

Political Dynasties in Defense of Democracy: The Case of France’s 1940 Enabling Act¹

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Abstract

The literature has pointed out the negative aspects of political dynasties. But can political dynasties help prevent autocratic reversals? We argue that political dynasties differ according to their ideological origin and that those whose founder was a defender of democratic ideals, for simplicity labelled “pro-democratic dynasties”, show stronger support for democracy. We analyze the vote by the French parliament on July 10, 1940 of an enabling act that granted full power to Marshall Philippe Pétain, thereby ending the Third French Republic and aligning France with Nazi Germany. Using data collected from the biographies of parliamentarians and information on their voting behavior, we find that members of a pro-democratic dynasty were 9.6 to 15.1 percentage points more likely to oppose the act than other parliamentarians. We report evidence that socialization inside and outside parliament shaped the vote of parliamentarians.

Keywords: Autocratic reversals, democratic dynasties, voting behavior, World War II.

JEL classification: D72, H89, N44.

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1. Introduction

Dynastic politicians, defined as politicians who are related by blood to other individuals formerly holding political office (Dal Bó et al., 2009, Geys and Smith, 2017), have long been suspected of undermining the representative nature of democracies (Pareto, 1901, Michels, 1911). On average, they implement poorer policies (Braganca et al., 2015), substitute dynastic ties for experience (Thomas Bohlken, 2016), put less effort into politics (Rossi, 2017, Geys and Smith, 2017), and have in some contexts been found to be less educated (Daniele and Geys, 2014, Geys, 2017). Additionally, family ties may be used to coordinate during coups (Naidu et al., 2017). Positive effects are much less often evoked, with the exception of the possibility that political dynasties may help women enter parliament and protect them from political violence (Chandra, 2016, Basu, 2016, Smith, 2018).

Political dynasties may, however, not be entirely beyond redemption. We argue that, while the literature in general pools all dynastic politicians together, they ought to be distinguished according to their ideological origins, a likely influence on their political behavior. Specifically, dynasties whose founders opposed authoritarian regimes or belonged to a party defending democratic ideals should be distinguished from other dynasties because they are more likely to stand-up for democracy, should the necessity arise. For simplicity, we refer to these dynasties as “pro-democratic” for the rest of the paper. We define pro-democratic dynastic politicians by two criteria. First, they must belong to a dynasty and should therefore be related to other individuals formerly holding political office. Second, the dynasty must be pro-democratic. We consider a dynasty as pro-democratic if its founder showed explicit support for democracy. Accordingly, the founders of pro-democratic dynasties must have opposed former autocratic regimes, supported the democratic regime in which they started their political career, or both.

The conjecture that politicians belonging to a pro-democratic dynasty are more likely to stand up for democracy rests on either self-interest or socialization. Pro-democratic political dynasts may have a vested interest in democracy because it grants them an electoral advantage (Camp, 1982, Dal Bó et al., 2009, Fiva and Smith, 2018; Querubin, 2016) or certain economic advantages (Amore et al., 2015, Gagliarducci and Manacorda, 2020; Fafchamps and Labonne, 2017, Folke et al., 2017).

After an autocratic reversal, these advantages may be lost while other dynasts may still enjoy part of them. Pro-democratic dynasties may also nurture a democratic culture in line with the literature on the transmission of values within families (Jennings, 1968, Bisin and Verdier, 2001, Jennings et al., 2009, Besley and Persson, 2019). Parents' party identification is a strong predictor of their children's (Aidt and Rauh, 2018), and pro-democratic culture may be reinforced as dynasts are monitored by family (Olson, 1993, Smith, 2008, Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2017). This argument is in line with the model of Besley and Persson (2019) where values that are more adapted to a given regime, be it democratic or autocratic, have a higher probability of spreading, either because parents socialize their children or because members of younger generations imitate successful types in previous generations.

Testing the conjecture that pro-democratic dynastic politicians should more strongly support democracy is difficult. Indeed, pro-democratic dynasties take time to emerge and may therefore not be observed when democracies are still in their infancy. More generally, clearly identified threats to democracy are rare. The vote which took place following the French defeat against Germany in 1940 allows us to overcome these limitations. On July 10, 1940, a majority of the French parliament voted to surrender their powers to a dictator by passing an enabling act giving full powers to Marshal Philippe Pétain. In addition to being an instance of a decision by a democratic parliament to end democracy, the vote has three key desirable features for our purposes.

First, we know the vote of each parliamentarian, which was reported in the *Journal officiel de la République Française*.

Second, the Third Republic was a fertile ground for political dynasties (Cirone and Velasco Rivera, 2017). As the Third Republic was seventy years old in 1940, pro-democratic dynasties had had time to appear. Using the *Dictionnaire des députés et sénateurs français (1889-1940)*, we can determine whether the father, grandfather, uncle, or brother of a parliamentarian was an elected politician. Moreover, we can observe whether these family members supported democracy.² We can therefore determine whether a parliamentarian belonged to a dynasty and whether that dynasty was pro-democratic, and we compare the votes of parliamentarians of various dynastic statuses.

Third, the vote was far from purely formal. Neither the military defeat nor the armistice signed on June 22, 1940 implied a regime change (Paxton, 1972). France could have appointed a caretaker

² We use the masculine when referring to parliamentarians in this paper, because all the members of the parliament were male at the time of the vote on the enabling act.

government, like Belgium and the Netherlands did. Moreover, parliamentarians knew the enabling act meant the advent of an autocratic regime (Odin, 1946, Ermakoff, 2008). It was common knowledge that the new regime would lead to a radical institutional change, as, in early July 1940, newspapers referred to it as a permanent solution with long-term consequences.³ The nature of the change was also clear to foreign observers, who underlined the “tremendous concentration of power in the hands of the executive” (Heneman, 1941, p.90). Contemporary witnesses stressed the emotional burden of the vote (Ermakoff, 2008), with some parliamentarians who had supported the act leaving the chamber in tears, behavior hard to reconcile with the idea that the vote was a formality. Finally, the new regime implemented the “révolution nationale” (national revolution), a radical conservative reform package based on Catholicism, political centralization, large capitalist corporations, coercion, and the persecution of freemasons and Jews.

The vote took place in chaotic circumstances. Despite the practical difficulty of reaching Vichy, the perceived risk of standing out, and the emotional burden involved, 80 parliamentarians opposed the act, equivalent to 12 percent of those taking part in the vote. It is precisely because the result was not unanimous that we can investigate the determinants of individual parliamentarians’ votes and gauge the effect of being a dynastic parliamentarian. We observe that members of pro-democratic dynasties had a 9.6 to 15.1 points higher probability of opposing the enabling act than other parliamentarians. Robustness checks show that the results are not attributable to parliamentarians’ ability to participate in the vote. The results are unaffected if we consider abstention either as an intermediate position, between explicit opposition and explicit support, or as a third independent position. Our results are not driven by self-interest, different party memberships, having fought under Pétain’s command in World War I, different political careers, or any other observable characteristic.

Additional evidence suggests that the difference was driven by the socialization of pro-democratic parliamentarians inside and outside parliament. Opposition to the act among pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians essentially came from those with less experience and prominence inside parliament and stronger ties outside of it. Those findings are consistent with a model where socialization inside parliament eroded the pro-democratic values that pro-democratic

³ July 8, 1940, newspaper “Le Matin” stated “It [i.e. the enabling act] will be an actual revolution in French history”. July 9, 1940, “Le Petit Parisien” stated “what existed yesterday should not exist tomorrow”. July 10, 1940, “Le Temps” mentioned the delegation of power as a way to “provide our country with a new soul”, and “La Croix” mentioned a “new order”.

dynastic parliamentarians had internalized in their families. They are also consistent with a model in which parliamentarians are influenced by their networks inside and outside parliament, the former gaining prominence as time spent in parliament increases.

By investigating the behavior of dynastic parliamentarians in the vote on the enabling act, our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it sheds light on the vote itself. Accounts of the vote typically investigate why it was passed with such an overwhelming majority. They blame coercion, the naivety of parliamentarians, who were fooled by the supporters of the act, a coordination problem, and the rise of authoritarian ideas in 1930s France (Ermakoff, 2009). By contrast, our paper investigates why 80 parliamentarians opposed the act.

Second, our paper adds a dimension to the emerging literature on political dynasties (Dal Bó et al., 2009, Geys, 2017) by showing that they should not be viewed as homogenous. To the best of our knowledge, the origins of political dynasties are usually overlooked, with the exceptions of Jensenius (2016), who observes the specific electoral advantage of dynastic politicians with a royal background in rural India, and Smith and Martin (2017) and Smith (2018), who report that politicians with a forebear who served in a cabinet enjoy a specific advantage. Our analysis provides evidence that political dynasties that endorsed the democratic ideal from the outset behaved differently from those that did not. They opposed an autocratic reversal, whereas the literature has so far insisted on the negative consequences of dynasties.

Third, our paper contributes to the general literature on autocratic reversals (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, Svobik, 2008, 2015) and on the decision by democratic parliaments to pave the way for an autocratic regime (Ermakoff, 2008) by showing that pro-democratic dynasties may contribute to stabilizing democracy. Our analysis therefore complements historical studies of the motivations of oligarchic elites to engage into democratization. A popular explanation of democratic transitions is that elites allow democratization to avoid being overthrown by a revolution. That is the gist of the mechanism suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson's (2001) paper and illustrated by Aidt and Franck (2019) for the 1832 Reform Act in Britain. On the contrary, North et al. (2009) argue that transitions occur when the dominant elite coalition finds an interest in extending its privileges to other elite groups and eventually to other members of society. Using data on the Prussian parliament in the late XIXth and early XXth centuries, Becker and Hornung (2020) document that liberal reforms can be in the economic interest of a subset of the elite. In the

same vein, our evidence suggests that a subset of the elite may be socialized in a way prompting it to endorse democratic values.

Fourth, the paper adds to the literature using roll call votes and the composition of historical parliaments to study *de jure* and *de facto* democratic reforms in various countries (Stasavage, 2007, Aidt and Franck, 2019, Becker and Hornung, 2020, or Heckelman and Dougherty, 2013). For the most part, that literature looks at democratic reforms. By contrast our paper studies a parliament that voted for an autocratic reversal.

Fifth, our paper suggests a driver of democratic consolidations in the long term. Because pro-democratic dynasties take time to emerge, and pro-democratic dynastic politicians may be more likely to stand up for democracy, they could be a dimension of what Persson and Tabellini (2009) refer to as “democratic capital”. When a democratic regime has just been established, pro-democratic dynasties simply cannot exist. As time goes by, the children of elected officials can start a political career, thereby spawning a dynasty. That may contribute to explaining why older democracies are more stable. The evidence suggesting that socialization drives our main finding echoes the role of values posited by Besley and Persson (2019). In their model, the share of citizens who hold values that prompt them to protect democracy increases with the length of a country’s democratic experience. We report evidence that the behavior of French parliamentarians is in line with the model’s prediction and our finding illustrates the micro-foundations advanced by Besley and Persson (2019).

2. Historical background

The Third Republic replaced the Second Empire in 1870, after France’s military defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. The Constitutional Laws of 1875 defined the institutions of the Republic. The lower chamber, the Chamber of Deputies, was elected by universal male suffrage, whereas the upper chamber, the Senate, was elected indirectly. Together, the two chambers formed the National Assembly. The head of state, the President of the Republic, was elected by the National Assembly. The system was supplemented by the government, referred to as the Council of Ministers and chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers. The President of the Republic had limited powers but appointed the President of the Council of Ministers, who held effective executive power. As the system was strictly bicameral, both chambers had to vote each law in the same wording. Changing the constitution required a bicameral vote.

This constitutional setting still prevailed when the Battle of France started on May 10, 1940. In six weeks, Germany overran Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands and occupied a large portion of France. On June 16, 1940, the President of the Council of Ministers, Paul Reynaud, resigned because his government was divided about whether to sign an armistice. The President of the Republic, Albert Lebrun, then appointed 84-year-old Marshal Philippe Pétain, a popular World War I hero.⁴ On June 22, 1940, he signed an armistice with Germany making the occupation of the northern half of France official. The demarcation line between occupied and “free” France was not yet well-established at the local level, but it was becoming clear that it would divide some departments (Alary, 1995, p.31).⁵

As the new President of the Council of Ministers, Pétain appointed Pierre Laval as Vice-President of the Council of Ministers on June 23. Laval viewed the military defeat as an opportunity to establish an authoritarian regime aligned with Germany and Italy.⁶ The members of parliament could therefore neither ignore Laval and Pétain’s intentions nor that the bill they were planning meant the end of the republic. Laval held several information meetings and announced an “alignment with totalitarian states”, as Senator Jean Taurines, among others, reported (cited in Ermakoff, 2008, p. 121). Eighteen members of parliament signed the “Bergery declaration” for a “new authoritarian order”, supporting Laval’s project for an autocratic reversal.⁷ Yet the majority of parliamentarians were not, in principle, in favor of an autocratic regime. After all, the Chamber of Deputies elected in 1936 had led to a left-wing coalition known as the Popular Front.

The vote on the enabling act took place in Vichy eighteen days after the armistice was signed, and sixteen days after it came into force (Wieviorka, 2001).⁸ The government convened parliament on the night of July 4. Parliamentarians were scattered all over the country; some were still in their constituencies, others were refugees. Some were still in the army, whereas others were prisoners of war, or had been killed in action (Wieviorka, 2001). Traveling was made particularly difficult

⁴ He was the commander of the allied troops during the battle of Verdun and was often referred to as the “victor of Verdun”. His handling of the 1917 mutinies had been perceived as humane, earning him a reputation for being concerned with the situation of soldiers and avoiding bloodshed.

⁵ Departments, “départements” in French, are the main administrative division in France. They are divided in smaller districts where deputies are elected.

⁶ Laval was an influential politician of the Third Republic. He had been elected as a socialist parliamentarian in 1914, served as minister several times and twice as President of the Council of Ministers. He had also been the French ambassador to Italy, where he befriended Benito Mussolini.

⁷ The declaration was named after Gaston Bergery, a left-of-center parliamentarian, who drafted it.

⁸ The choice of location had been dictated by the successive retreats the government had been forced to undertake in order to avoid being captured.

by the disruptions of war. Out of the 847 members of Parliament in 1940, only 669 took part in the vote. Fewer than 300 parliamentarians were in Vichy by July 8 – representing 45 percent of parliamentarians voting in July 10, 1940 and around 36 percent of all parliamentarians (Ermakoff, 2008). Not only was getting to Vichy difficult, finding a place to stay and work was also hard. Political parties had collapsed, making it even more difficult to coordinate any opposition to the bill.⁹ In short, debate and coordination ahead of the vote was almost impossible, especially since parliamentarians did not receive a draft of the bill until July 9.

On July 10, 1940, the French parliament was asked to vote on a one-paragraph act that read: “The parliament provides full powers to the Government of the Republic, under the authority and the signature of Marshal Pétain. As a consequence, a new constitution for the French State will be promulgated by one or several acts. This Constitution will guarantee the notion of Work, Family and Fatherland. It will be ratified by the Nation and applied by the Assemblies it will have created”. It meant the end of the Third Republic.

This was no trivial matter. The Third Republic was 65 years old. It remains to this day the longest-lasting republican regime in French history. The new government would rule the country. It was recognized by the US, which did not acknowledge the French Committee of National Liberation as the representative of France until 1943. By early July 1940, newspapers were describing the new regime as a permanent solution with long-term consequences. Most of all, the regime implemented the “national revolution”, a radical conservative reform package based on Catholicism, political centralization, large capitalist corporations, and coercion. The worst dimension of the program was the persecution of freemasons and Jews. The infamous “statut des juifs” (“Jewish status law”) passed on October 3, 1940, banning Jews from elected office and positions in the civil service, the army, and secondary and higher education. According to Paxton (1972), there is no evidence of German demands concerning France’s policy towards Jews until August 1941. Until then, the new regime was responsible for its own anti-Semitic policies.

Despite the circumstances, the outcome of the vote was no foregone conclusion. Neither the defeat nor the armistice signed on June 22 implied a regime change. At the time of the vote, Hitler’s interest was in France remaining stable to keep financing the German war effort and serve as a stepping-stone to invade Great Britain (Paxton, 1972). Mobilizing the French economy to help

⁹ On July 9th 1940, Senator Jean-Marie Froget wrote in a letter to his daughter “There is no party anymore” (Calef, 1988, p. 432).

Germany win the war, was viewed as a priority. Large occupation costs were thus imposed on defeated France (Occhino et al., 2008). An autocratic transition implementing a series of radical reforms could have jeopardized those plans.

