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Member States. This article also reveals that such ideational and power struggles have consequences for the EU's identity. Theoretically, the article builds on the new intergovernmentalist claims and on the normative/civilian power literature. Empirically, it explores the usage of normative justifications by EU institutions and points to inter-institutional tensions in framing the EU's response to the refugee challenge.

Footnote Information



2 **The EU–Turkey deal in the 2015 European ‘refugee crisis’:**
3 **when intergovernmentalism cast a shadow on the EU’s**
4 **normative power**

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8 **Abstract**

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10 key refugee deal’ in March 2016 in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis, despite
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20 internal divisions between Member States. This article also reveals that such idea-
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25 response to the refugee challenge.

26 **Introduction**

27 The European Union (EU) has often been portrayed as a ‘normative power’ both by
28 academics and political actors (Manners 2002; Withman 2011). However, in 2015
29 the dramatic conditions which led people to flee their homelands and seek better

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30 futures in Europe had given rise to various questions pertaining not only to the abil-
31 ity of the EU to solve fast-burning crises, but also questions about the EU's com-
32 mitment to its principles and values. While in most EU Member States the rhet-
33 oric of 'fear' and 'the exclusionary rhetoric of othering prevailed' (Krzyżanowski
34 et al. 2018, p. 1; Thielemann 2018, p. 66), calls for strengthening European soli-
35 darity failed. Consequently, the EU opted to externalize the issue by concluding
36 international agreements with third states, in particular with Turkey. The EU–Tur-
37 key Joint Action Plan (JAP)—provisionally agreed to in October 2015 and activated
38 in November 2015—permitted the denial of entry to refugees who were arriving
39 by way of the Aegean Sea, leading many to argue that the EU was undermining
40 its human rights commitments (Lavenex 2018). Another source of suspicion was
41 related to the rapprochement between the EU and Turkey, despite Turkey's declining
42 commitment to the Copenhagen political criteria (Niemann and Zaun 2018; Slomin-
43 ski and Trauner 2018).

44 This gap between the EU's norms and actions has attracted considerable attention.
45 Observers have argued that the so-called 'refugee crisis' has turned into a 'solidar-
46 ity crisis' (Grimmel and Giang 2017; Takle 2017) or an 'identity crisis' (Rizcallah
47 2019, pp. 249, 256). In this regard, the EU–Turkey deal has been examined by trac-
48 ing the institutional process that led to its entry into force (Smeets and Beach 2020)
49 or by analysing the impact of the deal on the EU's normative identity (Lavenex
50 2018; Martin 2019; Gürkan 2019). This article seeks to explain the EU's response
51 to the 2015 refugee challenge from a different angle. Here, the focus is on the jus-
52 tifications put forward by EU institutional actors, as well as on the power relations
53 between them in the process of forming institutional preferences. More specifically,
54 the question is why the EU opted to conclude an agreement with Turkey, despite this
55 being in contradiction with its own values. Theoretically, to explain this outcome,
56 this article builds on the normative/civilian power literature (Manners 2002; Duch-
57 êne 1972) and the new intergovernmentalist claims (Bickerton et al. 2015). While
58 the former facilitates the examination of how EU institutions, beyond internal divi-
59 sions and struggles, motivate their preferences and positions on the issue at stake,
60 the latter provides a framework to understand how power relations at the EU level
61 shaped the final outcome. This article examines the EU's normative power in action
62 and argues that in formulating the EU's response to the refugee challenge, security
63 prevailed over normative considerations, in particular over solidarity principle and
64 humanitarian concerns, leaning the EU towards a civilian power. We devote particu-
65 lar attention to the attempts of EU institutions to translate the principle of solidar-
66 ity into concrete action (Ross and Borgman-Prebil 2010; Grimmel and Giang 2017;
67 Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Bonjour et al. 2018), and trace different interpretations of
68 solidarity in connection with the refugee challenge in 2015–2016.

69 Drawing on content analysis, the empirical part demonstrates that although inter-
70 nally divided (Guiraudon 2018; Ripoll Servent 2019), the European Parliament (EP)
71 emphasized the importance of norms and values as an illustration of the EU's nor-
72 mative power, the European Council and the Council (hereafter European/Council)
73 privileged security and a state-centred conception of international politics as an
74 illustration of the EU's civilian power, with the Commission oscillating between
75 normative and civilian power. This article concludes that the completion of the



76 EU–Turkey agreement not only challenges the ontological characterization of the
77 EU as normative power, but also lends support to the new intergovernmentalism as
78 the outcome of the EU–Turkey agreement was a reflection of the priorities of the
79 European/Council, rather than the preferred option of supranational institutions.

80 The article is structured as follows: The first section gives an account of the
81 context and positions of key actors during the ‘refugee crisis’ from 2015 until the
82 EU–Turkey statement in March 2016. The second section presents the theoretical
83 argument, including an overview of how we operationalize civilian/normative power
84 concepts. The third section outlines methodological considerations. The fourth sec-
85 tion offers an in-depth analysis of the main actors’ preferences by highlighting their
86 preferred solutions at different stages of the crisis as a result of the evolution of their
87 power relations. The conclusion discusses broader theoretical and policy implica-
88 tions of main findings.

89 **The context in the run-up to the EU–Turkey statement of March 2016**

90 In May 2015, in response to an accelerated number of arrivals, and in particular
91 to the death of over 800 refugees in the Mediterranean Sea in a single boat trag-
92 edy in April 2015, the European Commission launched the ‘European Agenda on
93 Migration’. The Agenda called for both short-term priorities with a view to ‘tak-
94 ing immediate action to prevent further losses of migrants’ lives at sea’, as well as
95 medium-to-long-term priorities for supporting Member States with better manage-
96 ment strategies and coordination of all aspects of migration (European Commission
97 2015a, 2015b).

98 In order to implement the Agenda, the Commission adopted two packages of
99 measures on 27 May and 9 September. The most divisive proposal was the call by
100 the Commission to establish an emergency relocation scheme for a total of 160,000
101 migrants from three frontline Member States, namely Hungary, Greece and Italy.
102 Under the second package, the emergency relocation proposal for 120,000 people
103 was explicitly based on Article 78(3) of the TFEU, making the relocation procedure
104 mandatory for all Member States. Similarly, the permanent relocation mechanism,
105 which would be activated by the Commission when a Member State is confronted
106 with a large and disproportionate inflow of third-country nationals, would be man-
107 datory for all Member States with the exception of the UK, Denmark and Ireland,
108 which had an opt-out (European Commission 2015c).

109 However, reaching consensus on the relocation of 120,000 people from the sec-
110 ond package represented fundamental challenges. On 22 September, the Council
111 adopted by qualified majority the relocation decision, although the Czech Repub-
112 lic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia voted against this decision (Council 2015a).
113 While northern EU Member States, in particular Germany, initially championed the
114 Commission’s relocation plans, Central European states opposed the Commission’s
115 agenda for various reasons (Trauner 2016, p. 320; Biermann et al. 2019), invoking
116 mainly the security argument (Coman 2019; Gürkan 2019). Subsequently, as a result
117 of domestic opposition, the ‘pro-quota camp’ led by Angela Merkel switched its



118 position to opposing quotas, and the EU opted to search for alternative solutions to
119 the crisis (Zaun 2018).

120 Following its informal meeting on 23 September 2015, the European Council
121 instructed the other institutions to put more weight on diplomatic cooperation
122 with EU partners in dealing with the refugee crisis as well as on fortifying the EU's
123 external borders. The European Council also called for 'reinforcing the dialogue
124 with Turkey at all levels' to strengthen Turkey's cooperation with the EU on migra-
125 tory flows (European Council 2015a). The European Council meeting of 15 Octo-
126 ber 2015 considered the JAP with Turkey as 'part of a comprehensive cooperation
127 agenda based on shared responsibility' (European Council 2015b). Also, in return
128 for Turkey's cooperation in the refugee crisis, the European Council promised to re-
129 energize Turkey's accession process.

