *Catholic* organizations in Italy, including groups directly linked to the Vatican, argued that freedom of expression could not be unconditional. In line with the Pope's official position, *L'Osservatore Romano*, the semi-official bulletin of the Holy Seat, stated that "dignity" was often not respected by *Charlie Hebdo* and that

38. https://www.ucoii.org/1288/comunicati-stampa/francia-costernazione-e-rabbia/.
39. http://www.coreis.it/comunicati/comunicato.php?id=285.
40. We checked the groups *Si all'Islam in Italia* and *Musulmani d'Italia*.

freedom of expression could not justify the lack of respect for religious beliefs. Similarly, several groups suggested that freedom of expression must be rethought in times of multiculturalism, to respect the diversity of religious and cultural values. Most Catholic groups mobilized strategically to build a united religious front challenging unconditional freedom of expression:

> All participants in the Ecumenical forum of Churches, held in Geneva, have expressed a strong condemnation of violence and terrorism. But they also noted the need to pay particular attention to the risk that, in the name of freedom of speech, sectarian tensions are fueled and stereotypes are supported, spreading the fear of the other more than the desire to know and understand diversity.[41]

In a similar vein, the daily outlet of the Italian Episcopal Conference, *Avvenire*, argued that freedom of expression should have some limits. Unlike what we observed for Jewish organizations, however, columnists from *Avvenire* criticized the theory of a "clash of civilizations," framing terrorism as an "internal" problem of Europe rather than of Islam. Furthermore, groups in this area—such as the conservative *Comunione e Liberazione*—challenged contemporary "postmodern and relativistic" values in Western societies.[42]

While the different confessional groups displayed some degree of specificity, common traits could be identified. Most notably, with regard to *diagnostic* framing, all the groups analyzed here addressed the issue of unconditional freedom of expression. Some considered it a source of interreligious conflict, whereas others saw it as a solution. Catholic and Muslim groups claimed that freedom of expression should not harm the beliefs of people, and therefore argued that the decreasing role of religion in secular European states was problematic. In this respect, there have been some frame alignments with Pope Francis on the need to respect the dignity of religious sensitivities. Some groups within the Jewish community, instead, suggested that freedom of expression should be universalistic, and that the problem rested in the inability of Islam to cope with Western secularism. Furthermore, both Muslim and Jewish actors pointed to increasing religious intolerance in European societies. Still, while Jewish organizations put the blame mostly on Muslim communities of migrant origin, Muslim groups considered discrimination endemic to Western societies.

41. "Forum del Consiglio ecumenico delle Chiese dopo gli attacchi a Parigi: Comunità religiose e libertà d'opinione," *L'osservatore romano* (15 January 2015), 6.
42. https://it.clonline.org/cm-files/2015/04/15/alain-finkielkraut-dopo-la.pdf.

Concerning *prognostic* frames, all groups demanded a revision of the idea of secularism, without making a distinction between the different Church–State systems in Europe. In this respect, most groups suggested that Western societies must find a new meaning for religious practices and values, since exclusion breeds radicalization. Finally, while Jewish groups focused primarily on the problem of anti-Semitism, all groups agreed that education on religious tolerance should become a priority for European governments, to avoid similar tragedies in the future. In this respect, *motivational* frames, finally, related to calls for unity between religions, in which all groups were asked to join in a common condemnation of extremism, fundamentalism, and terrorism, and in calling for increased inter-religious dialogue. This last frame, seen in all the previous countries too, finds the loudest echo in the British religious debate.

UNITED KINGDOM: TOWARD INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE?

The current church-religion system was not challenged by British religious groups, and little polarization in the debate took place. The existing institutional arrangements between a strong state church and a relative accommodation of other religious groups' needs (Soper and Fetzer 2007, 936) allowed the different confessional groups to seek inter-religious dialogue after the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, as well as to express their loyalty to a peaceful coexistence of the different confessional groups. Nevertheless, some differences were identified in religious organizations' internal arenas. Jewish and Christian groups argued for a more universalistic approach to freedom of expression, despite the British tradition of respecting cultural and religious sensitivities. In this respect, we see a relative dissociation from Muslim groups. The latter appeared in the debate as the only religious grouping to insist on the tradition that expects freedom of expression to be respectful of minorities' beliefs.

The relations between the State and religions are, in fact, characterized by the United Kingdom's "closed regime" (Messner 1999), since the Queen of England is the Supreme Governor of the Anglican Church, representing the largest confessional community in the country. A culturally pluralist conception of citizenship (Vink 2017), however, balances the institutional dominance of the Anglican Church. Pluralism is visible in affirmative action policies or religious dress-code exemptions. Despite the predominant role of the Anglican Church, other religions have identified the State

as a resource for their policy claims. For instance, the British model has "encouraged Muslim groups to look to the state for public recognition of their religious rights," and the State has responded positively to these demands (Soper and Fetzer 2007, 936). Jews and Catholics have also largely been accommodated by the State through funding of religious schools (Weller, Feldman, and Purdam 2001). In terms of political opportunities, religion generates, moreover, some resonance in electoral competitions, since many religious communities take a clear position in favor of one over another candidate. In this respect, progressive Muslims often have links to the Labour Party, while the election of London's Muslim mayor Sadiq Khan in 2016 represented an exemplary case of inclusivity and tolerance toward minority religions. This tolerance is also visible in public attitudes toward Muslims. In 2015, these positions were more positive compared to the other countries under investigation (e.g., according to a Pew Research Center survey).[43]

As in other countries, *Jewish* organizations affirmed their right to safety, pointing to European governments that seem unable to protect Jewish citizens from Islamist attacks. As Anthony Glees reported in the *Jewish Chronicle*:

> It makes perfect sense that the Jews of Europe, including those in Britain, should now feel frightened. The governments of Europe are clearly less able than they ought to be to disrupt Islamist attacks on them, whether they are perpetrated by well-trained paramilitary-style groups, like the Kouachi brothers and Coulibaly in Paris, or individual Islamists who stab and maim using kitchen knives or trucks.[44]

Jewish groups called for durable solutions within multiculturalism and inter-religious dialogue. As Rabbi Goldsmith from the Reform Judaism group argued: "We can and must defeat the murderers by continuing to build a society where Jews live with Muslims and Christians and Hindus and secular people learning from each other, valuing our differences, taking care not to hurt each other."[45] Jewish groups in the United Kingdom thus appeared in the debate much more tolerant than their co-confessionals in

43. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/19/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/.

44. http://www.thejc.com/comment-and-debate/analysis/130202/ultimately-we-can-only-uproot-ideology-education.

45. http://www.reformjudaism.org.uk/sermon-by-rabbi-mark-goldsmith-10-january-2015/.

Italy or even in Germany, where some more or less directly accused Muslim organizations of nourishing radicalization and anti-Semitism.

Muslim organizations saw the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks as an opportunity to express opposition to violence against their communities but also to radicalism within. Although all groups firmly condemned the attacks, the issue of universalistic freedom of expression was much more divisive. *Charlie Hebdo* was at times seen as "stupid provocation,"[46] but more established organizations denounced its alleged Islamophobia, differentiating themselves from Muslim groups in the other countries. Muslim organizations affirmed their loyalty to the existing religion-church system but also to their embeddedness in the British citizenry. An important umbrella organization, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), stated:

> As British citizens, we must not allow hate to creep into our hearts due to the horrific incidents of Paris. Muslims, non-Muslims and people of all backgrounds must come together and show unity and solidarity and not let it divide our communities. We must remember the statements of the Prophet (peace be upon him) such as: "Someone who unjustly kills a non-Muslim citizen cannot attain a whiff of Heaven, even though its fragrance is felt from a distance of forty years" (Bukhari), or, "He who hurts a non-Muslim citizen hurts me, and he who hurts me annoys Allah."[47]

Moreover, Muslim organizations, like their co-confessionals in the other countries, were critical of a dominant pattern of the general debate according to which Muslims should explicitly declare that they are on the "right side." This frame was largely mobilized by the populist anti-European party UKIP. In fact, its leader, Nigel Farage, stated one day after the attacks that "gross policies of multiculturalism" were responsible for terrorism.[48] In a response letter to the Secretary of State, the MCB seized the opportunity to address the far right's Islamophobia in the country, adding their attachment to British Muslims' belonging to the nation: "[W]e reject suggestions that Muslims must go out of their way to prove their loyalty to this country of ours."[49]

46. http://www.islamophobiawatch.co.uk/another-stupid-provocation-from-charlie-hebdo/.
47. Ibid.
48. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/08/paris-attack-nigel-farage-gross-policy-multiculturalism.
49. http://www.mcb.org.uk/lettertossclg/.

For the different *Christian* denominational groups in the United Kingdom, the debate led to a discussion of freedom of expression and blasphemy. They all tended to empathize with Muslims in feeling offended by disrespectful cartoons, but they also distanced themselves from violent actions, adopting to a certain extent an open, almost universalistic approach to freedom of expression that could even justify blasphemy.[50] Freedom of expression, offensive as it may be, led British Christian groups to argue against censorship. British Catholics even challenged Pope Francis's statement on the duty to respect religious people's dignity, as became most evident in the *Catholic Herald*'s article: "Is the Pope right to suggest there is a limit to free speech? Or should we feel free to mock religions as we wish?"[51]

Christians emerged in the debate as more tolerant, creating coalitions with the Jewish community.[52] However, like Muslims, they urged an improved representation of religions in social life[53] and stood in favor of "religious literacy" as a remedy to the loss of spirituality in Europe.[54]

Christians presented themselves as promoters of inter-religious dialogue, aligning in this respect with Jewish but also with Muslim groups. Without seeking to polarize their positions or address a critique to the existing national Church–State system, they supported dialogue between the different confessional groups. For instance, evangelicals claimed that "the Christian-Muslim relationship dynamics will develop in a way so as to maximise the Christian contribution. That engagement will involve bridge-building, friendship and support as well as bringing faith perspectives into discussions."[55]

Beyond their specificity, among British groups, religious pluralism was not *diagnosed* as terrorism's source. Muslims, in particular, tried to dissociate themselves from terrorism. But universalistic freedom of expression was at times challenged, with some Muslim groups criticizing it. Jewish and Christian groups did not unconditionally support Charlie either, pointing to the existence of religious sensitivities. But unlike the Muslims,

50. http://www.eauk.org/current-affairs/politics/working-together-to-tackle-extremism.cfm.

51. http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2015/01/15/is-pope-francis-right-to-say-there-is-a-limit-to-freedom-of-speech/.

52. http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2016/01/07/sometimes-there-is-a-moral-duty-to-mock-religion/.

53. http://www.eauk.org/culture/friday-night-theology/fox-news-birmingham-and-getting-past-cartoonishness.cfm.

54. http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2015/02/16/the-media-must-invest-in-journalists-who-understand-religion/.

55. http://www.eauk.org/current-affairs/politics/working-together-to-tackle-extremism.cfm.

they spoke against censorship. Furthermore, criticism of discrimination against one's own group was present in all religions' framings. Muslims in particular talked about Islamophobia, Jews talked about anti-Semitism, while Christians focused on the loss of religious education and the decline of spirituality in the United Kingdom.

As for *prognostic* framing, religious groups discursively allied with each other, as manifested in calls for inter-religious dialogue. Religious groups expressed their views on religious pluralism as a chance for education and cultural change. In a similar vein, Christian and Jewish groups argued in favor of the existing pluralist model of the United Kingdom. Moreover, they advanced the idea of "religious literacy" in the media against ignorance and misunderstandings, and called for legislative change to promote the role of religious groups in the country. The state was solicited in terms of safety and protection against terrorist attacks, mostly for Jews but also for Muslims who called for fighting against Islamophobia. All groups, but most importantly Christian and Jewish ones, pointed to inter-religious dialogue as a main *motivation* for action against blasphemous freedom of expression and peaceful coexistence of confessional groups. Muslim groups were particularly attentive in empathizing with the Jewish community, especially after the kosher market attacks, while Christian and Jewish actors, to a lesser extent, expressed their empathy toward Muslim communities.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: RETHINKING SECULARISM THROUGH CRITICAL JUNCTURES

In this chapter, we have discussed the public discourse developed by religious actors in the aftermath of the January 2015 *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, in their respective countries and public spheres. As is the case with other social movement groups, the attacks provided a major opportunity for religious organizations to participate in the general debate. However, religious actors contributed to a significant discursive production in their own arenas, too, which allowed them to frame their issues in ways that would resonate with the overall tone of the debate (firm condemnation of the attacks, universalist readings, attacks on freedom of expression), or to nuance their framings by distancing themselves from the dominant framings. The different types of confessional groups (Jews, Muslims, and Christians) made sense of the problems and advanced solutions, often through common framings. However, depending upon the national arenas in which

religious groups were called to perform (cross-national variations) and the different types of actors (cross-confessional variations), these framings differed significantly.

The main question we have addressed was how the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks functioned as a critical juncture that allowed religious groups to advance a discursive production of frames and justifications of what they saw as "problematic," and what solutions they proposed within their national arenas. Religious groups in each country referred to the church-religion system, either to challenge, maintain, or reinforce it. In fact, religious groups in France, an open universal system, asked the state to effectively intervene and regulate freedom of religion and protection from the risks faced by religious minorities. Germany's hegemonic system, in terms of cooperation between church and state, was not criticized. Actors instead preferred to refer to it in order to seek more protection from the state, especially on issues of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Muslim groups attempted to expand the existing system, by trying to get further accommodation for their communities within. In contrast, in Italy, which is also regulated by a hegemonic system that privileges the Catholic Church, we observed a discursive alliance between Muslim and Catholic groups concerning protection of blasphemy and limits to freedom of expression. In reality, both groups asked for an effective regulation of freedom of expression so that it does not offend believers' feelings. Through this alliance, the Catholic Church managed to strengthen its position rather than having it challenged. Jewish groups, on the other hand, pointed to the dangers they faced from "Islamist" groups. Finally, the closed system of the United Kingdom was seen by its religious actors as a model of peaceful cohabitation for the different communities who live in the country. Although some Christian and Jewish groups advanced universalist understandings of freedom of expression, the overall tone of the debate was quite interreligious, pointing to a self-regulation of religious life in the public space. Therefore, the existing Church–State system, with its pluralist traditions, was celebrated rather than challenged.

With regard to cross-group variations, we observed that Jewish and Muslim groups stressed their minoritarian character in European public spheres, a frame that allowed them to ask for protection, under this status, from the state. Jewish groups pointed primarily to anti-Semitism and Muslim groups to Islamophobia, both asking for further security measures but also educational and preventive measures. Religious groups' framings and the way they seized the events point to a perception of the attacks as moments in which stigmatization is amplified, both by terrorism and by the increasing secularizing processes in Europe. As for terrorist attacks,

both Jewish and Muslim groups understood their communities as victims. Jewish groups asserted that they had been victims of Islamist fundamentalism and of the state's inactivity in guaranteeing their freedom of religious practice. Muslims, in turn, perceived themselves as targets of increasing Islamophobia, manifested not only in acts, but primarily through dominant discourses. In fact, as many Muslim groups repeatedly pointed out, their communities were called upon to declare they were not terrorists, receiving pressure to conform to a "good Muslim" narrative. With regard to European secularization, confessional groups referred to it as another "threatening" factor, although with many variations depending on their national arenas. Christian groups were prominent in presenting themselves as the main victims of secularization and of loss of spirituality in Western countries. To that extent, framings of loss of social cohesion, decline of spiritual values, and need for humanism were mentioned as causes of the terrorist threat.

Despite calls for inter-religious dialogue, Islam received a variety of neutral or negative framings. (Mostly) Catholic and some Jewish groups explicitly targeted Islam, blurring the boundaries between this religion and terrorism, and aligning with the framing of "clash of civilizations." In a more nuanced respect, other groups talked about Islam's failure to adapt to European values, mostly freedom of expression and protection against anti-Semitism. Islam, however, enjoyed a relatively positive framing when religious groups wanted to create strategic alliances in order to maintain the status quo of their countries' church-religious systems. In the first case, Christian and Jewish groups in the United Kingdom demonstrated relatively welcoming framings toward Muslims in order to emphasize the peaceful co-existence of the official Church–State regime. In the second case, Italian Catholic groups expressed some sympathy toward Muslims' claims on limitations to freedom of expression, as a strategy to maintain unchallenged the recognition of blasphemy. Muslims and Islam therefore became a main object of the debate, but Muslim groups were actors in their arenas as well. Muslim organizations in fact explicitly attempted to distance themselves from dominant framings that linked Islam with terrorism, advancing at times an openly pluralist rhetoric according to which states should respect all religious traditions and sensitivities.

CHAPTER 8

Justifications in the debate on citizenship

Whose common good?

ON JUSTIFICATION: AN INTRODUCTION

Claims and frames are linked to broader references to what is just. Participants in public debates are, at least in part, moved by normative concerns, which they must argue. As Boltanski and Thévenot (2006, 37) note, people "seek to carry out their actions in such a way that these can withstand the test of justification." In this sense, people's motivations for action are "reasonable, coherent, and justifiable according to a principle which is known and acknowledged by all, as opposed to unconscious motivations or hidden or inadmissible interests" (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 43). Human beings are in fact capable of establishing agreements by referring to core values (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 32).

During critical junctures, justification is all the more necessary, given that existing paradigms might be unsuited to addressing the emerging problems. In particular, in our discourse analysis we found references (both positive and negative) to the worlds of worth that Boltanski and Thévenot identified. Referring to the "imperative to justify" based on references to public goods (1991), the two scholars singled out some principles of worthiness as being at the basis of justification arguments, linking them to philosophical foundations that address moral worth. Suggesting that the moral principles to which people refer in their everyday debates are the same as those found in elaborated philosophical theories, they have

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in particular differentiated the following "worlds," each based on specific principles of worthiness:

Inspired worth. Based on St. Augustine's *The City of God*, this set of justifications praises spiritual commitment, as embedded in religious devotion but also in art or nature. Worthiness is based on creativity, emotion, passion, ingenuity.