The parliamentarians voted simultaneously, and each individual ballot was made public. Ermakoff (2008) surveys the three reasons mentioned by historians, parliamentarians who participated in the vote, and their contemporaries to explain why the majority of parliamentarians endorsed the act. The first is coercion and moral pressure. At the end of a ceremonial drill on July 4, General Maxime Weygand, Supreme Commander of the French army during the last weeks of the Battle of France and Minister for Defense in Pétain's government, declared "we must clean the country of the people who drove it where it is" (Calef, 1988, p.253). Weygand's statement lent credence to the possibility of a coup d'état and was seized upon by Laval and his supporters. Likewise, Laval evoked the possibility of labor camps. On the day of the vote, the casino where the chambers met was surrounded by the military police, officially for protection. It is reasonable to believe that some parliamentarians felt threatened and found opposing the act unsafe.

The second reason put forward by some parliamentarians who endorsed the act is that they had been fooled by its supporters. As the meaning of the act was straightforward and Laval and his followers had been clear about their intentions, this explanation can only be marginal, but some parliamentarians who arrived late in Vichy might not have been aware of Laval's statements.

The literature also stresses a third reason: the act and the program of Pétain echoed the preferences of some parliamentarians. Although most of them belonged to democratic parties, the critique of democracy had gained popularity, especially among conservatives, since the turn of the twentieth century, particularly during the 1930s. The new regime was therefore the outcome of a long process of diffusion of antidemocratic ideas (Sternhell, 1996). Ermakoff (2009) suggests as a fourth reason for the massive endorsement of the act, the incentives to conform to the vote of other parliamentarians. Under pressure, and in circumstances where organizing opposition was materially difficult, parliamentarians could consider that they would face retaliation if they stood out. In a context of uncertainty, the view of the majority could be viewed as the better and safer option. They therefore had an incentive to conform to the vote of their peers, which led to the bill being passed.

Yet, 80 parliamentarians voted against the act. Some of them clearly stated the defense of democracy as a first motivation. For example, 27 parliamentarians signed the Badie declaration

claiming their “attachment to democracy” as the reason for refusing to support the act. Some parliamentarians also spelled out the symbolic importance of the vote and how their dynastic experience shaped it. Odin (1946) quotes Pierre-Etienne Flandin, the descendent of a republican family: “This [France’s institutions] is a sacred legacy that was bequeathed by our fathers that we have to bequeath intact to our sons.”¹⁰

3. Data and method

3.1 Data

Our dataset draws primarily upon the *Dictionnaire des parlementaires de 1889 à 1940*, edited by Jean Joly, the contents of which are conveniently posted on the websites of the French National Assembly and Senate.¹¹ The *Dictionnaire* includes biographical information, including genealogies, of the 847 parliamentarians in 1940. Since biographies are written in a standardized way, we could retrieve the following pieces of information.

Pro-democratic and other Dynasties: The variable of interest is a dummy variable equal to one if a parliamentarian belongs to a pro-democratic dynasty. To be part of a dynasty a politician must have at least one forebear who held political office at the national or local level.¹² If a politician had a relative in politics, the first paragraph of the biography in the *Dictionnaire* systematically mentions it, stating where to find that relative in the *Dictionnaire*. (i.e. “son of the previous [parliamentarian]” or “his grandfather is...” when surnames differ). If a previous dynastic member is mentioned, so are his or her political offices. Hence even if this forebear is not in the *Dictionnaire*, we know which offices he held.

To qualify as pro-democratic, a dynasty must have been founded by a politician who either opposed former autocratic regimes or supported one of the French republics. In practice founders of pro-democratic dynasties opposed the following autocratic regimes: the absolute monarchy, the July Monarchy, or the two Napoleonic Empires. Additionally, founders of political dynasties who belonged to parties supporting the Third Republic also started pro-democratic dynasties. By contrast, if the founder of the dynasty either (1) supported an autocratic regime, (2) was a member

¹⁰ “C’est là un dépôt sacré qui nous a été légué par nos pères et que nous devons léguer intact à nos fils. ”

¹¹ The sources of all variables are described in Appendix A.3.

¹² Our definition considers all family members who were previously in office since we are interested in the origins of the dynasty. Other studies have a more restricted view and only consider politicians as dynastic if they were directly preceded by family members active in electoral politics (Chandra, 2016).

of a party showing no clear support for democratic ideals during the Third Republic (Monarchist, Bonapartists, Conservative and members of the Republican Federation and the Catholic of Liberal Action), or (3) was affiliated to no party, the dynasty they started will not qualify as pro-democratic.¹³

Our definition of pro-democratic dynasties is conservative, as it excludes non-affiliated parliamentarians. It moreover excludes members of parties that originally integrated parliamentarians supporting autocratic alternatives to democracy. It ensures that founders of pro-democratic dynasties explicitly stood for democracy. With that definition, we may have underestimated the number of descendants of politicians holding democratic values. Those errors would however induce a downward bias in our estimations and reduce the likelihood of finding an effect of pro-democratic dynasties on the probability to oppose the enabling act.

Using biographies circumvents a drawback of papers on dynasties that rely on surname similarities, (e.g. Geys, 2017, Cruz et al., 2017) insofar as the information on the existence of a politician forebear is reliable.¹⁴ Biographies moreover allow identifying links between a parliamentarian and a forebear on the maternal side.

We identify 126 dynasts among the 847 parliamentarians, implying that 15 percent of them were dynastic. 66 parliamentarians belonged to a pro-democratic dynasty, tallying 7.8 percent of parliamentarians. Another 60 belonged to “other dynasties”, those not explicitly democratic. The proportion of dynastic parliamentarians in our sample exceeds the one reported in Dal Bó et al. (2009) and is in line with evidence presented in Fiva and Smith (2018).

Although some aristocratic dynasties may be traced back to the Ancien Régime (before the French Revolution of 1789), more than 90% of the pro-democratic dynasties started during the Third Republic. By contrast, the other dynasties are distributed more evenly over time, with more than 50% pre-dating the Second Republic (1848). All dynastic parliamentarians and the founder of their dynasties are presented in Appendix A.1, their distribution over time in Appendix A.2.

¹³ The “Fédération Républicaine” had an ambiguous position towards democratic institutions (see Agrikoliansky, 2016) whereas the Catholic “Action Libérale” was created as a result of Pope Leo XIII encyclicals “On the Church and State in France” prompting Catholics to take part in French institutions to defend Catholic values.

¹⁴ Out of dynastic parliamentarians, 11.9 percent were identified as dynastic on their maternal side. As women could not be elected, those were identified as dynastic because of an uncle, a grandfather, or a great-grand-father.

Votes: Data on the vote of the enabling act comes from the *Journal officiel de la République française* of July 11, 1940. We identify three groups: opponents to the reform (80 of the 669 voters, or 12 percent), abstentions (20 out of 669, or 3 percent) and supporters (569 of 669, or 85 percent).

Individual characteristics

We also control for a series of parliamentarians' characteristics.

Age is the age of the parliamentarian at the time of the vote. On one hand, an older parliamentarian would suffer less from an autocratic reversal, since his career prospects would be more limited. This would decrease the likelihood of opposing the act. On the other hand, an older parliamentarian would also benefit from extensive experience with the regime and possibly have a sentimental link to it, thus being less likely to vote for reversal.¹⁵

Senator: This dummy variable equals one if the parliamentarian was a member of the Senate.¹⁶ Due to the differences in the way in which they were elected, Senators and Deputies might have faced different incentives in the vote. Moreover, some Senators defined themselves as guarantors of the Republic. For instance, in his first speech of the 1936-1940 mandate, the President of the Senate, Jules Jeanneney, stated "True to its traditions, the Senate acts as the attentive guardian of the Republican institutions".¹⁷

Départements: As the main subnational administrative units in France, the département of the parliamentarians' geographic origin may have an influence on his voting behaviour. In several specifications we use departmental fixed effects.

Jewish Parliamentarian: This is a dummy variable set to one if the parliamentarian was Jewish. We control for the Jewishness of parliamentarians because Laval had stated that the vote would allow an alignment with Nazi Germany (Ermakoff, 2008), making Jewish parliamentarians likely targets of the new regime.

¹⁵ One must distinguish the parliamentarian's age, his experience with the regime, and his experience with the parliament, which we will leverage in Section 5. A parliamentarian who was elected later in life can have accumulated less experience in parliament than a younger one who started his parliamentary career early.

¹⁶ Deputies were elected in a popular vote using male universal suffrage. Constitutionally, the Senate was composed of older politicians already having a career and elected by local politicians (see Article 4 of the constitutional law of February 24, 1875, on the organization of the Senate). In indirect elections, the dynastic advantage would be more decisive thanks to the political networks transmitted by dynasties.

¹⁷ *Journal officiel de la République – Débat au Sénat (21 Janvier 1936).*

Freemason: This a dummy variable set to one if a parliamentarian was a Freemason.¹⁸ Freemasons may have coordinated with each other. Moreover, they were targeted by attacks of Pétain’s supporters. These two dimensions may have prompted opposition to the Enabling Act by Freemasons.

Occupied département and département crossed by the demarcation line: One dummy variable takes the value one if a parliamentarian’s *département* was occupied at the time of the vote; the other takes the value one if their *département* was crossed by the demarcation line at the time of the vote.

Parliamentarians’ Political Orientation: We control for parliamentarians’ political orientation according to Ermakoff’s (2008) classification of parties as leftwing, centrist, and rightwing. We define dummies for leftwing and centrist parliamentarians, with rightwing parliamentarians being the reference group.

Profession: On the basis, of the biographies we create dummy variables to control for parliamentarians’ occupations. All occupations were not mentioned but we may distinguish journalists, doctors, and civil servants, as well as law-related and low-skilled occupations. The reference group consists of professional parliamentarians, defined as parliamentarians with no occupation beside their political mandates. Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to identify professional parliamentarians who were large landowners or rentiers. A parliamentarian with a lucrative professional activity would not lose as much as a professional parliamentarian if the republic was abolished. In addition, professionals, such as lawyers and doctors, might voice stronger opposition to the reform because they benefited from local networks protecting them from possible retaliations. Lawyers might also have a better grasp of the constitutional consequences of the vote, as hypothesized by Ermakoff (2008). We would have liked to include income proxies as in Abramitzky et al. (2014). Data on average incomes in 1940 France is often limited to workers and farmers. Our sample poses another limit to using income proxies. Politicians’ income may vary with their political activity and so would diverge from the average income of the rest of the profession. Moreover, wages in France exhibit regional patterns that we could not assess due to a lack of data. Nonetheless by controlling for several professions, we implicitly control for differences in income across occupations.

¹⁸ Shortly after the Vichy regime was inaugurated, it published in the *Journal Officiel* a list of the members of parliament who were freemasons.

WWI veteran: This is a dummy variable set to one if the parliamentarian was a World War I veteran. Veterans might have been more willing to approve the reform, because they might have admired Pétain (Cagé et al. 2020) but conversely, they may also have been more inclined to support pacifism (Gelpi and Feaver, 2002).

Years of study: This is the number of years of higher education. This information is usually mentioned in the *Dictionnaire*. If not, we use the usual years of study needed to obtain the highest degree a parliamentarian has or the sum of years of study needed to obtain all the degrees he holds.¹⁹

In addition to the variables used in baseline estimations, we also consider data on parliamentary debates (e.g. number of interventions in the parliament, number of times they were applauded, and number of times they were booed), and data on the political career of parliamentarians and on their party membership.

Table 1 separately reports descriptive statistics on observable variables for members of pro-democratic dynasties, members of other dynasties, and non-dynastic parliamentarians.²⁰ The left-hand panel reports averages and standard deviations. The right-hand panel shows differences in averages.

The fourth column reports differences between non-dynastic and pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians. For each variable, we subtract the values of pro-democratic dynasties from those of non-dynasties. A negative value thus represents a higher value for pro-democratic dynasts. Three characteristics appear to differ across the two groups: Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were more educated, less likely to hold low-skilled jobs but more likely to be involved in law-related positions than non-dynastic parliamentarians. Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were also less likely to come from occupied *départements* but more likely from *départements* crossed by the demarcation line. These differences are significant at the five-percent level of confidence or beyond.

¹⁹ As doctoral studies have no predefined curriculum, we consider 8 years of study for a PhD.

²⁰ To save space, we only report variables for which we could observe statistically significant differences between the two types of dynasties. By default, the other individual characteristics did not differ between pro-democratic dynastic politicians and other dynastic politicians. These variables are presented in Online Appendix A.5.

Table 1: Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians versus other dynastic parliamentarians

	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(1.4)	(1.5)	(1.6)
	Pro-democratic dynastic (n=66)	Non-dynastic (n=721)	Other dynastic (n=60)	(1.2)-(1.1) No-dynastic – Pro-democratic dynastic	(1.3)-(1.1) Other dynastic – Pro-democratic dynastic	(1.2)-(1.3) Non-dynastic – Other dynastic
Jewish	0.045 (0.026)	0.03 (0.006)	0 (0)	-0.016 (0.022)	-0.045* (0.027)	0.03 (0.02)
Freemason	0.076 (0.03)	0.058 (0.009)	0 (0)	-0.018 (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	0.058* (0.03)
Years of study	5.17 (0.36)	3.43 (0.11)	3.72 (0.4)	-1.73*** (0.39)	-1.45*** (0.53)	-0.28 (0.41)
Low-skilled	0.09 (0.036)	0.22 (0.02)	0.2 (0.052)	0.13** (0.05)	0.11* (0.06)	0.02 (0.01)
Law	0.48 (0.061)	0.28 (0.017)	0.25 (0.056)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.23*** (0.08)	0.027 (0.02)
Journalist	0.14 (0.043)	0.14 (0.012)	0.03 (0.02)	0 (0.044)	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.10** (0.04)
Occupied	0.39 (0.06)	0.52 (0.02)	0.63 (0.06)	0.12* (0.05)	0.24*** (0.09)	0.11* (0.07)
Crossed by the demarcation	0.26 (0.05)	0.13 (0.01)	0.12 (0.04)	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.14** (0.07)	0.01 (0.05)
Leftwing	0.15 (0.04)	0.23 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.08 (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.05)

Columns (1.1) to (1.3) are sample means. Columns (1.4) to (1.6) show differences between groups. Standard deviation in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In comparison to other dynastic parliamentarians, pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were on average more educated, more likely to be Freemasons, to belong to a leftwing party and to work as journalist or in a law related profession. Finally, in comparison to other dynastic parliamentarians, non-dynastic parliamentarians were more likely to belong to a leftwing party.

The upshot of Table 1 is that dynastic parliamentarians differed from non-dynastic parliamentarians. Most importantly within the group of dynastic parliamentarians there were substantial and statistically significant differences between pro-democratic and other dynastic parliamentarians. The table therefore provides evidence supporting the notion that the two groups should be distinguished and may have voted differently on the enabling act. To see if they did, Figure 1 displays the shares of votes opposing the votes cast by each group.




Figure 1: Mean comparison – Shares of parliamentarians opposing the act

Three findings emerge from Figure 1. First, pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians opposed the act more than non-dynastic parliamentarians. Specifically, 21.1 percent of democratic dynastic parliamentarians voted against the act (12 out of 57 taking part in the vote), compared with 11.4 percent of non-dynastic parliamentarians (64 out of 561 taking part in the vote). This difference is statistically significant at the five percent level of confidence. Second, democratic dynastic parliamentarians also opposed the act more than other dynastic parliamentarians, only 7.8 percent of whom did so. This difference is marginally statistically significant at the ten percent level. Finally, the difference between non-dynastic and other dynastic parliamentarians is not statistically significant at accepted levels.

3.2 Methodology

To go beyond bivariate correlations, we estimate the following baseline model:

$$Vote_i(No) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Pro - democratic Dynasty_i + \beta_2 Other Dynasty_i + \Gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where $Vote_i(No)$ is a dummy variable equal to one if a parliamentarian i opposed the enabling act. $Pro - democratic Dynasty_i$ is a dummy variable equal to one if he belongs to a pro-democratic dynasty. $Other Dynasty_i$ is a dummy variable equal to one if he belongs to a dynasty that is not defined as democratic. X_i is a set of control variables including *départements* fixed effects accounting for spatial differences in the vote.²¹ β_0 , β_1 , and β_2 are coefficients. Γ is a vector of coefficients and ε_i the error term. The specification therefore distinguishes three types of parliamentarians: pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians, other dynastic parliamentarians, and non-dynastic parliamentarians, which is the reference category.

In the baseline specification, opposing the reform is defined as having voted “No”. We do not take abstentions into account in our baseline model, because abstention cannot be interpreted as a tacit opposition to the reform. The baseline model therefore contrasts “No” votes on the one hand and “Yes” votes and abstentions on the other hand.²²

This model is estimated as a Linear Probability Model, using Ordinary Least Squares, to facilitate the interpretation and because the results are unlikely to diverge from the ones obtained using other procedures (Battay et al., 2019; Gomila, 2019). Appendix B3 shows that the baseline results are similar when estimating a logit model. This robustness test should alleviate concerns arising from the use of a Linear Probability Model for binary dependent variable.²³ All models are estimated using standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the party level because ideologies and the taste for democracy are more likely to be correlated across their members even without explicit coordination.²⁴

²¹ We control for *départements* fixed effects because it is the smallest geographic unit that we can match to both senators and deputies. Specifically, senators were elected in *départements* by a college of local officials of the *département*, while deputies were directly elected by voters in *arrondissements*, which are a subdivision of *départements*.