130 In the run-up to the meeting of the EU heads of state and government with Tur-
131 key in November, Bulgaria decided to extend the fence along its borders with Turkey
132 and Greece. Slovenia began to construct a barrier on its border with Croatia. Four
133 Member States (Austria, Denmark, Germany and Sweden) and Norway (non-EU,
134 but a Schengen member) re-introduced border controls (Morsut and Kruke 2018,
135 p. 154). While these developments put the Schengen regime at risk, the informal
136 meeting of the European Council in November 2015 concentrated on enhancing the
137 control of the EU's external borders and the modalities of diplomatic cooperation
138 with Turkey. The summit meeting between President Erdoğan and EU leaders on 29
139 November activated the JAP. In return for Turkey's cooperation in controlling irreg-
140 ular migration from Turkey to the EU, Turkey obtained financial support to cope
141 with the high number of Syrian refugees in Turkey. In addition, the EU promised to
142 lift visa requirements for Turkish citizens travelling to the Schengen area and to re-
143 energize the EU-Turkey accession process (European Council 2015c).

144 The subsequent (third) implementation package of the Commission and European
145 Council meeting in December enhanced the measures aimed at containing migrants
146 in adjacent regions and fortifying external borders rather than focusing on the relo-
147 cation and resettlement measures initially proposed by the Commission. Finally,
148 through the EU-Turkey statement of 18 March 2016, the EU and Turkey agreed to
149 return to Turkey all irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands
150 (Slominski and Trauner 2018, p. 108), while the EU, in addition to granting an extra
151 €3 billion for the refugee facility in Turkey, reconfirmed its readiness to lift the visa
152 requirements for Turkish citizens (subject to some caveats), to upgrade the customs
153 union with Turkey and to re-energize the accession process of Turkey (European
154 Commission 2016).

155 The EU and Turkey agreed on a series of measures concerning asylum seekers,
156 irregular migration, and Turkey's accession to the EU (summarized in "Appendix
157 1"), which would potentially result in serious breaches of EU law and interna-
158 tional legal obligations (Labayle and De Bruycker 2016; Rizcallah 2019, p. 257;
159 Martin 2019, p. 1355). Legal scholars argued that the collective deportation of a
160 group from a particular nationality to a country where they cannot claim asylum
161 and may not thus be a 'safe third country' is in violation of the Geneva Con-
162 vention and the European Human Rights Convention (Articles 3,4 of Protocol 4)
163 and EU law (Guiraudon 2018, p. 17). Against the backdrop of these normative



164 considerations, the next section sets the conceptual framework to analyse EU
165 institutional actors’ response to the refugee challenge.

166 **Normative power vs. civilian power in the shadow** 167 **of intergovernmentalism**

168 In this article, we argue that the EU’s response to the refugee challenge is more an
169 expression of civilian power resting on diplomatic cooperation rather than a nor-
170 mative one. We contend furthermore that the EU–Turkey agreement is a reflec-
171 tion of power relations at the EU level and of diverging conceptions of ‘what is
172 normal’ as promoted by intergovernmental and supranational institutions. There-
173 fore, the explanation has two facets: one is about normativity (What should the
174 EU do?) and the second is about power (Which actor has the upper hand?).

175 For the former question (What should the EU do?), Normative Power Europe
176 (NPE) and Civilian Power (CP) provide an analytical grid for classifying EU
177 institutions’ preferences in the face of the refugee challenge. Following François
178 Duchêne’s original work, CP concept dominated academic debates at the begin-
179 ning of the 1990s. As Maull (1989) put it, CP is about ‘(a) the acceptance of the
180 necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; (b)
181 the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national
182 goals with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safe-
183 guard other means of international interaction; and (c) a willingness to develop
184 supranational structures to address critical issues of international management’.

185 In an attempt to overcome the debate about the EU as a military or CP, Ian
186 Manners argued that a NP approach can lead to a better understanding of how the
187 EU acts in the global arena. Using the familiar division of power into military,
188 economic and ideological dimensions, Manners linked military power to the abil-
189 ity to use military instruments, civilian power to economic power or to the ‘abil-
190 ity to use civilian instruments’ of power, and normative power to the ability to
191 define what is ‘normal’. He concluded that the ability to define ‘what is normal’
192 is the greatest power of all (Manners 2002, p. 253). From this perspective, ‘EU’s
193 power cannot be enucleated to either military or purely economic means, it works
194 through ideas, opinions and conscience’ (Diez and Manners 2007, p. 175; Man-
195 ners 2002; Whitman 2011).

196 To overcome the conceptual fluidity of NPE, Forseberg (2011, p. 1190) defines
197 both the concept of norm and normative. A norm is usually defined as ‘a principle
198 of right action’, while ‘normative power’ is the ability to define what passes for nor-
199 mal. In his view, NPE means normative identity; that is, the set of norms and values
200 on which the EU is founded. NPE implies normative interests, which represent a
201 ‘common good’ rather than ‘selfish possession goals’. NPE implies using normative,
202 rather than military or economic, means of power (Forseberg 2011, p. 1193). These
203 elements, as Forseberg (2011) explains, constitute an ideal type, and are used in this
204 article to group institutional preferences, opposing normative to civilian power.

205 Against this backdrop, one should argue that NPE empirically manifests:



- 206 (1) *by putting forward the identity of the EU*. Normative identity derives from the
207 nature of the EU as a values-based, treaty-based legal order. If the EU institu-
208 tions invoke the EU's normative identity, they are expected to place the EU's
209 constitutive norms and values at the centre of their positions, and seek to trans-
210 late values—such as solidarity—into concrete political action. Put differently,
211 if institutional actors' motivations are grounded in NPE, we expect to see EU
212 institutions calling for increased intra-European solidarity and/or to make refer-
213 ences to the norms and values at the origins of its foundations for taking action.
- 214 (2) *by its pursuance of normative interests and ends*. NP engages in (foreign policy)
215 activities that aim at a common good, rather than selfish strategic interests,
216 which characterize a traditional power. Therefore, if EU institutions argue in
217 favour of normative interests, we expect to see EU institutions call on adopting
218 policies that aim to extend solidarity to refugees by helping refugees in need,
219 by addressing the root causes of migration and/or by extending solidarity to the
220 EU's external partners, to share the burden of refugees in the form of resettle-
221 ment of refugees from third states to Europe.
- 222 (3) *by using normative means of power*. NP uses normative means and persuades
223 by making references to general rules, practices, international or cosmopolitan
224 law and/or by shaping discourses about what is normal. If EU institutional actors
225 argue in favour of normative means, we expect to see 'standards for the others
226 through the means of spreading norms rather than being powerful with either
227 military or economic means' (Diez and Manners 2007, p. 175). Therefore, we
228 expect EU institutions to make references to or to define norms-based approaches
229 to refugees, as well as norms-based action to be taken at the global level or in
230 the EU's relations with its external partners. Furthermore, NP would seek to
231 overcome 'power politics through a strengthening of not only international but
232 cosmopolitan law, emphasizing the rights of individuals and not only the rights
233 of states to sovereign equality' (Sjursen 2006, p. 249).

234 Civilian power, in contrast, rests upon three dimensions:

- 235 (4) the 'centrality of economic power' (non-military) in the achievement of national
236 goals (Mauil 1989);
- 237 (5) the primacy of 'diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems' (multi-
238 lateralism);
- 239 (6) the willingness to work through legally binding supranational institutions (inter-
240 national law) (Manners 2002, pp. 236–237; Bickerton 2011, p. 27) in order to
241 privilege security (see Whitman 2013, pp. 174–175).

