Introduction. Values in Japan and Europe: a comparative historical, socio-cultural and political perspective

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Abstract: The introduction defines what is meant by “value politics” and shows how values are the touchstones of dynamics of consensus and conflicts in all societies. It maps the interdisciplinary state of the art about values in social sciences. Next, Europe and Japan are framed as different but commensurable cases that beg for more extensive and systematic comparisons. Finally, the key research question of the book is highlighted: Is there a convergent evolution of values in Japan and Europe, especially regarding authoritarianism?

Studying values is a multi-level playground. On one hand, at polity level, we understand “value politics” (Foret and Calligaro, 2018) as debates where values frame political issues in a way that transcend the competition of interests to oppose different worldviews defined in moral terms. The consequence is a dramatization of a choice between good and evil, between loyalty or betrayal and/or between identity/sovereignty and alienation. “Value politics” may deal with intrinsically normative issues such as life-and-death matters (abortion, euthanasia, death penalty, commodification of the human body, sexual orientations, gender) but also with identity and memory or with material stakes (austerity conceived as a violation of human dignity or a moral responsibility towards future generations; security and emergency vs respect of privacy, fundamental rights and rule of law). On the other hand, at actors’ level, values have been long studied as part of a basis of individual belief systems in psychology and the role of ideology in voters’ political orientations has been rigorously examined in an empirical fashion as a result of the behavioural revolution in social sciences. As such, values have been studied in different contexts with different academic traditions in different countries, and we find it extremely valuable to study this theme collectively by nurturing both Japanese and European perspectives.

According to scholarship in political science and sociology, values are deeply cultural in a double sense. They are mental representations of what is worth being appreciated and not facts of nature; they are collective representations that cannot be reduced to individual opinions. They vary constantly across time and space, and the purpose is to analyse them in a holistic manner and measure these variations in an empirical fashion where appropriate. Values illustrate both the consensual and conflictual dimension of social life: they unite members of a social group in the sharing of a common axiological repertoire but divide them through divergent implementations and distinguish them from other social groups (Heinich, 2017). Values serve as a magnet for uniting those who embrace similar views but also for igniting a tension between those who come from different socio-political backgrounds. In the era of supposedly increasing polarisation in advanced democracies, it is pertinent to study what role values play in accelerating or mediating perceived conflicts.

State of the art: values in social sciences and comparative politics

Our theoretical framework draws on various inspirations cutting across disciplines. Considering the extensive literature dealing with values in social sciences, the purpose is not to be exhaustive but to emphasize the specific contribution of each relevant approach. Each one highlights a different dimension of our reflection: values as perceived and defended at the level of individuals and groups in their spheres of experience; values proclaimed by the institutions
in legal texts; and values enacted in politics and policies. All disciplines converge to observe that values are deeply situational and, as a result, can change deeply according to the time and space of their enunciation.

In the field of historiography, successive waves of global history, world history, interconnected history and other variants (Douki and Minard, 2005) have strongly challenged assumptions of the uniqueness, homogeneity and autonomy of values anchored in a specific territory and society. Scholars observe continuities and commonalities that draw the boundaries of communities of values but emphasize also their internal plurality and their multiple borrowings. A European ethos is characterized by different “traditions” (Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman, Medieval, Enlightenment, etc.) or “values” (e.g. rationality, freedom, self-actualization), and these values are “verbally continuous but semantically discontinuous”: they are consensual per se but disagreements occur about their definition and political implementation (Schulz-Forberg and Stråth, 2010). Postcolonial historiography has questioned the nature and universality of European values which often justified imperialist enterprises (Chakrabraty, 2000). It has pointed out the irrelevance of the Weberian approach of a European modernity based on a new and unique set of values (individualism, science, personal profit, labour). The attribution of such values to a determined group ("the Europeans") and their subsequent universalization is highly Eurocentric, if not potentially racist (Vanhaute, 2013: 107-109).