²² Taking abstention into account, either as an intermediary position between an explicit opposition and an explicit support to the act or as a third independent position does not change our results (see Appendix B.1). One may consider other forms of opposition to the act. For instance, some parliamentarians had already joined General de Gaulle in London. Others had sailed on the *Massilia* to reach Algiers and organize a government there. Others were simply absent, with or without being excused, or prisoners. In Appendix B.2, we show that pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were as likely as other parliamentarians to follow those courses of action.

²³ Table B.1 presents models using *départements* means to account for peer effects. To avoid biasing the estimates by selecting only a subset of observations, we use *départements* means when estimating models via maximum likelihood.

²⁴ Our results are robust to using ordered logit or multinomial logit models (see Appendix B.1). Furthermore, the results remain the same if we cluster standard errors at the *department* level. Political parties are described in Table A.4 in the appendix. As there are many political parties, we also use a Wild-Bootstrap correction using

4. Empirical results

Table 2a reports baseline regressions. It contrasts models where all dynastic parliamentarians are pooled together, reported in odd-numbered columns, and models where we distinguish between pro-democratic and other dynastic parliamentarians, reported in even-numbered columns.

Column 2a.1 reports a bivariate regression controlling for a single dummy variable that pools all dynastic parliamentarians, pro-democratic or not. The coefficient of that variable is non-significant at usual levels. At first sight, dynastic parliamentarians therefore did not oppose the act more than non-dynastic parliamentarians.

However, pooling dynasties hides differences. Column 2a.2 reports the result of a regression distinguishing pro-democratic and other dynastic parliamentarians. In that regression, the coefficient of the pro-democratic dynastic dummy is positive and statistically significant at the five-percent level. The point estimate implies that pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were 9.64 percentage points more likely to oppose the act than their non-dynastic peers. Conversely, the coefficient of the other dynasty dummy variable is negative and insignificant at standard levels, implying that the behavior of other dynastic parliamentarians did not differ from the behavior of non-dynastic parliamentarians. This finding again supports our presumption that pro-democratic and other dynastic parliamentarians differed in the vote. This is confirmed by the finding that the coefficients of the Pro-democratic dynasty dummy variable and of the Other Dynasty are statistically different at the five-percent level.

Columns 2a.3 and 2a.4 report similar regressions, controlling for the main observable characteristics of parliamentarians. The coefficient attached to some personal characteristics is in line with some of the explanations put forward by historians. Three are positive and statistically significant at the five-percent level: being a Freemason and having served during WWI and representing an occupied territory. Political orientation also mattered in the vote. Leftwing and centrist parliamentarians were more likely than their rightwing counterparts to oppose the act, as their coefficient is positive and significant at the one-percent level.

999 replications of our results. Those results are presented in Appendix B.4. Those different clustering methods do not affect our results.

Table 2a: Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians and opposition to the enabling act:

Baseline results				
Dependent variable: Vote _i =No	(2a.1)	(2a.2)	(2a.3)	(2a.4)
Political Dynasty	0.0341 (1.511)		0.125** (2.615)	
Pro-democratic dynasty		0.0964** (2.675)		0.151*** (3.403)
Other dynasty		-0.0357 (-1.109)		0.0946 (1.393)
In <i>Senate</i>			0.0379 (0.680)	0.0358 (0.650)
Age			0.00289* (1.774)	0.00287* (1.763)
Jewish			0.00854 (0.0980)	0.00310 (0.0350)
Freemason			0.122** (2.787)	0.122** (2.775)
Years of study			0.00316 (0.475)	0.00315 (0.475)
Occupation: Journalist			-0.00844 (-0.202)	-0.00983 (-0.234)
Law-related			0.0201 (0.734)	0.0173 (0.610)
Medical profession			0.0642 (1.322)	0.0612 (1.269)
Civil Servant			-0.0540* (-1.924)	-0.0557* (-1.955)
Low-skilled			0.0385 (1.097)	0.0388 (1.110)
Occupied territory			0.0951** (2.431)	0.0988** (2.245)
Crossed by the demarcation line			-0.0543 (-0.731)	-0.0567 (-0.792)
WWI veteran			0.0450** (2.453)	0.0457** (2.469)
<u>Reference category: Right</u>				
Center			0.146*** (3.074)	0.144*** (3.005)
Left			0.323*** (5.865)	0.320*** (5.884)
Constant	0.114*** (3.894)	0.114*** (3.892)	-0.104 (-0.747)	-0.0972 (-0.695)
<i>Départements FE</i>				
Wild bootstrap (95% CI: Pro-Dem Dyn)				
		[.07031, .2941]	✓	[.06681, .2832]
Observations	669	669	669	669
R-squared	0.001	0.008	0.333	0.334

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the party-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Two other characteristics bear coefficients that are significant at the ten-percent level: age, whose coefficient is positive, and civil servant, whose coefficient is negative. These results can be interpreted in light of the determinants of the vote surveyed by Ermakoff (2009). The first is pressure. One may contend that older parliamentarians were less likely to give in to pressure because a smaller part of their career was at stake. Freemasons or members of veterans' associations were likely more immune to pressure in the parliament because they could feel a responsibility vis-à-vis their fellow members. The coefficients of the variables coding ideology may be driven by the fact that right-wing politicians were ideologically closer to the supporters of the Act.

More to the point, the dynastic dummy variable exhibits a positive and statistically significant coefficient in Column 2a.3, suggesting a general effect of being a dynastic parliamentarian. Again, when pro-democratic and other dynasties are distinguished in Column 2a.4, the effect appears to be driven mostly by pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians. The coefficient of the pro-democratic dynastic dummy variable is positive and significant at the one-percent level and its point estimate implies that pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were 15.1 percentage points more likely to oppose the act than their non-dynastic peers. By contrast, the coefficient of the other dynasty dummy fails to be significant at accepted levels.

Regressions 2a.3 and 2a.4 confirm the two key findings of Regressions 2a.1 and 2a.2. Firstly, pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were more likely to oppose the enabling act than their non-dynastic peers. Secondly, the votes of other dynastic parliamentarians were statistically indistinguishable from those of their non-dynastic peers. Even after accounting for a set of individual characteristics, pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were more likely than their non-dynastic peers to oppose the vote. On the contrary, other dynastic parliamentarians did not differ from their non-dynastic peers. The coefficients of the pro-democratic dynasty and the other dynasty dummies are not statistically different. Control variables likely explained part of the differences between the two types of dynasties. The main lesson of Table 2a is that pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians can be distinguished from non-dynastic parliamentarians whereas it is not the case for other dynastic parliamentarians. Moreover, the effect of belonging to a pro-democratic dynasty rather than being a non-dynastic parliamentarian was substantial. Looking at the magnitude of the coefficient, pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians did oppose the act 9.6 to 15.1 percentage points more than their non-dynastic peers.

Table 2b: What explains the difference between pro-democratic and Other dynastic parliamentarians

	(2b.1)	(2b.2)	(2b.3)	(2b.4)	(2b.5)	(2b.6)	(2b.7)	(2b.8)	(2b.9)	(2b.10)
Dependent variable: $Vote_i=No$										
Pro-democratic Dynasties	0.0964** (2.675)	0.0984** (2.642)	0.0961** (2.307)	0.0965** (2.692)	0.0937*** (2.838)	0.0965** (2.680)	0.0937** (2.281)	0.0907** (2.332)	0.127*** (3.001)	0.110*** (3.177)
Other Dynasties	-0.0357 (-1.109)	-0.0301 (-0.926)	-0.0319 (-0.904)	-0.0357 (-1.107)	-0.0340 (-1.065)	-0.0356 (-1.065)	-0.0360 (-1.120)	-0.0190 (-0.541)	0.0298 (0.579)	0.0319 (0.761)
Constant	0.114*** (3.892)	0.109*** (3.544)	0.0982*** (2.802)	0.117* (1.852)	0.112*** (3.981)	0.114*** (3.539)	0.108** (2.755)	0.164*** (4.058)	0.143 (0.938)	-0.00299 (-0.117)
<u>Controls:</u>										
Free-mason		✓								
Occupation			✓							
Age				✓						
Jewish					✓					
WWI Veteran						✓				
Years of study							✓			
Territory – Demarcation line								✓		
<i>Départements</i> FE									✓	
Political orientation										✓
Wald test – Difference:										
Pro-Dem Dynasties / Other Dynasties	0.018**	0.023**	0.05*	0.017**	0.015**	0.020**	0.030**	0.058*	0.067*	0.103
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669
R-squared	0.008	0.013	0.020	0.008	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.031	0.238	0.101

OLS estimates. Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Each column adds a set of control variables. Column 2b.1 presents the same results as Column 2a.2 in Table 2a. Column 2b.2 adds a dummy variable for membership to free-masonry. Column 2b.3 adds dummy variables for different occupation (Journalist, Law-related, Medical profession, civil-servant, Low-skill). Column 2b.4 adds age as a control variable. Column 2b.5 adds a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Parliamentarian was Jewish. Column 2b.6 adds as control a dummy variable equal to one if the parliamentarian was a veteran from World War I. Column 2b.7 adds years of study as a control. Column 2b.8 adds two dummy variables: one if the *département* is in the territory occupied by Germany and one if the *département* he represents is crossed by the demarcation line. Column 2b.9 adds *départements* fixed effects. Column 2b.10 adds one dummy variable if the parliamentarian is left-wing, one dummy variable if he belongs in a party of the Center and one dummy variable equal to one if he was a Senator.

Table 2b further investigates the difference between the two types of dynastic parliamentarians. To do so, it sequentially adds control variables and reports Wald tests assessing whether the difference between the two dynastic dummy variables is statistically significant. Regardless of the control variable, the coefficient of the pro-democratic dynastic politicians is significant at the ten percent-level or beyond and the magnitude of the coefficient of the pro-democratic dynasty dummy variable varies little across regressions. Accordingly, the point estimates of the effect of being a pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian rather than a non-dynastic one ranges from 9.07 to 12.7 percentage points. Pro-democratic dynastic politicians differ from non-dynastic politicians in the same way regardless of the control variable that we include in the regression.

The Wald-tests show that the two dynastic dummy variables are statistically different from each other at the ten-percent level of significance or beyond, except when we control for parliamentarians' political orientation. In that case, pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians cannot be distinguished from other dynastic parliamentarians. This finding suggests that political orientation was an important driver of the difference in the propensity to oppose the act between pro-democratic and other dynastic parliamentarians. It however does not explain why pro-democratic dynastic politicians opposed the act more than non-dynastic parliamentarians.

Our results are robust to five different considerations: selection into the vote, the role of abstention, confounding effects of covariates thanks to a propensity score matching procedure, alternative clustering of standard errors, and alternative coding of the dynasty variable (See Appendices B.1 to B.6).²⁵

The results from our propensity score matching exercise, reported in Appendix B5, may be illustrated by pairs of otherwise similar parliamentarians who belonged to a different form of political dynasty and voted differently.²⁶ The first pair consists of Paul Giacobbi and François Piétri, both from Corsica. They came from the same part of Corsica, being born at a distance of approximately 80 km from each other. Both had been trained as lawyers. They began their political career at the same time, Paul Giacobbi being elected mayor of Bastia in 1922 and François Piétri member of parliament in 1924. Paul Giacobbi belonged to *Parti Radical*, François Piétri belonged

²⁵ We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to test the alternative coding of the dynastic variable presented in Table B.6.

²⁶ We chose those two pairs because their propensity scores were close and because they both featured a pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian and another dynastic parliamentarian.

to the *Républicains de gauche*, which were both left-of-center political parties, even though the second one gradually drifted to the center right at the end of the interwar period.²⁷ Their political dynasties differed also strongly. Paul Giacobbi's father, Marius Giacobbi, had been elected member of parliament and senator during the Third Republic and belonged to the Gauche Démocratique. Accordingly, Paul Giacobbi is a pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian. François Piétri's political forebears include two senators active during the Second Empire as well as members of parliament during the Third Republic. He is therefore classified as belonging to another dynasty. In 1940, Paul Giacobbi voted against the proposal to grant full powers to Pétain while François Piétri endorsed it. During the occupation, Piétri served as French ambassador in Madrid, Giacobbi joined the resistance, was captured, escaped and was active in the liberation of Corsica in 1943.

The pair formed by Robert Mauger and Paul Bénazet provides another illustration of the role of political dynasties. Both came from a rural department from the center of the country, respectively Loir-et-Cher and Indre, fought during the First World war, and belonged to parties on the left of the political spectrum, respectively *SFIO* and *Gauche démocratique*. Robert Mauger's father, Pierre-Henri Mauger, had been elected on a leftwing-party list in 1924 as deputy of Loir-et-Cher. Paul Bénazet also came from a dynastic family, as his grand-father, Théodore Bénazet, had been active in politics and his father, Paul-Antoine Bénazet, was a Deputy of Indre. However, Paul-Antoine Bénazet was a Bonapartist. Accordingly, Robert Mauger's dynasty is classified as pro-democratic whereas Paul Bénazet's is not.²⁸ Robert Mauger voted against the enabling act whereas Paul Bénazet voted in favor.

5. Why did democratic dynastic parliamentarians behave differently on July 10, 1940?

We now investigate why pro-democratic dynasts were more likely to vote against the enabling act than their peers, distinguishing explanations based on self-interest from those based on socialization. First, we document the trajectories of those parliamentarians during World War II to gauge the role of self-interest and of a genuine commitment to democracy (Section 5.1). Second, we leverage the heterogeneity of pro-democratic dynasties to further investigate both the

²⁷ Admittedly, the two parliamentarians also differed across other dimensions: François Piétri was a war veteran and a deputy in 1940 while Paul Giacobbi was a senator.

²⁸ Robert Mauger and Paul Bénazet also differed in other dimensions. Robert Mauger was a free-mason and was a deputy in 1940, while Paul Bénazet was a senator.

importance of self-interest and the role of socialization in the family (Section 5.2). The remaining sections are devoted to the role of later socialization: during World War I (Section 5.3), in political parties (Section 5.4), and inside and outside the parliament (Section 5.5).

5.1 Self-interest and commitment to democracy: The trajectories of parliamentarians during the war

The behavior of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians may be driven by lower career prospects under the new regime. Their opposition to the enabling act would then have been driven by self-interest. We investigate this hypothesis by studying the trajectory of parliamentarians under the Vichy regime and during the war. If the opposition of pro-democratic parliamentarians to the enabling act was driven by their lower career prospects in the new regime, we should observe that they fared less well than other parliamentarians during the war. This is not the case. Pro-democratic dynastic politicians were no more likely than other parliamentarians to hold a position in the Vichy regime nor were they more likely to die during the war (Appendix C.1).²⁹

Another way to gauge the role of self-interest is to assess the role of the individual political capital accumulated by parliamentarians. In Appendix C.2, we control for a series of measures of individual political experience and political capital. When doing so, the effect of being a pro-democratic parliamentarian is little affected.

Participation in the resistance during the war can be interpreted as evidence of a deep-rooted motivation to stand for democracy. We therefore document the participation of parliamentarians in the resistance based on their biographies. We also determine whether a parliamentarian received the medal of the resistance after the war, thanks to data collected by Wieviorka (2001). We code that information as two dummy variables that we use as dependent variables instead of the opposition to the enabling Act.

Table 3 reports the outcome of those regressions. Even after controlling for baseline control variables, the coefficient attached to the pro-democratic dynastic variable is positive and significant at the ten-percent level (Column 3.2). Its magnitude implies that pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were 10 percentage points more likely than non-dynastic parliamentarians to join the resistance. Likewise, in Columns 3.3 and 3.4, where the dependent variable is the dummy

²⁹ Death during the war may capture danger both as a collaborator or as a resistant. We interpret this result accordingly and infer that differences in death rates could be interpreted as more exposure to danger. However, in Appendix C.1, we do not find any evidence of difference in death rates.

variable set to one if a parliamentarian was awarded the medal of the resistance, the coefficients attached to the Pro-democratic dynasty variable are positive and significant at least at the ten-percent level. Their magnitudes imply that pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were 8.5 to 11.1 percentage points more likely to obtain the medal of the resistance. Moreover, dynastic parliamentarians did not behave differently in votes related to the balance of power between the government and the parliament in the legislature preceding World War II (Table C5.a and C5.b in Appendix) suggesting that their specific behavior appears when democracy is threatened.

Table 3: Pro-democratic dynasties and resistance during World War II

	(3.1)	(3.2)	(3.3)	(3.4)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Dependent variable:	Joins the resistance	Joins the resistance	Medal of the Resistance	Medal of the Resistance
Pro-democratic dynasty	0.0660 (1.383)	0.103* (1.993)	0.0854* (1.971)	0.111** (2.089)
Other Dynasty	-0.0517 (-0.918)	-0.0189 (-0.270)	-0.0178 (-0.769)	0.000689 (0.0238)
Constant	0.267*** (7.578)	0.704** (2.473)	0.0374*** (3.455)	0.110 (1.391)
Political orientation		✓		✓
Baseline controls		✓		✓
<i>Département</i> FE		✓		✓
Observations	669	669	669	669
R-squared	0.003	0.205	0.015	0.196

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

The results of this section indicate that the opposition to the enabling act of pro-democratic dynasts was unlikely driven by self-interest but rather reflected the effect of a genuine commitment to democratic ideals.