Domestic worth. Exemplified by the works of the French philosopher Bossuet, this world emphasizes the value of tradition, through inherited status and hierarchy. Worthiness is based on esteem, trust, authority.

The worth of fame. In this world, which resonates with Hobbes' *Leviathan*, worthiness stems from recognition by followers (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991, 223–225). Worthiness is based on renown, recognition, celebrity.

Civic worth. This world, inspired by Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *The Social Contract*, evaluates worth in terms of solidarity and equality; respect for collectives is represented by the will of the people and the collective well-being. Worthiness is based on collective interest, formality, solidarity, equality.

Market worth. Following Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, worth is measured by money, while the common good emerges as a by-product of profit. Worthiness is based on price, money, exchange, purchasing power.

Industrial worth. Illustrated by Saint-Simon's work, worth is related with efficiency, to be achieved through planning, regulation, and scientific expertise. Worthiness is based on efficiency, measurability, functional links, expertise.

In these debates, different orders of worth are addressed through appropriation, stigmatization, or compromise. In everyday disputes as well as political conflicts in the public sphere, people tend to resort to particular moral principles, which can be reconstructed by reference to modern political philosophy. Actors justify their positions by referring to objects, actions, or actors as particularly worthy. Indeed, the broader the reference to different worlds of worth, the most successful a justification tends to be (see Ylä-Anttila and Luhtakallio 2016).

The need for convergence on higher common principles—or confrontation between several such principles—increases in moments of crisis, disequilibrium, or contestation, as the old order breaks down (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 25). In fact, "An initial challenge to a situation comes when disharmonies between the worths of the persons and objects involved are made manifest and translated into forms of deficiency. The scene of contention is then developed around the exposure of a lack of worth, and thus of some injustice or luck of justness in an array. This lack gives rise to discord" (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 134). In these disturbed situations, uncertainty emerges about what has worth: Contentious processes

develop, sometimes ending in new agreements about a "just distribution of the persons and objects to which worth has been ascribed" (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 136). Especially in these moments, appeals to common principles are used in order to assess and reassess the relative worthiness of people and ideas.

In general, these different worlds serve to justify claims and frames in public debates by offering common references to conceptions of common good (Ylä-Anttila and Luhtakallio 2016). Relatively unaddressed is an important aspect of justification: Who is considered as part of the common good? In fact, justifications vary in the definition of who is judged to be part of the community and who is not. The connotations of insiders and outsiders are particularly relevant in debates that critically address the issue of citizenship. As we mentioned in the introductory chapter, citizenship is, at the same time, a source of inclusion and exclusion. Within a symbolic contestation around the meaning of citizenship, considering acts of citizenship—that is, acts to assess one's own right as citizen—can push for a broader understanding of who is in (Isin and Turner 2003).

In sum, justifications are particularly relevant during critical junctures in order to define insiders and outsiders. The "worlds of worthiness," analyzed in this chapter, provide justifications for the frames we have presented in the previous three chapters, reflecting the organizations' interests and ideas.

As we will see in what follows, focusing especially on variations between left-wing, right-wing, and religious actors, public debates on the Charlie Hebdo attacks in different public spheres tended to rely upon specific criteria of worthiness, which differed for the different types of actors we covered, although with some combinations between different worlds. On the left, the common good is inclusive, emphasizing humanity as a community of equals ~~within a civic world of worthiness~~; while on the right, the conception is exclusive, with a stress on the Western tradition within a domestic world of worth. Religious organizations are split between universalistic appeal and support for the elected few. In particular, references to civic worth in terms of solidarity and equality predominate on the left; the domestic worth of tradition dominates justifications on the right-wing spectrum; while among religious groups we find references to the inspirational worth of faith, although bridged in some cases with universal and in some cases with exclusive definitions of whom the common good belongs to.

THE LEFT: A CIVIC WORLD OF WORTH

In general, the left has struggled to address the Charlie Hebdo attacks, given the tension between its deeply rooted inclusive position toward migrants and minorities and the defense of freedom—perceived as a collective rather than an individual right. This tension is visible in utterances, but also in silences. Nevertheless, shared justifications are found in the world of civic worth, with a strong continuity with its own tradition of the defense of equality (especially against social inequality). The challenge is represented by the growing need to deal with diversity, as well as to allow for some connection with the inspired worth embedded in claims of freedom of religion and protection of minority rights. The expression of the tensions on issues such as the limits to individual freedom and the position toward religion in general—and Islam in particular—resonate with specific domestic cultural roots. Solidarity is more often stressed in countries where the "Old Left" remains strong, while the libertarian dimensions tend to be emphasized where it has weakened. In addition, the attempt to understand Islam is stronger—along with the resulting tensions—where previous transformative events had brought ~~this issue~~ to the forefront.

The common good is attributed to humanity at large. The French left calls for humanist justifications: "It is time for some [teachers] to decenter some of their own views and listen, really, without paternalism, to others' point of view. Is not this the humanist heritage of Montaigne?"[1] ~~So, for instance,~~ the Interventionistische Linke (IL) confirmed its defense of the value of the French Revolution, as well as the importance of May 1968 and "everything that had become possible in Europe and in the world after 1789 and 1968."[2] In this sense, there is a claim—resonant with the deeply rooted civic values on the left—against intolerance in general, and against Islamophobia in particular. A frequently cited position is, "We stand against this attack, and against those who seek to use this terrible tragedy as an opportunity to stoke Islamophobia. The criminal actions of extremists of any sort must never be used as political capital to demonise entire communities."[3]

One justification within the civic world of worth stresses equality and solidarity in general. This implies a call for humanity against discrimination

1. "Les mots sont importants," February 3, 2015, https://paris-luttes.info/a-bonne-ecole-eleves-barbares-2582?lang=fr.
2. "Keine Unterwerfung: eine Antwort auf Paris liegt in Athen," January 18, 2015, http://www.interventionistische-linke.org/beitrag/keine-unterwerfung-eine-antwort-auf-paris-liegt-athen.
3. http://leftunity.org/response-to-charlie-http://leftunity.org/response-to-charlie-hebdo-shootings/hebdo-shootings/.

based on the affirmation of one's own superiority, as called for in the domestic world of worth. Consistent with the left-wing repertoire of moral justification is, therefore, the denunciation of racism, which is identified among the root causes of the attack, as well as the reactions to it. Thus, Italian groups stress that racism produces terrorism, as "[r]acism and terrorism are two sides of the same coin. We must react together against hatred and violence, reviving our culture of peace, human rights, democracy. We must keep high our constitutional and anti-fascist values. The massacre in Paris [. . .] should not be exploited by the xenophobic and racist right, and by those who want to fuel conflicts, fears and hatred."[4] In general, the Islamist attacks are stigmatized along with attacks on Muslim targets, condemning "any attempt to recover the attacks for Islamophobic, racist, anti-Semitic, nationalist and securitarian purposes."[5] Relationally, the position of the left also revolves around the deeply rooted moral register of the struggles against the right-wingers' racism and xenophobia. The radical right is thus denied credibility in a critique of traditionalism: "These bigots aren't defending 'civilisation' or 'free speech'—they are debasing these terms and weaving them into their own 'war.'"[6] In Germany, the traditional left-wing support of a universalistic civic justification is evident in the linking of the Charlie Hebdo attacks and the rise of the right-wing racist Pegida movement, synthetized in the widespread slogan "Wir sind Charlie—nicht Pegida."

In line with rooted positions on the left, civic worthiness is embedded in a critique of market worth. Thus, neoliberalism and the ensuing marginalization at the social, economic, and political levels are seen as the root of the attacks against Charlie Hebdo. In Germany, Attac stigmatizes economic inequalities, attributing the roots of violence to a "destructive neoliberal policy of exclusion, exploitation and annihilation of fundamental livelihoods and systems of social security worldwide."[7] Similarly, according to ~~an Italian group~~:

> We have to take care of the political amnesia that affects French governments since the 1990s, as they neglect the social and economic symptoms that regularly explode in the peripheries of metropolitan areas but also in neighbourhoods of

4. http://www.rifondazione.it/primapagina/?p=16166.
5. http://www.femmesenlutte93.com/article-rassemblement-dimanche-18-janvier-contre-le-racisme-et-l-islamophobie-125385607.html.
6. http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news/2113-is-state-islamophobia-coming-to-a-classroom-near-you.
7. http://www.attac.de/neuigkeiten/detailansicht/news/warum-nicht-alle-charlie-sind/?no_cache=1.

> an increasing number of French cities. We must remind [French governments] of their postcolonial syndrome and the many laws they introduced to defend the *laïcité républicaine*. And finally, we must observe how they replaced occupation armies with the exercise of social control and institutionalized punishment over the poor and the impoverished.[8]

And for the British Libcom, capitalism (and related imperialism) fuels fundamentalism by creating "a monster, Islamism, which is adjusted to its imperialist needs and demands that are in turn connected to how and where to access, control and exploit oil/gas reserves and raw/cheap materials in this region."[9]

The positions taken on the Charlie Hebdo attacks are thus embedded in the left-wing discourse of social justice. In a positive vision of freedom, social rights are considered as its indispensable precondition. The critique of the republican model targets in particular its neglect of the poor and the attempts to discipline them through a particular understanding of *laïcité* as assimilation. Beyond the specificity of the French republican model, the West's perceived failure in addressing social integration is considered as a precondition of a cultural integration based on universal values. Therefore, an Italian group states that:

> Europe is not collapsing because of the so-called "Decline of the West," but because it is not capable of advancing a system of economic justice that combines social and cultural integration. [. . .] To challenge these radical contradictions, we need a genetic mutation of the field of the left: a tremendous cultural change aimed at building concrete paths of emancipation, at going beyond resignation to neoliberalism, and beyond any nihilism (be that the war of civilizations and / or fascism).[10]

Tensions emerge, however, in the very understanding of freedom, between an individual conception of freedom as a (negative) right and a collective (positive) understanding of it. Some positions are rooted in the critique of inspirational worth, as inherently non-universalistic. The latter allows for a debate about the global values to be preserved through freedom, while the former is called for when claiming the right to satire of religious issues. Thus, an Italian Atheist network states that:

8. http://www.globalproject.info/it/mondi/je-ne-suis-pas-charlie/18508.
9. https://libcom.org/library/proletarian-note-charlie-hebdo.
10. http://www.ilcorsaro.info/in-crisi-3/2015-tre-spettri-si-aggirano-per-l-europa.html, January 9, 2015.

> the idea that it is wrong to do satire of religion leads to the legitimation of those who kill on the grounds that they have been offended. The idea that it is a taboo to discuss or criticize the religious authorities is one of the reasons why sexual abuse in the Catholic Church lasted for so long. The idea that "insulting" religion is a crime justifies the imprisonment of humanists like Asif Mohiuddin in Bangladesh and Raif Badawi in Saudi Arabia, and the persecution of atheists and religious minorities in Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, etc.[11]

Freedom is praised as an individual right linked to modern thinking against bigotry. Thus, in the United Kingdom, LGBT organizations often take positions against religious bigotry (in particular, homophobic beliefs within Islam).

The women's movement, in particular, reflects on the general location of freedom within a civic world of worth. The gay/LGBT magazine *PrideOnline* stresses the limits on (absolute) freedom: "Of course these bloggers and associations [who published anti-gay cartoons] now praise the total freedom of satire after the events in Charlie Hebdo [. . .]. But I still maintain that stupid, violent, vulgar and free provocations should always be avoided."[12] Indeed, the argument is that:

> Freedom of expression is precious and must be defended with all the courage and all laws that we have. For the same reason, it should be used to express ourselves free of all censorships but with the necessary wisdom. If one offends the deep feelings of women and men to sell more copies of a book or a movie, rather than to achieve a genuine transformation of culture, it is not wisdom. Even worse, it is to use freedom of expression to incite hatred and fear between different cultures.[13]

This position is located within a broader conception of tolerance, which includes the need to punish hate crimes. With a critique of market worth, however, social integration through social justice is considered as indispensable for freedom, especially for women. Thus, an Italian left-wing platform stresses that: "The long term solution to eradicate terrorism cannot be a tougher justice for all. It must be sought, instead, in more tolerance, more respect, and greater reciprocal understanding. The terrorists will have achieved their objectives if the backlash to their infamous actions is social

11. https://www.nextquotidiano.it/gli-atei-per-labolizione-legge-contro-blasfemia.
12. http://www.prideonline.it/2015/02/13/le-vignette-sataniche/.
13. http://www.libreriadelledonne.it/charlie-hebdo-non-voleva-fomentare-lodio-ma-stemperarlo-risposta-a-luisa-muraro/.

polarization and cultural crusades."[14] Similarly, Emergency calls for "more democracy, more openness, and more humanity."[15]

The defense of humanity against the market is also linked to a reversal of a Hobbesian definition of the security of the community. The position against the war on terror, in which Western powers are seen as playing the same game as Islamic terrorists, also falls along the traditional lines of justification on the left: opposition to military intervention in the name of civic worthiness. Again in line with the traditional justifications of the left, war is considered economically motivated, with a stigmatization of principles of economic "worthiness." So, the (UK-based) Liberty Human Rights opposes civicness to military intervention abroad as well as security measures within, explicitly presenting it as resonant with past positions: "So much for the West's love of free speech when the barbarians are Saudi Arabia . . . Saudi oil and the Saudi market for weapons easily trump their commitment to 'our' values, and criticisms have been generally polite, muted or non-existent."[16]

At home, selective implementation of security to target mainly those seen as "the others" held as responsible for the radicalization. The policies of internal security adopted after the attacks on 9/11 and 7/7 receive particular criticism. As a UK human rights organization notes, "The legal and political exceptionalism that Governments have adopted over the last 13 years has not extinguished the threat posed by terrorism. Instead it has often undermined the unity and solidarity that can help to combat that threat and the very freedoms that democratic politicians vow to defend."[17] Blaming Muslims for producing insecurity is thus perceived as a government-led scapegoating strategy that will spiral into more and more violence as "government and media stoke the fires of Islamophobia."[18] German organizations address the same issues, as radicalization in Muslim communities is considered as a reaction to the aftermath of 9/11, when people started to see every Muslim as a potential terrorist.

Laws against radicalization are criticized as politically manipulated against the opposition, with a "counter extremism" strategy attacking

14. http://www.valigiablu.it/charlie-hebdo-perche-la-vera-risposta-e-piu-tolleranza-piu-rispetto/.

15. http://www.emergency.it/comunicati-stampa/solidarieta-a-charlie-hebdo.html.

16. http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news/1876-so-much-for-the-west-s-love-of-free-speech-when-the-barbarians-are-saudi-arabia.

17. https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/news/blog/libert%C3%A9-%C3%A9galit%C3%A9-fraternit%C3%A9.

18. http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news/1923-blame-the-muslims-how-government-and-media-stoke-the-fires-of-islamophobia.

"the very democratic values it claims to defend." In the United Kingdom, while "fighting terrorism is something no humane person could disagree with," "the vague definition of 'extremism' is deeply worrying. The smear of 'extremist links' in recent years have been used not against terrorist supporters, but against everyone from Labour and Lib Dem MPs to Tory ministers to a spectrum of faith, charitable, welfare and campaigning organisations."[19] Securitization at home is considered counterproductive as well as morally hazardous, attacking the principles of freedom and tolerance. Counter-terrorism is criticized in the name of the very freedom of expression that it is supposed to defend. The French left blames securitization for the discrimination of the stop-and-search policing against people of "Muslim appearance."[20]

Debates have emerged around the limits to freedom of expression in the name of tolerance and respect for others. Some groups agree with Amnesty International's position that "the right to freedom of expression includes all ideas and beliefs, also those that may be considered offensive."[21] Others consider limits to freedom of expression as appropriate in order to protect individuals or groups from offenses. In this direction, according to some comments on the online version of the German left-wing daily *Tageszeitung*, the "publication of Mohammed caricatures is stupid, it is dangerous for journalists and offensive and a mode to instrumentalise religion."[22] This is reflected in the dispute over the slogan "Je Suis Charlie," which is debated with reference to rooted left-wing conceptions of civic worthiness. According to the German *Indymedia*, Charlie Hebdo is considered by some as a "satirical newspaper embedded within the left to left-liberal spectrum that deserves our solidarity (. . .) [W]e Leftists should be that, anti-clerical without fear and anti-racist and full of mockery for every kind of authority."[23] However, others criticize "Charlie Hebdo" for having fueled Islamophobia, triggering a civilization war and securitization policies.[24]

19. http://www.counterfire.org/articles/opinion/17721-democracy-threatened-by-counter-extremism.

20. http://stoplecontroleaufacies.fr/slcaf/2015/02/13/des-associations-denoncent-la-recrudescence-des-controles-au-facies/.

21. "Brutaler Anschlag auf die Meinungsfreiheit," January 7, 2015, http://www.amnesty.de/2015/1/7/brutaler-anschlag-auf-die-meinungsfreiheit?destination=suche%3Fwords%3DCharlie%2BHebdo%26search_x%3D0%26search_y%3D0%26search%3DSuchen%26form_id%3Dai_search_form_block.

22. http://www.taz.de/!5024512/.

23. "Zusammenfassung: Heuchlereien rund um Charlie," January 13, 2015, https://linksunten.indymedia.org/de/node/131712.

24. "'Je suis Charlie' und die Heuchelei dahinter," January 12, 2015, https://linksunten.indymedia.org/de/node/131595.