Sociologists contributed to this criticism of a Eurocentric approach to modernity. Through his concept of “multiple modernities”, Shmuel Eisenstadt (2008: 41) argues that “the emergence of modernity should not be considered a natural outflow of the potentialities inherent especially in European axial civilizations”. Modernity therefore reflects different civilizational paths and worldviews. In the 1970s, Ronald Inglehart (1977; 1990; 1995; Inglehart and Abramson, 1997) began developing pioneer projects which aimed at assessing the evolution of belief systems and their impact on social and political change. Such works helped shape tools to elaborate a mapping of societies, such as the World Values Survey. A central question is the extent to which divergent values and worldviews have an impact on political orientations and shape political cleavages. In Europe, at the continental like at the national level, scholarship suggests that values remain contrasted but may be less and less polarized. The main traditional political conflicts along the lines identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) are weakening. New conflicts have emerged but do not oppose radically rightist and leftist people (Bréchon, 2014, 26-59). The old patterns of conflicts between state and church and centre and peripheries are mollified, and they are not replaced with the same intensity by fresh frontlines like productivists vs. ecologists, nationalists vs. supranationalists, post-materialists vs. materialists. The “silent revolution” of post-materialism, as theorized by Inglehart, suggesting the transformation of individual values from materialist (emphasizing economic and physical security) to post-materialist (prioritizing autonomy and self-expression) holds some truth but does not describe the full picture (2008: 130). These hypotheses pave a stimulating path for comparison between Europe and Japan.

The impact of values on political orientations raises subsequently the issue of their further influence on public policy. Constructivist and cognitive approaches insist on the role of ideas in the elaboration of public action and in the framing of policy narratives and interests of actors (Radaelli, 1999). The “referential” is a cognitive image of an issue and of the potential solutions that a public action intends to propose (Jobert and Muller, 1987). Values are situated at the most general level of this referential; they correspond to the fundamental frame of what is good or wrong and informs deliberation, like “equity”, “growth”, “family” (Muller, 1990).
Constructivist and cognitive approaches have the merit to tackle values but do not take full account of their normative effects. Discursive institutionalism suggests that ideas and belief systems are important elements for the understanding of policymaking. Discourses are a “set of ideas” which “appeal to values” (Schmidt, 2002: 169) and reflect the national identities, values, norms and collective memories which contribute to shape interests (Schmidt, 2000).

Public policy overlaps with economics to discuss the place of values in the interaction between the state and the market. The silences or restrictions characterizing mainstream economic theories regarding values are best shown in critical approaches that advocate a radical reconceptualization of the notion. Their postulate is that value is produced by collective powers dictating what is worth pursuing. It transcends individual intentionality and as such cannot be understood through the model of the rational actor mastering all the variables of the economic game, or the homo oeconomicus entering into the exchange with a full knowledge of what he wants and by which means he intends to serve his interests (Aglietta and Cartellier, 1998, 129-157). By articulating what actors define as good or bad, ‘values intervene upstream of the formulation of interests, objectives, preferences and thus strategies’ (Smith, 2016: 9). In Europe, Smith argue that contemporary politics of economy is structured by a tension between Freedom and Security, with actors proposing competing definitions of these values and of two subordinate values: Equality and Tradition.

Values are also the sources of law. Once they are integrated into legal order, they are turned into principles regulating the work of legislators, judges and other professionals (Heuze and Huet: 2012). However, this leaves pending the question of the process of selection of the values on which norms should be based, and who is in charge with which effects (Weiler, 2002). Looking at the broader picture, legal theorists increasingly acknowledge the cultural roots of norms. Courts and judges speak the language of legal doctrine but reflect also prevalent ideological trends in their environment. Besides, they strategically assess their political surroundings to anticipate positive and negative reactions to their decisions, which may lead to self-restraint when ruling on the most controversial issues (Hirschl, 2010).

As boundary-maker between Self and Otherness, values are also pivotal in foreign affairs. International relations as a research field are dominated by a realist approach that turns normative elements into secondary variable subordinated to interests. However, there has been an increasing interest for the influence of powers in terms of values. The EU, is commonly described as a “normative” (Manners, 2002), “soft” (Nye, 2004), “transformative” (Grabbe, 2005), or “civilian” (Telò, 2006) power. In the same way, Japan is framed as a prominent advocate of human rights and especially “human security” (Tanke, 2021); an “adaptive state” prioritizing “pragmatic liberalism” (Berger, 2007); an ardent supporter of a ‘rules-based order’ (Tamaki, 2020); a country turning pacifism and anti-militarism into diplomatic assets to inverse historical stigmas after WW2 (Hagström, 2016); as well as an increasingly successful international actor developing a ‘grand strategy’ pushed by Shinzo Abe (Hughes, Patalano, and Ward, 2021) to maximise its national interests. Japan has been enhanced as a technological leader, a development model and a focus of cultural attraction that enjoys an influence going well beyond its resources of “hard power”.