5.2 Heterogeneity within pro-democratic dynasties

Pro-democratic dynasties are heterogeneous. They may for example be of different lengths or have emerged in different contexts. Some may have been interrupted whereas others exhibit continuity. Those characteristics may result in either a stronger self-interest in maintaining

democracy or a stronger socialization/monitoring by the dynasty. According to Piketty's (1995) hypothesis of dynastic learning, different dynastic histories could result in different levels of support for democracy, hence potentially different behaviors in the vote of the enabling act.

Table 4 investigates how those characteristics may either explain or mediate our effect. Columns 4.1 and 4.2 split the baseline pro-democratic dynastic dummy variable into a more restrictive dummy variable capturing whether the founder of the dynasty was also a founder of the republic and another capturing other pro-democratic dynasts. The coefficient of the dummy based on the more restrictive definition is positive and statistically significant at the five percent level. Its magnitude is similar to that of the broader pro-democratic dynasties dummy, as evidenced by the Wald-test presented in Column 4.3. Accordingly, the origin of a pro-democratic dynasty was not essential to determine the behavior of a parliamentarian, as long as the dynasty was pro-democratic.

Younger pro-democratic dynasties may provide a smaller electoral advantage therefore reducing the vested interest of pro-democratic dynasts in maintaining democracy and/or transmit weaker democratic ideals. To test the effect of dynasties' age in the vote, we consider how long the dynasty had been active in parliament (Columns 4.4 to 4.6). The variable "Tenure in Parliament" is equal to the sum of years spent, as a deputy or as a senator, by the family members of dynastic parliamentarians in our sample. With the same end in view, we define a dummy variable taking the value one if the dynasty was only one generation old in 1940 (Columns 4.7 to 4.9). By construction these dynasties were uninterrupted and can be used to assess the role of continuity. When controlling for those variables or interacting the pro-democratic dynasty variable with them, the main results remain unchanged. In this set of regressions, one result stands out: the probability of pro-democratic dynasts to oppose the reform decreases when their dynasty had been active in Parliament for a longer time (see Column 4.6 and Figure C1 in the Appendix).

Dynasties also monitor their members (Geys and Smith, 2017). That monitoring is likely tighter when a forebear is still alive. We therefore control for two dummy variables coding that condition, one for all dynasties and one specifically for pro-democratic dynasties. Those estimations are reported in Appendix C.6.b. They show that the monitoring of parliamentarians with surviving forebears active in politics does not explain baseline results.

Table 4: Investigating heterogeneity within pro-democratic dynasties

	(4.1)	(4.2)	(4.3)	(4.4)	(4.5)	(4.6)	(4.7)	(4.8)	(4.9)
Dependent variable $\text{Vote}_i = \text{No}$									
Pro-Democratic dynasties (Founding fathers – III rd Republic)	0.143** (2.539)	0.152** (2.584)	0.156** (2.684)						
Pro-Democratic dynasties (others)			0.135 (1.212)						
Tenure Dynasty in parliament				0.0036** (2.149)	0.000759 (0.312)	0.00403* (1.810)			
Pro-Democratic dynasties					0.141** (2.729)	0.193*** (3.845)		0.200*** (2.914)	0.239** (2.701)
Pro-Democratic dynasties × Tenure in parliament						-0.0071* (-1.849)			
New Dynasties							0.0868 (1.518)	-0.0610 (-0.713)	-0.0224 (-0.218)
New Pro-Democratic Dynasties									-0.0866 (-0.707)
Other dynasties		0.0882 (1.339)	0.0943 (1.377)	0.0301 (0.484)	0.0840 (1.180)	0.0387 (0.521)	0.0502 (0.800)	0.118 (1.566)	0.104 (1.290)
Constant	-0.0662 (-0.480)	-0.0763 (-0.549)	-0.0940 (-0.632)	-0.114 (-0.833)	-0.0994 (-0.726)	-0.112 (-0.828)	-0.0966 (-0.688)	-0.101 (-0.738)	-0.103 (-0.750)
Political orientation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Baseline control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Département</i> FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Wald test Founders= Other Pro-Dem			0.8795						
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669
R-squared	0.328	0.332	0.334	0.326	0.334	0.338	0.326	0.335	0.336

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

5.3 Socialization during World War I: Veterans' proximity to Pétain

In 1940, many parliamentarians were WWI veterans. What that particular form of socialization meant could depend on under whose command they fought. Cagé et al. (2020) argue that soldiers who had fought under Pétain's command in the first world war were more likely to support his regime. We follow their approach and distinguish veterans who fought under the authority of Pétain, in particular during the battle of Verdun, from others. We checked the military records of the 397 veterans in our sample and looked for information about their activities during the war in their biographies to determine if they served under Pétain's command. Appendix B.7 describes our method. We defined four dummy variables capturing different periods of Pétain's command and controlled for them in the baseline regression.

The results are reported in Table B.7 in the Appendix. The table features three panels, each devoted to a specific way to consider veterans whose records could not be found. If anything, the table reports little evidence that parliamentarians who served under Pétain's command were less likely to oppose the enabling Act. In most regressions, the coefficients of the dummy variables are statistically insignificant or significant and positive, meaning that having served under Pétain's command does not correlate or correlates positively with the probability of opposing the enabling act. The only exception appears in Panel B of Table B7, where the dummy capturing service under Pétain's command bears a negative coefficient significant at the ten-percent level. The evidence is however weak, as the same variable is statistically insignificant in all other regressions. These results could be reconciled with those of Cagé et al. (2020) on the grounds that the populations and the incentives to support Pétain's regime are certainly different between their sample and ours.

Regardless of the dummy variables for which we control in Table B7, the finding that pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were more likely to oppose the enabling act is not driven by their service under Pétain during World War I.

5.4 The role of political parties

Despite parties being weak, they may still have contributed to the socialization of parliamentarians. That could explain the behavior of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians if they were more likely to join parties with a specific pro-democratic stance. We therefore control for affiliation in several ways in Table 5.

First, we control for party fixed effects. In Column 5.1, we now observe that the coefficient of the dynasty dummy variable is positive and statistically significant at the five-percent level. However, Column 5.2 confirms that that effect is mainly driven by pro-democratic dynasties, whose coefficient is statistically significant at the one-percent level while the coefficient of other dynasties is statistically insignificant.

We then investigate the specific role of democratic parties. To do so, we define a dummy variable capturing whether a parliamentarian belonged to a party that would qualify as pro-democratic according to our definition of pro-democratic dynasties. 535 parliamentarians belong to such a party in our sample.

We first use that dummy as dependent variable, to determine whether pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were more likely to join a pro-democratic party. Column 5.3 shows that dynastic parliamentarians were not more likely than their peers to join a democratic party. In Column 5.4, however, the coefficient of the pro-democratic dynastic dummy is positive and statistically significant at the ten-percent level. Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were 10.9 percentage points more likely to belong to a democratic party.

Second, Column 5.5 reports estimates of the baseline specification restricting the set of explanatory variables to the pro-democratic party dummy and baseline control variables.³⁰ In that regression, the coefficient of the pro-democratic party variable is statistically insignificant at standard levels. Therefore, members of pro-democratic parties were as likely to oppose the enabling act as members of other parties.

Third, to test whether belonging to a pro-democratic party amplifies the effect of being a pro-democratic dynast, we interact the dynastic dummies with the pro-democratic party dummy in Columns 5.5 and 5.6. Neither of these interaction terms is significant but the pro-democratic dynastic dummy is positive and statistically significant at the ten-percent level, confirming that pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were more likely than non-dynastic parliamentarians to oppose the enabling act even when the former did not belong to a pro-democratic party. Membership to pro-democratic parties hence neither mediate nor moderate our baseline results.

³⁰ As party dummies captures the democratic nature of parties, we need to drop party fixed effects to be able to estimate that regression as well as regressions 5.6 and 5.7.

Table 5: Political parties, dynasties, and opposition to the enabling act

Dependent variable:	(5.1) Vote _i =No	(5.2) Vote _i =No ₄₀	(5.3) Democratic Party _i	(5.4) Democratic Party _i	(5.5) Vote _i =No	(5.6) Vote _i =No	(5.7) Vote _i =No ₄₀
Dynasty	0.132** (2.767)		0.0666 (1.398)			0.182** (2.629)	
Pro-democratic Dynasties		0.152*** (3.404)		0.109* (1.898)			0.102* (1.718)
Other Dynasties		0.109 (1.654)		0.0161 (0.256)			0.0927 (1.344)
Pro-democratic party					0.0621 (1.517)	0.0638 (1.350)	0.0475 (1.066)
Dynasty × Pro-democratic party						-0.0767 (-1.045)	
Pro Democratic Dynasty × Pro-democratic party							0.0475 (0.630)
Constant	-0.0763 (-0.396)	-0.0751 (-0.388)	0.492 (1.629)	0.509 (1.678)	-0.0505 (-0.271)	-0.0639 (-0.348)	-0.0424 (-0.230)
Marginal effect of the relevant dynastic variable in a pro-democratic party						0.11** (0.05)	0.149*** (0.05)
Party FE	✓	✓					
Baseline control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Départements FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Political orientation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669	669
R-squared	0.395	0.395	0.294	0.302	0.277	0.286	0.287

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Pro-Democratic Parties is a dummy variable equal to one if a parliamentarian belongs to a party that would qualify as “democratic” according to our definition of pro-democratic dynasties. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), département crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

For comparability, Table 5 controls for political orientation, which correlates with party types. Controlling for both political orientation and party memberships allows to separately consider socialization within party and political preferences. Table C.7 in the Appendix however shows that not controlling for political orientation does not affect our results on the behavior of dynasts. The coefficients attached to the pro-democratic party dummy variable then becomes positive and statistically significant. Accordingly, the political orientation of those parties correlates with opposition to the enabling act but does not explain the specific behavior of dynasts.

5.5 The importance of socialization inside and outside parliament

Despite being born and initially socialized in pro-democratic dynasties pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians interacted with their peers in the parliament. More experienced parliamentarians would have built more and stronger relationships with their peers, internalized their norms more, thus becoming more likely to conform. The effect of being a pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian would therefore fade with prominence in the parliament and time spent as a parliamentarian. By contrast, stronger connections outside parliament in the local environment shaped by their forbears could counterbalance connections within parliament. The effect of being a pro-democratic dynast could thus be larger for parliamentarians with stronger connections outside parliament.

We proxy prominence in the parliament by the number of interventions of each parliamentarian from 1936 to 1940, according to the parliamentary minutes published in the *Journal officiel de la République Française*.³¹ We also define a dummy variable capturing whether the parliamentarian had held a special position before the war, namely if he had been chairman, vice-chairman, or secretary of one of the two chambers. We consider two measures of the strength of connections outside parliament: years of experience in the departmental assembly, “Conseil général”, and a dummy variable coding dynasties whose founder was a member of local labor or agricultural associations. The longer the parliamentarian’s experience in the departmental assembly the stronger the connections he will have kept with his constituency. Likewise, the founder of the dynasty’s membership in an agricultural or labor union could measure the strength of the

³¹ Those measures are normalized in each chamber and in the group of former ministers. For instance, for senators, the measure is the number of interventions minus the mean number of interventions in the Senate divided by the standard deviation of the number of interventions in the Senate. The same operation applies to deputies and ministers.

commitment of the dynasty to democracy because membership in those organizations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was a statement in favor of democracy. Parliamentarians raised in such a dynasty should therefore have internalized stronger democratic norms.

Table 6: Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians and opposition to the 1940 enabling act: Effects conditional on socialization inside and outside parliament

	(6.1)	(6.2)	(6.3)	(6.4)
Dependent variable $\text{Vote}_i = \text{No}$				
Democratic Dynasties	0.155*** (3.389)	0.169*** (3.146)	0.0848 (1.252)	0.122*** (2.873)
Other Dynasties	0.0965 (1.435)	0.0971 (1.441)	0.0971 (1.486)	0.0925 (1.369)
Nb of Intervention	-0.00753 (-0.630)			
Democratic Dynasties \times # Interventions	-0.0530* (-1.773)			
Special Role in the Assembly		-0.00286 (-0.0704)		
Democratic Dynasties \times Special Role in the Assembly		-0.0847 (-1.328)		
Time as a conseiller général			0.000562 (0.346)	
Democratic Dynasties \times Time as a conseiller général			0.00632 (1.619)	
Democratic Dynasties + Agr/Lab Org				0.299*** (3.017)
Constant	-0.134 (-0.931)	-0.122 (-0.802)	-0.106 (-0.754)	-0.107 (-0.757)
Baseline controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Political orientation	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Département</i> FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	669	669	669	669
R-squared	0.335	0.334	0.338	0.337

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

Simply controlling for the accumulation of more individual experience, prominence in parliament, or connections outside parliament, which we do in Online Appendix C, leaves our results unchanged. However, interacting them with the pro-democratic dynastic dummy variable shows that they moderate its effect, in line with the socialization hypothesis. The outcomes of those

regressions are reported in Table 6. In regressions 6.1 and 6.2, the interaction terms between the pro-democratic dummy variable and the two measures of prominence bear a negative sign, suggesting that the effect of being a pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian was lower for more prominent parliamentarians.


We obtain similar results when we interact the pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian dummy variable with years of experience in their “Conseil général” and connections of the dynasty with local labor or agricultural associations. Here, the interaction terms bear a positive coefficient (Columns 6.3 and 6.4 of Table 6), suggesting that the effect of being a pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian was larger for parliamentarians with stronger connections outside parliament.

To gauge the quantitative significance of the regressions, Figures 2 to 5 plot the point estimates and the confidence intervals of the marginal effect of being a democratic dynastic parliamentarian on the probability to oppose the enabling act implied by the regressions of Table 6, as suggested by Brambor et al. (2006). The marginal effect of being a pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian was statistically insignificant for parliamentarians with a large enough number of interventions in the parliament (Figure 2).³² Only pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians who had held no special position opposed the act more than their non-dynastic peers (Figure 3).

The marginal effect of being a pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian increased with experience at the local level (Figure 4). Figure 5 moreover shows that the point estimate of the probability to oppose the act is larger if the founder of the dynasty belonged to a local agricultural/labor organization. It is twice as high as the probability of other dynastic parliamentarians to oppose the act. Conversely, the opposition rate of members of pro-democratic dynasties not linked to those organizations is similar to that of other dynasties.


³² Note that we cannot define a threshold number of interventions from which the effect of democratic dynasties starts being insignificant, since this measure is normalized within chambers.

Figure 2: Marginal effect of being a pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian on the probability of opposing the enabling act conditional on the number of interventions in parliament




Estimates inferred from Regression 6.1 reported in Table 6.

Figure 3: Probability of opposing the enabling act conditional on role in Parliament




Estimates inferred from Regression 6.2 reported in Table 6.

Figure 4: Marginal effect of being a pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian on the probability to oppose the enabling act conditional on years as *conseiller général*



Estimates inferred from Regression 6.3 reported in Table 6.

Figure 5: Probability to oppose the enabling act conditional on connection to labor and agricultural organizations



Estimates inferred from Regression 6.4 reported in Table 6.

Those results sketch a consistent picture of the role of socialization inside and outside the parliament. The stronger their socialization inside the parliament, the lower the propensity of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians to oppose the act. Conversely, the stronger their socialization

outside the parliament, the higher their propensity to oppose the act. As connections to labor and agriculture amplified the effect of being a pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian, the nature of connections also mattered.

6. Conclusion

Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were more likely than the vast majority of their peers to oppose an act leading to the advent of a dictatorship. The finding is specific to pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians, defined as members of a dynasty whose founder was a defender of pro-democratic ideals. It does not extend to other dynastic parliamentarians and survives a series of robustness checks and propensity score estimates lending some credence to a causal interpretation of the results.

We provide suggestive evidence that the behavior of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians was in general not driven by self-interest, socialization within parties, the accumulation of more experience or prominence in parliament, or the monitoring of their dynasty. However, pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians with less experience in parliament, more experience in local politics, and with a connection to labor and agricultural organizations were more likely to oppose the act. Those findings suggest an important role for socialization inside and outside the parliament. Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians who had had less time to socialize within parliament and who had more relationships outside it could better resist the conformity to the parliamentary majority.

Those results contrast with the literature that usually points out the negative consequences of dynasties. Since pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were more likely to oppose an autocratic reversal, the emergence of pro-democratic dynasties may contribute to the stabilization of democracy after a democratic transition.