Linked to positions on religion, specific tensions also emerge on the left on the conception of Islam. Within a critique of the inspirational world, there is widespread stigmatization of "a minority of Muslims"—as "an openly misanthropic attitude of a small but unfortunately effective Muslim minority." In some cases, this is connected to a critique of the Islam mainstream's hesitancy to "distance [themselves] from the parts of the Quran and Islamic tradition, which extremists base their murder on."[25] This is a vision present particularly among feminist groups—for example the German Frauenrat, which calls for freedom against "deadly, religion-concealed, racist and sexist superiority madness, fed by hatred, disastrous masculinity perceptions and misanthropy."[26]

Yet others, with a reversal of the market worth—for example, on the French radical left—reflect on Islam as a cultural resource for those who feel discriminated against. This is expressed by statements such as:

> Islam is part of the culture of many families that enables a number of our people to organize their lives on dignity and solidarity values. It is a canvas of collective and intimate backgrounds upon which the real and violent discrimination is added, result of western racism. In this grinding machine where class, race, gender and territory are mixed, questions and answers about Islam as a problem or a solution obscures imperialism, neo-colonialism, class conflict, racial domination that everywhere in the world sow death and misery.[27]

The imposition of a "racist *laïcité*" is, therefore, stigmatized.[28]

Similar divisions emerge on the alignment with mainstream institutions on the defense of "national cohesion," which can be read in the refusal of the Hobbesian worth of fame. In France, some human rights associations such as SOS-racisme join the call, defining the target of the attacks as "the republican order, enemy of the fascist terrorists who aspire to a political Islam."[29] More often, however, the very notion of "national unity" is considered as alien to the left-wing morality—an argument supported

25. Petra Uphoff, "Karikaturenstreit, Blasphemie, und die Beleidigung des Islams," January 2015, http://www.igfm.de/themen/blasphemie-und-beleidigung-des-islam/karikaturenstreit/.

26. Deutscher Frauenrat, November 17, 2015, http://www.frauenrat.de/deutsch/infopool/nachrichten/informationdetail/article/deutscher-frauenrat-nous-sommes-unies.html.

27. https://quartierslibres.wordpress.com/2015/01/13/tout-probleme-a-sa-solution-lapres-charlie-dans-les-quartiers/#more-8171.

28. https://luttennord.wordpress.com/2015/01/page/2/.

29. http://sos-racisme.org/les-je-ne-suis-pas-charlie-savent-ils-qui-ils-sont/.

by reference to participation in the January 11 march by "dictators, war criminals and representatives of imperialist states."[30] According to the French PIR, "national unity serves the consolidation of the white consensus, alleviating our struggles and opening a new chapter in the oppression suffered by the third people in France and the Third World."[31] The result is a call for a "decolonial" political alternative against "national unity," with a "decolonial" majority—against the myth of the "citizen" and the imposed identitarian assignations. Through a rupture with the racist, imperialist, and capitalist system, this project would bring emancipation to all.[32] A mobilization from below must be promoted through networks of struggles and resistance against exploitation and exclusion—as, for example, in the vision of *Tavola Per la Pace*, which asserts that integration cannot be promoted top-down, and that a hard version of *laïcité* risks creating a reverse effect.

In sum, justifications among left-wing groups are put forward in the name of humanity at large, within an inclusive conception of citizenship. Consistent with a moral discourse of inclusiveness, dialogue needs to be oriented to stop "attacks against freedom of expression and freedom of the press," but also to protect the Muslim populations against stigmatization, marginalization, and Islamophobia. As noted, reference to the civic worth was bridged, in different combinations, with refutation of other principles of worth, primarily the market and domestic worth, but also the inspirational one.

THE FAR RIGHT: THE WORTHINESS OF TRADITION

With regard to the justifications on the far right, the Charlie Hebdo attacks certainly functioned as a transformative event. As observed earlier, while the attacks did not invert existing trends, they gave more relevance to a justification based on the defense of freedom, even if within the traditional domestic world of worthiness. For their very symbolism, the attacks increased the resonance in public opinion of some main issues of which the radical right has long claimed ownership, such as the defense of Western

30. http://www.femmesenlutte93.com/article-rassemblement-dimanche-18-janvier-contre-le-racisme-et-l-islamophobie-125385607.html.

31. http://indigenes-republique.fr/charlie-hebdo-la-lutte-decoloniale-plus-que-jamais-a-lordre-du-jour/.

32. Ibid.

civilization against external invasion. However, they also raised some cognitive tensions, as the target of the attack (with which to solidarize) was a (perceived) left-wing journal with a reputation for mocking those traditional values. While identification with the victims presents a symbolic challenge, given the alignment of Charlie Hebdo on the left, the alleged characteristics of the perpetrators—broadly considered as Islamic terrorists—allow for a frame extension with issues that are topical for the far right, such as anti-migration politics, racism, and xenophobia. Within an exclusive vision, and with internal tensions, the far right justifies an increasing focus against Islam in the name of the defense of the West, including liberal values. This emerges with different emphasis according to national citizenship regimes and the characteristics of the far right.

In the far right's justification, a crusade is deemed necessary to defend freedom, as a Western value traditionally belonging to an exclusive group identified with the nation (or, more rarely, Europe), Christianity, or even "the white man." An initial justification for exclusive conceptions of the self develops around the use of the traditional worth to exclude the "diverse," represented not only by radicals but also by typical Muslims, as well as by migrants and ethnic minorities in general. First and foremost, Islam is presented as a religion that is per se different from the others and, what is more, particularly dangerous. In Italy, the *Lega Nord* concurs with the *Corrispondenza Romana* that "Islam is not a religion like the others, because Allah asked all Muslims to fight a war of conquest."[33] The "Prophet" is said to preach violence, since he conquered the city of Mecca as well as launching attacks on Rome and Constantinople—"this is why dozens of Popes have called the Crusade, and dozens of saints have preached and justified it"—so much so that "the easiest thing in the world is to convince a militant Islamist to kill Christians." As titled in an online article by a British right-winger, "Rage is to Islam what love is to Christianity."[34]

The justification of exclusion in the name of the worth of tradition is in tension with a definition of freedom as a typically Western value, which sits uneasily with the respect for authority that is usually put at the basis of domestic worth. The very lack of freedom in Muslim countries is imputed to religion as, according to British right-wingers,

33. https://www.corrispondenzaromana.it/notizie-dalla-rete/strage-di-parigi-la-vera-debolezza-delloccidente/, January 10, 2015; and http://www.liberoquotidiano.it/news/politica/11741106/Lega-Nord--Matteo-Salvini-.html, May 10, 2015.

34. https://libertygb.org.uk/news/rage-islam-love-christianity.

> [i]t is no coincidence that these rights of the individual are lacking in Muslim countries. You are willing to turn Britain into a secret surveillance state, comparable to the former East Germany, rather than address the root cause of the growing insecurity—the immigration of persons not of British ancestry. You make no effort to enforce the law of the land by rounding up and deporting the estimated three million illegal immigrants in the country. You do nothing to strengthen our border controls to make them fit for purpose. You're a spineless dhimmi who has yet to understand that "diversity" and social cohesion are mutually exclusive.[35]

The assumed proximity of moderate Islamists to terrorism as linked to the very essence of a religion is presented at different levels as justification for forced repatriation of migrants. For the French *Riposte Laique*, for instance, moderate Islamists do not exist—rather, "the Muslim 'moderate' mass, this pool without discourse or consciousness, where it is likely that any of its inhabitants contains a percentage of complicity or even desire for (terrorist) action."[36] The stigmatization tends moreover to shift from religion to ethnicity, as Arabs and Turks are considered unable to nurture (decent) Western values: "Clearly, irrespective of the role played by Islam in the government of their countries, people of Hamatic, Arabic and Turkic ethnicity have an innate predisposition toward authoritarian rule that is intolerant of dissent."[37]

In the exclusive definition of the community as made up only of those who share the same ancestors, mass migration is generally considered as a precondition leading to terrorism but also to the destruction of Western civilization, based on the assumption that "[t]he immigration of the last sixty years has changed our society, but for the worse in every way."[38] The definition of "exogenous people" targets all those who come from outside. As mentioned, according to the Italian NR, "the real problem we face today is not the faith of a minority of manipulated fanatics, but the ongoing replacement of European populations with inflows of exogenous people, with the sponsorship of the UN and all global players."[39] British right-wing groups consider migration to be "the sea in which the jihadist terrorists

35. http://www.patria-uk.org/camerons-legacy-jihad-on-our-streets/.

36. http://ripostelaique.com/charlie-hebdo-gouvernement-et-caste-mediatiques-coupables.html.

37. http://www.westernspring.co.uk/charlie-hebdo-and-islam-some-further-considerations/

38. http://www.patria-uk.org/camerons-legacy-jihad-on-our-streets/

39. http://noreporter.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22729:la-primavera-dellaraba-fenice&catid=14:note&Itemid=18, March 3, 2015

swim."[40] In particular, against the "bogus refugees that arrived in recent months," the defense of Western traditions justifies the expulsion even of migrants whose only fault is their provenance from Islamic countries. The Italian FN supports this position, calling for "the humanitarian and respectful repatriation of citizens who come from Islamic countries even if they have respected the law and lived honestly in Europe." [41]

The need for authority, stressed in the domestic world, is thus highlighted. The Paris attacks are in this sense seen as a turning point: the sign that "an era is over," that "given the pressure of the terrorist threat [. . .] and the ongoing economic crisis, we cannot risk any further conversions to Jihad and social tensions. Hence, we must create the conditions for the return of these immigrants to their land".[42] Similarly, British right-wingers claim repatriation as justified by the increasingly strong need for security as protection of one's own community, given a sort of natural propensity of all Muslims to delinquency. As stated on a British right-wing website, the entire Muslim community represents the Other, and must be eliminated:

> While only a minority of Muslims are actively involved in acts of terrorism against the West or in the fighting in Syria, opinion polls have shown significant passive support for organisations such as Islamic State and Al Qaeda amongst Muslim communities and these attacks underline the dire need for Western governments to quarantine Islamic populations in Europe and to begin a programme of repatriation to their countries of origin, before all of Europe becomes embroiled in the chaos and violence that inevitably seems to follow in the path of Islamic immigration.[43]

Justification is therefore put forward in the name of the security of a repressed national majority, against the immigration that puts the traditional order at risk. Thus, the far right in Germany justifies its actions as protecting a German people discriminated against and weakened. Migration policies as well as an assumed multiculturalism are accused of "diluting the German nation." Here again, however, the call for tradition is bridged with a defense of Western civilization, which includes references to civic values:

40. http://www.patria-uk.org/camerons-legacy-jihad-on-our-streets/
41. http://www.atuttadestra.net/index.php/archives/292650, November 16, 2015
42. (FN) http://noreporter.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22729:la-primavera-dellaraba-fenice&catid=14:note&Itemid=18, March 18, 2015.
43. http://www.westernspring.co.uk/125-parisians-terminally-enriched/.

> Allowing the immigration of culturally unassimilable foreigners, such as Muslims and other ethnic aliens, to continue is, as Enoch Powell said, to heap up our country's funeral pyre. . . . You use the dangers which Lib-Lab-Con policies have created, such as jihadist terrorism, as a pretext to undermine the rights and liberties our English forefathers won over centuries. Rights such as free speech, trial by jury and freedom from arbitrary detention without charge or trial.[44]

In fact, as in the United Kingdom, reference is made to an "ancestral property of the white European race," while "sub-ethnic wasters have no place here regardless of their religion."[45]

A return to tradition is therefore promoted, as European peoples are called upon to engage in "a vast cultural revolt against the tenets of political correctness," and against anti-white racism. The tradition is also counterposed to the innovations introduced by the modernizers, defined as cosmopolitans, liberals, and *bobos* (*bourgeois bohemiennes*). In a rebuttal of economic worthiness, which some have used to justify migration as useful to economic growth, "the attack on Charlie Hebdo marks the beginning of the strategy of the European Twin Towers. Mass migration and terror have become the symbols of the power of cosmopolitan oligarchy." [46] In France in particular, the bobos, as middle-class and cosmopolitans (even left-wing), are perceived as the main promoters of the perverse attack against the nationals. They are accused of having developed permissive immigration policies to destroy the nation through multiculturalism that risked the safety of the community, valued within the traditional world of worth.

> It is also the height of folly to expect a civilised and law abiding society to result from the current obsession by liberal Western leaders with the imposition of multiculturalism upon every White country throughout the world. It is as the Charlie Hebdo massacre and the subsequent Islamic terrorist incidents illustrate so well, a recipe for disaster, and we must all strive to separate ourselves from the dysfunctional multicultural towns and city areas that have already been created. We must build racially intentional communities where we can live safely and confidently as White people and campaign at every opportunity to

44. http://www.patria-uk.org/camerons-legacy-jihad-on-our-streets/.
45. http://national-action.info/2016/02/20/war-plans-2016/.
46. http://noreporter.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=23820:il-sont-charlie&catid=8:storiaasorte&Itemid=19, January 6, 2016.

reverse the non-White immigration of recent decades that has so blighted the nations of the West.[47]

The normal people, linked to traditional values, are thus opposed to the cosmopolitanism of the elites. A hypocritical humanitarianism and multiculturalism is stigmatized, for example by the Veneto Fronte Skinhead, which accuses associations such as the Catholic Caritas of "generat[ing] speculation and favour[ing] interest, proposing a dangerous model of integration that aims solely at reducing Italy into a mush undifferentiated peoples eradicated from their roots and their tradition, in the name and on behalf of the dominant multiculturalist paradigm."[48]

Notwithstanding some calls in defense of Western values, the appeal to tradition is also juxtaposed with modernity, stressing the most conservative vision of the domestic world by contrasting traditions to both civic values and market values. According to the Italian *Corrispondenza Romana*, "one cannot fight Islam in the name of the Enlightenment or relativism."[49] In particular, the Enlightenment is accused of having weakened the West, as "the West lost and will always lose the clash of civilizations [because] if one puts no limits to freedom and abolishes all identities (such as that of family and gender), European culture will become nothing but an empty shell."[50] Particularly in Italy, with strong appeals to the "natural" family within the radical right, a connection is established between gender theory and the West's lack of capacity to defend its own values—to the point of assimilating #JeSuisCharlie and ISIS, since "while the one murders families, the other kills The Family."[51]

Appeals for the security of the narrow community are connected with the refusal of cosmopolitanism, accused of weakening the West by enforcing legislation against "hate crimes" and Islamophobia, defined as "a country-wide conspiracy" ("if a dozen mosques were razed to the ground and hundreds of goat-fanciers beaten to within an inch of their lives—maybe there would be cause for complaint—but they were not").[52] This

47. http://www.westernspring.co.uk/charlie-hebdo-and-islam-some-further-considerations/.
48. http://www.camera.it/leg17/410?idSeduta=533&tipo=atti_indirizzo_controllo 01/12/2015.
49. http://www.corrispondenzaromana.it/notizie-dalla-rete/strage-di-parigi-la-vera-debolezza-delloccidente/ 10/01/2015.
50. https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=929638360380022&id=176831138994085&substory_index=0.
51. https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=960805920596599&id=176831138994085&substory_index=0 17/03/2015.
52. https://www.stormfront.org/forum/t1132296-2/.

"insecuritization" of the majority, through the attacks against community values, is said to happen as the freedom of the majority is reduced through protection of a minority. In the same direction, concern for hate crimes against Muslims is contrasted with the lack of defense of Christianity—for instance, in a post by the British Democratic Party:

> Protest, crime, huge moral indignation from the usual suspects, follows anything that is even remotely perceived as an attack on Islam or the strictures which Islam expects us to adhere to in the name of respecting and tolerating their faith. Christianity is fair game, say or do what you like, there will be few objections and nobody listens to those who object anyway. It's a very two tier system where one group taking offence counts for far more than another group.[53]

The tradition is therefore seen as attacked: the weakness of the West is singled out in its "multiracial utopia," which pushes to "undermine our traditional freedoms, long fought for by our ancestors, in order to appease Islam and make Europe ever more sharia compliant."[54] Freedom is, then, presented as possible only within homogeneous groups, given that the very presence of the other limits freedom. According to UK Patriots: "Our freedom of speech is already diminished with the Muslims we have in the Western world today. And their numbers keep growing fast. As long as we have a significant number of Muslims here, we may never be able to regain our freedom of speech. That is a sad fact, but it is nevertheless a fact. They may win, by sheer brutality and willingness to kill."[55]

The traditional world of worth is also referred to in the call to action as a continuation of a historical struggle between the West and the other, with frequent reference to the crusades: "We won in Lepanto, we will succeed once more: Islam out of Italy!";[56] "Neither Islam nor Charlie: Christian Europe wake up!"[57] Italian right-wingers call for "protecting its homeland" and "the Sacred European soil," being "constantly on the side of the Italian

53. http://britishdemocraticparty.org/bible-burnings-in-cornwall/.

54. https://libertygb.org.uk/news/free-speech-charlie-hebdos-left-wing-journalists-tried-ban-front-national.

55. http://www.libertygb.org.uk/news/west-after-charlie-hebdo-massacre. See also British National Party's "You reap what you sow—Islam and the growing terror threat," http://www.bnp.org.uk/news/national/you-reap-what-you-sow-islam-and-growing-terror-threat.

56. http://www.atuttadestra.net/index.php/archives/287439 14/01/2015.

57. Forza Nuova, http://www.atuttadestra.net/index.php/archives/273112 13/01/2015.

people." The reference to the crusade allows justification of the most violent reactions; as an Italian right-winger stated, "I am willing to die to assert that Islam is not a religion of peace, but one of war, of hate toward the individual and freedom." Similarly, for the British right-wingers a crusade is, as in the distant past, justified as legitimate defense against the "jihad. We are fighting it abroad, and it is high time we started fighting it at home."[58]

In sum, a most exclusive conception of citizenship is advocated, even including very violent references. A crusade is justified by the danger to this community represented by an "other," quickly broadened to include not only the terrorists or the jihadists, but all Muslims, or even all migrants and non-whites or non-Christians. The threat to the domestic world of worth is also identified in the traitors of the white race, with the spreading of non-Western values that is brought about by permissive policies toward migration and repression (via claims of Islamophobia) of the real defenders of Western civilization.