**Studying values in Japanese and European politics: advocacy for and challenges of a comparison**

*To go beyond the gaps tradition vs change and endogenous vs exogenous*
Plenty of books and articles by Western observers are dedicated to the description of Japanese culture with a mix of fascination, essentialization and ostracization. These analyses are produced in humanities more than in social sciences and therefore relate differently to the claim for falsifiability and axiological neutrality. Overall, some recurrent lines emerge to emphasize the constitutive tension between tradition and modernity. The dialectic between change and continuity is frequently framed around the way Japan has imported and incorporated Western standards since Meiji and WW2 (Ishida, 1983), and normative stances are not absent. Conversely, the stereotyped opposition between the ‘European making of Japanese values’ vs the irreducibility of ‘Asian values’ is criticized as ignoring the constant evolutions and interactions of cultures (Morris-Suzuki, 1998).

Analysts highlight the "dual structure" of traditional values and modern practices and the various configurations that may range from hybridization of "oriental," "European," and "American" ideas and practices, « dislocation » of individual and collective attitudes and feeling of alienation, or diversification of values (Kumagai, 1996: 192). This duality is best expressed by the Japanese claim to be « modern without being Western » (Souyri, 2016), to accept modernization inspired as much by Western standards than by Chinese heritages while cultivating traditional denial of alienation and maintaining its Asian identity. Overall, qualitative studies contribute strongly to the qualification of the so-called Japanese exceptionalism while emphasizing its singular combination of transformations, re-inventions, change and continuity.

The contrast between the ultra-modernity of Japanese society and economy and the conservation of cultural practices, between the rigor of ceremonies and rituals and the innovation and freedom of technology, cultural industry and morals has filled up shelves of libraries (Bremen and Martinez, 1995). A touchstone of this contrast lies in the “Japanese things”, at the crossroad between culture and religion, between traditional spiritual forms deriving from Shintō and Buddhism and new religious movements.

Religion as a touchstone of the « normality » of Japan

Religion is never a one-way path and its political and cultural uses are always ambivalent and reversible. It may be both a resource to resist change, an accelerator of transformation and a carrier of globalisation and modernity. Meanwhile, religious hybridisation may be less a sign of opening than a way to promote of cultural chauvinism by coining syncretism as a Japanese brandmark and to incorporate novelty by negating its foreign origin (Dessì, 2013). Shintō itself, the most « Japanese » spiritual form, is constantly mutating over time and made available for contradictory uses in favour of reform or conservation, opening or closure (Breen and Teeuwen, 2011). In short, the religious element is as flexible, permeable and multivocal in Japan than everywhere else (Burchardt, Wohlrab-Sahr and Middell, 2015).

To meet the challenge set by Christian intruders, Asian religious traditions were mobilized to imitate Western spiritual frameworks. The move came from political powers in order to instrumentalize energies, resources and capacities of informal religiosities. Meanwhile, multiple religious movements reshaped themselves spontaneously and evolved towards transcendentalism to counterbalance Christianity (Duara, 2011). Japan is a striking example of transmutation of both Shintō and Buddhism to emulate Christianity, with the singularity that the state managed to keep a stronger control than elsewhere on heterodox new religious groups that tried simultaneously to use this reinvented spiritual energy to criticize and contest the established order. Japan figures thus an "immanent theocracy", but also a bastion of secularism that subordinates religion to its own purpose (Ibid., 310). "Here we see the ability of a strong
Asian state to apply the requisite categories of secular nationhood developed in a secularizing
West upon a different historical society, to its great advantage. By converting its control over
the divine into overwhelming control over national authenticity, it gained the modern power of
mobilisation that few other states possessed at the time" (Ibid., 311).