The effect was driven by pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians, as opposed to their other dynastic peers. This finding uncovers an unexplored source of heterogeneity: dynasties may differ in terms of their democratic culture.

History offers numerous examples of successful or failed autocratic reversals, including Spain in the 1930s and 1980s, or authoritarian backsliding, like in contemporary Eastern Europe. Gauging the role that pro-democratic dynasties may have played or still play in those episodes offers perspectives for future research.

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Appendix A: Description of the data

Table A1: List of dynastic parliamentarians

<u>Parliamentarian in 1940</u>	<u>Pro-democratic dynasty</u>	<u>Dynasty Founder</u>	<u>Political regime</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Party</u>
Bernard d'Aillières	no	Augustin, Henry Caillard d'Aillières	July Monarchy	Deputy (1837-1839)	Ministerial majority
André Albert	yes	François Albert	Third Republic	Senator (1920-1927) Deputy (1928-1933) Took part in the Commune (1871)	Radical Party
Gaston Allemane	yes	Jean Allemane	Third Republic	Deputy (1901-1902 /1906-1910)	Republican - Socialist
Hubert d'Andlau de Hombourg	no	Frédéric-Antoine-Marc d'Andlau	Monarchy	Noble at the General Estate of 1789	Royalist
Joseph Antier	no	Abbé Antier	Absolute monarchy	Reactionary Abbot during the French Revolution	Monarchist
Paul Antier	no	Abbé Antier	Absolute monarchy	Reactionary Abbot during the French Revolution	Monarchist
Étienne d'Audiffret-Pasquier	no	Etienne-Denis Pasquier	Restoration July Monarchy	President of the deputies assembly (1816-1817) President of the Chamber of Pairs (1830-1848)	Monarchist
Léonide Babaud-Lacroze	yes	Antoine Babaud-Lacroze	Third Republic	Deputy (1890-1919)	Republican
Paul Bachelet	yes	Henri Bachelet	Third Republic	Senator (1920-1930)	Republican Union
Emerand Bardoul	no	Julien-Marie Bardoul	Third Republic	Mayor of Marsac-sur Don Conseiller général of Guéméné Penfao	Republican Federation
Jacques Bardoux	yes	Agénor Bardoux	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1881) Senator (1882-1897)	Republican
Léon Baréty	yes	Alexandre Baréty	Third Republic	Conseiller général Mayor of Puget Théniers Mayor of Lauzerte (1896-1904)	Republican
Étienne Baron	yes	Jean Baron	Third Republic	Conseiller général (1892-1904)	Republican
Comte Jean de Beaumont	no	Marc-Antoine de Beaumont	Restoration	Pair of France (1814-1830)	Monarchist
Adrien Bels	yes	Gabriel Lamothe-Pradelle	Third Republic	Deputy (1885-1888)	Republican

Paul Bénazet	no	Louis Marie Joseph Bénazet	Restoration	General of the Empire Mayor of Dunkirk (1826-1846)	Monarchist
Louis de Blois	no	Eugène Caillaux	Third Republic	Deputy (1871-1876) Senator (1876-1882)	Monarchist
Jean Boivin-Champeaux	yes	Paul Boivin-Champeaux	Third Republic	Senator (1907-1925)	Democratic Left
François Boux de Casson	no	Charles de Casson	Absolute monarchy	Local Lord	Monarchist
André Breton	yes	Jules-Louis Breton	Third Republic	Deputy (1898-1921) Senator (1921-1930)	Socialist
Auguste Brunet	yes	Louis Brunet	Third Republic	Deputy (1893-1905) Senator (1905)	Republican
Louis Buyat	yes	Etienne Buyat	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1887)	Republican
Joseph Caillaux	no	Alexandre Eugène Caillaux	Third Republic	Deputy (1871-1876) Senator (1876-1882)	Monarchist
Stanislas de Castellane	no	Boniface de Castellane	Restoration	Pair of France (1815-1837)	Monarchist
Jean Chaulin-Servinière	yes	Lucien Chaulin-Servinière	Third Republic	Deputy (1889-1898)	Progressist Republican
Alphonse Chautemps	yes	Emile Chautemps	Third Republic	Deputy (1889-1905) Senator (1905-1918)	Radical Socialist
Camille Chautemps	yes	Emile Chautemps	Third Republic	Deputy (1889-1905) Senator (1905-1918)	Radical Socialist
Emery Compayré	no	Etienne Compayré	Revolution	Legislative body (1798-1803)	Bonapartist
Joseph Coucoureux	yes	Lucien Coucoureux	Third Republic	Conseiller général (1875-1907)	Republican
Charles Delesalle	no	Charles Delesalle	Third Republic	Mayor of Lille (1904-1919)	No political affiliation (Right conservatism)
Roger Delthil	yes	Camille Delthil	Third Republic	Mayor of Moissac (1894-1895) Senator (1902)	Republican
René Delzangles	no	Pierre Delzangles	Third Republic	Mayor of Villefranque	No political affiliation
Jean Deschanel	yes	Emile Deschanel	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1881) Senator (1881-1904)	Moderate Republican
Charles Desjardins	yes	Jules Desjardins	Third Republic	Deputy (1893-1914)	Moderate Republican
Louis de Diesbach de Belleroche	no	Eugène de Belleroche de Diesbach	Third Republic	Deputy (1871-1876)	Bonapartist
Pierre Dignac	no	Eugène Dignac	July Monarchy	Mayor of Gujan-Mestras	Monarchist
Jacques Duboys-Fresney	yes	Etienne Duboys-Fresney	July Monarchy	Deputy (1842-1846 / 1871-1876)	Republican

Pierre Duchesne-Fournet	yes	Paul Duchesne-Fournet	Third Republic	Deputy (1881-1885) Senator (1894-1906)	Republican
Pierre Dupuy	yes	Jean Dupuy	Third Republic	Senator (1891-1919)	Republican
Henri Elby	yes	Jules Elby	Third Republic	Senator (1923-1933)	Republican Union
Pierre Even	yes	Jacques Even	Third Republic	Deputy (1881-1885)	Republican Left
André Fallières	yes	Armand Fallières	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1889)	Republican Left
Roger Farjon	yes	Pierre Farjon	Third Republic	Deputy (1906-1910)	Republican
Camille Ferrand	yes	Emile Labussière	Third Republic	Deputy (1893-1906)	Socialist
Pierre-Étienne Flandin	yes	Hippolyte Ribière	Third Republic	Senator (1876-1885)	Republican Left
Achille-Armand Fould	no	Achille Marcus Fould	Second Empire	Minister of State (1852-1860)	Bonapartist
François du Fretay	no	René Monjaret de Kerjégu	Absolute monarchy	Concellor of the King Mayor of Moncontour	Monarchist
Félix Gadaud	yes	Antoine Gadaud	Third Republic	Deputy (1885-1889) Senator (1891-1897)	Republican Union
André Goirand	yes	Léopold Goirand	Third Republic	Deputy (1887-1898) Senator (1906-1920)	Republican
Georges de Grandmaison	no	Comte Lobau	Restoration	Deputy (1828-1833)	Monarchist
Charles					
Robert de Grandmaison	no	Comte Lobau	Restoration	Deputy (1828-1833)	Monarchist
Edmond Hannotin	no	Maurice Sabatier	Third Republic	Mayor of Viry-Chatillon	Conservatism
André Join-Lambert	no	Arthur Join-Lambert	Third Republic	Conseiller général of Brionne	Monarchist
Marquis Jacques de Juigné	no	Jacques Leclerc de Juigné	Absolute monarchy	Representing nobility at the General Estate of 1789	Monarchist
Edgar de Kergariou	no	Joseph de Kergariou	Restoration	Deputy (1820-1827)	Monarchist
Guy La Chambre	no	Charles-Emile La Chambre	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1878 / 1889-1893)	Monarchist
Marquis Henri de La Ferronnays	no	Pierre Léon de la Ferronnays	Restoration	Pair of France	Monarchist
Lucien Lamoureux	yes	Etienne Lamoureux	Third Republic	Deputy (1910-1914)	Republican radical socialist
Fernand Lavergne	yes	Bernard Lavergne	Second Empire	Deputy (1849-1851 / 1876-1889) Senator (1889-1900)	Montagne / Republican
Edmond Leblanc	no	Edmond Lucien Leblanc	Third Republic	Deputy (1884-1889)	Conservative Union
Jean Le Cour Grandmaison	no	Adolphe le Cour Grandmaison	Second Republic	Deputy (1849)	Bonapartist
Edmond Lefebvre du Prey	no	François-Joseph	Directory	Member of the "Conseil des Anciens" (1800-1811)	Monarchist

		Lefebvre-Cayet			
Victor Lourties	yes	Victor Lourties	Third Republic	Senator (1888-1920)	Republican left
Émile Malon	no	Pascal Malon	Third Republic	Mayor of Saint-Georges de Rouellé	No political affiliation
Augustin Michel	yes	Adrien Michel	Third Republic	Deputy (1902-1906)	Republican moderate
Eugène Milliès-Lacroix	yes	Raphaël Milliès-Lacroix	Third Republic	Senator (1897-1933)	Republican
Joseph Monsservin	yes	Emile Monsservin	Third Republic	Senator (1892-1911)	Republican
Hubert de Montaignu	no	François de Wendel	Restoration	Deputy (1815-1825)	Monarchist
Geoffroy de Montalembert	no	Marc René de Montalembert	Restoration	Pair of France (1819-1830)	Monarchist
Jean Montigny	no	Jean-Joseph de Verneilh-Puyraseau	Restoration	Deputy (1817-1824 / 1827-1830)	Monarchist
Louis Nachon	no	Missing Name	Third Republic	Mayor of Conliège (1891-1921)	No political affiliation
Henri de Pavin de Lafarge	no	Joseph Pavin de Lafarge	Third Republic	Mayor of Viviers (1897-1935)	Republican Federation
François Piétri	no	Francois Piétri	French Revolution	Deputy at the Constituting Assembly	Moderate group
Étienne Pinault	yes	Eugène Pinault	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1889) Senator (1901-1913)	Republican Union
Jean-Pierre Plichon	no	Ignace Plichon	July Monarchy	Deputy (1846-1848 / 1857-1888)	Monarchist
François Reille-Soult-Dalmatie	no	Jean-de Dieu Soult	July Monarchy	Chief of government (1832-1834 / 1839-1847)	Monarchist
René Rollin	yes	Henri Rollin	Third Republic	Deputy (1932-1933)	Republican Radical Socialist
Guillaume des Rotours	no	Eugène des Rotours	Second Empire	Deputy (1868-1889)	Bonapartist
Georges Roulleaux-Dugage	no	Henri Roulleaux Dugage	Second Empire	Deputy (1852-1870)	Bonapartist
Édouard Roussel	yes	Edouard Roussel	Third Republic	Conseiller général (1898-1910)	Republican
Henri Salengro	yes	Roger Salengro	Third Republic	Deputy (1928-1936)	Socialist
Albert Sarraut	yes	Omer Sarraut	Third Republic	Mayor of Carcassone (1887)	Radical
Paul Saurin	no	Paul Saurin	Third Republic	Senator (1927-1933)	Independant
Émile Taudière	no	Jacques-Paul Taudière	Third Republic	Deputy (1889-1893)	Conservatism
René Thorp	yes	Antoine Dubost	Third Republic	Deputy (1880-1897) Senator (1897-1921)	Radical
Pierre Sérandour	yes	Pierre Marie Sérandour	Third Republic	Deputy (1924-1928)	Republican left
Marcel-François Astier	yes	Francois Astier	Third Republic	Deputy (1909-1910)	Radical Socialist

Laurent Bonnevey	yes	Jacques Bonnevey	Third Republic	Conseiller général du Rhônes	Republican
Georges Bruguier	yes	Victorien Bruguier	Third Republic	Municipal council of Nice (1888-""")	Republican
Pierre de Chambrun	no	Joseph Aldebert de Chambrun	Second Empire	Deputy (1857-1871)	Bonapartist
Maurice Delom-Sorbé	yes	Joseph Delom-Sorbé	Third Republic	Deputy (1914-1921)	Republican Left
Marx Dormoy	yes	Jean Dormoy	Third Republic	Mayor of Montlucon (1892-1898)	Socialist
Amédée Guy	yes	Jules Guy	Third Republic	Mayor of Bonneville (1900-1904)	Republican
Jean Hennessy	no	Jacques Hennessy	Restoration	Deputy(1824-1842)	Monarchist
François Labrousse	yes	Philippe Labrousse	Third Republic	Deputy (1884-1893) Senator (1894-1910)	Radical left
Albert Le Bail	yes	Roland le Bail	Restoration	Mayor of Plozévet (1837-1840)	Anti-Monarchist Republican
Alfred Margaine	yes	Henri Margaine	Third Republic	Deputy (1871-1888) Senator (1888-1893)	Republican Left
Robert Mauger	yes	Pierre Mauger-Vioilleau	Third Republic	Deputy (1924)	Republican Socialist
Léonel de Moustier	no	Clément Edouard, de Moustier	July Monarchy	Deputy (1824-1827)	Monarchist
Léon Roche	no	Marie-Léon Roche	Third Republic	Mayor of Oradour-sur-Vayre	No political affiliation
Isidore Thivrier	yes	Christophe Thivrier	Third Republic	Deputy (1889-1895)	Republican
Théodore Steeg	yes	Jules Steeg	Third Republic	Deputy (1881-1889)	Republican Union
Paul Bastid	yes	Paul Devès	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1885)	Republican Left
Michel Tony-Révilleon	yes	Tony Révilleon	Third Republic	Deputy (1881-1893)	Socialist
Robert Lassalle	yes	Gustave Lassalle	Third Republic	Conseiller général of Soustons (1901-1913)	Republican
Jean Bouhey	yes	Jean-Baptiste Bouhey-Alex	Third Republic	Deputy (1902-1913)	Socialist
François de Wendel	no	François de Wendel	Restoration	Deputy (1815-1825)	Monarchist
Jean Chiappe	no	Ange Chiappe	Convention	Deputy (1792-1797)	Moderate - Conservatism
Bernard de Coral	no	Jules Labat	Second Empire	Deputy(1869-1893)	Moderate Conservatism
Paul Cuttoli	yes	Jules Cuttoli	Third Republic	Deputy (1928-1936)	Republican radical
Ernest Daraignez	no	Joseph Daraignez	Third Republic	Mayor of Hagetmau (1904-1908)	No political affiliation
Armand Dupuis	no	Charles Dupuis	Third Republic	Mayor and Conseiller général	No political affiliation

Paul Faure	yes	M. Faure	Third Republic	Conseiller général de Dordogne	Republican
Michel Geistdoerfer	yes	Michel Geistdoerfer	Third Republic	Municipal Council of Dinan	Republican
François Charles d'Harcourt	no	Francois Gabriel d'Harcourt	July Monarchy	Deputy (1827-1837)	Monarchist
James Hennessy	no	Jacques Hennessy	Restoration	Deputy(1824-1842)	Monarchist
Paul Vasseux	no	Name missing	Second Empire	Mayor of Golancourt	No political affiliation
Georges Denis	no	Jean-Henri Merle d'Aubigné	First Empire (Germany)	Chaplain to Wilhem the first	Monarchist - Evangelist
Jean Neyret	no	Blaise Neyret	Third Republic	Deputy (1914-1924)	Republican Federation
Jacques Poitou-Duplessy	no	Roger Poitou-Duplessy	Third Republic	Deputy(1910-1914)	Catholic of Liberal Action
François de Saint-Just	no	Victor de Saint-Just d'Autingues	Third Republic	Deputy (1924-1933)	Republican Federation
Charles Saint-Venant	yes	Charles Saint-Venant	Third Republic	Deputy (1919-1926)	Socialist
Paul Giacobbi	yes	Marius Giacobbi	Third Republic	Deputy (1914-1919) Senator (1903-1912)	Radical
Paul Reynaud	yes	Hippolyte Gassier	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1885) Senator (1930-1907)	Republican
Maurice Cabart-Danneville	yes	Jean-Baptiste De Beauvais	French Revolution	Representing clergy at the General Estates of 1789	Reformist
Amaury de la Grange	no	Prosper de Lagrange	Second Empire	Deputy (1852-1857)	Bonapartist

Table A2: The origin of dynasties

		Pro-Democratic dynasty		Other dynasty	
		Numbers	Percentage	Numbers	Percentage
Ancien régime	< 1789			4	6.78%
1789 Revolution and Constitutional Monarchy	1789-1792	1	1.52%	3	5.08%
First Republic	1792-1795			1	1.69%
Directory	1795-1799			2	3.39%
Consulate and First Empire	1799-1815 [#]				
Restoration	1814-1830	1	1.52%	14	23.73%
July Monarchy	1830-1848	1	1.52%	6	10.17%
Second Republic	1848-1852			1	1.69%
Second Empire	1852-1870	1	1.52%	7	11.86%
Third Republic	1870-1940	62	93.94%	21	35.59%
Total		66	100%	59	100%

[#] In fact 1814 with a short-lived return in 1815 (the Hundred days episode).