242 On the second question (Which institution has the upper hand to define out-
243 comes?), the literature is divided, as decision-making in the EU is fragmented
244 and varies from one area to another. In recent years, scholars in European stud-
245 ies have unpacked the power relations between EU institutions in contrasting
246 ways. Where the new intergovernmentalists (Bickerton et al. 2015; Puetter 2012;
247 Fabbrini 2013; Fabbrini and Puetter 2016) see an increase in the power of the



248 Member States, the promoters of the new supranationalism (Bocquillon and Dob-
249 bels 2014; Dehousse 2015; Bauer and Bekker 2014; Savage and Verdun 2015)
250 observe a continued empowerment of supranational institutions. The new inter-
251 governmentalism states that since the beginning of the 1990s decisions at the EU
252 level are influenced by the European/Council to the detriment of supranational
253 institutions. It suggests that Member States have been increasingly inclined to
254 solve collective problems by strengthening the power of intergovernmentalism,
255 whereas the power of supranational institutions has been impaired (Fabbrini and
256 Puetter 2016; Coman 2017; Bonjour et al. 2018). The rise in power of Member
257 States is reflected in the attempts of the European Council to instruct the Com-
258 mission and the Council to pursue particular policy initiatives, thereby monop-
259 olizing the agenda setting (Puetter 2015, p. 166). Due to the decision-making
260 procedures at work, the central role of the European Council in the day-to-day
261 decision-making process limits the room for manoeuvre of both the EP and the
262 Commission as policy entrepreneurs. Although the Commission and the EP
263 struggle to frame policy issues at stake against the preferences of the European/
264 Council, supranational institutions are not able to ‘convince the Council that they
265 represent a legitimate solution to the substantive problems raised by the crisis’
266 (Ripoll Servent 2019, p. 295), and they are constrained to follow the preferences
267 of the European/Council which are often in stark contrast with their own posi-
268 tions (Bressanelli and Chelotti 2016). Therefore, in this article, if the postulates
269 of new intergovernmentalism hold, we expect to observe that the EU’s ultimate
270 solution to the refugee challenge was shaped in line with the preferences of the
271 European/Council, and despite diverging positions of supranational institutions.

272 **Data and methodological considerations**

273 The data generated for this article come from the qualitative content analysis of 65
274 texts. This dataset includes 50 speeches delivered at the EP plenary debates between
275 April 2015 and July 2016 by three top Commission officials directly involved in
276 the formulation of the EU’s response to the ‘crisis’ (President of the Commission,
277 Jean-Claude Juncker, First Vice President of the Commission, Frans Timmermans,
278 and European Commissioner for Migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos), as well as the
279 President of the European Council, Donald Tusk and the Presidents-in-office of the
280 Council (Bert Koenders, Klaas Dijkhoff, Zanda Kalniņa-Lukaševica, Nicolas Schmit
281 and Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert). To study the position of the EP, the analysis draws
282 on nine resolutions related to migration adopted in the run-up to and immediately
283 after the deal. Resolutions—rather than the parliamentary debates—were analysed
284 as they represent the official and ultimate position. This dataset is triangulated with
285 official documents and press releases issued by the European/Council and the Com-
286 mission between April 2015 and July 2016. This period is rich in data because the
287 European/Council and Commission officials briefed the EP on migration in every
288 plenary sitting, and the EP issued a record number of resolutions on migration and
289 refugees. Moreover, the data collection covers the period preceding the completion
290 of the EU–Turkey deal and ends in July 2016. This enables us to focus on changes



291 and continuities in institutional preferences in the run-up to the conclusion of the
292 deal, leaving aside factors that altered the EU's approach to Turkey following the
293 coup attempt in July 2016 (Martin 2019).

294 The data have been analysed through computer-based manual coding by focusing
295 on the nature of EU institutions' preferred solutions about the adoption of distinct
296 policies concerning the EU's response to the refugee challenge across two meta-nar-
297 ratives (NPE and CP) and six subtopics, which are comprised of code.1/normative
298 identity, code.2/normative interests/ends, code.3/normative means, code.4/economic
299 power, code.5/diplomatic cooperation, and code.6/security (see "Appendix 2").

300 Only those ideas/statements that belong to these six labelled codes were selected.
301 The coding unit in this study was the idea rather than an entire text or a core sen-
302 tence. The coded idea could span the length of a sentence or an entire paragraph.
303 The passages that were coded contain a statement about how or why the EU or
304 Member States should act in a certain way in response to the refugee challenge.
305 If any two statements/ideas in a single text produce the same coding sequence, we
306 coded it only once. For example, if the same Commissioner makes the same argu-
307 ment/idea about the same issue throughout the same text (or in two separate texts
308 during the same intervention at the plenary), we coded this statement only once.
309 But if the same action is justified through two separate ideas in the same text, we
310 coded these statements separately. For example, if the same Commissioner refers to
311 the need to 'open safe and legal avenues for refugees to come to Europe' as a way
312 to extend solidarity to the refugees *and* as a way to help the EU's neighbours, these
313 two justifications were coded separately although they belong to the same thematic
314 family (normative interests/ends). In the same vein, while generic references to the
315 same sub-theme were coded only once, two different specific ideas belonging to
316 the same sub-theme were coded twice. For example, if an institution refers to the impor-
317 tance of social inclusion of the refugees more than once in the same text, these refer-
318 ences were coded only once as norms-based approach to refugees, but if the same
319 institution makes references to two (or more) different ideas/policies on how the EU
320 should act to achieve social integration of refugees (for example, through 'language
321 courses' *and* 'the validation of skills' *and* 'housing' and 'sporting activities'), these
322 ideas were coded separately. This resulted in an amount of 667 total coded state-
323 ments (253 for the Commission, 259 for the EP, and 155 for the European/Council).

324 The manual coding of data allowed us to identify the salience of discursive
325 dimensions per institution, and observe changes across time per each institution, and
326 in comparison to each other.

327 **Empirical findings: EU institutions' preferences in response** 328 **to the refugee challenge in 2015–2016**

329 To interpret the manually coded data, we proceeded in two steps. First, we calcu-
330 lated the emphasis put by each institution on a preferred solution to the refugee
331 challenge between 2015 and 2016. Drawing on Wendler's analysis, the emphasis
332 scores were calculated as the percentage of each dimension of NP/CP in relation
333 to all statements made by a given institution (Wendler 2014). These scores indicate



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334 not only the salience of a preferred type of response to the refugee challenge for
 335 each institution, but also allow us to compare institutions’ preferred response in rela-
 336 tion to each other through emphasis ranks (Table 1). Second, to trace changes in
 337 institutional positions over time, we calculated the frequency of each subtopic per
 338 institution and per month. To track meaningful changes/continuity across time, we
 339 aggregated the data into three periods: the period preceding the agreement on the
 340 JAP (April–September 2015), the period covering the finalization of the deal (Octo-
 341 ber 2015–March 2016), and the period succeeding the completion of the EU–Turkey
 342 statement (April–June 2016). For these three periods, we separately calculated peri-
 343 odic emphasis scores as the percentage of each dimension of NP/CP in relation to all
 344 statements made by a given institution during a given period (Table 2).

345 The assessment of data provides insights in two ways. First observations relate
 346 to the overall preferred solution of all the three institutions. The data indicate that
 347 although both meta-narratives are key to understanding the EU’s response to the ref-
 348 ugee challenge, dominant thematic emphasis for the whole dataset was NPE (57,9),
 349 while arguments pertaining to CP (42,1) remained secondary (see Table 1). Con-
 350 cerning specific discursive dimensions, arguments with regard to the adoption of
 351 normative means (36,1) constituted the core of the overall discussion on the EU’s

Table 1 Emphasis scores^a and emphasis score ranks (ESR)^b of EU institutions’ preferred solution to the refugee challenge (2015–2016)

Meta-narratives	Discursive dimen- sions	European Commis- sion	European Parlia- ment	European/Council	All institutions	N
NPE	Normative identity	ESR:1 12,2	ESR:3 6,1	ESR:2 8,3	ESR:n.a 9	60
	Normative inter- ests	ESR:1 17,7	ESR:2 10,8	ESR:3 7,7	ESR:n.a 12,7	85
	Normative means	ESR:3 13,8	ESR:1 71	ESR:2 14,1	ESR:n.a 36,1	241
	All NPE	ESR:2 43,9	ESR:1 88	ESR:3 30,3	ESR:n.a 57,9	386
Civilian power	Economic coop- eration	ESR:2 9,4	ESR:3 2,3	ESR:1 9,6	ESR:n.a 6,8	45
	Diplomatic coop- eration	ESR:2 26	ESR:3 6,1	ESR:1 29,6	ESR:n.a 19,2	128
	Security	ESR:2 20,5	ESR:3 3,4	ESR:1 30,3	ESR:n.a 16,2	108
	All CP	ESR:2 56,1	ESR:3 12	ESR:1 69,7	ESR:n.a 42,1	281
	All coded dimen- sions	253	259	155	667	667