JUSTIFICATIONS IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS: THE INSPIRATIONAL WORLD OF WORTH

Religious justifications could be expected to refer to the inspirational world, with connections to an elected community of blessed people. However, we might also expect such references to be bridged, in different balances, to the civic and domestic worlds of worth, as these appear more resonant. Looking at contextual dimensions, a main assumption for the cross-national comparative analysis is that the evolution of the relations between church and state will affect the structure and content of religious groups' justifications. We might expect religious organizations to adapt, to a certain extent, to the dominant political opportunities, framing issues in ways that resonate with the dominant institutional culture. Indeed, the debate was influenced by the discursive opportunities: In countries characterized by (more) laic separation of the church and the state, the general reference to the inspirational world of worth was more often linked to the universalist worthiness of the civic worth; while the domestic world of worth—with appeals to tradition—was more often present in countries with more intertwining between church and state. For all religions, however, we notice internal

58. https://www.facebook.com/amwaters0/. See also Liberty's "A typical weekend in Dhimmi Britain," http://www.libertygb.org.uk/news/why-eric-pickles-mp-distrusts-muslim-council-britain.

cleavages referring to communitarian versus cosmopolitan views, freedom entering in tension with offenses against religion (blasphemy) and liberty with claims about security. Ecumenical arguments are also contrasted by claims about the superiority of one's own religion. The common good is therefore presented as either the universal human being or the specific community of religious brothers/sisters.

Embedded within the value of freedom, *laïcité* and secularism are first of all discussed in these specific ~~(sub)~~public spheres. Generally, in the countries in which the state developed as more autonomous from the church (primarily France, but also Germany), freedom is defended as a main civic value that is granted more fundamental importance than the right not to be offended. Thus, for instance, the abolition of blasphemy is called for in France and Germany. In France—where in 2004 the center-right government passed a law against conspicuous religious symbols, imposing religious neutrality on the users of public services as well—none of the religious groups criticized *laïcité*, even though some asked for a return to a more pragmatic approach. While the FN embraced *laïcité*, presenting itself as the defender of republican values, even representatives of the German Kirchenrechtliches Institut of the EKD called for the abolition of the "blasphemy paragraph," section 166 of the German penal code.[59]

In Italy, where *laïcité* does not imply equality—as Catholicism is considered a cultural inheritance—the debate is instead dominated by the Catholic Church, following Pope Francis's call to limit freedom in the name of respect for religious beliefs. With less prominence, similar calls are also present in the debates in the United Kingdom. According to British Christian groups,

> If people of different faiths are to coexist peacefully and engage in the enlightened dialogue of conciliation, we must indeed be mindful of individual sensitivities and cultural differences. But respect for faith cannot be enforced where there is no belief. To insist that the unbeliever may not depict Mohammed, and to do so with a degree of inviolability verging on aggression, is to transgress a foundational principle of liberty. For if the unbeliever may not mock Mohammed, then the Muslim ought not to be free to refute the divinity of Christ. If criticising Islam is off-limits and Mohammed is to be immune from

59. Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) "Beschimpfung von Bekenntnissen, Religionsgesellschaften und Weltanschauungsvereinigungen," http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__166.html.

> historical scrutiny, then so must be the truth-claims and prophets of all theistic traditions. And that, of course, would be absurd.[60]

In all countries, however, freedom is defended in the name of different conceptions of the public good: in a cosmopolitan way—as belonging to the humanity, against the inhumanity of the terrorists—or in a communitarian, rather exclusive way, as a specifically Western value.

When the appeal is to humanity at large, justifications develop within a civic world of worth that takes an inclusive point of view. Freedom of expression is linked to fraternity and solidarity worldwide. Thus, civic values are promoted by the French Islam et Laïcité, a multi-religious association that aims to contribute to a secular and civic reflection on the place of Islam and Muslims in French society, based on the founding principles of secularism and connected with those of democracy and *laïcité*. As they state:

> this cowardly and inhuman act against these victims is an attack against humanity. God has made life sacred. Killing a soul is killing humanity. We express our sincere condolences and support to the families of the victims. Faced with this tragedy that strikes our whole society we say NO to Violence, No to extremism, no to withdrawal, NO to manipulation. This shock must unite our entire society around values of liberty, fraternity and solidarity. We continue our journey in the dialogue and the aim to create with our neighbors, while respecting their differences and opinion.[61]

Within a universalistic justification, the Community of Synagogues in the city of Cologne (Synagogen-Gemeinde Köln—SGK) calls for standing together for "the dignity of the human being, freedom of the press and of the media, free expression of opinion, free art, freedom of religion, for freedom and diversity."[62] Muslim organizations in the United Kingdom also refer to civic values, specifically "a battle of ideas: between those who believe in those universal values of liberty, equality and fraternity, and those who do not."[63] Says one:

60. http://archbishopcranmer.com/unbelievers-and-non-believers-must-be-free-to-blaspheme-with-impunity/.

61. http://www.psm-enligne.org/index.php/component/search/?searchword=charlie%20hebdo&searchphrase=all&Itemid=9999.

62. "Bleiben wir frei. Gemeinde solidarisiert sich mit 'Charlie Hebdo' und verlegt Repräsentantensitzung," *Jüdische Allgemeine*, 13.1.2015, http://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/article/view/id/21181/highlight/Charlie&Hebdo.

63. http://www.reformjudaism.org.uk/statement-from-rattacks-in-paris/.

> In the coming weeks Muslims will face the test of having to justify themselves and their place in Western society. As Muslims we are ever mindful of our Lord's injunction to convey our true faith with wisdom and beautiful words. Indeed in the noble Qur'an we are told: "The true servants of the Merciful are those who walk humbly on the earth and when the ignorant address them they say: Peace." In addition, while Muslims must engage with fellow citizens in a spirit of dialogue and friendship, we must all come together to seek unity and defy the terrorists whose only aim is to divide us. The best defence against closed minds is for a truly open society, welcoming of all.[64]

Also with reference to universalistic values, Muslim associations denounce a perceived Islamophobia, often located on the extreme right, lamenting that freedom of expression is not applied to their own community. In France, this also implies the freedom to wear religious symbols:

> We stand against the far right, fascism, Islamophobia, Anti-Semitism and racism, which are in danger of further advancing following the Paris shootings. We are concerned about the current climate, which has seen criticism of the Charlie Hebdo cartoons as racist, Islamophobic and anti-Semitic conflated with support for the actions of the perpetrators of the shootings, and opposition to freedom of expression.[65]

In Germany, the debates on the attacks overlapped with those addressing the right-wing, xenophobic Pegida's Monday Demonstration, juxtaposing exclusive versus inclusive references to the public good as referring, respectively, to the narrow national community versus the broad humanity. Against the xenophobic and specifically Islamophobic positions of Pegida, a broad coalition of associations and parties called for peace and dialogue among the various religious communities in the country. Thus, the Muslim KRM expressed "support for peace and tolerance, an open German society, and ~~their~~ opposition to hatred, violence and terrorism," presenting Islam as a religion of reconciliation and brotherhood. Muslim groups claim, in fact, that there was no religious connection with terrorism. As the Liberal-Islamischer Bund (LIB) stated, Muslims were actually the victims of Islamist terrorists, and fully supported freedom of expression.[66]

64. http://www.mcb.org.uk/paris-murders-jan-08-15/.

65. http://www.mcb.org.uk/france-unity-no-fascism-anti-semitism-islamophobia-defend-civil-liberties/.

66. "Pressemitteilung: Anschlag in Paris," 7.1.2015, http://www.lib-ev.de/index.php?c=72151; "Pressemitteilung: Aufruf zur Teilnahme an Mahnwachen," 12.1.2015, http://www.lib-ev.de/index.php?c=72153.

Muslim associations mostly referred to ecumenical views, even if calling for some limits on freedom of expression. Against discrimination, they called for a full legitimacy of their religion. For instance, the Italian Muslims stated that: "The horrific, bloody attack to the office of the Charlie Hebdo magazine is a cowardly terrorist act, which may have no justification, nor can it be attributed to any one particular religion, culture, or constitutive part of a society" (*Unione comunità Islamiche d'Italia*).

Peace was deemed a fundamental value for humanity. Thus, UK Christians adopted a universalistic definition of the common good when they appealed to peace, stating, "As a people of faith, we honour the integrity of other faith communities in this island. As we confess Jesus as Prince of Peace, we shall speak and work for peace, as part of our contribution to the common good."[67] The Zentralkomitee der Deutschen Katholiken (ZdK) stigmatized the attacks as targeting freedom of the press, but also social peace and interreligious dialogue. Criticizing "the instrumentalisation of anger and anxiety of many people (. . .) through populist, racist and extremist movements and parties," it instead locates a "common foundation of both Catholic Christian and Muslim faiths in the human person."[68] Some French Catholics also defended freedom of expression, linking it to peace, as "a fundamental element of our society. This society, which consists of all sorts of diversities, should continually work to build peace and brotherhood. Barbarity as expressed in this murder hurts us all. In this situation where anger can invade us, we need more than ever to redouble attention to the fragile fraternity and peace that we should always keep consolidating."[69]

Also on the universalistic side, the appeal to the unity of the nation is criticized as potentially divisive. In this direction, the French Jewish Union for Peace promotes "vivre ensemble," criticizing a narrative of a "mythical national unity," considered as "a machine to divide those who should be united and to unite those who should be divided." Universalistic visions are also promoted by progressive Jews, with a criticism of nationalism as divisive. In the United Kingdom, they stated, "We can and must defeat the murderers by continuing to build a society where Jews live with Muslims and Christians and Hindus and secular people learning from each other,

67. http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/node/21365.

68. Zentralkomitee der deutschen Katholiken, "Gesprächskreis ´Christen und Muslime' verurteilt Gewalt im Namen der Religion," press release, January 9, 2017, http://www.kolping.de/presse-medien/presse/news-archiv/news-details/news/gespraechskreis-christen-und-muslime-verurteilt-gewalt-im-namen-der-religion/.

69. "Attentat Charlie Hebdo," January 7, 2015, http://www.eglise.catholique.fr/conference-des-eveques-de-france/textes-et-declarations/388599-attentat-charlie-hebdo/.

valuing our differences, taking care not to hurt each other. The alternative is a future of warring walled up nations. . . . Shun evil and do good, seek peace and pursue it. It will not simply come to us."[70]

In more radical views, the state is blamed for racism and freedom is expressly linked to the right to oppose racism. The logic of securitization is pointed to as an instrument for silencing the opposition and so is the military intervention abroad, often related to neoliberal expansionism. Thus, in a joint call signed with other antiracist organizations, the French Jewish Union for Peace bridges civic worth with refusal of the market worth:

> Against open hunting to the "potential terrorist" Muslim, Arab, black; against the attacks and accusations, including the filing of pupils by teachers [. . .]. Against the attempt to criminalize those who denounce Islamophobia. Against security laws to silence those who want to highlight and deconstruct the structural roots, political construction, socio-economic and cultural state racism. Against the neoliberal offensive adopted by the Macron law on austerity policies whose first victims are the people. Against the logic of "we are at war" and against military interventions abroad, especially in the Middle East and Africa and the continued oppression of the Palestinian people [. . .]. For the egalitarian freedom to express, challenge and denounce all forms of racism, including State racism.[71]

Among religious groups, however, universal appeals are paralleled by references to a type of (inspirational) worth, related with the superiority of religious values. This is especially evident in the debate on blasphemy. Thus, UK Muslims claim the right not to be offended, with mutual respect limiting freedom of speech:

> Muslims do believe in freedom of speech. And they do respect the right for people to say what they believe to be correct. However, freedom of speech should not be translated in to a duty to offend. Furthermore, it is common knowledge that absolute freedom of speech does not exist. There are laws to protect the dignity and properties of people. We urge governments, civil society and our media to foster a culture of mutual respect and unity, not one of division and disdain.[72]

70. http://www.reformjudaism.org.uk/sermon-by-rabbi-mark-goldsmith-10-january-2015/.

71. http://www.ujfp.org/spip.php?article3921&lang=fr.

72. http://www.mcb.org.uk/defend-beloved-prophet-let-us-exemplify-true-ideals-say-imams/.

In Italian debates dominated by the Catholic Church, which opposes the idea of a multicultural society, there is widespread support for limits on freedom of speech. Even Muslim groups call for limitations to freedom, referring to Pope Francis's statement confirming "what Muslims have always said about freedom of expression, which must be exercised in accordance with the beliefs and the dignity of peoples, and can in no way become a right to offend and insult" (~~*Comunità religiosa islamica italiana*~~).[73]

The very recognition of "sacred" as a superior value poses per se limits upon freedom. In this sense, religious beliefs are recognized a sort of superiority as compared to non-religious ones, the debate on the attacks providing an occasion to claim a higher level of protection for the sphere of the sacred. As argued in the newspaper of the Italian bishops:

> What we defend, when we defend the freedom we have won? The right to build the cathedrals or the right to vandalize them? The first right (to build) contains the second (to deride and demean), but not vice versa. Nothing takes root on nothing. Certainly not freedom (~~*Avvenire*~~).[74]

Within an exclusive conception of the beneficiary of the public good, with appeals to domestic worth in terms of tradition, freedom is also presented as a Western value. Thus, defense of freedom of speech is justified as defense of one's own civilization. For example, the chairman of the German Conference of Catholic Bishops (Deutsche Bischofskonferenz), Cardinal Marx, denounces "a brutal attack against the values and the culture of law that characterise modern countries." The *www.katholisch.de* website stigmatizes the "attack against freedom of the press and freedom of expression [that] is one of the pillars of free societies" and thus an "attack against all of us."[75]

Muslims are therefore called to address the potential problems of their own religion. The attack is linked to "the feeling of profound strangeness and hatred against our western societies"—an attack against the Western world, to which the German Catholic Church belongs. There, Catholics call for Muslims to take responsibility: "Surely the moral duty is to oppose its flawed ideas contained in Quran, Hadiths and sharia with our theology of Christ's teachings and the church's tradition of faith and reason. Instead we

73. http://www.coreis.it/comunicati/comunicato.php?id=285 15/01/2015.

74. https://www.avvenire.it/opinioni/pagine/che-cosa-difendiamo-difendendo-la-libert- 17/02/2015.

75. "Aus christlicher Sicht: Charlie Hebdo," *Saarländische Rundfunk*h, http://www.katholisch.de/video/14876-aus-christlicher-sicht-charlie-hebdo.

try to accommodate and respect a set of ideas that repudiate our own faith and justify the oppression and murder of our co-religionists."[76] Even more radically, some Italian Jewish associations and leaders promote speech acts suggesting that while not all Muslims are terrorists, all terrorists are Muslims, thus blaming the attacks on "political correctness," which would explain the failed integration of Muslims in Europe, and the public indifference toward growing anti-Semitism (See Funaro 2014; Israel 2015).[77]

The inspired and domestic worlds of worth are also linked in the debate around the issue of security, characterized by a strong reference to the specific victimization of one's own religious ~~groups,~~ with groups within each confession presenting themselves as victims of attacks. Framed especially with reference to one's own religious community, security is claimed as (failed) protection against aggressions that limit the freedom to perform one's own religious rituals.

References to the defense of the public good of the specific religious groups are particularly present among Jewish organizations. In France, Jewish groups focus on anti-Semitism, often seen as tolerated by the government. German Jews point to the lack of sufficient protection for their community. They also highlight their own perceived discrimination as, according to Julian-Chaim Soussan, a rabbi in Frankfurt am Main, "everyone has expressed solidarity with the Charlie Hebdo journalists and the quest for freedom of expression and freedom of the press, but only a few have expressed solidarity for the four victims at the Jewish supermarket. I would wish that everyone would carry the sign 'Je suis Juif' on our lapels, because attacks against Jews are attacks against all of us."[78] In the same vein, Jews in the United Kingdom resent legislative interventions in the name of security, lamenting that security laws might reduce their own freedom as "the Jewish community suffers two-fold from Islamic terrorism, first as targets and subsequently in the knock-on effect of the backlash from Western countries which try to stop Muslim practices such as Halal religious slaughter."[79]

76. http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2016/01/07/sometimes-there-is-a-moral-duty-to-mock-religion/.

77. See http://moked.it/blog/2015/01/22/time-out-la-risposta-dellislam/ and http://www.shalom.it/J/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1491&Itemid=51.

78. "Rabiner vermisst Solidarität mit Juden. Julian-Chaim Soussan: »Angriffe auf Juden sind Angriffe auf uns alle«," *Jüdische Allgemeine*, 16.1.2015, http://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/article/view/id/21242/highlight/Charlie&Hebdo.

79. http://www.thejc.com/news/world-news/134466/european-rabbis-first-meeting-pope-francis.

Muslim groups consider the Charlie Hebdo attacks threatening to their own specific community. The CFCM calls for "vigilance against the alarming escalation of anti-Muslim acts." Muslims also present themselves as victims of the conflict between the "Islamic State and the modern secular state." As UK Christians argue, the vast majority of Muslims are even "less accountable for what is being done in the name of their religion, than the citizens of Britain and America are for what has been done in our name in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the continuing use of drones to carry out illegal executions of those identified, rightly or wrongly, as potential terrorists."[80] Even among Catholics, the victimization of religious communities is stigmatized with reference to the persecution of Christians around the world.

The domestic world of worth is expressed in the use of justifications that appeal to tradition. In this vein, a competition within monotheistic religions emerges, with a focus on the common good of the specific religious community. ~~As already mentioned~~, the Italian *Unione Comunità Ebraiche Italiane* blames specific characteristics of Islam for violence:

> To say that the problem with Jihadi terrorism is Islam is deeply wrong. Yet it is true that Islam has a problem and it seems that the Muslim world does not want to realize it. Denying the religious nature of terrorism will not help us in combating it. The fact that some of the bombers were French does not mean that the problem is integration of foreigners or "Western imperialism"; the problem is exclusively internal to Islam and the solution to radicalism must come from Islam itself and by those who reject the image of their religion provided by Isis, Al Qaeda and Hamas. ~~(Unione comunità Ebraiche Italiane)~~[81]

With reference to traditions, Jewish and Christian religions are often associated with the roots of the European civilization.