In the instances when an ancestor held several mandates, we code the beginning of the dynasty with the first mandate. Etienne Denis Pasquier held a political mandate both during the Restoration and the July Monarchy, we consider the dynasty began during the Restoration. In one instance, Georges Denis and his ancestor, Jean Henri Merle d'Aubigné, the dynasty began outside France. This case is therefore not included in our table.

Table A3: Variables definition

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Source</u>
<u>Dependent variables</u>		
Pro-democratic dynastic	1 if family member is or has been a Mayor, a <i>Conseiller général</i> or a national representative in a party of a Republican origin	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Other dynastic	1 if family member is or has been a Mayor, a <i>Conseiller général</i> or a national representative but is not consider pro-democratic	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Study Years	Number of years needed to achieve the highest degree obtained by the representative	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
<u>Control variables</u>		
Freemason	1 if Freemason (0 otherwise)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Study Years	Number of years needed to achieve the highest degree obtained by the representative	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Conseil Général	Time as a <i>Conseiller Général</i> (in years)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Age	Age of the representative	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
<u>Constituency:</u>		
Mean No-votes per <i>département</i>	For each <i>département</i> the proportion of representatives opposing to the reform (excluding the vote of the observation)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Mean Abst per <i>département</i>	For each <i>département</i> the proportion of representatives abstaining (excluding the vote of the observation)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
<u>Constituency specific</u>		
Mean No-votes per party- <i>département</i>	Proportion of "No" votes on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and the same <i>département</i>	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Mean Abst per party- <i>département</i>	Proportion of abstention on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and the same <i>département</i>	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Mean No-votes per party if senator	Proportion of "No" votes on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and belonging to the <i>Sénat</i> (if the representative is a <i>Sénateur</i> , 0 otherwise)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Mean Abst per party-if Senator	Proportion of abstention on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and belonging to the <i>Sénat</i> (if the representative is a <i>Sénateur</i> , 0 otherwise)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
<u>Parliamentary group</u>		
Mean No-votes per parliamentary group	Proportion of «No» votes on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same parliamentary group	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Mean Abst per parliamentary group	Proportion of abstention on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same parliamentary group	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
<u>Personal</u>		

Occupied	1 if the <i>département</i> of the representative is occupied (0 otherwise)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website /
Crossed	1 if the <i>département</i> of the representative is crossed by the demarcation line (0 otherwise)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Journalist	1 if the representative is or has been a journalist (0 otherwise)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Doc	1 if the representative has or has had a medical profession (0 otherwise)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Civil_servant	1 if the representative is or has been a civil_servant (0 otherwise)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Law	1 if the representative has a law degree (0 otherwise)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Low	1 if the representative is a farmer or a worker (0 otherwise)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Age	Age of the representative (in years)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Study years	Number of years needed to achieve the highest degree obtained by the representative	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Mandate		
Min	Time as a <i>Ministre</i> or a <i>Secrétaire d'Etat</i> (in years)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Conseil Général	Time as a <i>Conseiller Général</i> (in years)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Mayor	1 if the representative is or has been a Mayor (0 otherwise)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
National Mandate	Time as a <i>Député</i> or as a <i>Sénateur</i>	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Social Status		
Freemason	1 if Freemason (0 otherwise)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Synd	1 if the representative is or has occupied a position in a union (0 otherwise)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Jewish	1 if the representative declared being Jewish or he was victim of antisemitic attacks during parliamentary debates (0 otherwise)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
WWI_veteran	1 if the representative served during WWI (0 otherwise)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Legion	1 if the representative has a <i>Légion d'honneur</i> (0 otherwise)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
War_Medal	1 if the representative has a <i>Croix de guerre</i> (0 otherwise)	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Party		
Left	1 if the representative belongs to a leftist party (0 otherwise). We follow the definition of parties adopted by Ermakoff (2008, p. 86-87).	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Center	1 if the representative belongs to a centrist party (0 otherwise). We follow the definition of parties adopted by Ermakoff (2008, p. 86-87).	Parliamentarians' biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Occupation		

Occupied	1 if the representative is from an occupied <i>département</i> (0 otherwise)	
Crossed	1 if the representative is from an occupied <i>département</i> (0 otherwise)	
<i>Political behavior</i>		
Total opposition	Percentage of times a representative opposed to its parliamentary group's vote (if more than 66 percent of a parliamentary group voted along the same line)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Abstention	Number of times a representative abstained during the 5 previous votes dealing with checks and balances during the 1936-1940 legislature.	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Scoreno	Number of times the representative voted against checks and balance dismantlement during the past five votes on this issue	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Length Bio	Length of the Biography in Joly's dictionary	<i>Dictionnaire des parlementaires français (1889-1940)</i>
Dynasty with syndicalism	= 1 if the founder of the dynasty was active in a union	<i>Dictionnaire des parlementaires français (1889-1940) and Wikipédia page of some parliamentarians</i>

Table A4: List of parties

<i>Leftwing parties</i>
Union populaire française, Section Française de l'internationale ouvrière
<i>Center parties</i>
Union socialiste républicaine, Gauche indépendante, Gauche radicale
<i>Rightwing parties</i>
Alliance démocratique, Indépendants d'action populaire, Républicains indépendants et d'action sociale, Indépendants républicains, Fédération républicaine, Gauche démocratique, Union Républicaine, Union démocratique républicaine, Parti républicain, Parti agraire et paysan français, Non inscrits

Based on parliamentarians' biographies and Ermakoff (2006, p. 86-87).

Table A5: Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians versus Other dynastic parliamentarians

	(A5.1)	(A5.2)	(A5.3)	(A5.4)	(A5.5)	(A5.6)
	Pro-democratic dynastic	Non-dynastic	Other dynastic	(A5.2)-(A5.1) Non-dynastic – Pro-democratic dynastic	(A5.3)-(A5.1) Other dynastic – Pro- democratic dynastic	(A5.2)-(A5.3) Non-dynastic – Other dynastic
Age	56.53 (1.46)	56.55 (0.42)	55.85 (1.63)	0.02 (1.46)	-0.68 (2.19)	0.70 (1.54)
In <i>Senate</i>	0.5 (0.06)	0.34 (0.02)	0.4 (0.06)	-0.16*** (0.06)	-0.10 (0.09)	0.06 (0.06)
Medical Profession	0.12 (0.04)	0.11 (0.01)	0.067 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.039 (0.04)
Civil Servant	0.11 (0.04)	0.07 (0.01)	0.08 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.03)
Mean opposition in <i>Département</i>	0.10 (0.02)	0.11 (0.01)	0.07 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
Mean abstention in <i>Département</i>	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.00)	0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Center	0.23 (0.05)	0.22 (0.02)	0.13 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.06)

Standard deviation in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix B: Robustness checks

B.1 The role of abstention

Our baseline specification contrasts explicit opposition to and approval of the enabling act. One may, however, view abstention could as an intermediate form of opposition to the act. To take this possibility into account, we estimate an ordered logit model where the dependent variable is a trichotomous variable coding the decision to cast a “Yes” vote, abstain, or cast a “No” vote, and the main explanatory variables are the two dummy variables coding pro-democratic and other dynasties. The results of that regression are reported in the first column of Table B3. In this regression, the pro-democratic dynasty dummy exhibits a positive coefficient statistically significant at the one percent level while the coefficient of the other dynasty dummy is statistically insignificant, confirming our baseline results. In the same vein, we estimate a multinomial logit model. This model simultaneously estimates the factors affecting the probability of abstaining and of opposing the act. These estimations reach results similar to baseline results: Pro-democratic dynasties do not influence abstention but opposition to the reform. We also now observe that other dynasties had a lower probability of abstaining in the vote but not to vote against the act.

Table B1: Taking abstention into account

	(B1.1) Ordered logit	(B1.2) Multinomial Logit	(B1.3) Multinomial Logit
Dependent variable	Opposition (=0 if $Vote_i=Yes$ / =1 if $Vote_i=Abstention$ / =2 if $Vote_i=No$)	$Vote_i=Abstention$	$Vote_i=No$
Pro-democratic dynasty	0.938*** (2.675)	-1.090 (-0.844)	1.061*** (2.577)
Other dynasty	0.350 (0.473)	-16.13*** (-25.38)	0.766 (0.969)
Constant		-5.935*** (-2.646)	-6.120*** (-4.273)
Constant cut1	5.169*** (4.997)		
Constant cut2	5.487*** (5.498)		
Baseline controls	✓	✓	✓
Political orientation	✓	✓	✓
<i>Départements</i> means	✓	✓	✓
Observations	669	669	669
Log-likelihood	-273.7	-248.9	-248.9

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

B.2 Selection into the vote

Baseline estimates assess the effect of belonging to a pro-democratic dynasty on opposing the act. If dynastic membership also determined selection into the vote, our estimates could be biased. To investigate this issue, we first use the universe of French parliamentarians in 1940 as sample and then estimate a sequential logit model taking as dependent variables first the probability of being in Vichy then the probability of casting a “No” vote. The results of the estimation of the sequential logit model are reported in Table B2.a.

Table B2.a: Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians, being in Vichy, and opposition to the 1940 enabling act: Sequential logit estimates

Dependent variable	(B2.1)	(B2.2)	(B2.3)	(B2.4)	(B2.5)	(B2.6)
	Sequential logit Cast a vote	Sequential logit Opposition	Logit Cast a vote	OLS Cast a vote	Logit Cast a vote and oppose	OLS Cast a vote and oppose
Pro-democratic Dynasties	0.466* (1.838)	1.079*** (2.811)	0.520* (1.803)	0.0528 (1.527)	1.163*** (3.057)	0.119*** (2.976)
Other Dynasties	0.333 (0.774)	0.808 (1.025)	0.123 (0.306)	0.0249 (0.475)	0.739 (0.980)	0.0691 (1.442)
In <i>Senate</i>	-0.0216 (-0.0673)	0.684 (1.120)	-0.355 (-1.076)	-0.0439 (-1.259)	0.542 (1.143)	0.0334 (0.823)
Age	-0.0179* (-1.780)	0.0194 (1.056)	-0.0426*** (-3.253)	-0.00586*** (-6.104)	0.0148 (0.878)	0.00143 (1.338)
Jewish	-1.099*** (-2.683)	0.262 (0.574)	0.697 (0.677)	0.0360 (0.425)	0.0270 (0.0592)	-0.0249 (-0.580)
Freemason	-0.338 (-1.000)	0.998* (1.949)	0.338 (0.946)	0.0577 (1.476)	0.673 (1.500)	0.0786** (2.482)
Years of study	0.0477 (1.438)	0.0477 (0.488)	0.133*** (3.749)	0.0162*** (3.733)	0.0500 (0.621)	0.00294 (0.617)
Occupation :						
Journalist	-0.408* (-1.797)	-0.405 (-0.807)	0.0573 (0.232)	0.0239 (0.813)	-0.602 (-1.197)	-0.0272 (-0.836)
Law-related	-0.341 (-1.220)	0.493 (0.916)	-0.410 (-1.067)	-0.0403 (-1.215)	0.299 (0.627)	0.00504 (0.201)
Medical profession	-0.155 (-0.678)	0.385 (1.739)	-0.459 (-1.554)	-0.0712** (-2.096)	0.772 (1.423)	0.0417 (0.878)
Civil Servant	-0.355 (-0.960)	-1.027* (-1.938)	-0.340 (-0.750)	-0.0338 (-0.508)	-1.181*** (-2.634)	-0.0512*** (-3.054)
Low-skilled	-0.342* (-1.791)	0.385 (1.218)	-0.319 (-1.329)	-0.0387 (-0.999)	0.411 (1.416)	0.0266 (1.217)
Occupied territory	-1.214*** (-3.632)	-0.236 (-0.774)	-1.324*** (-4.788)	-0.342*** (-4.161)	-0.643* (-1.825)	0.0475*** (2.819)
Crossed by the demarcation line	-0.470 (-1.153)	0.0714 (0.249)	-0.0888 (-0.151)	0.0768 (1.052)	-0.0927 (-0.374)	-0.0129 (-0.396)
WWI veteran	0.320 (1.193)	0.288 (1.416)	0.292 (1.213)	0.0519 (1.632)	0.368* (1.953)	0.0370*** (2.854)
Constant	3.143*** (5.051)	-6.084*** (-4.907)	4.825*** (5.264)	1.286*** (15.74)	-5.605*** (-5.239)	-0.0522 (-0.380)
Political orientation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Départements</i> means	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
<i>Départements</i> FE				✓		✓
Observations	847	847	847	847	847	847
R-squared				0.267		0.297
Pseudo-R ²			0.133		0.220	

Sequential logit estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means or department fixed effects.

When estimating the probability of casting a no ballot on the whole population of parliamentarians (Columns B2.a.5 and B2.a.6), we still observe that pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians have a 11.9 percentage points higher likelihood to oppose the act than their non-dynastic peers. Table B2.b shows that dynasts were not more likely than other parliamentarians to choose alternative ways to protest against the enabling act.

Table B2.b: Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians

Dependent variable	(B.2.b.1) Prisoners	(B.2.b.2) London	(B.2.b.3) Massilia	(B.2.b.4) Absent (Excused)	(B.2.b.5) Absent (All)
Pro-democratic dynasties	-0.000468 (-0.0458)	-0.00326 (-1.138)	-0.0104 (-0.466)	0.0111 (0.650)	-0.0538 (-1.549)
Other Dynasties	-0.0154 (-1.439)	-0.00270 (-0.824)	-0.0166 (-1.051)	0.0173 (1.066)	-0.0268 (-0.496)
Constant	-0.213 (-1.340)	-0.0161 (-1.144)	0.0629 (0.726)	-0.0422 (-0.947)	-0.320*** (-3.618)
Political orientation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Baseline control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Département</i> FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	847	847	847	847	847
R-squared	0.276	0.127	0.220	0.136	0.263

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

B.3 Logit estimates

Table B3: Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians and opposition to the 1940 enabling act:

Logit estimates

	(B3.1)	(B3.2)	(B3.3)	(B3.4)	(B3.5)	(B3.6)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Dependent variable	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No
Dynastic	0.301** (2.062)		0.995** (2.205)		1.522** (2.225)	
Pro-democratic Dynastic		0.728*** (3.612)		1.079** (2.525)		1.719** (2.069)
Other Dynasty		-0.414 (-1.001)		0.808 (1.016)		1.164 (1.332)
Constant	-2.050*** (-5.770)	-2.050*** (-5.770)	-6.121*** (-4.216)	-6.084*** (-4.240)	-19.91*** (-7.846)	-19.88*** (-8.169)
Political orientation			✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Départements</i> means			✓	✓		
<i>Départements</i> FE					✓	✓
Baseline controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	669	669	669	669	349	349
Pseudo	0.00194	0.00989	0.227	0.227	0.349	0.350
Marginal effect – Dynasty	0.03		0.08		0.17	
Marginal effect – Pro Dem Dyn		0.08		0.09		0.19
Marginal effect – Other Dyn		-0.04		0.07		0.13

Logit estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Marginal effects are computed from the reference value of the variable. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means or department fixed effects.


B.4 Alternative clustering of standard errors

Table B4 Clustering at the *département*-level

	(B5.1.1)	(B5.1.2)	(B5.1.3)	(B5.1.4)
Dependent variable Vote _i = No				
Dynasty	0.0341 (0.875)		0.125*** (2.875)	
Pro-democratic dynasties		0.0964* (1.693)		0.151** (2.612)
Other Dynasties		-0.0357 (-0.786)		0.0946 (1.658)
Constant	0.114*** (5.787)	0.114*** (5.782)	-0.104 (-0.916)	-0.0972 (-0.858)
Political orientation			✓	✓
Baseline control			✓	✓
<i>Département</i> FE			✓	✓
Observations	669	669	669	669
R-squared	0.001	0.008	0.333	0.334

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

Figure B1: Wild-Bootstrap – Graphical representation



On the left panel are the results of the Wild-Bootstrap using 999 replications in a specification without control (akin to the specification presented in Column 2.2, Table 2). On the right panel are the results of the Wild-Bootstrap using 999 replications in a specification with full control variables (akin to the specification presented in Column 2.4, Table 2)

B.5 Rebalancing of covariates using Propensity Score Matching

The baseline model controls for individual characteristics in a linear fashion. To complement this approach, we estimate a series of propensity score matching models using baseline controls to balance the “treated” and “non-treated” samples. We therefore compare pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians with other parliamentarians whose observable characteristics are similar.

Propensity score matching proceeds in two steps. In the first one, using the set of baseline controls, it assigns a score to each parliamentarian. This represents their probability of being a member of a pro-democratic dynasty according to observables. In the second step, parliamentarians from the treated group, i.e. those belonging to a pro-democratic dynasty, are matched with the parliamentarians from the control group –those who do not belong to a pro-democratic dynasty– with the closest score. The difference in the outcome variable between the two groups is comparable to an average treatment effect on the treated. The results of propensity score estimations are reported in Table B5. Results also confirm that pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians behaved differently from other parliamentarians in the vote of the enabling act.