^aEmphasis scores = the percentage of each dimension of NP/CP in relation to all statements made by a given institution

^bESR = the salience of a given dimension for an institution in comparison with other institutions, 1 corresponding to the highest score and 3 to the lowest



Table 2 Changes in EU institutions' preferred solution to the refugee challenge over time (April 2015–June 2016)

	European Parliament ^a	European Commission	European/Council
April–September 2015	NPE (90)/CP (10) Normative means (45) Normative interests (25) Normative identity (20)	NPE (73,3)/CP (26,7) Normative interests (31,1) Normative identity/means (21,1)	NPE (44,4)/CP (55,6) Diplomatic cooperation (29,6) Security (26) Normative identity/end/means (14,8)
October 2015–March 2016	NPE (100)/CP (0) Normative means (96,7) Normative interests (3,3)	NPE (17,6)/CP (82,4) Diplomatic cooperation (41,7) Security (27,8) Economic cooperation (13)	NPE (29,1)/CP (70,9) Security (31,1) Diplomatic cooperation (27,2) Economic cooperation/normative means (12,6)
April–June 2016	NPE (86,6)/CP (13,4) Normative means (73,3) Normative interests (9,1) Diplomatic cooperation (7,5)	NPE (47,3)/CP (52,7) Diplomatic cooperation (30,9) Normative ends/means (20)	NPE (23,8)/CP (76,2) Security (38,1) Diplomatic cooperation (28,6) Normative means (19,1)

Periodic emphasis scores^b in brackets for two meta-narratives and top three ranked discursive dimensions

^aThe data for the EP covers April 2015–December 2016

^bThe periodic emphasis scores were calculated as the percentage of each dimension of NP/CP in relation to all statements made by a given institution during a given period



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352 response to the refugee challenge. Diplomatic cooperation with third states (19,2)
353 and achieving security (16,2) were also frequently coded arguments followed by
354 normative interests (12,7), normative identity (9) and economic cooperation (6,8).
355 This set of observations indicate that while the preferred solution for all three insti-
356 tutions was framed primarily in normative terms, the outcome (in the form of the
357 EU–Turkey agreement) reflected the preferred option of the European/Council,
358 which had a clear preference for achieving security (30,3).

359 Second, the data indicate that preferences of EU institutions change over time
360 with the exception of the EP, whose characteristic emphasis was on normative
361 means throughout the crisis (Table 2). While the European/Council has consistently
362 put forward arguments pushing the EU towards civilian power, its justifications/
363 discursive dimensions switched from diplomatic cooperation with external partners
364 (which was the main theme between April and September 2015) to security (from
365 October 2015 onward). In accordance with our prior expectations, the extreme dis-
366 cursive shift took place in the European Commission, which, until the end of Sep-
367 tember, put the emphasis on normative ends, and then starting from October 2015
368 onward it advocated a diplomatic solution (mainly through the deal with Turkey).

369 The article now turns to the qualitative assessment of coded texts per institution
370 with a view to examining the thematic content of each institutions’ preferred solu-
371 tion to the refugee challenge, and how institutional arguments relate to each other.

372 **The European Commission: the limits of its normative power**

373 Overall, although the Commission more frequently put forward arguments inclin-
374 ing the EU towards CP, the manual coding of Commission texts indicates similar
375 emphasis scores for both meta-narratives (43,9/NPE and 56,1/CP). This observation
376 is in sharp contrast with the high emphasis scores of the EP (88/NPE) and the Euro-
377 pean/Council (69,7/CP), which had a stronger emphasis on discursive dimensions
378 embedded in the NPE and CP, respectively (see Table 1). In a similar vein, the argu-
379 mentative content of the Commission’s discourse does not mark a high score in any
380 of the specific discursive dimensions (26/diplomatic cooperation; security/20,5; nor-
381 mative interests/17,7; normative means/13,8; normative identity/12,2; and economic
382 cooperation/9,4). This observation provides initial evidence for demonstrating half-
383 hearted support by the European Commission to a solution inclining the EU towards
384 CP.

385 Beyond these general observations, a closer look at the Commission’s dis-
386 course across time indicates an abrupt discursive shift in the Commission’s fram-
387 ing of the EU’s response to the refugee problem. Periodic emphasis scores cal-
388 culated separately for the three time periods (see Table 2) show that from April
389 until the end of September 2015, the Commission devoted particular attention to
390 the situation of refugees, and frequently used arguments embedded in the nor-
391 mative conceptualization of the EU (ES: 73,3/NPE and 26,7/CP). During this
392 period, the overarching theme in the Commission’s discourse was normative
393 ends/interests (ES: 31,1), mainly the need to extend solidarity to refugees in the
394 form of pursuing an open-door policy and creating legal avenues. This discursive



395 dimension was frequently used in connection with the necessity to strengthen soli-
 396 darity between Member States as well as adopting normative means to deal with
 397 the problem, as indicated by the identical and relatively high emphasis scores
 398 observed for both normative identity and normative means (ES: 21,1/21,1). The
 399 Commission’s call for fair-burden sharing among Member States in the form of
 400 relocation was used for supporting the Commission’s argument to extend solidar-
 401 ity to refugees through an open-door policy (Juncker 2015a, 2015b). This does
 402 not mean that the Commission advocated the opening of all borders, but the char-
 403 acteristic emphasis of the Commission was on helping those fleeing war, hence
 404 showing solidarity with refugees by adopting policies in favour of accommodat-
 405 ing refugees in EU Member States (Timmermans 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d,
 406 2015e; Avramopoulos 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d). Moreover, the qualitative
 407 review indicates that the Commission frequently made arguments related to a
 408 norms-based approach to refugees (ES for normative means: 21,1), in particular
 409 by putting universal norms at the centre of the EU’s relations with the outside
 410 world.

411 By the end of September 2015, facing increased opposition from Member State
 412 governments who contested the relocation scheme, and in light of several Member
 413 States’ decision to reintroduce internal border controls, the Commission started to
 414 side with the European Council in framing the response to the crisis. This is shown
 415 by the fact that the overall emphasis score for CP increased from 26,7 for April–Sep-
 416 tember 2015 to 82,4 for the October 2015–March 2016 period (Table 2). Following
 417 the European Council’s acknowledgement of the need to enhance cooperation with
 418 Turkey to reduce and manage migratory flow, the Commission shifted its primary
 419 focus from extending solidarity to the refugees by adopting normative means and by
 420 strengthening solidarity among Member States (hence pushing for mandatory relo-
 421 cation schemes) to making a case for closer cooperation with neighbouring coun-
 422 tries for externalizing the refugee problem (see Fig. 1). From that point onward, the
 423 Commission became complicit in keeping refugees out of the EU and took the lead
 424 in negotiating the deal with Turkey (Smeets and Beach 2020, p. 138).




Fig. 1 European Commission—The shift in meta-narratives (April 2015–June 2016)



425 This policy change was justified around two main discursive dimensions that
426 received their highest emphasis scores between October 2015 and March 2016.
427 First, the primacy of diplomatic cooperation to solve refugee crisis emerges as the
428 principal argument for the European Commission (ES: 41,7/October 2015–March
429 2016, and 30,9/April–May 2016). The qualitative review indicates that most-
430 frequently coded sub-themes under diplomatic cooperation were the argument of
431 solidarity with Turkey and the emphasis on mutual gains. As for the former, the
432 Commission’s rhetoric converged with that of several Member States as well as
433 the European/Council, arguing that the EU’s effort to contain refugees in adjacent
434 regions was an act of solidarity with EU external partners. For example, the JAP
435 presented by President Juncker to President Erdoğan on 5 October 2015 was pro-
436 moted as a set of ‘concrete measures covering support for refugees, migrants and
437 their hosting communities’ (European Commission 2015d: 13). In other words,
438 the plan was conceived by the Commission as a tool not only for preventing
439 uncontrolled migratory flows from Turkey to the EU, but also for assisting Turkey
440 in managing the massive influx of refugees (European Commission 2015e, see
441 also Timmermans 2015f, 2015h, 2016b; Juncker 2015c; Avramopoulos 2016d,
442 2016e).