In the United Kingdom, some Christian organizations point to special relations with the Jewish religion. The United Reformed Church expresses high regard for "the Jewish people, with whom we share a common heritage in the Hebrew scriptures, and the followers of Islam with whom we are glad to collaborate in various projects and communities around the land."[82] Conservative Christians assert the superiority of their own civilization:

80. http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/node/21354.
81. http://moked.it/blog/2015/01/22/time-out-la-risposta-dellislam/ 22/01/2015.
82. http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/node/21365.

> What would have protected their right to live, as opposed to their legal right to "blaspheme," would have been a better understanding of the virtues of our Judeo-Christian tradition and Christian heritage and an energetic defence of them; ones which she and others in so many ways have been so keen to repudiate. This would have brought more honesty from the start as to what makes Christianity so very different from, and dare I say it, superior, to the Muslim faith.[83]

UK Conservative Christians refer to their right to convert the Muslims, as "The Catholic Church has converted millions of Muslims throughout its history. The Catholic faith is the only set of principles which has made headway against Islam. Now that the Church has joined the Boy Scouts by abandoning most of its teachings and peddling bogus notions of ecumenism, human rights and freedom of speech, how the Muslims must laugh at us! Islam requires conversion, not slaughter."[84]

In the name of an exclusive community built on traditional values, on the right-wing side of French Catholicism, atheism and *laïcité* are presented as weakening Western civilization, which is linked to the refusal of its own traditions. According to Civitas, after Charlie Hebdo, the French republic clearly showed its atheist face, imposing *laïcité* as the main religion of the state:

> The Republic hates God. The Republic nevertheless knows that man cannot live without religion. The Republic therefore wants to impose secularism as a substitute religion. In a scenario worthy of Aldous Huxley and George Orwell, the Republic commands the population to repeat the mantra "I'm Charlie," at school or at work, under penalty of being denounced as a deviant. Everyone is summoned to accept blasphemy, to tolerate the desecration, to smile at the sacrilege. Unless the "sacrilege" is aimed at a dogma of republican secularism. There, instantly, the famous freedom of expression gives way to the repressive arm of the Republican ogre and its thought police.[85]

Also widespread among Italian religious groups is the opposition to secularism, with calls for restoring the centrality of religion, especially strong within the majoritarian community. Catholic groups ask for limits on freedom as justified by the need to rethink secularism, while blaming

83. http://www.conservativewoman.co.uk/kathy-gyngell-not-islamophobia-worries-phobia-christian-heritage/.
84. Ibid.
85. http://www.civitas-institut.com/content/view/1242/2/.

the failed integration of Islam. This ends indeed in a criticism of the homogenizing effects of post-modernism as deleting differences. So, in the vision of the Italian (conservative) *Comunione e Liberazione*:

> Postmodernism has fought against the exclusion of the other, the "different" that was generated by modernization, but found no other way to do it than to exclude "diversity" itself, since it is widely believed that peaceful coexistence cannot be achieved if not by excluding all religious experience and ethics from the public sphere. This, however, implies the exclusion of difference and, when the religious experience is one of the most important elements of the identity, the exclusion of the difference becomes exclusion of the self ~~(CL)~~.[86]

In sum, while an inspirational world of worth seems well rooted among religious groups, they are deeply divided, within each confession, between those who bridge those values with universalistic concerns with solidarity—as promoted in the civic world—and those who instead promote mainly their own communities, with justifications that remain in the domestic world.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We noted three public spheres influenced by specific worlds of worth in which "worth is the way in which one expresses, embodies, understands and represents other people" (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 133), confirming that "principles held in common are grounded in different worlds" (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 131). This was particularly true on the left and on the right, which strongly differed in their justifications, while the religious groups tended to split along different alignments. Moreover, we noted the importance of internal divisions, in all of the different public spheres, around the combination of the main world of worth with others, either in positive combinations or in terms of opposition, appropriation, or stigmatization.

On the left, ~~in contrast,~~ references were made mainly to a civic worth that stresses equality and solidarity—as in Rousseau's view, in which "the Sovereign of the civic polity is created by the convergence of human wills that comes about when citizens give up their singularity and distance

86. https://it.clonline.org/cm-files/2015/04/15/alain-finkielkraut-dopo-la.pdf 15/04/2015.

themselves from their private interests to take only the common good into account" (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 108). Universal values are promoted in the name of the interest of all, which must be defended in order to achieve a just civil peace.[87] In this vision, the common good belongs to humanity. ~~Belonging to~~ a collective means praising unity: "People's actions are relevant when, as participants in a social movements, they take part in a collective action that gives meaning and justification to their own individual behaviour" (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 187). Within this common reference, however, groups on the left disagree over their stigmatization of the market worth and the domestic worth, as well as the inspirational worth and the worth of fame.

On the right, we noticed common references to traditional worth as depicted in the domestic polity, based on "hierarchical position in a chain of personal dependence" (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 90). The exclusive definition of those who are worthy of protection reflects a demand for reverence and deference toward superior beings within chains of personal dependency. Within a defense of harmony, foreigners are considered as unworthy (or, at least, less worthy). In this world, the art of knowing whom to include and whom to exclude is praised, as "opposition between inside and outside, spaces between which pass ways are opened or closed" (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 174). Resonant with this, the radical right proposes exclusive visions of the common good, linked to the traditional community. While, at times, freedom is praised as belonging to this tradition, the domestic world is more often combined with the recognition of authority, which is more typical of the world of fame.

In the religious public spheres, reference was frequently made to the supreme worth of faith, with several mentions of the sacred as the supreme value. This resonates with a stress on God's merciful grace, considered a gift and related to detachment, as presented in St. Augustine's City of God (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). In our analysis, we also found the definition of the (more) worthy as those belonging to one's own community of faith. However, with a very visible internal cleavage, some bridged the appeal to the inspirational world with an acceptance of civic worth, others with domestic worth. While there were appeals to dialogue among confessions,

87. Persons need to be freed from dependence, as well as from public opinion and their interest, as they "are endowed with the ability to escape this selfish, deficient state and to reach a second state in which they are concerned not with their own interests but with the interest of all. The possibility of establishing a just civil peace depends on the extent to which they implement this ability which they are free to cultivate or leave dormant" Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 110).

and peace in the name of a universalistic definition of the public good, there was also an emphasis on traditional values, as expressions of domestic worthiness.

In sum, the various conceptions of worth and related justifications tended to differ in their definitions of whose common good we are talking about, that is, how the communities of the "worthies" are defined. In the public debates on Charlie Hebdo, an imperative to justify was certainly at work, and it implied a reference to the common good. This varied, however, as by referring to the different worlds of justification, identities were also constructed by defining the boundaries of the community whose good was at stake. Group identities ~~are~~ in particular built by attributing prevalence to the good of some groups over the good of humanity. That is, the definition of the "we" passed either through opposition to the other, or through coexistence, inclusion, or exclusion.

CHAPTER 9

Discursive turns and critical junctures

Some conclusions

Our research has addressed discursive turns during a critical juncture that changed ~~in~~ the political debate. From the theoretical point of view, our aim was to analyze transformative events in order to trace their effects on the content and form of the debate in multiple public spheres. Extraordinary events trigger an intensification of cognitive and emotional mechanisms, which affect the definition of problems and solutions. Indeed, such events have the potential to transform, in the long term, public discourse on fundamental norms and values regulating the collective life of a political community.

Empirically, we looked at the Charlie Hebdo controversy as a most important moment in the assessment of collective understandings of citizenship, broadly understood as setting the boundaries of who is inside and who is outside. Analyzing public debates before and after the events, we reconstructed the interactions between different moments of condensation in the cultural definition of the self and the other. In addressing claiming, framing, and justifying by different actors in different countries, as well as the deliberative qualities (or lack thereof) of the discussion, we aimed at assessing the impact of the national political contexts ~~as well as~~ groups' traditions. In this concluding chapter, we synthesize some of our main results in cross-group and cross-national perspectives.

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DEBATING CITIZENSHIP: GROUPS' POSITIONS AND DILEMMAS

The Charlie Hebdo attacks catalyzed attention to central issues of citizenship rights, with different players addressing those issues, in the attempt to achieve gains—by acquiring symbolic advantage for their positions. In doing so, the different players had to address several dilemmas in setting up their arguments within different arenas (Jasper 2006). In line with critical citizenship studies, we considered the very utterances around the core issues of the debate triggered by the Charlie Hebdo attacks—from freedom to equality to security—as affecting the definition of insiders and outsiders, aiming to reinstate or transform (in either inclusive or exclusive directions) the assessment of citizenship rights and duties. Moments of crisis produced sudden changes in the ways in which the various actors established priorities and balanced challenges at the discursive level. The breaking of the normal equilibrium also intensified the symbolic struggle among and within collective actors. In a moment of acute attention to particular issues, traditional discursive alignments were disrupted and new ones were built. The conjunctural characteristics of the transformative event—in this case, a terrorist attack with religious implication for the actors and targets—clearly influenced the form and content of the debate.

Our findings on claims-making indicated that the mass-media public sphere in the four countries is characterized by the predominance of state institutional actors as well as media actors, whereas most civil society actors—both on the left-wing and right-wing sides of the political spectrum—remain at the margin, along with religious groups. Women were remarkably absent in these very selective mainstream public spheres. Mass-media reports of public debates about politics and governments in these critical times tended to be not only male-centered, but also skewed toward the actors that are considered most legitimate to intervene during national emergencies. In particular, the centrality of security issues increased the prominence of governmental actors, and the marginalization of civil society actors, in all countries under study.

The content of the debate in the mass-media sphere showed that security and freedom of expression were the primary issues, while most political conflicts concerned issues related to Islam, discrimination, and migration. There were, in particular, three main components of claims-making on Charlie Hebdo:

A debate on issues that all actors recognized as important and on which they agreed in terms of main interpretations—including

security issues, freedom of speech and religion, as well as racism and anti-Semitism.

A debate on issues that most actors considered important but on which they tended to disagree—as in the case of Islam as a religion and Islamophobia.

A (non-)debate on issues that received little attention yet created much polarization among actors, such as in the case of migration and integration, which received attention only from a minority of actors yet created conflict in the public sphere.

Put differently, public attention in the mass media focused primarily on issues that are approached consensually by most actors in the system (for example, security, freedom of expression). Political conflict, instead, characterized divisive issues that either received a certain extent of public attention (such as Islam) or were addressed only by a minority of actors, yet created conflict in the public sphere (such as migration).

The configuration of attention over these three sets of issues implies that the debate presented different discursive opportunities and challenges for the various players intervening in different arenas and on various issues. In this respect, our analysis went beyond the investigation of public claiming as reported in the mass media, and addressed three more actor-specific public spheres: on the left, on the right, and for religious groups. This allowed us to identify the challenges the transformative event introduced in the traditional discourses of the various actors, with respect to the different discursive fields embedded in the Charlie Hebdo debates.

Among *left-wing actors*, the attacks intensified internal cleavages and accelerated transformations around issues of redistribution and recognition. Both issues were central for them, but with different balances in so-called Old Left and in libertarian (new) left movement organizations. Master frames, more or less shared among these actors, focused on a diagnosis of radicalization as linked to social exclusion provoked by colonialism and neoliberalism. As for the prognostic framing, actors converged on a definition of the solution to the crisis in the development of inclusive conceptions and practices of citizenship. Finally, movements expressed fears of excessive securitization and proposed collective fights against governments' new eventual anti-terrorist measures, seen as endangering civil liberties.

Tensions were evident on two central issues: the limits to be imposed on individual freedoms in order to protect the common good, and the recognition of the specificity of cultural inequality and its intersectionality with social inequality. The main dilemma was between the stress on equality and the acceptance of minority rights. Both movement organizations

struggling for distributive justice and those focusing more on recognition were forced to address the tension between freedom versus respect of cultural/religious minorities.

With relatively closed opportunities for mobilization, left-wing movement organizations found it difficult to achieve a cognitive synthesis. Instead, they split between those supporting unconditional freedom of expression and those stressing the need for respect of cultural minorities. Polarization of positions occurred between the secularist and anticlerical sides, on the one hand, and those with more pluralistic understandings and internationalist visions, on the other. Moreover, although (most) movements acknowledged the problem of Islamophobia in Europe, the remedies were not broadly discussed. Minority religions were traditionally discussed as reflecting social marginality.

These internal tensions were visible in the justifications of claims and frames in terms of moral commitment. Clearly, the left-wing actors embraced the civic world of worth, which resonated with their deeply rooted commitment to social justice within a universalistic conception of citizenship rights. This inclusive definition of the common good as the good of humanity at large was, however, linked with a different emphasis on the rebuttal of other worlds of worth. While a refusal of the domestic world and its traditional values was widespread, some groups focused especially on refusal of the market world, others on the rebuttal of the inspirational world.

Tensions also emerged on the *right*. Certainly, the attacks brought forth issues that are deeply intertwined with far-right politics. This facilitated the mobilization of a specific set of immigration- and security-related idioms by the far right, which managed to bridge the two issues in ~~making sense~~ of the problem ~~by~~ using security frames to dismantle conceptions of rights. At the same time, the debate presented a major dilemma for the far right, which was torn between supporting Charlie Hebdo "against Islam"—thus also supporting the liberal-progressive values the magazine promoted—and remaining loyal to conservative, anti-modern values. At the same time, the exclusion of Muslims and migrants was linked to a defense of Western civilization that was at times defined through a recognition of freedoms and minority rights (of women, LGBTQ, and so on) that were traditionally the object of right-wing attacks rather than protection. Radical-right actors succeeded in mobilizing in what they defined as defense of the West, excluding migrants as responsible for its demise. This also configured a critique of the establishment that gained considerable legitimacy in the public sphere, with the symbolic exclusion of corrupt elites from the definition of the nation. Diagnostic frames were shared by most actors irrespective

of their ideological differences: These interpretations coalesce around the belief that a multiculturalist liberal ideology dominates European politics, supported by the economic and political establishment and the mainstream media. The naïve, relativistic, and elitist nature of the politics of multiculturalism was held responsible for the insecurity, and the related decay, of contemporary European societies.

Far-right movement organizations in fact correctly understood that the events had set in motion a deep social process of moral panic, which they could exploit to perform their privileged role of entrepreneur of fear. Compared to most other actors engaged in the Charlie Hebdo debates, the far right effectively mobilized as a collective actor sharing a single, transnational identity across national settings. This emerging identity is rooted in a ~~set~~ of common European values, defining a shared history and culture in reaction to increasing diversity and immigration. As a result, the European far right defined itself primarily in antagonism to the cultural hegemony of multiculturalist values, in a struggle that unites the peoples of Europe against ruling elites at the national and supranational levels. Collectively, it saw itself as a bulwark against multiculturalism and Islamization, and as the true representative of the will of the people against corrupt political elites. Through the deliberate mobilization of pseudo-liberal values, the far right thus targeted cultural pluralism for being too inclusive, calling for new forms of exclusion against migrants and minorities.

The radical-right groups located their justifications within a domestic world of worth, understood as a defense of traditions, within a restrictive, nativist vision of the community as composed exclusively of the direct descendants of the indigenous ancestors of the nation. The nation, however, does not only symbolize purity and superiority, but also embeds values of freedom and civilization, which are threatened by foreign people (migrants) and ideas (cosmopolitanism). In this sense, the far-right discourse was characterized by a tension between the defense of modernity as a Western value and the opposition to the market worth (as opposed to tradition)—and, even more, to the civic worth of solidarity and equality. An exclusive definition of the nation as a fatherland to be preserved against invasions was stressed.

Religious groups were heterogeneous in their diagnostic and prognostic framing, but these differences were not so much between religious confessions, but rather within each of them. In general, the diagnosis pointed at the lack of protection for religious freedom: ~~The~~ prognostic frames stressed the need to restore spiritual values and respect for religious behavior. So, many religious groups stressed a problem of *discrimination*, amplified by both terrorist attacks and the increasing secularization. Jewish and Muslim groups understood their communities to be targets.

Jewish organizations defined Jews as targets of Islamist fundamentalism, as well as of anti-Semitism, which flourished given the state's inactivity in guaranteeing their freedom of religious practice. Muslims perceived themselves as targets of increasing Islamophobia, expressed in acts and in dominant discourses. Even Christian groups felt discriminated against, both in light of attacks on Christians in Muslim countries and as a consequence of the loss of social cohesion and decline of spiritual values due to consumerism. Ecumenically, respect for religion was called for. There were, however, tensions—here mainly between the call for religious freedom and equality, as embedded in the modern conception of the relations between Church and State, and the appeal for special protection for religious beliefs.

Islam was variously framed. Some Catholic and Jewish groups explicitly targeted Islam, blurring the boundaries between the religion and terrorism and aligning with the "clash of civilizations" frame. In a more nuanced way, other groups stigmatized the failure of Islam to adapt to European values and keep radicals at bay. In response, Muslim organizations explicitly attempted to distance themselves from the dominant framings that linked Islam to terrorism. Ecumenical visions were promoted by some religious groups in all countries under study, but they were far from unanimous. In general, religious groups tended to split on a left-right cleavage in their argumentation.

In terms of justifications, the religious actors tended to root their claiming and framing within an inspirational world of worth that stressed spiritual values. However, religious organizations split between those that tended to bridge the inspirational and civic worlds of worthiness, emphasizing justice and equality, and those that instead bridged it with a domestic world, stressing traditions. This cleavage, with alignment on the left or on the right respectively, occurred within each religion—with a tension between the emphasis on equal freedom for all religious (and non-religious) beliefs versus the superiority of one religion over the others.