Table B5: Propensity Score Matching

	(B5.1) Matching	(B5.2) Matching	(B5.3) Matching	(B5.4) Matching	(B5.5) Matching
Number of match(es)	1	2	3	4	5
Dependent variable	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No
Panel A / Comparison group: Non-dynastic + Other dynastic parliamentarians					
Democratic dynasty	0.105** (2.038)	0.105** (2.068)	0.111** (2.448)	0.101** (2.310)	0.0982** (2.355)
Panel B / Comparison group: Non-dynastic parliamentarians					
Democratic dynasty	0.0877** (2.229)	0.114*** (3.408)	0.117*** (4.542)	0.127*** (5.016)	0.105*** (4.976)
Observations	669	669	669	669	669

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Matching on political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means. Standard errors take into account that the propensity score is estimated. Abadie-Imbens standard errors are presented in parentheses.

B.6 Alternative coding of the Dynasty variable

This section uses an alternative coding of the dynastic variable. The variable is equal to zero if a parliamentarian is not a dynast, to 1 if he comes from a dynasty not qualified as a pro-democratic dynasty, and 2 for pro-democratic dynasts.

Table B.6: Alternative coding of the Dynasty variable

Dependent variable Vote _i = No	(B6.1)	(B6.2)
Dynasty (alternative definition)	0.0347 (1.356)	0.0783*** (2.881)
Constant	0.111*** (5.801)	-0.0945 (-0.848)
Political orientation		✓
Baseline control		✓
<i>Département</i> FE		✓
Observations	669	669
R-squared	0.004	0.334

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects means.

B.7 Considering different definitions of the veteran variable

Our database features 397 parliamentarians who were active during World War One. To assess whether they fought directly under Philippe Pétain we went back to their individual military records. A large number of these have been digitized but the files are not complete.³³ The relatively limited number of parliamentarians renders this approach feasible. It allows making sure that a parliamentarian was fighting when Pétain was at the helm and not for example, in a hospital recovering from an injury. It also takes the fact that some soldiers regularly changed unit into account.

The military record of Auguste Polimann illustrates these points. His military record shows he began the war at the 8^{ème} bataillon de chasseurs in November 1914, was transferred to the 45^{ème} régiment d'infanterie on April 21st, 1915, then to the 62^{ème} régiment d'infanterie on May 1st, 1915, followed by the 137^{ème} régiment d'infanterie on June 15th, 1915, that he was made prisoner on June 13th, 1916 and remained in captivity until the end of the war. On the basis of his record, we can then see if any of the unit in which he was active was commanded by Pétain.

We exclude the following units because they did not have a direct fighting role: parliamentarians involved in units of support (auxiliaires) and transport (escadrons du train) or medical units. We code soldiers involved in the air force as separate, as Pétain strongly supported the creation and development of these units.

We managed to track the records of 247 parliamentarians. We took a conservative approach when there was a doubt regarding identity. The cases of André Daher and Raymond Susset may be used to illustrate the search process. There is no André Daher in the database listing the records of French soldiers' but there is an André Dahren. The date of birth of both is similar (1st February 1891), the place of birth too (Marseilles), the father of both has Paul as first name and Dahren is listed as a law student; Daher would later on hold a law decree. Daher's biography mentions his involvement in the infantry and later on his work with armored vehicles, like the document from Dahren. In such a case we consider that there was an encoding mistake in 1911 and therefore consider the two persons as being one. By contrast, consider the case of Ismael Pascal Susset who was born on the same date

³³ Some files are referred to but not accessible. For example, in one case the id number of soldiers are digitized for the numbers between 1 and 500 and 1000 and 1500 but no the numbers in between. In another instance a specific website could not be accessed because of maintenance issues etc.

and in the same municipality as Raymond Susset (Magné, 5 June 1895). Neither Ismael or Pascal are mentioned in Raymond Susset's biographical notice. Ismael Pascal may therefore have been Raymond's twin and we exclude the observation from the sample. If either Ismael or Pascal had been a second or third name, then we would have considered a match.

In case of doubt, we looked at biographical notices. We also used these to complement the database when military records were unavailable. When the mention was vague (e.g. "fought gallantly in the artillery"), nothing was encoded. It was only when the name of the unit and the exact dates of service were mentioned in the biography that we added the parliamentarian's details. This approach allowed increasing the number of covered parliamentarians by 49 units.

We then code dummy variables capturing when the veterans fought under Pétain's command. We consider four periods³⁴: The first covers the beginning of the war, from August to October 1914, when Pétain was in charge of the 6^{ème} division d'infanterie. The second ranges from October 1914 to June 1915 when he was commanding the 33^{ème} corps d'armée. The third runs from June 1915 to May 1916 when the 2^{ème} Armée was under his command. For this period, we distinguish the soldiers who were there between February and May 1916 to specifically identify those involved in the Battle of Verdun. We code no specific Pétain variable after that battle, as Pétain's responsibilities had grown to such an extent that almost all soldiers fell directly or indirectly under his command. We then add those dummy variables coding these episodes to the set of explanatory variables in the baseline estimation.

We could document the military activities of 74.56% of parliamentarians listed as veterans in their biographies. There is therefore attrition in the data, with which we deal in several ways. First, we simply consider veterans whose military record we could not find as missing observations. Second, we code them as not having fought under Pétain's command. Third, we conversely code them as having fought under Pétain's command.

³⁴ See Vergez-Chaignon (2014, pp. 110-111).

Table B7: Controlling for service under Pétain's command during World War I

Dependent variable	(1) Vote _i =No	(2) Vote _i =No	(3) Vote _i =No	(4) Vote _i =No	(5) Vote _i =No	(6) Vote _i =No	(7) Vote _i =No	(8) Vote _i =No	(9) Vote _i =No	(10) Vote _i =No
Panel A: If not found in the Archives=Missing										
Pro-democratic dynasties	0.152*** (3.720)	0.152*** (3.738)	0.138*** (3.571)	0.141*** (3.625)	0.152*** (3.694)	0.152*** (3.847)	0.152*** (3.866)	0.138*** (3.740)	0.142*** (3.797)	0.152*** (3.835)
Other dynasties	0.151* (1.979)	0.151* (1.977)	0.145* (2.028)	0.148* (2.070)	0.152* (2.025)	0.150* (1.945)	0.150* (1.944)	0.143* (1.972)	0.146* (2.007)	0.151* (1.977)
February-April 1916	0.101 (1.235)					0.0843 (1.001)				
June 1915 -May 1916		0.0926 (1.319)			0.0893 (1.244)		0.0769 (1.055)			0.0707 (0.945)
October 1914 – June 1915			-0.0179 (-0.186)		-0.0103 (-0.103)			-0.0391 (-0.388)		-0.0271 (-0.261)
August 1914 – October 1914				-0.0492 (-0.706)	-0.0507 (-0.738)				-0.0683 (-0.925)	-0.0658 (-0.887)
WWI veteran						0.0249 (1.596)	0.0247 (1.551)	0.0378** (2.377)	0.0371** (2.382)	0.0287 (1.673)
Constant	-0.109 (-0.548)	-0.108 (-0.542)	-0.123 (-0.619)	-0.122 (-0.613)	-0.114 (-0.565)	-0.118 (-0.627)	-0.117 (-0.621)	-0.138 (-0.744)	-0.135 (-0.722)	-0.127 (-0.668)
Observations	574	574	579	578	572	574	574	579	578	572
R-squared	0.355	0.355	0.355	0.355	0.357	0.356	0.356	0.357	0.358	0.359
Panel B: If not found in the Archives=0										
Pro-democratic dynasties	0.155*** (3.307)	0.155*** (3.298)	0.152*** (3.309)	0.154*** (3.330)	0.156*** (3.296)	0.154*** (3.352)	0.153*** (3.344)	0.151*** (3.388)	0.153*** (3.418)	0.155*** (3.349)
Other dynasties	0.0995 (1.507)	0.100 (1.514)	0.0988 (1.512)	0.0980 (1.500)	0.0991 (1.498)	0.0954 (1.394)	0.0958 (1.396)	0.0944 (1.388)	0.0936 (1.375)	0.0945 (1.372)
February-April 1916	0.0894 (1.288)					0.0629 (0.867)				
June 1915 -May 1916		0.0818 (1.316)			0.0819 (1.321)		0.0573 (0.874)			0.0565 (0.861)
October 1914 – June 1915			-0.0386 (-0.434)		-0.0400 (-0.441)			-0.0586 (-0.614)		-0.0590 (-0.609)
August 1914 – October 1914				-0.113 (-1.630)	-0.115 (-1.655)				-0.134* (-1.842)	-0.135* (-1.830)
WWI veteran						0.0419** (2.160)	0.0418** (2.130)	0.0466** (2.406)	0.0466** (2.453)	0.0436** (2.077)
Constant	-0.0762 (-0.495)	-0.0757 (-0.491)	-0.0811 (-0.531)	-0.0783 (-0.505)	-0.0779 (-0.510)	-0.0940 (-0.678)	-0.0936 (-0.674)	-0.101 (-0.739)	-0.0972 (-0.694)	-0.0977 (-0.718)
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669
R-squared	0.332	0.332	0.330	0.331	0.332	0.335	0.335	0.334	0.335	0.336
Panel C: If not found in the Archives=1										
Pro-democratic dynasties	0.150*** (3.283)	0.150*** (3.283)	0.151*** (3.311)	0.151*** (3.303)	0.151*** (3.227)	0.150*** (3.346)	0.150*** (3.346)	0.151*** (3.384)	0.151*** (3.373)	0.151*** (3.289)
Other dynasties	0.0943 (1.368)	0.0947 (1.378)	0.0966 (1.430)	0.0972 (1.444)	0.0945 (1.380)	0.0928 (1.332)	0.0931 (1.339)	0.0942 (1.373)	0.0944 (1.378)	0.0929 (1.342)
February-April 1916	0.0619** (2.408)					0.0431* (1.775)				
June 1915 -May 1916		0.0621** (2.493)			0.112** (2.195)		0.0437* (1.832)			0.0956* (1.796)
October 1914 – June 1915			0.0378 (1.407)		-0.0260 (-0.424)			0.0123 (0.527)		-0.0332 (-0.560)
August 1914 – October 1914				0.0388 (1.401)	-0.0391 (-0.619)				0.0138 (0.565)	-0.0368 (-0.581)
WWI veteran						0.0306* (1.830)	0.0300* (1.763)	0.0421** (2.687)	0.0417** (2.647)	0.0320* (1.963)
Constant	-0.0737 (-0.486)	-0.0731 (-0.481)	-0.0765 (-0.499)	-0.0792 (-0.520)	-0.0696 (-0.460)	-0.0876 (-0.618)	-0.0869 (-0.612)	-0.0950 (-0.671)	-0.0958 (-0.679)	-0.0844 (-0.599)
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669
R-squared	0.334	0.334	0.332	0.332	0.336	0.336	0.336	0.334	0.334	0.337
Political orientation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Baseline controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Département FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

Appendix C: Extensions – What are the transmission channels?

C.1 Expectations regarding the war

Democratic dynastic parliamentarians might have behaved differently from their peers because they had different expectations about how the war would affect them. Although expectations are unobservable, we indirectly test this hypothesis by looking at whether pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians had a different trajectory during the war. In particular, we test whether they had a specific probability to be a mayor under the Vichy regime or participate in its institutions. Conversely, we also test whether they had a higher likelihood to be arrested by the regime or killed during the war. Table C1 estimates the baseline model on four new dependent variables: a dummy variable equal to one if a parliamentarian was a mayor under the Vichy regime, a dummy variable set to one if he participated in its institutions, either as Conseiller National or as Conseiller Départemental, as recorded by Wieviorka (2001), a dummy set to one if he was arrested by the regime, and a dummy variable equal to one if he died during World War II.

In Table C1, none of the pro-democratic dynasty dummy turns statistically significant. We interpret these results as evidence that expectations about the evolution of the war and of the regime did not affect pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians in a systematic way different from other parliamentarians. Being a pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian was not associated with the probability to be a mayor, participate in the regime, be arrested by the regime, or to die, suggesting that pro-democratic parliamentarians did not benefit from specific networks affecting their relationship with the regime or protecting them from death. This finding runs against the possibility that specific expectations about their trajectories during the war drove their vote on the enabling act.

Table C1: Pro-democratic dynasties during the war

Dep. Variable :	(C1.1) Mayor under Vichy	(C1.2) Mayor under Vichy	(C1.3) Mayor under Vichy	(C1.4) Mayor under Vichy	(C1.5) Participated in Vichy Institutions	(C1.6) Participated in Vichy Institutions	(C1.7) Arrested by Vichy	(C1.8) Arrested by Vichy	(C1.9) Died during WWII	(C1.10) Died during WWII
Pro-democratic dynasty	-0.00281 (-0.0615)	0.00360 (0.0519)	-0.0169 (-0.159)	-0.0291 (-0.236)	0.0454 (0.531)	0.0303 (0.429)	0.0235 (0.617)	0.0205 (0.518)	-0.0114 (-0.203)	0.0138 (0.264)
Other Dynasty	0.0766 (1.276)	0.00762 (0.178)	0.0412 (0.490)	-0.185** (-2.132)	0.118** (2.436)	0.0231 (0.407)	-0.00535 (-0.147)	0.0267 (0.656)	-0.0125 (-0.228)	-0.00180 (-0.0284)
Constant	0.178*** (8.468)	0.336 (1.363)	0.303*** (8.353)	0.607 (1.676)	0.235*** (5.598)	0.373 (1.491)	0.0642*** (5.741)	0.354** (2.073)	0.169*** (6.818)	-0.337 (-0.741)
Political orientation		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓
Baseline control		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓
Département FE		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓
Observations	669	669	331	331	669	669	669	669	669	669
R-squared	0.003	0.229	0.001	0.365	0.006	0.24	0.001	0.199	0.000	0.183

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample to politicians that have been mayors before the Vichy regime. Pro-Democratic Parties is a dummy variable equal to one if a parliamentarian belongs to a party that would qualify as “democratic” according to our definition of pro-democratic dynasties. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

C.2 Individual experience and prominence in the parliament

The dynastic advantage may have materialized as additional individual prestige, political experience, or parliamentary prominence, which pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians may have leveraged to oppose the act. To determine whether additional individual prestige drove the results, we create a dummy variable capturing whether a parliamentarian had received the War Medal or the *Légion d'Honneur*. We measure political experience by the length of his biography in the *Dictionnaire des députés et sénateurs français* (1889-1940). We also measure experience by the time spent as of July 1940 respectively in a ministerial cabinet, with a national mandate, as a local representative (“Conseiller général”). Finally, we create a dummy variable capturing whether the parliamentarian was also a mayor.

The results of the regressions including those variables are reported in Table C2. The variable distinguishing holders of a War Medal is the only one significant (at the five-percent level). This result is in line with the previous finding that war veterans were more likely to oppose the act. Hence, parliamentarians recognized as war heroes had a higher propensity to oppose the act. However, and more to the point, the magnitude and significance of the pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian dummy remain in line with baseline estimates.

Those variables measure prestige and experience, but political capital specific to the work of a parliamentarian may have mattered more on July 10, 1940. We therefore also look at experience and prominence inside parliament. Specifically, we measure the number of commissions on which each parliamentarian had sat as of July 1940. We also define a dummy variable set to one if the parliamentarian had held a special position, namely if he had been chairman, vice-chairman, or secretary of one of the two chambers. We also code the number of interventions of each parliamentarian from 1936 to 1940 and the reactions of his peers. We therefore create a variable measuring the number of times a parliamentarian was applauded and another measuring the number of times he was booed.³⁵ We refine those measures by distinguishing applause and boos from left- and right-wingers. Results are reported in Table C3.

³⁵ The parliamentary minutes published in the *Journal de la République Française* record whether a parliamentarian was applauded or booed when he spoke in the debate. We normalized boos/applause inside each chamber and inside the group of former ministers. An example: for senators, the measure is equal to the number of boos/rounds of applause minus the mean number of boos/applause in the senate divided by the standard deviation of the number of boos/applause in the senate. The same operation applies to deputies and ministers.