443 Besides the theme of assisting Turkey, Commissioners often voiced the argument
444 of mutual benefits. The deal was a mutually beneficial diplomatic tool for the EU to
445 stop refugee inflows and for Turkey to receive other benefits from the EU (Avramo-
446 poulos 2016a, Juncker 2015f, 2016a). While on some occasions, Juncker (2016b)
447 defended the cooperation with Turkey as an essential tool for saving the Schengen
448 regime, in other instances, the Commission justified the deal as a key component of
449 EU strategy for stopping sea arrivals (Juncker 2015e; 2016c; 2016d; Timmermans
450 2016a, 2016b; Avramopoulos 2016b).

451 The second most-frequently used discursive dimension from the beginning of
452 September onward was the necessity to protect external borders to ensure the secu-
453 rity of the Union (ES: security/27,8 between October 2015–March 2016). In line
454 with the arguments raised by the European/Council, the Commission maintained
455 that the deal was necessary for stemming refugee flow and for securing the EU’s
456 external borders (for the similarity of the arguments, see interventions by Juncker
457 2015c and Tusk 2015b; Schmit 2015a and Timmermans 2015f, 2015 g; Juncker
458 2015d and Schmit 2015b). However, we observed that the security argument
459 becomes relatively less important following the agreement on the EU–Turkey state-
460 ment between April–May 2016 (ES: 10,9), while normative arguments become once
461 again more pronounced by the Commission (normative interests/means identical
462 ES: 20/20, Table 2). This provides additional evidence to our main argument about
463 the Commission’s oscillation between security and solidarity arguments.

464 In a nutshell, despite the Commission’s attempt to strengthen intra-European
465 solidarity in order to extend solidarity to refugees, the resistance of Member States
466 prevented it from giving meaning to the values of solidarity and shared responsibil-
467 ity enshrined in the treaties. In the end, the Commission followed the position of
468 the European Council and the majority of Member State governments (Smeets and
469 Beach 2019). This policy change was clearly captured by Timmermans who, follow-
470 ing the conclusion of the deal with Turkey, stated that the agreement with Turkey



471 was ‘the only way forward to solve that problem’ because it was impossible to curb
 472 the position of Member States (Timmermans 2016b).

473 **The European Council and the Council: the champion of security**
 474 **and the EU’s civilian power**

475 The data show that European Council and the successive rotating presidencies of
 476 the Council pushed the EU towards a civilian power (Fig. 2). From the beginning of
 477 2015, the European/Council’s primary focus was on the stability and security of the
 478 EU, hence on the EU’s material interests. This is not to say that humanitarian norms
 479 were not important for these two institutions, but security had primacy over other
 480 (normative) considerations. This is shown by the low scores for normative dimen-
 481 sions (ES: normative identity, interests and means: 8,3/7,7 and 14,1, respectively)
 482 and the high overall emphasis score for security (30,3 see Table 1). These securiti-
 483 zation arguments became the primary theme for the European/Council, as several
 484 Member States started to reinstate border controls. A qualitative review of the con-
 485 tent of arguments shows that although the main theme in European/Council texts
 486 was the securitization of migration to the EU, the referent object (what is threatened)
 487 was conceptualized to encompass a broad array of values or policies of the Union.
 488 What needed to be protected ranged from ‘the collapse of Schengen’ (Tusk 2015e),
 489 ‘to political chaos in the EU’ and ‘the loss of control over external borders’ (Tusk
 490 2016a, 2016b).

491 The data indicate also that the main security theme in the European Council’s
 492 discourse was used in connection with the need to establish diplomatic cooperation
 493 with external partners, which received a similar overall emphasis score (ES: secu-
 494 rity/30,3 and diplomatic cooperation/29,6 see Table 1). The qualitative analysis of
 495 European Council texts supports this observation. It shows that securitization of the
 496 migration flow justified ‘policies of permanent exceptionality’ (Moreno-Lax 2018:
 497 121) in the form of regaining the control of external borders (Tusk 2015c; 2015d;
 498 2015e; 2016a; 2016b). For this, the European/Council relied upon diplomatic




Fig. 2 European/Council – Meta-narratives across time (April 2015–June 2016)



499 cooperation with the countries of origin and transit as well as on economic means.
500 As early as April 2015, according to Tusk (2015c), the best way to address the refu-
501 gee crisis was ‘to ensure that [refugees] do not get on the boats in the first place’.
502 In order to achieve this, a recurring theme in his speeches was the need to coop-
503 erate with countries of transit to ‘monitor and control the land borders and travel
504 routes’. The necessity of diplomatic cooperation with Turkey was a dominant theme
505 in Tusk’s framing of a solution to the ‘crisis’ (2015b; 2015e). Similar arguments
506 were also raised by the Council Presidency calling on closer cooperation with Tur-
507 key, despite Turkey’s authoritarian drift (Schmit 2015a, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e, Hen-
508 nis-Plasschaert 2016a). The President of the European Council and rotating Presi-
509 dencies of the Council repeatedly called on Member States to financially support
510 Turkey and other countries of origin and transit (Tusk 2015e; Schmit 2015e, 2015f,
511 2015g; Hennis-Plasschaert 2016b).

512 A comparison of the frequency and the content of the arguments between the
513 institutions reveals that the European/Council’s emphasis scores are similar to the
514 Commission’s altered position, which, between October 2015 and March 2016,
515 overwhelmingly argued in favour of the primacy of diplomatic cooperation with
516 third countries (41,7) and preserving the security of the Union (27,8 see Table 2).
517 These two institutions’ convergence on securitization and diplomatic cooperation
518 with partners is in sharp contrast with the position of the EP, which embraced exclu-
519 sively normative arguments (see Table 2). This institutional cleavage again lends
520 support to our hypothetical expectations, as it reveals not only how the European/
521 Council pushed the EU towards civilian power by prioritizing security over norma-
522 tive concerns, but also the inter-institutional weight of the European/Council as the
523 outcome (the conclusion of EU–Turkey agreement) reflected its security concerns
524 despite diverging positions among the EU institutions.

525 **The European Parliament: the champion of values and the EU’s** 526 **normative power**

527 The data for the EP consist of own-initiative reports and resolutions on topical issues
528 which formed an ‘important channel of inter-institutional communication’ allowing
529 the EP to set its normative priorities *vis-à-vis* the other institutions (Ripoll Servent
530 2018, p. 97). Although the non-legislative character of these resolutions arguably
531 facilitated their adoption and magnified their normative emphasis, extreme scores
532 recorded for these texts show that throughout the crisis, the EP had a clear prefer-
533 ence for solutions pushing the EU towards NPE (88/NPE and 12/CP, see Table 1
534 and Fig. 3). Despite intra-EU divisions, the main political groups in the EP argued
535 in favour of a norms-based approach to refugees, putting human rights, the right to
536 asylum, and human dignity at the centre of the EP’s approach to the refugee chal-
537 lenge (Agence Europe, 7 October 2015). This is evidenced by high scores recorded
538 for normative means (71) followed by normative interests (10,8) and normative
539 identity (6,1) in EP Resolutions (see Table 1). While normative means remained the
540 most-frequently used theme, it became more pronounced by the EP between Octo-
541 ber 2015 and March 2016 (ES for normative means/96,7 and NPE/100 for the same






Fig. 3 European Parliament – Meta-narratives across time (April 2015–December 2016)

542 period, see Table 2). This extreme value is explained by the EP’s criticisms to both
543 the Commission and the European/Council’s preferred option to the refugee crisis,
544 which converged around the securitization and externalization of migration.

545 A closer analysis of EP Resolutions indicates that the EP’s discourse on the
546 migration challenge had three characteristics. First, compared with other institu-
547 tions, the EP’s framing of a solution to the ‘crisis’ rested on a rights-based discourse
548 referring to the authority of laws, rules and regulations. In the EP’s argumentation,
549 the act of seeking asylum was a fundamental right and not a security risk; hence,
550 extending solidarity to refugees was a legal obligation. The EP repeatedly called on
551 Member States to ratify all international treaties and conventions and to implement
552 the highest international legal standards for ensuring the full protection of refugees’
553 rights (EP 2016b; 2016c paragraph 56). Consequently, the EP criticized the policies
554 of the Member States and the European Council aimed at stopping refugee arrivals,
555 and reiterated its preference for creating safe and legal routes for asylum seekers (EP
556 2015a, paragraph 13; 2016a).