Overall, in terms of debates on citizenship and groups' dilemmas vis-à-vis collective understandings of belonging, our empirical analysis suggested that while the mass-media debate converged around issues on which most actors agreed, the individual public spheres of each of the most relevant actors involved were divided by preexisting grievances and conflict on how to address the crucial issues embedded in the Charlie Hebdo debates. The attacks intensified a ~~debate~~ on broader issues of citizenship, raising tensions within each public sphere on its conceptions and practices.

CITIZENSHIP REGIMES AND DEBATES ON CITIZENSHIP: CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON

The discussion so far has pointed at the presence of a number of crucial similarities across nations, which suggest that the critical events produced effects at the European level in terms of constraints, obligations, and normative frameworks. Still, our analysis also identified several dimensions of cross-national diversity, which could be accounted for in the context of national citizenship frameworks and the regimes of Church–State relations.

In our theoretical model, we suggested the relevance of two types of regimes: those regulating (formal and informal) citizenship rights, and those regulating the relationship between the state and religious institutions.

We saw important cross-national differences in the prominence of different state, party, and civil society actors, and in the main issues that characterized public debates in the mass media. Crucial cross-national differences concern the involvement of groups whose resources depend strongly on the type of debate at stake. Political opportunities influence the degree to which religious groups, the far-right and left wings, and civil-rights actors participate in the public debates in the mass media. Furthermore, field-specific opportunities are crucial to setting the degree of conflict and attention with respect to the different issues discussed in the mass-media debate around the Charlie Hebdo attacks.

In particular, the configuration of the separation between public and religious authorities appears to be associated with the varying importance, and divisive effects, of religious affairs across European countries. At least in the claims-making reported in the mass media, countries promoting a heightened separation between Church and State are also characterized by enhanced participation by religious groups in the debate following the terrorist attacks. Church–State separation seems to grant these actors not only an independent status in the system, which brings about benefits such as recognition and resources, but also the possibility of building alliances with other actors within the party system and the institutional setting, mobilizing on similar issues and positions.

Citizenship regimes have an impact on a different yet equally important discursive field embedded in the Charlie Hebdo debates: migration affairs. While across all countries migration politics received somewhat less attention than we originally anticipated, collective understandings of belonging to the national community influenced the importance attributed to migration within the debate, as well as the degree of conflict over these issues.

Migration is most often associated with the attack in contexts characterized by restrictive understandings of national citizenship and identity, and ~~least often~~ when the configuration of cultural diversity and individual equality is more inclusive. Furthermore, political attention seems to accompany political conflict, so that countries with restrictive citizenship regimes are also characterized by more heated and polarized debates over these issues.

This implies that the political opportunities associated with a country's citizenship regime and the regime addressing Church–State relations are, if not the main determinants of, at least influential over claims-making in the public sphere. At the same time, cross-national variation did not pertain exclusively to the domain of mass-mediated claims-making, but also to the various ~~social movement~~ public spheres. In this respect, left-wing, right-wing, and religious actors mobilized differently on the issues embedded in the Charlie Hebdo debates depending on the group-specific opportunities available in the different countries.

This was confirmed in the comparative analysis of the way in which the three groups under observation framed the Charlie Hebdo controversy. Most notably, the debate among left-wing movements varied considerably across countries. In those countries with more open opportunities, movements converged on the connection of the terrorist attacks with military interventions in the Middle East (Germany, United Kingdom). Conversely, in countries with relatively closed opportunities (France, Italy), movements polarized over the dilemma of whether Muslims could be integrated in Western liberal values, and the extent to which Islam per se was a source of conflict in European societies. The identification with Charlie Hebdo became a highly divisive issue for some left-wing actors, especially in France and Italy, as expressed around the appropriation of the slogan *Je suis Charlie*. In France, in particular, left-wing organizations split around the participation in the large January 11 demonstration in solidarity with the victims: Large and institutionalized groups largely took part, while grassroots groups criticized the demonstration (and the "national unity" it attempted to represent).

On the right, as well, the extent and nature of mobilization in the four countries varied depending on available opportunity structures for far right actors, and on the discursive construction of migration and diversity. Compared to the left, however, the public sphere of far-right social movements was considerably more consensual in the interpretation of the events, and in the targeting of Islam, migration, and multiculturalism. Still, the more favorable opportunities available in some countries further facilitated the development of common idioms and strategies by different types of actors, and the breakthrough of far-right discourse in the broader

public sphere, which led to the mainstreaming of far-right narratives in Italy and the United Kingdom in particular.

Religious groups in each country addressed Church–State relations, to either challenge, maintain, or reinforce them. Religious groups in France, an open universal system, asked for the state to effectively intervene and regulate freedom of religion and protect religious minorities, but did not challenge its *laïcité*. Similarly, in Germany, religious actors expressed support for the existing regime of separation between church and state, with some form of functional representation for various religious groups. Religious actors ~~instead~~ preferred to appropriate it in order to seek more protection from the state, especially on issues of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. In Italy, regulated by a hegemonic system that privileges the Catholic Church, we observed a discursive alliance between Muslim and Catholic groups against blasphemy and unconditional freedom of expression, ~~asking~~ for its effective regulation to avoid offending believers. Through this alliance, the Catholic Church managed to reinforce its position. Jewish groups, on the other hand, pointed to the dangers they face from "Islamist" groups. Finally, the UK regime, bridging a state religion with multiculturalism, was seen by its religious actors as a model of peaceful cohabitation for the different communities who live in the country. Although some anti-Islamic views were expressed, the overall tone of the debate was rather ecumenical, pointing to a self-regulation of religious life in the public space.

Overall, the cross-national analysis pointed at the presence of both similarities and differences in the way in which collective actors debated the issues embedded in the Charlie Hebdo controversy. While crucial cross-national similarities indicate that the attacks produced a critical moment of transformation throughout Europe—triggering common trends across our countries—cross-national differences confirmed some of our expectations on the effects of political opportunities and their appropriation by various actors. On the one hand, citizenship regimes and Church–State regimes had important impacts on the nature of claims-making in the mass-media public sphere. On the other, group-specific opportunities and resources influenced the framing and justifications by left-wing, right-wing, and religious players within their specific arenas.

DELIBERATION AND POLARIZATION IN CRITICAL JUNCTURES

Our research addressed both the content and form of the debate. In the latter, we were interested in the deliberative qualities of the debate as well

as its polarization. With a focus on communication within different types of public spheres, we looked at dimensions such as equality of access, respect for others, exchange of reasons and reason-giving, horizontality, and reciprocal understanding. We were thus able to show how multiple public spheres were endowed with specific grammars about the form of the debate, as well as its content.

To begin with, some polarization can be observed during the debate in the discursive critical juncture. Findings from claims analysis indicated that, in the mainstream media, the expression of political conflict on the Charlie Hebdo issue was generally low, at all points in time. This suggests that, in critical moments, in order to access the mainstream public sphere (as reproduced by newspapers/media), actors must share a certain type of interpretation of the phenomena at stake.

The public emotion caused by the Paris massacre further reduced the expression of political conflict within the mass-media public sphere. Discursive critical junctures had intense symbolic consequences that ~~condensed~~ and neutralized public debates. The Charlie Hebdo attacks produced an increase in the participation of state and institutional actors to the detriment of civil society actors, and a widespread discursive realignment toward a restricted set of issues on which most actors converged. By January 2016, however, polarization had resurfaced and the debate largely returned to its pre-Charlie standards (in terms of attention to issues and diversification of positions).

Moreover, changes over time in actors' claims-making suggest that actors have adapted to the new circumstances. As expected, transformative events produce new resources and challenge established power relations among competing actors. While communication is to a certain extent constrained by existing repertoires, critical junctures give new meaning to issues on which certain types of actors enjoy more credibility than others. Transformative events have the potential to remobilize public understandings of existing problems—shaping the cooperative/competitive interactions between collective actors. The Charlie Hebdo attacks restructured the relative importance of various constitutive dimensions of public debates.

From a deliberative democratic standpoint, the quality of the debate in mainstream newspapers is rather low. During critical junctures, we do not observe an improved quality of engagement, but rather some (even if provisional) worsening of it. The communicative infrastructure is affected only marginally and briefly by the critical juncture, and the normal levels of deliberativeness tend to be reestablished. The observed change of framing and justification cannot be understood as the result of a moment of deep

deliberation. Rather, it represents the provisional outcome of little or non-deliberative interactions.

In line with our expectation, the Charlie Hebdo debates as reported in the four mainstream newspapers ~~under examination~~, seem only partially to meet some basic standards of deliberation. While coercion is limited, both in form and in content, the situation is more problematic in terms of reason-giving and reciprocity. By all accounts and in all respects, in moving from the period before the attacks to their aftermath, there is a decline in the values of the ~~deliberative variables~~. Between the aftermath of the attacks and the first anniversary, we see an improvement in these qualities, to different degrees and with exceptions.

The Charlie Hebdo controversy as reported by mainstream newspapers is not characterized by any substantial form of coercion: This is a necessary though certainly insufficient condition to achieve deliberative engagement. However, the quality of the debate in terms of extent and type of justifications provided is quite low. Claims backed by no arguments at all are very few, but the bulk of claims that express a position without any justification or only minimal justification amount to almost two-thirds of the total. In other words, the debate under examination is more oriented to affirming the actors' views than to exchanging reasons underpinning different positions. Reciprocity is also low. In particular, claims that simply acknowledge or positively appreciate other actors or their views are largely a minority (around 20 percent of the debate). Instead, the vast majority of claims simply fail to refer to other actors or ideas, or they refer to them in a degrading way.

Although the content of debates, as we saw, tends to change significantly over time, its deliberative qualities varied little before, during, and after critical junctures. In the mainstream media, the critical juncture affected very marginally, but generally never in positive ways, the deliberative qualities of the debates on all main issues. Overall, though the critical juncture does not represent a moment of deliberative breakdown, our societies seem poorly fit to perform what political actors systematically invoke on these occasions and what might be reasonable to hope for: to turn critical junctures into moments of collective reflection and opportunities for envisioning a better course.

The trends of polarization and deliberation run parallel to each other, both declining in the aftermath of the critical juncture. This speaks to a very important immediate effect that critical junctures may have on public debates: a tendency to converge on a superficial consensus. The latter is not the result of greater engagement among actors with different views; to the contrary, it stems from the momentary bracketing of differences.

While we do not claim that in the aftermath of a great shock the ability to put aside differences is negative in itself, we argue that this is not an ideal moment of democratic life either—far from it. The removal of differences is linked to a lack of engagement with the other, not to reflexive debate among different actors. As for deliberation in small groups, a good degree of agonism—whereby participants do not quickly put aside their different opinions for the sake of a shallow effort toward consensus—may be central to developing a healthy societal debate (Bachtiger 2011).

Beyond the mass media, our research also addressed the discursive quality of different social-movement actors involved in the Charlie Hebdo debates. In this respect, a deep divide emerges between far-right actors, on the one hand, and left-wing and civil-rights groups as well as religious actors, on the other. The former are clearly non-deliberative, while the latter show more substantial deliberative and democratic qualities. Right-wing actors fall short of a good performance on virtually all of the conceptual dimensions of democratic deliberation, in all countries. In contrast, although with some limitations, left-wing and civil-rights groups, together with religious actors, tend to display good qualities on many of the dimensions of democratic deliberation we examined. The analysis of the deliberative qualities of left-wing and civil-rights organizations reveals a positive picture across all countries. Religious actors' deliberative qualities also are quite positive overall across all major religious actors, in all countries. Variation in deliberative qualities tended to occur within each religious group—between radical or highly conservative groups, on the one hand, and more moderate groups on the other—rather than across different religious groups.

There is also some within-group variation in the deliberative qualities of the debate, mainly with respect to relational aspects (coercion, mutual respect, inclusivity, and egalitarianism). To begin with, on the far right, extreme-right actors can be distinguished from radical-right ones, with the latter faring even more poorly than the former. In the left-wing and civil-rights category, we see a difference between moderate-left and civil-rights actors, which perform better, and radical-left and libertarian civil-rights organizations, which seem less deliberative. Finally, the religious category shows no substantial variation in deliberative qualities across Christians, Jews, and Muslims. However, in each of the three religious groups, it is possible to distinguish between more moderate components, on the one hand, and more conservative and radical ones on the other. The former actors tend to display higher deliberative qualities than the latter.

In sum, at least two of the three actors seemed capable of engaging in good democratic deliberation. Our findings seem in line with previous

studies of progressive movements, including the Global Justice Movement and recent anti-austerity mobilization (della Porta and Rucht 2013; della Porta 2015). Moreover, religious groups seem capable of engaging in ways that are consistent with deliberative democratic tenets, while this was not the case on the right. This highly differentiated picture indicates different deliberative capacities on the part of different publics. The lack of engagement in deliberative and democratic discussion seems largely related to an ideological aversion to deliberative and democratic values. The extent to which different actors' ideals resonate with such values greatly affects their ability to develop deliberative qualities. This is fully consistent with findings from studies of the deliberative qualities of social movements (e.g., Polletta 2002). In addition, the deliberative performance of different actors within the same category also seems affected by the distance between their views and those of the rest of the political system of which they are part. The greater the divide with the other actors, the less likely we will observe good relational qualities or ~~a need for~~ quality discursive engagement.

Deliberative qualities did not vary substantially across countries; rather, they were similar for the same categories of actors in different countries. With minor exceptions, no single country stands out for the deliberative qualities of its public-sphere actors, and actors in one country tend to behave like their counterparts in the other countries. The importance of the context in which groups take action should therefore not be overstated in understanding the ability of actors to engage in democratic deliberation. This is particularly true when the definition of the context is narrowed to a generic idea of a national setting. Rather, in line with findings from studies on the deliberative quality of social movement organizations (Felicetti 2016), our investigation supports the idea that the disposition of actors toward deliberative engagement determines their deliberative performance more than any context-related factor.

This observation leads us to question the idea that deliberation is a rationalistic practice whose performance is more suited for certain national cultures (Gambetta 1998). Rather, our results support Sass and Dryzek's (2014) remark that deliberative cultures do not necessarily overlap with more or less identifiable national cultures, which may better capture the complexity of democratic deliberation in the public sphere. Nationality as such seems to explain little or nothing in terms of the ability of public sphere actors to engage in deliberation. Instead, our findings suggest that ethical and political divides, such as those occurring among right, left, and religious groups, are indeed more substantial contextual factors affecting public-sphere deliberation than has thus far been granted.

Ultimately, our research suggests that critical junctures, far from providing a unique opportunity to advance participation in the public sphere, represent a challenging moment for public debate. On these occasions, exclusionary and non-deliberative tendencies may be bolstered, with a few empowered actors seizing all the attention of the mainstream media, thus constraining the debate on a limited number of consensual arguments and excluding all others. However, findings suggest that negative effects can be reversed, as with time the debate tends to return to normal. Expecting a virtuous reaction or a breakdown of the public debates in the aftermath of a critical juncture seems unwarranted. The more substantial challenge lies in turning these special moments into opportunities to enhance democratic debate, or at least, in limiting their possible negative effects.

In terms of inclusion (and exclusion) from public debate, our investigation shows that there are three levels from non-inclusion to inclusion. In the first, *high exclusion*, actors involved in a debate fail to engage substantially with anyone carrying dissenting opinions. This situation is best represented by the extreme-right actors. Among them, engagement with dissent, even when coming from the far right, is shunned as a meaningless and potentially dangerous undertaking. Radical or highly conservative religious actors display a similar attitude, which can occasionally be observed in radical-right and radical-left groups as well. In *partial inclusion*, actors involved in a debate engage with like-minded people who may have different views on specific issues. This appears to be the most common position in the public spheres we observed, emerging among some radical-right actors, the bulk of left-wing and civil-rights groups, and religious actors. Finally, *full inclusion*, whereby actors involved in a debate engage widely and constructively beyond the circles of like-minded individuals, is rarely observed.

Group polarization—the tendency of group members to move toward a more extreme point in whatever direction is indicated by the members (Sunstein 2002)—also relates to inclusion and exclusion dynamics. In particular, with group polarization at work, after discussing the Charlie Hebdo attacks, far-right actors became even less tolerant of Muslims; on the other hand, radical Muslims ended up being even more averse to the liberal values of Western societies. Our investigation clearly indicates that polarization rises whenever inclusion declines, and vice versa.

In sum, critical junctures ~~have a tendency to~~ homogenize public debates, which affects the quality of deliberation among different groups. In particular, they weaken differences in the political and discursive opportunity structures across nations. The political arena in which groups take action, rather than the country in which they find themselves, emerges as the

more important contextual feature affecting the deliberative performance of actors under examination.

TAKING STOCK AND MOVING FORWARD

A main assumption in our research has been that debates on some issues intensify during critical junctures in which existing arguments are challenged. Given what is perceived as a lack of capacity of existing assets to make sense of an extraordinary event, actors try to exploit the opportunities that open up, but they also have to face internal dilemmas. A discursive critical juncture triggers claims-making on various related issues. In the case of a terrorist attack, issues of security tend to become dominant and, as we saw in our case, remained so in the long term. In fact, securitization, introducing an element of exceptionalism, was used as a rationale for exclusive assessment of citizenship and restriction of citizenship rights. The debate also addresses citizenship—broadly framed: from social inequality to civic liberty.

In the debate triggered by the Charlie Hebdo attacks, various players have interacted, with long-lasting effects in terms of the thematization of some topical issues: from freedom to equality. In particular, critical junctures tend to affect the framing of who is a citizen and who is not, what are the duties and entitlements connected to citizenship, and what are the central moral values. For all the actors we analyzed, the emergence of dilemmas and the contentions over them can be expected to have long-lasting consequences. On the left, tensions emerged between equality and minority rights, freedom and respect, social equality and cultural equality. On the right, the claims to defend Western civilization instead opened questions about the defense of conservative values. For religious actors, the references to equality might upset the claims to superiority of one's own religion—and religion in general. The analysis confirmed the capacity of the Charlie Hebdo attacks to intensify the debate within and between groups and positions and, to a certain extent, produce discursive shifts.