_Japan as a critical user and reinventor of Western modernity and values, among other sources_

This forced conversion to secularism made possible by the successful reformulation of
local resources to fit with the Western model may be submitted to a more critical reading.
Scholars (Zarakol, 2011) advocate that Meiji reforms were undertaken not only for internal
purposes, but also to convince the West to look upon more favorably. Japan cannot escape a
fundamental ambivalence in its encounter with modernity: it cannot embrace totally the
Western worldview as it means conceding its inferiority; but it cannot reject it entirely as it is
too powerful. There is thus a constant double game to use Western methods to ingratiate oneself
to the ruling powers while at the same time to denounce and fight these methods. Meiji appears
as an attempt to recast Japan as a variant of Europe who happens to be in Asia, and as a country
that is both modern and Oriental. The purpose is to display how Japan has successfully
overcome its stigmatized past of backwardness. At the apex of nationalism in the 1930s and
1940s, the country gave itself as a "third civilization" standing for new values and capable of
rescuing both the East and the West from themselves. After WW2, the defeat and a rebuilding
of the country under foreign authority, the strategy followed the same game of imitation/distancing. Japan did not pretend any more to embody a third way but claimed to be
a missionary for Western values, and the one able to sell these values better than the West to
the rest of the world (Ibid., 183). Meanwhile, the preservation of traditional values and rituals
is a way to compensate the damage of progress, social change and individualization.

These historical processes do not come without conflicts. Post-war Japan has been torn between
conservatives wanting to make the most of the constraints by a focus on economy and the
renunciation to costly and dangerous military claims, nationalists advocating more autonomy
regarding the US and remilitarisation, and leftists looking towards the communist side and
defending pacifism. Radical left and nationalistic right neutralized each other at the beginning of
the 60s, leaving room for moderate pragmatists (Ibid., 186).

The end of the Cold war has led to a revival of identity debates and fresh questions about
belonging to the East or to the West. This resurgent ambivalence expresses that Japan remains
an outsider among great powers despite its economic success. It has not been totally able to
gain full respect from the West, and no more to establish firmly its influence in the East.
Gestures like visits to Yasukuni by high officials are expressions of long-lasting and
fundamental identity interrogations (Ibid., 190). Two contemporary difficulties for Japan are
more competitors and more demands. The dissolution of the Communist block increases the
number of countries applying for recognition as Western actors and partners of established
powers. Besides, the most recent definition of development includes post-modern values (like
for example cultural diversity and post-secularism) that Japan may be less well equipped to deal
with (Ibid., 198).

Comparisons with other outsiders of international relations cast extra light on the Japanese case.
Japan westernised much later than Russia, but more comprehensively than the Ottoman Empire.
The latter reacted in a similar way to European intrusions through superficial emulation and
constitutional reforms, with same pleas to receive equal treatment in trade treaties. However,
the Ottoman empire spent much energy in its internal fight against separatisms as a multiethnic
polity; and its long history of dealing with Europe blinded it on the urgency of the challenge set
by modern European states in the nineteenth century (Ibid., 175).

Russia followed a different path. It bears a resemblance with the "natives" of the European/Western order in ethnic and religious terms. It won a formal seat in the European society of states in the 19th century. After the Cold War, it was expected to regain quickly a place among the democracies and a role in the international system but revealed itself more troublesome than Japan and Turkey, precisely because it was less an outsider and suffering from a lesser stigma, so less prone to compliance (Ibid., 246).

In short, this theoretical perspective developed by Zarakol invites to take fully into account how non-dominant states at the turn of modernity have internalized the stimuli of the international system by duplicating but also subverting Western models and norms. The comparison with Turkey and Russia highlights that Japan is no exception (Ibid., 251).

Singular but not specific Japan

Still, the reputation of Japan as an abnormal state is resilient due both to its historical war responsibilities and its claims of cultural uniqueness (Hagström, 2015). Japan has developed a ‘renovationism’ or ‘reform nationalism’ (McVeigh, 2003) that merge politically orchestrated change, with the reassertion of myths of political, ethnic and racial continuity. This constant game of reinvention of tradition characterizes many other nationalisms worldwide, as well as the combined agency of bureaucracy and society to do so (McVeigh, 2014).

The academic works that documented the success of the Japanese model in post-WW2 decades as well as those investigating its stagnation or relative decline since the 1990s show the same intertwinment of national peculiarities and global trends. The transformations of Japanese capitalism are framed as an avatar among many of the 'neo-liberal moment' at work worldwide. Meanwhile, neo-liberal policies have frequently been appropriated by political and economic actors to preserve usual practices, coalitions and established interests (Lechevalier, 2014). The « Ghosn affair » offered a recent illustration of this (see the contribution by Miñambres and Vargovcikova).