557 The EP’s call for solidarity between Member States for pursuing a fair and equi-
558 table burden sharing was indeed a logical consequence of the EP’s call for an open-
559 door policy to accommodate refugees in Europe (see EP 2015a, paragraph 4; EP
560 2015b, paragraph 3). In this regard, the EP’s call for solidarity between Member
561 States overlapped with the initial position of the Commission as evidenced by similar
562 periodical emphasis scores for normative identity both for the EP and the Commis-
563 sion (20/21,1 for the EP and the Commission, respectively, for April–September
564 2015, see Table 2).

565 The second component of the EP’s normative approach to the refugee crisis was
566 manifested in its call for the adoption of a comprehensive EU policy, respecting in
567 particular the humanitarian aspects. The EP emphasized the integration of refugees
568 and asylum seekers by giving them access to housing, health care, education, social
569 protection and the labour market. In this regard, the EP criticized the Commission’s
570 reluctance to implement decisions concerning asylum seekers’ access to the labour
571 market (EP 2016d, paragraph 38). Also, compared with the European Council, the
572 EP had a fundamental difference in its argument in favour of enhancing controls in
573 registering asylum seekers. Unlike the European Council which advocated stricter
574 controls on the registration of asylum seekers at their arrival purely for security



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575 reasons, the EP highlighted the necessity of these controls for ensuring a timely and
576 legal access of refugees and asylum seekers to the labour market and for preventing
577 undeclared work practices and all forms of exploitation (EP 2016d, paragraph 40).
578 Besides, the EP, unlike the other institutions, attached a particular importance to the
579 protection of vulnerable groups, including children, women, LBGTI migrants and
580 minority groups (EP 2016b).

581 Third, the way the EP approached the EU’s collaboration with external part-
582 ners on refugee crisis management diverged from the European Council’s position.
583 While the protection of external borders/security was the main argument behind the
584 European Council’s discourse on collaboration with partners, the EP criticized EU
585 policies of outsourcing refugee flows on moral grounds (EP 2015a, paragraph 16).
586 In a similar vein, the EP was against the European Council’s decision to negotiate
587 an agreement with Turkey, as according to the EP, ‘outsourcing the refugee crisis
588 to Turkey [was] not a credible long-term solution to the problem’ (EP 2016e, par-
589 agraph 37) for two reasons. First, the EP was against forced returns, in particular
590 regarding the return of migrants to countries where they could face human rights
591 violations or persecution (EP 2016b, paragraph 84). Hence, given Turkey’s poor
592 record in human rights, Turkey’s classification as a safe country by the EU was criti-
593 cized (EP 2017, paragraph 67). Also, the EP placed more emphasis on the assistance
594 programs for promoting refugees’ integration in third countries, such as access to
595 education, health care and legal employment (EP 2015c). Second, the EP champi-
596 oned the consistent application of the EU’s political conditionality *vis-à-vis* Turkey.
597 According to the EP, cooperation with Turkey on migration and the EU’s relations
598 with Turkey were separate issues, and the EU should not have turned a blind eye to
599 the erosion of the rule of law and fundamental rights in Turkey (EP 2016e, para-
600 graph 3). This was in contrast with the European Council’s generous offer to Turkey
601 to guarantee its collaboration in the refugee crisis (EP 2016e, paragraph 3). This
602 observation is also supported by very low values recorded for diplomatic coopera-
603 tion (6,1) and economic cooperation (2,3) for the EP (see Table 1).

604 **Conclusion: failed intra-European solidarity, the affirmation of EU** 605 **civilian power at the expense of normative power**

606 This article sought to explain the EU’s response to the refugee ‘crisis’ that resulted
607 in the conclusion of the EU–Turkey deal. The analysis showed that EU institutions
608 had diverging policy emphases. While the EP framed EU’s response to the refugee
609 challenge in 2015–2016 through normative means in accordance with the image of
610 the EU acting as a normative power, the European/Council favoured a civilian power
611 approach. The Commission, which, in an initial stage was the champion of the EU’s
612 normative identity and normative interests, in the end found itself in support of the
613 security approach and negotiating the deal with Turkey. As a result, the EU–Turkey
614 agreement was more an expression of civilian power resting on diplomatic and eco-
615 nomic cooperation to achieve security interests rather than a normative one.

616 These findings have broader theoretical and policy implications. First, the arti-
617 cle suggests that CP and NP remain relevant conceptual tools for studying not



618 only the content of argumentative justifications advanced by the EU in response
619 to a crisis situation, but also the identity of the EU. The way institutions jus-
620 tify their preferences is important because, when framing a response to a crisis
621 situation by choosing to weight material or moral dimensions more heavily than
622 another, an actor is also asserting a specific identity (Hall 2005, p. 151). Accord-
623 ingly, by using these concepts as analytical grids to classify the EU's framing
624 of responses to the crisis, this article shed light on the identity of the EU in a
625 crisis situation. On this point, the analysis demonstrates that each institution put
626 a special emphasis on a specific dimension of CP or NPE, and hence chose to
627 assert one dimension of the EU's identity more strongly than another. However,
628 while the most-frequently introduced argument by all the institutional actors was
629 framed in normative terms, the EU's actual response was ultimately the pursu-
630 ance of its material interests (security) through the conclusion of the EU-Turkey
631 deal. This confirms scholars' observation about the EU's identity crisis referred
632 to in the introduction of this article. Besides, this divergence between normative
633 arguments and interest-driven policy outputs render the EU prone to mobilizing
634 criticisms about the EU's credibility in its external action, in particular in connec-
635 tion with the refugee deal with Turkey (Toygür and Gürkan 2020).

636 Second, this article not only lends support to the new intergovernmentalist
637 claims, but also expands theory's empirical scope to crisis situations. The new
638 intergovernmentalism has been launched 'to understand the changing dynamics
639 of European integration in the post-Maastricht period', and was criticized for fail-
640 ing to address the institutional dynamics set in motion by crisis situations (Hod-
641 son 2020). The analysis demonstrated that the EU's handling of the European
642 refugee crisis is largely consistent with the key claims of new intergovernmental-
643 ism. During the refugee crisis in 2015-2016, in accordance with new intergov-
644 ernmentalist expectations, Member States sought to restore stability and security
645 of the Schengen area at the expense of normative considerations raised by the
646 Commission and the EP. While the EP consistently framed the EU's response in
647 normative terms, the Commission ultimately sided with the European/Council,
648 which prioritized collaboration with third countries and border control over nor-
649 mative interests. Since 2015, subsequent proposals by the European Commission
650 related to migration indicate a similar preference hierarchy for the Commission
651 (EU Observer 2020; European Commission 2020). Third, and in a way related to
652 the previous point, these observations suggest that when faced with an exogenous
653 shock, the EU's crisis resolution measures are determined through consensus-
654 seeking at the European Council level but at the expense of ideational preferences
655 of supranational institutions. First-order preferences of supranational institu-
656 tions, especially those of the EP, remain marginal. Bridging ideational differences
657 between the institutions and increasing the role of the EP in forming preferences
658 in a crisis context would not only help to mitigate normative gaps in the EU's
659 policies, but also contribute to making the EU's identity more value-driven.

660



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661 **Compliance with ethical standards**

662 **Conflict of interest** On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of
663 interest.