Table C2: Controlling for individual prestige and political experience

	(C2.1)	(C2.2)	(C2.3)	(C2.4)	(C2.5)	(C2.6)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Dependent variable	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No
Democratic Dynasties	0.154*** (3.534)	0.150*** (3.504)	0.153*** (3.565)	0.152*** (3.441)	0.150*** (3.485)	0.152*** (3.673)
Other Dynasties	0.0843 (1.253)	0.0925 (1.430)	0.0967 (1.450)	0.0951 (1.406)	0.0849 (1.325)	0.0748 (1.196)
War Medal	0.0652* (2.030)					0.0668** (2.081)
<i>Légion d'Honneur</i>	0.0275 (1.259)					0.0254 (1.201)
Length Biography		1.22e-05 (0.342)				3.02e-05 (0.791)
Length Ministerial cabinet			-0.00919 (-0.871)			-0.0155* (-2.056)
Length national mandates				-0.000120 (-0.103)		-0.000282 (-0.208)
Mayor					0.0400 (1.342)	0.0398 (1.321)
Length – <i>conseiller general</i>					0.000900 (0.694)	0.000787 (0.532)
Constant	-0.0632 (-0.473)	-0.0884 (-0.666)	-0.112 (-0.791)	-0.1000 (-0.708)	-0.112 (-0.800)	-0.0900 (-0.661)
Baseline Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Political orientation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Départments FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669
R-squared	0.340	0.334	0.335	0.334	0.338	0.345

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

Among the measures capturing political capital in the parliament, only the number of interventions in the parliament is significant, at the five percent level, when controlling for all the variables measuring experience in the parliament. The coefficient is negative suggesting that parliamentarians active in the parliament were less likely to oppose the enabling act. Yet, in all the regressions reported in table C3, the coefficient of the pro-democratic dynastic dummy remains significant, and its magnitude remains the same. This again suggests that experience or prominence did not drive the vote of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians on the enabling act.

Table C3: Controlling for individual political capital in the Parliament

	(C3.1)	(C3.2)	(C3.3)	(C3.4)	(C3.5)	(C3.6)	(C3.7)	(C3.8)	(C3.9)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Dependent variable	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No
Democratic Dynasties	0.149*** (3.256)	0.153*** (3.269)	0.152*** (3.445)	0.149*** (3.115)	0.150*** (3.358)	0.155** (2.696)	0.152** (2.630)	0.151** (2.671)	0.152** (2.765)
Other Dynasties	0.0948 (1.399)	0.0947 (1.394)	0.0952 (1.411)	0.0925 (1.354)	0.0944 (1.388)	0.0938 (1.324)	0.0972 (1.367)	0.0948 (1.346)	0.0948 (1.376)
# commissions	0.00700 (0.740)								0.00660 (0.697)
Special role (=1)		-0.0162 (-0.365)							-0.00971 (-0.214)
# interventions (1936-1940)			-0.00876 (-0.764)						-0.0191** (-2.142)
# applause Left (1936-1940)				0.0356* (1.894)					0.0251 (0.704)
# applause Right (1936-1940)					-0.00510 (-0.832)				-0.00882 (-0.585)
# applause - chamber (1936-1940)						0.0224 (1.414)			0.0140 (0.743)
# boos from the right (1936-1940)							0.0395** (2.383)		0.0210 (0.625)
# boos from the left (1936-1940)								-0.00186 (-0.224)	0.00506 (0.396)
Constant	-0.108 (-0.820)	-0.101 (-0.727)	-0.110 (-0.832)	-0.0623 (-0.473)	-0.0959 (-0.685)	-0.0673 (-0.543)	-0.0833 (-0.682)	-0.0968 (-0.743)	-0.0850 (-0.739)
Baseline controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Political orientation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Département FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669
R-squared	0.335	0.334	0.335	0.343	0.334	0.338	0.341	0.334	0.349

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

C.3 When do pro-democratic dynasties matter?

Our baseline results show that pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were more likely to oppose the enabling act. One may wonder whether pro-democratic parliamentarians stood out in other circumstances, in particular in votes affecting checks and balances. The answer to that question is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, pro-democratic dynastic status may result in a greater sensitivity to any shift in the balance of power away from the parliament. On the other hand, the stronger preference of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians for democracy may pertain to the democratic nature of the regime rather than to the balance of power within a democracy. Moreover, it may also be that the specificity of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians had no reason to materialize in other votes, in the absence of pressure to conform, and when political parties were more organized. To address these questions, we consider five votes that took place during the pre-war period (1937-1940) and affected checks and balances. In those votes, the parliament was asked to grant a delegation of powers to the government. Although the votes did

not question the republican nature of the regime, they increased the power of the executive. The question of checks and balances was explicitly mentioned in the parliamentary debates, as the quotes reported in Table C4 show. The votes therefore provide information about the behavior of parliamentarians in instances that tilted the balance of power in favor of the government without jeopardizing the republic.

Table C4: Democratic culture – Votes to measure taste for checks and balances

Date / Cabinet	Vote on power delegation	Parliamentary debate
19/03/1939 Daladier	The government is allowed to take any necessary measures to defend the Homeland by decree.	M. Fleurot: “What honors and weakens a democracy is debate; the free examination of law projects by the deliberative assemblies” Journal officiel – Sénat 19/03/1939 M. Bachelet: “The powers you will provide the government with will allow it to take measures of the same kind as a dictator’s” Journal officiel – Sénat 19/03/1939
30/11/1939 Daladier	“In case of emergency, the government is allowed to take any measures guaranteeing the defense of the Nation after deliberation by the ministers’ cabinet”	M. Rotinat “The commission does not agree on renouncing the parliament’s right to control law projects, which is the mere principle of democracy.” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 30/11/1939
04/10/1938 Daladier	Grant the government with the necessary powers to “improve the economic and financial situation of the country”	M. Philip: “Be sure that we will not reform our democracy if we do not show the respect we owe each-other to discuss law projects » Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 04/10/1938 M. Grésa: “Full-powers, decrees, here is a dangerous path for our democracy.” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 04/10/1938
06/04/1938 Blum	Grant the government with the necessary powers to face its financial liabilities, especially for its defense expenses.	M. Reynaud: “In the present situation, we abuse the concept of popular will” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 06/04/1938 “We have no right to accept this imperative mandate” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 06/04/1938
19/06/1937 Blum	Grant the government with the necessary powers to “improve the economic and financial situation of the country”	M. Piétri: “Every dictatorship took advantage of the legitimacy of the blank check. It contradicts the necessary critic which is the law of true democracies.” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 19/06/1937 M. André Albert: “I thought and still think that the politics of power delegation might weaken the republican principle itself.” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 19/06/1937

We extract three types of information from the five votes. First, we count the number of times that each parliamentarian opposed the extension of government powers. Second, we count the number of times he abstained from voting. We interpret those variables as measuring the parliamentarian's opposition to a reduction of checks and balances, hence his opposition to a threat to democracy. The third piece of information we extract from the votes is the number of times that the parliamentarian voted against his party's line. As parties may have taken different stances, this variable measures the parliamentarian's independence.

Table C5a reports the results of a series of regressions taking in turn the three variables describing the behavior of each parliamentarian in the votes on special powers as dependent variables. We alternatively estimate the effect of dynasties on those different scores of opposition to delegations of power without any control (Columns C5a.1 to C5a.3) and when adding the whole set of controls (Columns C5a.4 to C5a.6).

Table C5.a: Dynasties in previous votes on power delegation

	(C5a.1) OLS	(C5a.2) OLS	(C5a.3) OLS	(C5a.4) OLS	(C5a.5) OLS	(C5a.6) OLS
Dependent variable	# Against C&B	# Abstained	% of votes opposed to party line	# Against C&B	# Abstained	% of votes opposed to party line
Pro-democratic Dynasties	0.115 (0.676)	0.0254 (1.044)	-0.0882 (-0.632)	0.00609 (0.0371)	0.0304 (1.275)	-0.00783 (-0.0719)
Other Dynasties	-0.0909 (-0.504)	0.00297 (0.137)	0.232 (1.145)	0.0720 (0.516)	0.0209 (1.097)	0.0278 (0.250)
Constant	0.797*** (9.494)	0.0320** (2.181)	1.474*** (7.508)	2.098** (2.224)	-0.0108 (-0.214)	1.732** (2.917)
Baseline controls				✓	✓	✓
Political orientation				✓	✓	✓
<i>Départements</i> FE				✓	✓	✓
Observations	669	667	669	669	667	669
R-squared	0.002	0.003	0.006	0.271	0.246	0.400

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

In Columns C5a.1 and C5a.4, the dependent variable is the number of times a parliamentarian opposed granting special powers to the government. In Columns C5a.2 and C5a.5, the dependent variable is the number of times a parliamentarian abstained in these votes. The dynastic dummies turn significant in none of the regressions reported in Table C5a. Finally, Columns C5a.3 and C5a.6 take as dependent variable, the proportion of the votes for which a parliamentarian opposed the

party line.³⁶ Again, in those regressions neither the pro-democratic nor the other dynasty dummies exhibit a statistically significant coefficient.

Overall, those regressions show that the specific opposition of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians to a change in the balance of power did not materialize before the vote on the enabling act. Moreover, dynastic status did not prompt parliamentarians to be more independent from their parties in the votes preceding the enabling act. Until that vote, pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians followed their parties' line. It is only when democracy was at stake, political parties disorganized, and the pressure to conform high, that the votes of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians differed in a systematic way.

We also tested whether the pattern of behavior of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians in previous votes predicted their vote on the enabling act, we supplement our baseline regressions with a series of regressions controlling for each variable coding parliamentarians' votes in previous voting. The idea here is to test whether there were types of parliamentarians that could be indirectly captured by the pro-democratic dynastic dummy. The results of these regressions are reported in Table C5b.

Table C5b: When do pro-democratic dynasties appear? Controlling for previous votes on power delegation

	(C5b.1) OLS	(C5b.2) OLS	(C5b.3) OLS	(C5b.4) OLS
Dependent variable	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No	Vote _i =No
Pro-democratic dynasties	0.148*** (3.710)	0.151*** (3.294)	0.151*** (3.385)	0.151*** (3.753)
Other Dynasties	0.0906 (1.352)	0.0923 (1.360)	0.0957 (1.428)	0.0883 (1.335)
# Against C&B	0.249*** (3.055)			0.226** (2.101)
# Abstained		0.0320*** (3.771)		0.0412*** (3.006)
% of votes opposed to party line			-0.0121 (-0.686)	0.00407 (0.165)
Constant	-0.103 (-0.748)	-0.164 (-1.147)	-0.0785 (-0.532)	-0.199 (-1.221)
Baseline controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Political orientation	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Départements</i> FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	667	669	669	667
R-squared	0.345	0.341	0.335	0.354

³⁶ A party line exists if 66 percent or more of a party's parliamentarian voted for (against) a delegation of power.

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

Column C5b.1 controls for the number of votes against the delegation of additional powers to the government, in addition to the baseline dynasty dummies. The coefficient of the number of votes against the delegation of powers is statistically significant at the five (Column C5b.4) or the one-percent level (Column C5b.1). When the number of times a parliamentarian abstained is controlled for, as in Column C5b.2, the coefficient is also statistically significant at the one percent level and positive. The result is also robust to jointly controlling for the three variables capturing parliamentarians' behavior in previous votes, shown in Column C5b.4. Therefore, parliamentarians who abstained more often from voting on the delegation of powers to the government were also more likely to oppose the enabling act. The findings of both regressions suggest the existence of a type of parliamentarian systematically opposing reforms reducing checks and balances.

When we control for the number of times a parliamentarian voted against the party line, in Column C5b.3, the coefficient of that variable is not statistically significant at usual levels. This finding implies that parliamentarians who had been more independent from their party in previous votes displayed no specific behavior in the vote on the enabling act.

However, the key result of Table C5b concerns dynastic parliamentarians. Throughout the table, the coefficient of the pro-democratic dynastic variable remains positive and statistically significant at the five percent level in all the regressions, regardless of the set of control variables. In addition, the magnitude of the pro-democratic dynastic dummy is similar to its value in baseline results. In line with baseline results too, the coefficient of the other dynasty variable is also statistically insignificant at accepted levels.

The upshot of the Table C5b is therefore that, while some parliamentarians indeed displayed a higher propensity to oppose the extension of government power, they did not drive the effect of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians in the vote for the enabling act.

C.6 Dynasty characteristics

Pro-democratic and other dynasties may face different constraints or leverage different skills or assets to emerge. As a result, the two types of dynasties may differ in their capacity to continuously have an active member, which may in turn have affected their behavior during the

vote on the enabling act. To test that possibility, we first compared pro-democratic and other dynastic parliamentarians in terms tenure in parliament, having a father who was a politician, and having a living member of the dynasty at the time of the vote on the enabling act. The results are reported in Table C6.a. We could find no difference between the two types of dynastic parliamentarians.

Table C6.a: The continuity of pro-democratic and other dynasties

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Pro-democratic Dynasties</i>	<i>Other Dynasties</i>	<i>Difference (p-value)</i>
Tenure in Parliament	14.32 (1.94)	14.07 (2.28)	0.93
Father politician	0.86 (0.05)	0.74 (0.06)	0.12
Member of the dynasty alive	0.11 (0.04)	0.19 (0.06)	0.25
Pro-Democratic dynasties (Founding fathers – III rd Republic)	0.77 (0.06)	0	0.00***
Pro-Democratic dynasties (others)	0.23 (0.06)	0	0.00***
New dynasty	0.79 (0.05)	0.37 (0.07)	0.00***

Sample means. Standard errors in parentheses.

We have so far pooled all pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians. Yet, even pro-democratic dynasties are heterogeneous. Some were created by active opponents to Napoleon III, others by parliamentarians who had simply joined a democratic party. Some dynastic parliamentarians still had a living elected ancestor while others were the only living parliamentarian of the dynasty. In Table C6.b, we investigate whether differences between pro-democratic dynasties drove the specific voting behavior of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians.

Table C6.b: Dynastic monitoring and the effect of pro-democratic dynasties


	(C6.b.1)	(C6.b.2)	(C6.b.3)
Dependent variable $\text{Vote}_i = \text{No}$			
Pro-Democratic Dynasties		0.150*** (3.691)	0.156*** (4.517)
Dynasties with one member alive	0.0709 (0.749)	0.0109 (0.114)	0.0576 (0.581)
Pro-Democratic Dynasties with one member alive			-0.108 (-0.476)
Other dynasties	0.0615 (0.911)	0.0926 (1.306)	0.0851 (1.119)
Constant	-0.105 (-0.737)	-0.0970 (-0.691)	-0.0990 (-0.703)
Political orientation	✓	✓	✓
Baseline control	✓	✓	✓
<i>Département</i> FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	669	669	669
R-squared	0.322	0.334	0.335

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

The monitoring exercised by the family on pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians may be more influential if one of their forebears was still alive. We therefore construct a dummy variable capturing whether a parliamentarian had an elected forebear still living at the time of the vote. We first include that variable as a single variable of interest. The results of the regression, reported in Column C6b.1, show that its coefficient is statistically insignificant. It remains statistically insignificant when the two baseline variables capturing dynastic status are included. Moreover, the pro-democratic dynastic variable exhibits a positive coefficient statistically significant at the one percent level. Its magnitude remains similar to its baseline estimates. The interaction of the pro-democratic dynasty variable with the dummy variable capturing whether a parliamentarian's forebear was still alive at the time of the vote is also insignificant. The behavior of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians was thus not driven by the monitoring or pressure of surviving members of the dynasty.

The negative sign of the interaction of the pro-democratic dynasty variable with dynasties' tenure in parliament in Column 4.6 of Table 4 is a striking result. To fully interpret it, Figure C3.c below presents the marginal effect on the probability to oppose the enabling act of being a pro-democratic dynast at different levels of dynastic tenure in parliament. Tenure in parliament is defined as the number of years spent in parliament by members of the dynasty to which a 1940 parliamentarian belongs. The graph plots the marginal effect resulting from the estimation.

Figure C1: Dynasties' tenure in parliament and the effect of pro-democratic dynasties



C.7 Dynasties and pro-democratic parties – Not controlling for political orientation

Table C.7: Political parties, dynasties, and opposition to the enabling act

Dependent variable:	(C7.1) Vote _i =No	(C7.2) Vote _i =No ₄₀	(C7.3) Democratic Party _i	(C7.4) Democratic Party _i	(C7.5) Vote _i =No	(C7.6) Vote _i =No	(C7.7) Vote _i =No ₄₀
Dynasty	0.129** (2.777)		0.0245 (0.522)			0.154** (2.178)	
Pro-democratic Dynasties		0.148*** (3.411)		0.116* (1.993)			0.115* (1.983)
Other Dynasties		0.106 (1.659)		-0.0817 (-0.938)			0.0568 (0.890)
Pro-democratic party					0.169*** (4.795)	0.179*** (4.562)	0.162*** (4.325)
Dynasty × Pro-democratic party						-0.0746 (-1.072)	
Pro Democratic Dynasty × Pro-democratic party							0.0137 (0.199)
Constant	-0.0763 (-0.396)	-0.0751 (-0.388)	0.492 (1.629)	0.509 (1.678)	-0.0505 (-0.271)	-0.0639 (-0.348)	-0.0424 (-0.230)
Marginal effect of the relevant dynastic variable in a pro-democratic party						0.08* (0.05)	0.13*** (0.00)
Party FE	✓	✓					
Baseline control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Départements FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Political orientation							
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669	669
R-squared	0.251	0.251	0.163	0.171	0.142	0.150	0.149

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Pro-Democratic Parties is a dummy variable equal to one if a parliamentarian belongs to a party that would qualify as “democratic” according to our definition of pro-democratic dynasties.

Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), département crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.