Japan and Europe: not so usual suspects for comparative and relational analysis

Comparisons between Europe and Japan regarding value politics are not that frequent as the usual model for Japan is the US. Meanwhile, Europe is more often confronted to the US or other Western countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, occasionally South-America, more seldom the rest of the world. When Japan and Europe are compared, it is mostly at the level of national cases and single issues. It may range from the distribution of power between centre and peripheries; political accountability and party ideologies (Nakano, 2009); to moral stakes such as abortion and death penalty (William, 1997). Some emerging fields for value-based bench-mark between Europe and Japan are: experiences of post-war reconciliations (between France and Germany, or Germany and Poland on the European side, vs between Japan and South-Korea and China on the other side); ways to relate to encumbering allies (the US), and authoritarian neighbours or global rivals (China, Russia, Turkey); arrangements with human rights in trade policy (Verdun, 2008). Memories of wars and their impact on national identity have been beautifully but still relatively little explored, with a focus on the controversial case of the Yasukuni (Breen, 2011). Much remains to be done in these matters (Audouin-Rouzeau, 2012).

The comparison between the political occurrences and effects of values in Japan and Europe takes us back to the debate on Asian values (Bar, 2004) in the 1990s and its periodic
recurrences, as a failed attempt to promote a common cultural heritage across Southeast and East Asia likely to offer an alternative framework to Western modernity and human rights. The emphasis on collectivity, harmony, traditional Confucian values and similarities of social structures across Asian countries did not manage to structure a sustainable basis for a continental identity. This advocacy for Asian values was largely led by leaders from Malaysia and Singapore to legitimize authoritarian governments and disqualify some rising regional democracies. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century and especially since the launch of the Silk Road project in 2013, China has taken the lead to enhance Asian specificities and the relativism of universal norms regarding human rights at large (Geeraerts, 2016) or emblematic issues such as LGBT rights (Lee, 2016). Asia is a prominent battlefield for the political and intellectual debate regarding multiple modernities, the commonalities and differences in the way to relate to concepts such as good Society, good Governance, human security and varieties of capitalism (Meyer and de Sales Marques, 2018). Japan is not a front-runner in such controversies, both because of its traumatic past and of its normative solidarities with Western powers.

Researchers relying on global social surveys have paved the way for the comparison between mainstream values structuring European and Japanese societies. They sketch a cultural world map structured by two major dimensions: *Traditional values* versus *Secular values* and *Survival values* versus *Self-expression values*. "*Traditional values* emphasize the importance of religion, parent-child ties, deference to authority and traditional family values. People who embrace these values also reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia and suicide. These societies have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook. *Secular values* have the opposite preferences to the traditional values. These societies place less emphasis on religion, traditional family values and authority. Divorce, abortion, euthanasia and suicide are seen as relatively acceptable. *Survival values* place emphasis on economic and physical security. It is linked with a relatively ethnocentric outlook and low levels of trust and tolerance. *Self-expression values* give high priority to environmental protection, growing tolerance of foreigners, gays and lesbians and gender equality, and rising demands for participation in decision-making in economic and political life."³ Looking at this map⁴, Japan neighbours with other societies with high scores in Secular and Self-expression values like Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, or Czech Republic. Other Asian societies such as China and Taiwan fare less on the Secular axis. This projection may not allow to build hard analytical categories but help questioning taken-for-granted gaps imposed by geography or history. It highlights the ambivalent positioning of Japan between two geopolitical worlds.