In sum, the purpose of our research has been to develop some ideas on discursive critical junctures as catalysts of debates on citizenship, broadly understood. Focusing on the Charlie Hebdo attacks, we moved in a logic of discovery, rather than a logic of testing (della Porta and Keating 2008). As such, the research is, we hope, innovative in asking new questions, but certainly has limitations in terms of the answers we could give.

From the theoretical point of view, we referred to the critical juncture as a useful concept in order to look at transformative events as unsettling

existing arguments, triggering dilemmas, mobilizing new ways of thinking, and talking about core issues of citizenship. We addressed an important moment and were able to reflect on its short-term consequences. However, we could not address some of the main theoretical claims, in terms of the long-term stabilization of the transformations produced. Only time will tell how "path-dependent" those changes were.

Additionally, we noted that the attacks catalyzed attention to issues of inclusion and exclusion, security and how to achieve it. We traced these transformations with reference to a specific media moment, but acknowledge that there were many other potential turning points after those events: other terrorist attacks, but also other events—such as the arrival of refugees—that affected the debate.

Furthermore, in terms of the players whose framing we analyzed, we have expanded on the research traditionally conduct on either left- or right-wing social movement organizations, by addressing both and by adding religious groups. However, we have only partially (through the claims analysis) covered other important players—including governments.

Certainly, the combination of claim analysis, frame analysis, and justification analysis has allowed us to reconstruct the contentious debate on inclusion and exclusion from (conceptions of) citizenship from multiple perspectives. In those intense moments, statements on core issues related to social justice and civic freedom can certainly be considered as acts of citizenship. We have, however, left out from the picture other acts—in solidarity or against minorities, policy decisions or protest—that are certainly important in reconstructing the struggles around citizenship.

Finally, we have covered four countries, chosen through theoretical sampling in order to address the impact of different regimes of citizenship and relations between Church and State. While the cross-national comparative perspective proved fruitful, research on other countries would help in addressing other potential contextual dimensions.

Admittedly, then, more research is needed: on other critical junctures, in a longer-term perspective, addressing more actors and forms of action, covering more countries. Moreover, we would need to locate the discourses in broader practices. We hope, ~~indeed,~~ that our work can stimulate other studies on discursive critical junctures and their effects on citizenship. Indeed, we believe that, in our intense times, the study of the relational processes through which citizenship is built is all the more important in order to challenge the "retrotopic" nostalgia (Baumann 2018) based on the spreading of fear that we saw develop in the Charlie Hebdo debate.

Technical appendix

POLITICAL CLAIMS ANALYSIS

In this appendix, we outline the rationale of the approach that was followed throughout our political claims analysis, focusing on the choice of newspapers and the reliability of the selection of articles and claims coding. We use Political Claims Analysis (PCA) of newspaper articles to address empirically the nature and content of public debates surrounding the cartoons' controversy and the Charlie Hebdo attacks in four European countries. In this section, we discuss the type of political behavior that can be observed by means of PCA, the type of information that can be gathered from newspaper data, and the rationale and practice of data collection and measurement.[1]

The rationale of political claims analysis

Claims-making as a form of political behavior implies "the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors" (Koopmans et al. 2005, 254). The PCA method has proven fruitful in previous work in the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics (e.g., Berkhout et al. 2015; Koopmans and Statham 1999) as well as for the study of public controversies about religion and the incorporation of Islam in

1. All empirical data used in this volume was gathered in the context of the "Mobilizing for Democracy" (M4D) project (ERC Consolidation Grant—Framework Programme 6; 2011–2016, agreement number 269136), www.cosmos.sns.it.

Europe (e.g., Cinalli and Giugni 2013; Lindekilde 2008). As noted by Swen Hutter, "[r]esearchers rely on Protest Event Analysis, as a type of *content analysis*, to systematically assess the amount and features of protests across various geographical areas (from the local level up to the supranational level) and over time (from short periods of time up to several decades)" (2014, 335). Hence, PCA is an evolution from Protest Event Analysis, as "scholars broadened the unit of analysis beyond protest to cover a larger group of public claims making (including protest events)" (Hutter 2014, 338; see also Koopmans and Statham 1999).

Despite its limitations and imperfections (e.g., Franzosi 1987; McCarty et al. 1982), this method provides researchers with extensive and systematic data on political activities in the public sphere and their different components and dimensions. Newspaper data can be used to study not only the quantitative and qualitative aspects of public debates and protest, but also their development over time and across different geographical areas (Rucht et al. 1999). Indeed, PCA is a method that allows for the quantification of many properties of claims-making, such as frequency, timing and duration, location, size, forms, carriers, and targets, as well as immediate consequences and reactions (for example, police intervention, damage, counter-protests, and so on; Koopmans and Rucht 2002). Moreover, unlike data collection strategies based on other types of archives—such as police records or parliamentary debates—press-based PCA records the political activities of all actors involved in the public sphere, rather than focusing only on a specific type, such as political parties or social movements. With precaution and many interpretative caveats, press-based ~~protest event and~~ claims analysis allows for controling, if not the real amount and forms of public interventions, at least the associations among specific characteristics of public debates. Hence, PCA can be considered as a useful (even if partial) instrument to assess the ~~presence~~ of different actors in the media public sphere, in a comparative fashion.

Choice of news media and newspapers

The use of newspaper data to gather information about the ~~Charlie Hebdo~~ debates enables us to compare the way in which multiple issues have been debated in the public sphere by competing actors. Still, we acknowledge the potential validity problems of this type of data that were raised by Franzosi (1987) (see also Mügge 2016; Dalen 2012), who correctly pointed out that researchers do not know the exact criteria by which journalists and editorial managers choose to report a given claim rather than the many

others that are likely to have been made on any given day. On the one hand, there is evidence that such risk of systematic error (especially for the over-representation of government actors) is of little importance in general (Earl et al. 2004). On the other, researchers relying on newspaper data have correctly pointed out that the risk is even more limited for studies that aim at comparing public debates over time and across countries, since "there are no reasons to assume that this error substantially changes over time or that the bias is larger in some countries than in others" (Berkhout et al. 2015, 28).

What is more, the selection bias of the media is an integral part of the broader research design of this volume, because our purpose is precisely to study how public discourse is constructed across different public spheres, triangulating different methodologies and approaches. Thus, we do not argue that everyone has access to the media, or that the media simply select relevant information and produce political reality, or even that "there is no politically relevant public sphere that exists outside of the media" (Berkhout et al. 2015, 29). On the contrary, we engage with the idea that debates evolve through the interaction of multiple public spheres. Rather than denying the political nature of the reality produced in the mass media, therefore, our PCA looks at this "reality" for what it truly is: an interpretation of real world events, or an inevitably biased reproduction of reality, which participates in the construction of public debates alongside the interpretations emerging from other arenas.

We opted for one mainstream quality broadsheet per country. In France, we relied on articles from the liberal newspaper *Le Monde*. In Germany, we used the progressive broadsheet *Suddeutsche Zeitung*. The center-left newspaper chosen in Italy was *La Repubblica*, and in the United Kingdom we selected the quality left-liberal paper *The Guardian*. The focus on quality newspapers rather than tabloids or television programs was based on the awareness that information broadsheets represent one of the most accurate sources of political coverage, as they report on political debates and influence the editorial decisions of several other news outlets and organizations. In terms of political biases, we chose outlets with moderately progressive political views usually close to center-left coalitions, which ~~we have been found to~~ report more frequently on issues ~~connected with the core of the debate under observation,~~ such as immigration and ethnic and religious relations (van der Brug et al. 2015). Moreover, previous studies using similar data collection strategies have shown that the selection of news stories is generally the same among different outlets (Koopmans et al. 2005).

Article selection and sampling

To gather the relevant content-analytic data, the research fellows in each country team followed a multi-step procedure, combining the advantages of automated search and selection of news media sources with the qualitative detail allowed by human coding. As an initial step, we selected one national newspaper per each country under observation (available online through the international databases *Factiva* and *Lexis-Nexis*), and extracted all relevant articles in the period 2010–2016 by relevant keyword searches.[2]

From the set of articles thus generated, we differentiated among three time periods, in line with our over-time comparative goals. First, we coded all articles published in the first month following the attacks, to address the public debates in the wake of the terrorist attacks.[3] Second, we defined a random sample of articles that is the same for all countries for the time period preceding and following the attacks. Other researchers have used stratified samples. Accordingly, we drew and subsequently coded a representative sample of twenty articles per each year preceding the attacks (2010–2014). Likewise, we drew and coded a representative sample of twenty articles focusing on *Charlie Hebdo* and published in the month of the first anniversary of the ~~*Charlie Hebdo*~~ attacks (January 2016). By drawing representative samples, we ensure that our over-time analyses are not focused merely on spectacular atypical events, but include the everyday debate about freedom of expression, migration, and secularism in Europe. Yet, since the Muhammad cartoons' debate was highly controversial across

2. The performed searches used the following search strings (translated in each language depending on the country case): (Charlie AND hebdo) OR Kouachi OR "Amedy Coulibaly" OR Charb OR Cabu OR Tignous OR Wolinski OR Honoré OR Jesuischarlie OR "Je suis Charlie" OR Jenesuispascharlie OR "Je ne suis pas Charlie" OR (Caricatur* AND Muhammad) OR (Caricatur* AND Prophet) OR (Cartoon* AND Muhammad) OR (Cartoon* AND Prophet) OR (Fatwa) OR (Fetwa) OR (Satir* AND Religio*) OR (Satir* AND Islam*) OR Imam OR (headscarf AND Islam) OR (Muslim* AND migr*) OR (Islam* AND migr*) OR (Muslim* AND immigr*) OR (Islam* AND immigr*) OR (muslim AND organization*) OR (Muslim* AND integr*) OR (Islam* AND integr*) OR (Islamoph*) OR (Secular*) OR (Laicité) OR (Laïcité) OR (Laïcisme) OR (mosque) OR (synagogue) OR (temple) OR (Massacre AND Paris) OR (Paris AND Attack*) OR (Paris AND Shooting*) OR (terrorism AND Paris) OR (Houellebecq) OR (Radicalis* AND Islam) OR (religio* AND symbol*) OR (Muslim* AND France) OR (Islam* AND France) OR (Muslim* AND Britain) OR (Islam* AND Britain) OR (Muslim* AND UK) OR (Islam AND UK).

3. The article selection procedure was adapted in France to account for the larger number of newspaper articles that could be found in this part of the study. To reduce the workload, articles were selected on randomly sampled days between January 7, 2015 and January 31, 2015. In those cases in which no newspaper was published on the day sampled, the following day was selected.

Europe, our samples also include intensely debated and conflict-ridden events.

The identified articles were then screened by human coders to assess their relevance to the debate under observation. To be considered, an article must include a relevant claim made in one of our four countries of coding, or be addressing an actor, institution, or event in one of the four contexts.

Coding of claims

All instances of claims-making included in each article were manually coded by four different coders. We define instances of claims-making as the expression of political opinion by physical or verbal action in the public sphere (Berkhout and Sudulich 2011; Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans and Statham 1999). This implies that a) claims must result from strategic action by the claimant; and b) claims must be political in nature. Hence, an instance of claim-making is a unit of strategic action in the public sphere, which consists of the expression of a political opinion by some form of physical or verbal action, regardless of the form this expression takes (statement, violence, repression, decision, demonstration, court ruling, and so on) and regardless of the nature of the actor (governments, social movements, NGOs, individuals, anonymous actors, and so on). In total, this procedure yielded a dataset of 4,711 claims stemming from 1,446 newspaper articles.

Main variables and categories

For each claim identified with the above procedure, we addressed several ~~different~~ elements: the location of the claim in time (when) and space (where); the claimant/actor making the claim (who); the form of the claim (how); its addressee and object actor (at whom, for/against whom); the substantive issue addressed in the claim (what); and the frame and justification for the claim (why). While claimant, addressee, and issue are the standard in claims analysis, we also coded valuable information on the deliberative qualities of claims-making, as well as on the positions in favor or against specific objects or issues expressed by actors in their public interventions.

For the purposes of this Technical appendix, we focus on four principal sets of variables. First, we address claimants, looking at who are the actors that are most visible in the debate, and at the features of claimants

in terms of group membership, scope, and gender. These were not coded based on a closed set of predefined categories, but using an open-ended code list that could be extended by coders whenever a new actor, form of action, or issue appeared in the debate. These codes were then grouped in summary codes for comparative analysis at a later stage, looking at their substantive content and at previous studies on similar topics (Lindekilde 2008). We differentiate collective actors based on whether they could be considered as state or party actors or instead as civil society actors, further differentiating across eleven subcategories. In addition, claimants are further defined in terms of gender ~~of the actor~~, their configuration regarding collective action (~~that is,~~ ~~whether~~ individual actors, collective actors, or members of collective actors), and scope.

Second, we use variables categorizing the forms of action by which the claimants intervene in the public sphere. In this regard, we differentiate among public statements, state interventions (political decisions and repressive actions), conventional and protest actions (of demonstrative, confrontational and violent nature), and online campaigns.

Third, we look at the variables for issue topics, which enable measuring the three main conceptual components of political conflict in public debates: issue salience, issue positions, and issue polarization (Castelli Gattinara 2016~~; Berkhout et al. 2015~~). Issue salience pertains to the *visibility* of different issues in the public sphere, in relative percentage points. We aggregated the substantive content of claims regarding eleven political issue categories corresponding to five broad themes: security affairs (differentiating between state and international security); migration politics (immigration and asylum; integration and minority rights); Church–State relations (freedom of speech and religion; secularism; Islam as a religion); discrimination (Islamophobia; racism and anti-Semitism); and identity politics (national identity; European identity). While the eventful nature of the debate under observation makes it impossible to address the salience of the *Charlie Hebdo* debates, we look at the variation in the numbers of claims made by different actors on each issue comprising this debate. Thus, we assess the varying importance of the different aspects embedded in the controversy across different countries, across groups, and over time. To further investigate variation, we performed Chi-Square tests of goodness of fit, and measured Cramer's V scores of associations between nominal variables, to investigate statistical difference across categories.

In addition to this, we look at the conflict between political actors on various issues, measuring the difference in the political positions that actors take on each of these topics. Issue positions measure the direction of the relationship between one actor and the issue at the core of its claim,

measured by a score ranging from -1 to +1. In line with previous studies (Castelli Gattinara 2016; 2018; Kriesi 2008; 2012), position variables measure how actors differ from each other in how they evaluate the substantive topic of an issue (for example, in favor or against the cartoons; pro- or anti-Islam; pro- or anti-migration, and so on). In substantive terms, each actor relates (positively or negatively) to each issue. This applies in the same way to all topics, but may take different meaning depending on the specific issue at stake. The five-point scale ranges from -1 to +1, with potential (+0.5 and –0.5) and a neutral position (0).

Polarization, finally measures the *intensity* of conflict related to an issue. Put differently, polarization expresses the difference between the positions taken by the various political actors on a given issue (Berkhout et al. 2015). Actors differ from each other on each substantive issue, so that highest values of polarization indicate largest differences in political positions between actors, in an ordered rating scale. For each issue, this "level of disagreement" is expressed with (the inverse of the score of) van der Eijk's agreement measure per country and year (van der Eijk, 2001), rescaled in such a way as to range from 0 to 1. The combination of the indicators on issue positions and polarization enables to observe on which position political actors tend to agree or disagree.[4]

Measurement of deliberative qualities

In this section, we illustrate our choice to approach the study of the deliberative democratic quality of the Charlie Hebdo debates in the four national newspapers under examination through the development of deliberation-related variables for PCA.

Similarly to other studies investigating far reaching debates on the basis of quantitative content analytical data from newspaper material, we decided to work with a limited number of variables. For example, Gerhards (1997) in his content analysis takes into consideration only three indicators: degree of respect toward other positions, extent of justification for one's position, and degree of rationality. Marcinowski and Donks' (2012) investigation of over 4,000 newspaper articles, which cover nine popular votes in Switzerland between 1983 and 2004, is also

4. Note that minimum level of salience of the issue is necessary to ensure the reliability of the indicators of issue positions and polarization, since one cannot assess whether political actors agree or disagree if there are no public statements about the issue at all.

based on a content analysis focusing on information, openness, argumentation, and civility.[5] As argued by Wessler (2008, 10–11), the more analysis focuses upon specific components of print media (for example, utterances, or claims within articles rather than full articles, newspaper pages, or sections) the more it is necessary to focus on basic elements of deliberation. Accordingly, our study cannot offer an exhaustive overview of the deliberativeness of the Charlie Hebdo debates in newspapers; yet, it provides us with precious information about the extent to which some central and necessary ingredients of any form of deliberation are present. In doing this, we are aware that claims made by different actors on various topics are of course reported in newspapers by journalists. Consequently, we refrain from attributing more or less deliberative behavior to one actor or the other. Rather, we focus explicitly on observing more how issues and actors are covered by newspapers.

Our analysis is also consistent with previous studies with respect to the decision to draw from the seminal methodology for assessing quantitatively the quality of deliberation, the Deliberative Quality Index (DQI) (Steenbergen et al. 2003). This approach is followed, for instance, by Pilon (2009), who analyzed seventy articles over a period of about four months to capture inclusion, equality, and the extent to which debates were based on exchange of evidence and arguments. However, unlike Pilon, whose analysis is at the article level, our work is more in line with Renwick and Lamb's (2013) research. They coded a vast number of articles (over 600 manually and over 3,000 automatically) at the level of statements (as well as at article-level, in order to understand also the overall balance of each article).[6] Of course, while the unit of analysis of the DQI is speech—intended as the public discourse by a particular individual delivered at a particular point in a debate (Steenbergen et al. 2003, 27)—our analysis is more focused, as it is based on claims. Furthermore, we do not strictly follow the operationalization of deliberation adopted in the DQI. In fact,

5. This approach is also adopted by excellent studies with a smaller scope. For instance, Maia's (2009) research based on thirty coded articles published in two Brazilian newspapers over a one-month period was aimed at assessing the quality of the arguments deployed by different actors. In addition, Schlaufer (2016) analyzed over one hundred newspaper articles along five variables that were coded: justification, reciprocity, respect, reference to the common good, and storytelling at the level of the article.