664 **Appendix 1 Summary of EU–Turkey statement, 16 March 2016**

Provisions related to asylum seekers and irregular migrants	Provisions related to Turkey’s accession to the EU
(1) All new irregular migrants or asylum seekers crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey	(1) The fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016
(2) For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU from Turkey directly	(2) The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing work on the upgrading of the Customs Union
(3) Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent irregular migration from Turkey to the EU	(3) The accession process will be re-energised, with Chapter 33 to be opened during the Dutch Presidency of the Council of the European Union and preparatory work on the opening of other chapters to continue at an accelerated pace
(4) Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or have been substantially reduced, a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be activated	
(5) The EU will further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated €3 billion under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Once these resources are about to be used in full, the EU will mobilise additional funding for the Facility up to an additional €3 billion to the end of 2018	
(6) The EU and Turkey will work to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria	

665

666 Source: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_16_1494



667 **Appendix 2: Operationalization of NPE/CP for content analysis**

Author Proof

	Categories/dimensions	Definition	Indicators	Examples of coded frames
668	Normative power 1. Normative identity	The constitutive values/norms of the EU and its treaty-based legal order	References to intra-EU solidarity (arguments in favour of fair-burden sharing, solidarity among Member States usually <i>in the form of</i> relocation or <i>through</i> the allocation of technical/financial resources to support the most-affected Member States) Call for a respect for or references to EU norms/values (respect for human rights, rights of refugees, fundamental values of the EU such as solidarity)	The EP stresses the need for the EU to base its immediate response to the situation on solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, as stated in Article 80 of the TFEU We thought it was time to give a true European response to such fundamental and simple questions. One where every Member State would do its fair share in order to promote the fundamental values of humanity and solidarity on which this Union is built
669				
670				
671				
672				



The EU–Turkey deal in the 2015 European ‘refugee crisis’: when...

Categories/dimensions	Definition	Indicators	Examples of coded frames
2. Normative interests/ends	Engaging in activities aimed at a common good (rather than selfish possession goals)	<p>Ideas about solidarity with refugees (helping those in need, helping those fleeing from war) <i>in the form of</i> resettlement of refugees, the pursuance of open-door policy for refugees, or the creation of legal avenues for refugees or evacuation of displaced persons from third countries</p> <p>Ideas about solidarity with partners (in terms of burden sharing of refugees <i>through</i> the resettlement of refugees from third states to Europe)</p> <p>Ideas about addressing the root causes of migration</p>	<p>Resettlement is one of the preferred options for granting safe and lawful access to the Union for refugees and those in need of international protection</p> <p>The Commission has proposed a resettlement scheme to transfer 20,000 refugees to Europe from third countries, showing much needed solidarity with our neighbours</p> <p>The EP stresses the need for the EU to step up its foreign policies so as to bring peace and stability to those areas where war and conflict trigger enormous migration flows towards the EU</p>

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Categories/dimensions	Definition	Indicators	Examples of coded frames
3. Normative means	The EU uses normative (rather than military or economic) means of power (the EU persuades by referring to the general rules and practices, or illustrating the future mutual gains, or by shaping the discourse of what is normal)	<p>Norms-based approach to refugees (including all policies related to the protection of refugees' human rights, human dignity, humanitarian admission, refugees' integration in European Member States or labour market, social inclusion, or protection of vulnerable groups among refugees)</p> <p>Respect for international and cosmopolitan law (rights of individuals, human rights, human dignity, humanitarian norms, right to asylum)</p> <p>References to or definition of the norms-based action needed to be taken either at the international level or at the EU level</p> <p>Norms-based approach to external partners (all arguments related to the firm application of EU's conditionality policy <i>vis-à-vis</i> third partners)</p>	<p>Priority should be given to actions providing immediate humanitarian assistance; provision of legal, administrative and psychological support to refugees; support for community centres; the enhancement of self-sufficiency and employability of refugees and their social inclusion</p> <p>The EP recalls that saving of lives is a legal obligation under international law</p> <p>The EU and its Member States must lead by example in promoting and protecting the human rights of migrants</p> <p>The EP calls on both the Commission and the Council not to ignore internal developments in Turkey and to clearly stand up for respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights in Turkey, as stipulated in the Copenhagen criteria, and irrespective of other interests</p>



The EU–Turkey deal in the 2015 European ‘refugee crisis’: when...

	Categories/dimensions	Definition	Indicators	Examples of coded frames
Civilian power	4. The ‘centrality of economic power’ (non-military) in the achievement of national goals	Economic cooperation with external partners (financial support)	Solidarity with external partners (arguments in favour of cooperating with external partners for stemming refugee flow to the EU) <i>through financial means</i> for supporting external partners	Turkey’s efforts to host more than two million Syrian and Iraqi refugees deserve not only our approval but also our full support and solidarity. The Council’s recent decision to increase the EU’s financial contribution, the Commission’s commitments in this respect and the increased contribution of Member States should help us in putting our forces together
	5. The primacy of ‘diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems’ (multilateralism)	Diplomatic cooperation with external partners	Working with external partners for stemming refugee flow to the EU, for better controlling irregular migration, for ensuring readmission and return through international agreements. These arguments usually take the form of ‘extending solidarity to external partners’	We need to gear up our cooperation with third countries to make sure return and readmission are the reality for those who have no right to stay in Europe. Another important contribution, and a result of this statement with Turkey, is better burden sharing with Turkey for jointly bringing order into migratory flows, and for stemming irregular migration

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Categories/dimensions	Definition	Indicators	Examples of coded frames
6. The willingness to work through legally binding supranational institutions (EU or international law) to achieve security	Control/protection of external borders	Measures related to the control/protection of external borders <i>in order to</i> provide security, safety for EU citizens, Member States, or the stability of the EU, or to save the Schengen system	We need to do a better job of protecting our external borders. Europe without its external borders equals Europe without Schengen. Europe without its external borders will become a breeding ground for fear in each and every one of us. And this will lead us, sooner rather than later, to a political catastrophe
		Measures related to preventing uncontrolled migratory flow to the EU, including measures regarding fighting smugglers, stopping sea arrivals usually justified <i>in order to</i> save refugees' lives	We have reacted with more funding and resources for Triton to help it manage borders and save lives

673

674 Appendix 3: The list of official documents and speeches

- 675 Agence Europe, 7 October 2015.
- 676 Avramopoulos (2015a) Speech at the EP plenary on the European Agenda on Migration (plenary debate), 20 May.
- 677
- 678 Avramopoulos (2015b) Speech at the EP plenary on Migration and refugees in Europe (plenary debate), 9 September.
- 679
- 680 Avramopoulos (2015c) Speech at the EP plenary on Conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on migration (plenary debate), 16 September.
- 681
- 682 Avramopoulos (2015d) Speech at the EP plenary on the Report of the extraordinary European Council meeting—The latest tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU migration and asylum policies (plenary debate), 29 April.
- 683
- 684
- 685 Avramopoulos (2016a), Speech at the EP plenary on Turkey's progress in fulfilling the requirements of the Visa liberalisation roadmap (plenary debate), 11 May.
- 686
- 687 Avramopoulos (2016b) Speech at the EP plenary on the Refugee emergency, external borders control and future of Schengen—Respect for the international
- 688



689 principle of non-refoulement—Financing refugee facility for Turkey—Increased
690 racist hatred and violence against refugees and migrants across Europe (plenary
691 debate), 2 February.

692 Avramopoulos (2016c) Press Release, EU–Turkey agreement: 54,000 places allo-
693 cated for resettlement of Syrians from Turkey, 21 March.

694 Avramopoulos (2016d) Speech at the EP plenary on the conclusions of the Euro-
695 pean Council meeting of 17 and 18 March 2016 and outcome of the EU–Turkey
696 summit (plenary debate), 13 April.

697 Avramopoulos (2016e) Speech at the EP plenary on the situation in the Mediter-
698 ranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration (plenary debate), 12
699 April.

700 Council (2015a). Justice and Home Affairs Council of 22 September 2015 main
701 results.

702 Council (2015b). Justice and Home Affairs Council of 8–9 October 2015 main
703 results.

704 Council (2015c). Foreign Affairs Council of 12 October 2015 Conclusions on
705 Migration.

706 Dijkhoff, K. (2016) Speech at the Plenary, Legal aspects, democratic control and
707 implementation of the EU–Turkey agreement (debate), 28 April.

708 European Commission (2015a). A Communication from the Commission: A Euro-
709 pean Agenda on Migration, 13 May, COM(2015)240.