Figure 1 The Inglehart-Welzel World Cultural Map - World Values Survey 7 (2020) [Provisional version]. Source: [http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/)
The comparison between Europe and Japan is intertwined with but does not coincide with the study of their relationship. Bilateral interactions between Japan and European countries are documented on a national basis and tend to focus on the cultural dimension. The EU has increasingly become the scale of analysis as far as the economic and diplomatic dimensions are concerned. The relationship between the EU and Japan is seen as potentially fruitful between two like-minded major actors of global politics but struggling to deliver enough to meet the expectations. Its original momentum was provided by the 1991 Hague Declaration on EU-Japan Political Relations. This event was followed by 20 years of half-hearted summits that formalized a gradual institutionalization without dissimulating an underlying mutual disappointment. There was hope of renewal in 2010 with negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement but again many difficulties were met on the way. The EU and Japan's Economic Partnership Agreement has finally entered into force on 1 February 2019. Today, the picture suggests both an intensification of interactions but also increasing mutual distance and disinterest. Europe seems obsessed by China and India as both markets and competitors. For Japan, Europe looks increasingly peripheral on the world map. This assessment challenges the common assumption that two traditional civilian powers are natural partners.

The origins of the EU-Japan relationships had been rooted in a world and time where economic power was directly translated into political influence, under the uncontested leadership of the US. The rise of new powers turned the trilateralism US-Japan-EU into an insufficient and maybe even obsolete pattern to ensure global stability (Mayer, 2015). Still, the diplomatic inflection of the Biden administration reasserting the transatlantic bound to reunify a Western front against China may lead to a revival of the connection (and subsequent comparison) between Europe and Japan, once again under the aegis of the US.
Research questions, methods, and structure

In this volume, values are tackled mostly in their political dimension, as factors driving political participation of individuals and the formation of collective preferences expressed by voting; as ideological components of party manifestos and communication in electoral campaigns; as political issues to be dealt with in policy-making; as ideational material working as incentives and resources for the mobilization of civil society and the media. Looking at the broader picture, some broad theoretical questions are underlying the different chapters and pave the way for common conclusions. Does the intensification of social interactions within a society and between societies lead to a convergence of values, unity and order; or to normative heterogeneity, dissent and conflict (Deutsch, 2008)? Are public institutions (be it the state or European institutions) bound to become a political roof for common values (Gellner, 1983), or may they remain an umbrella for the diversity of values (Lijphart, 1999)? To which extent are values of the social, cultural, political and economic spheres interdependent and specific in their intertwinement within each polity (Friedland, 2013)? In there one path to modernity shaping a single corpus of values, or several?

The comparison between Europe and Japan is justified by both their similarities and differences. A benchmark is possible between mature capitalist democracies facing crises of institutional legitimacy due to contested outputs and increasing unsatisfaction regarding electoral representation. The comparison is of course asymmetric between a continent and a single country. To cope with this difficulty, some chapters use large databases (Gonthier, Jou, and Hino; Dandoy and Ogawa) while others focus on one or several European states without pretending that they are representative of a unique “European model” but suggesting that they may illustrate some key features of European politics. Countries under specific scrutiny are thus Belgium (Fahey and Camatarri; Torrekens and Frangville); France (Miñambres and Vargovcikova), Italy (Fahey and Camatarri); the United-Kingdom (Chiba), Ireland (Fahey and Camatarri), polities with a consociational dimension (Endo, Foret and Hino). Another scale of the comparison confronts the European Union taken as a whole to Japan (Foret; other chapters occasionally). Both are considered here as systems of multi-level governance: the EU is analysed through its national, supranational and intergovernmental arenas; Japan through its national and provincial/local arenas, the latter having taken a fresh importance in recent years with the surge of a regionalist party based in Osaka. Of course, Japan is a much more politically and culturally integrated system than the EU. The purpose is precisely to understand how, against different but commensurable backgrounds, the rise of value politics alters (or not) the political game, for which purposes and with which effects.

The comparison is organized either by joining skills from experts of Japan and Europe in a single article or by systematizing a common analytical framework for the two cases. The volume gathers contributions relying on both qualitative and quantitative methods. Sources include: large social surveys (World, Asian or European Values Surveys, etc.); existing and ad hoc databases; documentary and media analyses; observations and interviews. Synthesis of available scholarship is combined with first-hand case studies. Values are addressed at the level of agents (citizens, leaders and social groups); of structures (public and private organizations; NGOs, parties, media); and of ideational flux and representations (communications, ideologies, identities, symbols and cultural objectivations). Some venues are explored for theoretical and methodological innovations such as the systematic application of consociationalism to the Japanese case (Endo, Foret and Hino); the de-focalization in the approach of political polarization thanks to more extensive social media data collection (Fahey and Camatarri); the elaboration of a diversity media index (Chiba); or the challenge to the assumption of the
incommensurability of Japan regarding multiculturalism (Torrekens and Frangville) or religion (Foret).