6. Haussler's (2011) analysis also relied on a version of the DQI. However, he adapted his methodology to the media at large (including but not limited to newspapers). This approach, denominated the (DQI_m), considers: rationality, inclusiveness of actors and perspectives, autonomy of and equality between actors, consensus, and scope of discourses.

the DQI is rooted in a strictly Habermasian understanding of rational deliberation (Bächtiger et al. 2009), which is only of little help in assessing quality of discursive interaction in the public sphere (Bächtiger et al. 2010; Dryzek 2007).

In developing deliberative variables for our claims analysis, we focused on a small set of qualities that are fundamental to any substantially deliberative exchange and meaningful to explore through extensive claims analysis. We developed four variables corresponding to four qualities of public debates that could be measured at the claim level: the use of disrespectful language, the expression of coercive content, and the extent of justification and of reciprocity.[7]

Use of disrespectful language and expression of coercive content in claims are intended to capture a core tenet of deliberative democratic theory: Democratic deliberation should feature respect and not be coercive (Cohen 1989; Dryzek 2009). Disrespectful language is intended to capture the presence of incivility and to assess whether claims under examination disrespect other actors by means of derogatory, demeaning language (Gutmann and Thompson 2002, Mansbridge et al. 2012). Coercive content, instead, is intended to capture the extent to which claims are not aimed at persuasion but rather at manipulation, abuse, threats, and deception (Dryzek 2000, 1). In both cases, we have adopted a simple dichotomic alternative to signal the presence/absence of disrespect and in a claim.[8]

The third variable is connected to the idea that in democratic deliberation the views of actors should be justified, another central idea of deliberation (See Steiner 2012). Thus, building on DQI's operationalization of the idea, our variable tries to capture whether and in what way claims contain a justification. In particular, we look at whether a claim contains no argument at all, expresses a position without justifying it, or contains what we call an inferior, a qualified, or a sophisticated justification. The last variable, finally, captures another key idea of deliberative theory: reciprocity, that is, the effort to communicate in ways "that others can accept" (Gutmann and Thompson 2009; Dryzek 2009). Accordingly, we assess

7. As already seen, such types of claims, including press conferences, interviews, written statements, and declarations, amount to a very substantial 67 percent of the total claims recorded in the Charlie Hebdo debate. Of course, only some of the articles and claims that were coded in this research could be meaningfully assessed against the deliberative variables.

8. Coders were instructed not to record as coercion what Mansbridge (1997) refers to as legitimate coercion.

Table A1: NUMBER OF ESTIMATED WEB PAGES VISITED BY COUNTRY AND BY TYPE OF ACTOR

	France	Germany	Italy	United Kingdom
Left, civil rights	130	190	200	140
Far right	200	170	210	220
Religious	150	130	180	160
Total	480	490	590	520

claims depending on whether an addressee ignores, degrades, neutrally acknowledges, or positively values the view of another actor.[9]

The articulation of different dimensions of deliberation was not only instrumental in the attempt to cover, as much as possible, the extensive and multifaceted conceptual space connected to the idea of democratic deliberation. It was also necessary because, as research on parliamentarian deliberation based on the DQI shows, "various DQI components do not constitute a uni-dimensional phenomenon." In particular, "debates may score high on some deliberative standards and low on others" (Bächtiger et al. 2009, 9–13).[10] Therefore, we thought it appropriate to limit ourselves to engagement with a small set of variables that would be suitable for claims analysis. Whereas limiting an overall statistical measurement of deliberativeness to four variables might seem an oversimplification, we contend that our ability to clearly state whether and to what extent some basic elements of deliberation emerged in the debates under examination is in itself highly interesting and ambitious.

Reliability of article selection, claims identification, and coding

Country comparisons are subject to potential errors emerging from differences in the reliability of selectors. For each country a single researcher selected the articles, and thus differences between selectors might

9. Of course, expressing disagreement with the views of someone else was not considered as a negative form of reciprocity as such. This could be coded as positive, neutral, or negative depending on the tone of the claim.

10. Our claims analysis certainly does not pretend to provide an exhaustive assessment of all the dimensions of deliberation or to investigate the types of discourses presented in the press (Bächtiger et al. 2009). Yet, our observations provide useful insight into whether at least some fundamental dimensions of deliberation are featured to a substantial degree.

result in country differences, but they do not represent an issue for over-time comparisons or for the analysis of each single country case. Moreover, claims require identification as claims. While we use a broad definition of claims-making to enhance inter-coder reliability in this regard, coders making different assessments might produce inter-coder reliability bias in the analysis of political claims.

The project codebook (available at www.cosmos.sns.it) was used as the basis for training the coders and provides precise descriptions of each of the components of political claims, the variables, and their categories. As the coders were also the research fellows in charge of the country cases, we ensured that coding was performed by political science experts familiar with the political system of the country for which they were responsible. The coders were trained in Florence in April and May 2015, and they were required to work collectively and discuss their independent and joint coding decisions. All coders had to complete the inter-coder reliability test before engaging in the actual coding work.

Concerning the first source of reliability error introduced earlier, the precise topic description and the fact that the selection procedure was conducted jointly by the central team and national coders assures us that this did not represent a major potential source of error. In other words, we think it is unlikely that articles were erroneously dismissed after the selection stage. However, the training of coders to ensure reliable identification of political claims was considerably more challenging. Building upon previous research (Berkhout 2015), we tackle this potential problem by defining claims in such a manner that the definition can travel across countries and be equally valid across news outlets. A more flexible definition of claims, combined with proper training of coders, should keep differences among coders within acceptable boundaries, while securing the most valid identification of claims. Consistency among coders was then further ensured by including many examples in the common codebook as well as through regular email and face-to-face discussions of problematic cases.

Inter-coder reliability was measured by asking all coders to code the same ten British newspaper articles, to test the reliability of the identification of claims and the coding of the relevant categories for the identified claims. Six coders participated in this test, which involved the scanning of newspaper issues for relevant articles and the identification and coding of claims within those articles. The results indicated a satisfactory level of reliability for article selection, as Cronbach's alpha was 0.92. The tests also yielded strong consistency both regarding the selection of claims and their description (computed on the sample of ten articles). The respective value for Chronbach alpha for claim identification within the selected articles was 0.98, while the Chronbach alphas for description bias scored a satisfactory average of 0.90.

Table A2: FRANCE: GROUPS AND ONLINE PLATFORMS BY ACTOR'S AREA

France		
Left, civil rights (23)	Far right (25)	Religious (22)
Left • Ensemble! • Attac • Quartiers Libres • Ligue de l'enseignement • Parti des Indigènes de la République (PIR) • Paris-luttes.info • Marseille Info autonomes • Fédération anarchiste • Alternative libertaire • Organisation communiste libertaire • Offensive libertaire et sociale • Parti pour la décroissance • Action antifasciste Paris-banlieues	**Radical Right** • Rassemblement Bleu Marine • Riposte laique • Bloc identitaire • Jeunesses identitaires • Action française • Egalité et reconciliation • Kontre-cultur • Manif pour tous • Dieudosphère • Minute • Rivarol • Présent • GUD • Blood and Honour • Hammerskins de France • Ligue du Sud • Ligue du Midi • Réseau Identités • Mouvement d'action sociale • Reconciliation nationale • Parti de la France	**Christian** • Action catholique • Secours catholique • Eglise catholique de France • Fédération protestante de France • Assemblée des évêques orthodoxies de France • Caritas • Aide à l'église en détresse • Civitas • Terres solidaires
Civil Rights • Ligue des droits de l'homme • SOS-Racisme • Amnesty International France • LICRA • MRAP • Stop au contrôle au faciès • Collectif contre l'islamophobie en France • Femmes en lutte 93 • Mamans toutes égales	**Conservative Christians** • Civitas • Renouveau français • SOS Chrétiens d'orient	**Islamic** • Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM) • Rassemblement des musulmans de France • Comité de coordination des musulmans en France • Islam et laicité • Participation et spiritualités musulmanes • Barakacity • Union des organisations islamiques de France (UOIF) • Secours islamique
Civil Rights • Osez le féminisme	**Far-Right Parties** • National Front	**Judaism** • Conseil représentatif des institutions juives en France (CRIF) • Mouvement juif libéral (MJF) • Union des étudiants juifs de France • Ligue de la défense juive • Union juive française pour la paix

Table A3: GERMANY: GROUPS AND ONLINE PLATFORMS BY ACTOR'S AREA

Germany		
Left, far left, civil rights (39)	Far right (27)	Religious (21)
Left	**Radical Right**	**Christian**
• Indymedia (Germany) • Jünge Welt • Anarchistisches Radio Berlin • Scharf Links • Labournet • Kein Veedel für Rassismus • Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands • Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands • Interventionistische Linke • Antifa • Autonomes Zentrum Köln • Die Tageszeitung • Attac! • NachDenkSeiten • Neues Deutschland • Jungle World	• Junge Freiheit • Zuerst! • Sezession • PEGIDA • LEGIDA • Pro-NRW • Pro-Köln • Islam-Deutschland Internet Forum • Islamverbot • Rettung für Deutschland	• Die Tagespost • Chrismon • Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland • Deutsche Bischofskonferenz • www.katholisch.de • www.kath.net • Forum Deutscher Katholiken
Civil Rights	**Extreme Right**	**Islamic**
• Amnesty International Germany • Dokumentations- und Kulturzentrum Deutscher Sinti und Roma • Pro-Asyl • Reporter ohne Grenzen Deutschland • Friedrich-Naumann Stiftung für die Freiheit • Internationale Gesellschaft für Menschenrechte • Heinrich Böll Stiftung • Humanistischer Pressedienst • Föderation Demokratischer Arbeitervereine • Digital Courage • Access Now • Verband Deutscher Schriftsteller • Campact	• NPD • Aktion Widerstand • Die Rechte • Bund für Gesamtdeutschland • Der Dritte Weg • Europäische Aktion • Deutsche Partei • Etschlichter Widerstandsbewegung im Süd-Tirol • Freie Kräfte Neuruppin / Osthavelland	• Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland • Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland • DITIB • Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren • Deutsche Muslim-Liga • Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg • Liberal-Islamischer Bund • Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland • Islamiq • SCHURA Hamburg

(continued)

Table A3: CONTINUED

Germany		
Left, far left, civil rights (39)	Far right (27)	Religious (21)
Feminist • Feministische Partei – Die Frauen • Feministisches Institut Hamburg • Journalistischer Bund • Deutscher Frauenrat • Bundesverband der Migrantinnen in Deutschland • Internationale Frauenliga für Frieden und Freiheit	**Outlier** • Cicero • Eigentümlich Frei • Die Achse des Guten • Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa • Politically Incorrect • Blaue Narzisse • Die Freiheit	**Judaism** • Jüdische Allgemeine • Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland • Synagogen-Gemeinde Köln
LGBTQ • Lesbenring e. V. • Lesben- und Schwulenverband in Deutschland		**Outlayer** • Zentralrat der Ex-Muslime in Deutschland

Table A4: ITALY: GROUPS AND ONLINE PLATFORMS BY ACTOR'S AREA

Italy		
Left, civil rights (40)	Far right (21)	Religious (42)
Left • GlobalProject • DinamoPress • InfoAut • WuMingFoundation • Contropiano • Euronomade • Sinistra Lavoro • European Alternatives • CGIL • FIOM • CUB • ARCI • Sbilanciamoci.info • Quaderni di San Precario • Controlacrisi.org	**Radical Right** • Gioventù Nazionale (GN) • Progetto Nazionale (PrNz) • Il Giornale d'Italia (GdI) • Fronte Sociale Nazionale (FSN) • www.atuttadestra.net (ATD) • www.iostoconoriana.it	**Christian** • L'Osservatore Romano • Avvenire / Conferenza Episcopale Italiana • Comunione e Liberazione • ACLI • Movimento Cristiano Lavoratori • Caritas Italiana • Comunità di Sant'Egidio • Forum delle Associazioni Familiari • Movimento Italiano Genitori • Movimento per la Vita • Associazione Scienza e Vita • Pontificia Accademia per la Vita • FIDAE • Associazione genitori cattolici • Consiglio Nazionale Scuola Cattolica.

Table A4: CONTINUED

Italy		
Left, civil rights (40)	Far right (21)	Religious (42)
Civil Rights • Libertà e Giustizia • A Buon Diritto • Valigia Blu • Articolo 21 • Emergency • Tavola per la Pace • Coordinamento Nazionale degli Enti Locali per la Pace e i Diritti Umani • Libera Informazione • Amnesty Italia • Coalizione Italiana Libertà e Diritti Civili.	**Extreme Right** • *NoReporter* (NR) • *Centro Studi Polaris* • *CasaPound Italia* (CPI) • *Il Primato Nazionale* (PN) • *StormFront* (SF) • *Veneto Fronte Skinhead* (VFS) • *Progetto Nazionale* (PrNz) • *Lealtà e Azione* • *Leone Crociato Hammerskin* • *Movimento Sociale Europeo* • *Associazione Culturale Gente d'Europa*	**Islamic** • Unione Comunità Islamiche d'Italia Messaggero dell'Islàm • Giovani Musulmani • Comunità Religiosa Islamica Italiana Musulmani d'Italia • Islam in Italia • Sì all'Islam in Italia • Islamitalia.it • Arabpress • Italiani Musulmani a Roma • Centro Islamico Culturale d'Italia – Grande Moschea di Roma • ISLAM, la religione della pace • Sostenitori di Mohammed il Messaggero di Allah • Nuova generazione islamica in italia
Feminist • Il Paese delle Donne • Casa Internazionale delle Donne • Libreria delle Donne • Noi Donne • Politica Femminile. • Donne in Nero • Association of Women of the Mediterranean Region • Mothers Oppose Violent Extremism • Se Non Ora Quando?	**Far-Right Micro-Parties** • Movimento Sociale – Fiamma Tricolore (MSFT) • La Destra (lD)	**Judaism** • Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane • Pagine Ebraiche • Comunità Ebraica di Roma • Shalom • Beth Shalom • Igaion • Hasidic Judaism • B'nai B'rith (Bené Berith) • Associazione Amici di Israele (ADI) • Ebraismo e Dintorni • Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael Italia • Morasha • Rav Shalom Hazan • Libero Pensiero • Israele Oggi
LGBTQ • Circolo di Cultura Omosessuale Mario Mieli • Gay.it • Italian Association against Sexual Orientation Discrimination • PrideOnline • Arcigay	**Outlier** • Lega Nord (LN) • Fratelli d'Italia – Alleanza Nazionale (FdI-AN)	

Table A5: UNITED KINGDOM: GROUPS AND ONLINE PLATFORMS BY ACTOR'S AREA

United Kingdom		
Left, civil rights (33)	Far right (31)	Religious (19)
Left	**Radical Right**	**Christian**
• Left Foot Forward, • Socialist Workers Party, • Left Unity, • Stop the war, • Counterfire, • libcom.org, • Workers Power, • Hope not Hate.	• Sharia Watch • New Daily Patriot Media, • Vive Charlie Mag • English Defence League (EDL), • Ulster Defence League • Ireland Defence League • Scottish Defence League • Nationalist Sentinel, • English Volunteer Force, • Casuals United, • Ulster Volunteer Force, • Infidels, • English National Resistance, • Pegida UK	• Catholic herald, • Christian Today, • Anglican mainstream • Evangelical Alliance • Ekklesia
Civil Rights	**Far-Right Micro-Parties**	**Islamic**
• Liberty Human Rights, • Tellmama, • UK Human Rights Blog, • Amnesty International UK.	• British National Front (NF), • Britain First, • English Democrats Party, • British Democratic Party, • British National Party (BNP), • Liberty GB, • British Renaissance, • British Voice.	• Onislam.net • Islamophobia watch • CAGE UK • Muslim Council of Britain • #visitmymosque • Euro-islam • Quillian Foundation
Feminist	**Extreme Right**	**Judaism**
• feminist frequency, • ukfeminista, • Fawcett society, • end violence against women, • engender, • nawo, • thewomensorganisation • imkaan, • Women Against Fundamentalism • Women Under Siege • Southall black sisters	• Stormfront Britain • Vanguard News Network (UK threads) • National Action, • Combat 18- Blood and Honour, • British Movement, • New British Union of Fascists, • League of St. George, • Column 88;	• Jew Hub/Jewish Values Social Change, • Jewish Sustainability Movement, • Engage, • Jewish Socialist's Group, • Jewish Chronicle, • movement for reform Judaism • Liberal Judaism

Table A5: CONTINUED

United Kingdom		
Left, civil rights (33)	Far right (31)	Religious (19)
LGBTQ • LGBT foundation, • LGBT consortium, • Safe Network, • c-h-e, • Intersex UK, • LGBT Network, • OutRage!, • Queer Youth Network, • Stonewall, • London Women in Black • Barnsley LGBT Forum • Pink News	**Outlayer** • United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)	

SOURCES OF QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

The qualitative analysis was based on the consultation and analysis of the web pages of a number of groups and online platforms in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Table A1 reports the number of web pages visited for the study, sorted by country and by type of actor (left and civil rights, far right, religious).

The relevant groups and online platform for each national case study are reported in Tables A2 through A5.

Further Information

For detailed information on the variables and categories that were used for the comparative analysis, the reader can consult our common codebook, which is available online at www.cosmos.sns.it. The detailed country-level raw codes, as well as additional information on the qualitative part of the study, are available from the authors on request.

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