710 European Commission (2015b). Press release. Managing migration better in all
711 aspects: A European Agenda on Migration. Accessed on 3 May 2018 on [https://
712 europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4956_en.htm](https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4956_en.htm)

713 European Commission (2015c). Fact Sheet Refugee Crisis: European Commission
714 takes decisive action—Questions and answers. Accessed on 5 May 2018 on [https
715 ://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5597_en.htm](https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5597_en.htm)

716 Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action.

717 European Commission (2015d) Communication from the Commission to the Euro-
718 pean Parliament, the European Council and the Council. Managing the refugee
719 crisis: State of Play of the Implementation of the Priority Actions under the Euro-
720 pean Agenda on Migration. COM(2015) 510 final.

721 European Commission (2015e) Press release. Draft Action Plan: Stepping up
722 EU–Turkey cooperation on support of refugees and migration management in
723 view of the situation in Syria and Iraq.

724 European Commission (2016) Memo, Implementing the EU–Turkey Statement:
725 Questions and Answers, 8 December.

726 European Commission (2020) New Pact on Migration and Asylum, 23 September.

727 European Council (2015a). Statement, Informal meeting of EU heads of state or
728 government on migration, 23 September.

729 European Council (2015b). European Council conclusions, 15 October.

730 European Council (2015c). Press Release, Meeting of Heads of state or government
731 with Turkey, 29 November.

732 European Parliament (2015b). EP resolution of 29 April 2015 on the latest tragedies
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- 734 European Parliament (2015c). EP resolution of 10 June 2015 on the 2014 Commis-
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- 736 European Parliament resolution of 10 September 2015 on migration and refugees in
737 Europe (2015/2833(RSP)).
- 738 European Parliament (2016a). EP resolution of 13 December 2016 on the situation
739 of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2015.
- 740 European Parliament (2016b). EP resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation
741 in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration
742 (2015/2095(INI)).
- 743 European Parliament (2016c). EP resolution of 5 July 2016 on refugees: social
744 inclusion and integration into the labour market (2015/2321(INI)).
- 745 European Parliament (2016d). EP resolution of 25 October 2016 on human rights
746 and migration in third countries (2015/2316(INI)).
- 747 European Parliament (2016e). EP resolution of 14 April 2016 on the 2015 report on
748 Turkey (2015/2898(RSP)).
- 749 European Parliament (2016). EP resolution of 8 March 2016 on the situation of
750 women refugees and asylum seekers in the EU (2015/2325(INI)).
- 751 Hennis-Plasschaert (2016a) Speech at the EP plenary on the Report on Turkey (ple-
752 nary debate), 13 April.
- 753 Hennis-Plasschaert (2016b) Speech at the EP plenary on the Preparation of the
754 European Council meeting of 17 and 18 March 2016 and outcome of the EU–Tur-
755 key summit (plenary debate), 9 March.
- 756 Juncker (2015a) Speech at the EP plenary on the conclusions of the Special Euro-
757 pean Council on 23 April: The latest tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU
758 migration and asylum policies (plenary debate), 29 April.
- 759 Juncker (2015b) Speech at the EP plenary, State of the Union address to the EP (ple-
760 nary debate), 9 September.
- 761 Juncker (2015c) Speech at the EP plenary on the Conclusions of the informal Euro-
762 pean Council of 23 September 2015 (plenary debate), 6 October.
- 763 Juncker (2015d) Speech at the EP plenary on the Preparation of the European Coun-
764 cil meeting of 17 and 18 December 2015 (plenary debate), 16 December.
- 765 Juncker (2015e) Speech at the EP plenary on the Conclusions of the European
766 Council meeting of 15 October 2015, in particular the financing of international
767 funds, and of the Leaders’ meeting on the Western Balkans route of 25 October
768 2015, and preparation of the Valletta summit of 11 and 12 November 2015 (ple-
769 nary debate), 27 October.
- 770 Juncker (2015f) Speech at the EP plenary on the Preparation of the European Coun-
771 cil meeting 15–16 October 2015 (plenary debate), 14 October.
- 772 Juncker (2015 g), Speech at the EP, Conclusions of the European Council (25–26
773 June 2015) and of the Euro Summit (7 July 2015) and the current situation in
774 Greece, 8 July.
- 775 Juncker (2016b) Speech at the EP plenary on the Conclusions of the European
776 Council meeting of 17 and 18 December (plenary debate), 19 January.
- 777 Juncker (2016), Speech at the EP, Preparation of the European Council meeting of
778 18 and 19 February 2016 (debate), 3 February.



- 779 Juncker (2016a) Speech at the EP plenary on the Conclusions of the European
780 Council meeting of 18 and 19 February 2016 (plenary debate), 24 February.
- 781 Juncker (2016c) Speech at the 2016 Spring Meetings of the IMF, World Bank
782 flagship event on ‘Forced Displacement: A Global Development Challenge’,
783 15 April.
- 784 Juncker (2016d), Speech at the EP plenary on the Conclusions of the European
785 Council meeting of 17 and 18 March 2016 and outcome of the EU–Turkey
786 summit (plenary debate), 13 April.
- 787 Kalniņa-Lukaševica, Z. (2015a), Speech at the EP Plenary, European Agenda on
788 Migration (plenary debate), 20 May 2015.
- 789 Kalniņa-Lukaševica, Z. (2015b), Speech at the EP Plenary Preparation of the
790 European Council meeting (25–26 June 2015), 24 June 2015.
- 791 Koenders, B. (2016), Speech at the EP, Refugee emergency, external borders control
792 and future of Schengen—Respect for the international principle of non-
793 refoulement—Financing refugee facility for Turkey—Increased racist hatred
794 and violence against refugees and migrants across Europe (plenary debate), 2
795 February.
- 796 Koenders, B. (2016), Speech at the EP Plenary, Preparation of the European Council
797 meeting of 18 and 19 February 2016 (debate), 3 February.
- 798 Koenders, B. (2016), Speech at the EP Plenary, Preparation of the G7 Summit (ple-
799 nary debate), 25 May.
- 800 Schmit (2015a) Speech at the EP plenary on the EU–Turkey Summit (plenary
801 debate), 2 December.
- 802 Schmit (2015b) Speech at the EP plenary on the Preparation of the European Coun-
803 cil meeting of 17 and 18 December 2015 (plenary debate), 16 December.
- 804 Schmit (2015c) Speech at the EP plenary on the Migration and refugees in Europe
805 (plenary debate), 9 September.
- 806 Schmit (2015d) Speech at the EP plenary on the preparation of the European Coun-
807 cil meeting (15–16 October 2015) (plenary debate), 14 October.
- 808 Schmit (2015e) Speech at the EP plenary on the Situation in Turkey (plenary
809 debate), 7 October.
- 810 Schmit (2015f) Speech at the EP plenary on the Humanitarian situation of refugees
811 within the EU and neighbouring countries (plenary debate), 6 October.
- 812 Schmit (2015 g) Speech at the EP plenary on the Outcome of the Valletta summit of
813 11 and 12 November 2015 and of the G20 summit of 15 and 16 November 2015
814 (plenary debate), 25 November.
- 815 Timmermans (2015a) Speech at the EP plenary, Statement by the President (plenary
816 debate), 17 September.
- 817 Timmermans (2015b). Speech at the EP plenary Debate on the European Agenda on
818 Migration, Strasbourg (plenary debate), 20 May.
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820 (plenary debate), 9 September.
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822 and Home Affairs Council on migration (plenary debate), 16 September.
- 823 Timmermans (2015e), Speech at the EP plenary on the preparation of the European
824 Council meeting (25–26 June 2015) (plenary debate), 24 June.



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828 Council meeting of 17–18 December 2015 (plenary debate), 16 December.
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830 13 November.
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832 menting the European agenda on migration (plenary debate), 8 March.
- 833 Timmermans (2016b) Speech at the EP plenary on the legal aspects, democratic
834 control and implementation of the EU–Turkey agreement (plenary debate), 28
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843 Council meeting—The latest tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU migration
844 and asylum policies (plenary debate), 29 April.
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846 October.
- 847 Tusk (2015e) Speech at the EP plenary on the Conclusions of the European Council
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858 meeting of 17 and 18 March 2016 and outcome of the EU–Turkey summit (ple-
859 nary debate), 13 April.
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