Is there a convergent evolution of values in Japan and Europe, especially regarding authoritarianism?

Values under investigation in our collective work range from news diversity (Chiba), cultural diversity in social networks (Fahey and Camatarri) or integration (Torrekens and Frangville), religious values (Foret) to good governance and transparency (Miñambres and Vargovcikova). Beyond this apparent polysemic, the focus is actually on a nexus of values that can be defined as constitutive of authoritarianism.

As explained further in this volume (see Gonthier, Jou, and Hino), a commonly accepted definition of authoritarianism refers to a preference for order, collective security and homogeneity at the expense of individual autonomy (Altemeyer, 1981). The notion of authoritarianism is operationalised as a covariation of three dimensions: authority in the sense of authoritarian submission (i.e. uncritical loyalty to authority and obedience to authority figures who protect the in-group and its way of life), conformity in the sense of conventionalism (i.e. strong support for conventional norms and values in order to preserve traditions and guard the in-group’s customs) and security against risks of disorder (i.e. authoritarian aggression as an expression of the need to punish those who violate social norms and undermine social cohesion).

All contributors were invited to use these three notions of authority, conformity and security as an adaptable analytical framework to measure the variations of values gravitating around these meanings. As values are polysemic by nature and constitute umbrella narratives likely to be mobilized for very different purposes, it is thus no wonder that chapters map diverse interpretations of these three notions. Authority is tested as a social representation through surveys (Gonthier, Hino and Jou) and an ideological feature in party manifestos (Dandoy and Ogawa). Conformity is discussed in terms of acceptation or rejection of multiculturalism (Torrekens and Frangville), reflection of the actual diversity of societies in politics (Endo, Foret and Hino) and in media (Fahey and Camatarri; Chiba), or compliance with the formal or non-formal rules of good behaviour in public and private management (Miñambres and Vargovcikova). Security is deciphered through the priority given to the defense of public order against threats ranging from physical violence to transgression of rules established by historical traumas and social conventions regarding what is religious or not, what is socially legitimate or not (Foret).

Different social sectors are investigated, including traditional and new media, public administration and corporations, various public policies, political parties, and so on. Variations of values were measured across space (between countries in Europe, but also at infra-national level on both European and Japanese sides) and time, in the contemporary days but with the constant concern to understand the most recent development under the light of the “longue durée” and as outcomes of historical processes.

Summary

The book is organized as follows. An introduction offers a state of the art of values in politics and maps theoretical and empirical venues for research. A first part documents social
values in both polities as bedrocks for power games and questions the link between the evolution of authoritarian values and authoritarian trends in politics (Gonthier, Jou and Hino).

A second part investigates the operationalization of values by their mobilization as political resources. Dandoy and Ogawa analyse how values are translated in party manifestos and how this is connected to social expectations and/or endogenous changes in institutions. Endo, Foret and Hino discuss the regulation of values in Japanese and European governance through the model of pillarization that implies to organize the coexistence and moderation of different values, identities and ideologies without trying to reduce their diversity. The cases of Japanese Komeito and European Christian democracy are used as touchstones of the agency of values in competition for power.

A third part shifts from parties and institutions to communication and media. The purpose is to understand dynamics of convergence or divergence of values in the new patterns and arenas of social interactions. Fahey and Camatarri rely on multiple variables in social networks to map polarisation of values at work both in Japan and Europe. Chiba offers an index of information diversity in the framing of two traumatic events (Brexit in the UK and the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan) by traditional news media.

A fourth part deals with values in identity politics and public action. Foret studies the complex combination between politics and religion in Japanese and European secularism to deal with radicalization and terrorism. Torrekens and Frangville explore the heated debate on multiculturalism, integration and migratory policies in Europe and Japan and how values are instrumentalized to harden boundaries between Self and Others. Miñambres and Vargovcikova analyze the “Ghosn affair” about the imprisonment of the CEO of Renault-Nissan as a showcase of different Japanese and European perceptions regarding values such as good governance of corporations and transparency.

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1 The following paragraphs draws on Foret and Calligaro (2018).
2 See for a recent example Minkenberg (2018).