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# 17. Policy transfer within the European Union and beyond: Europeanization in times of stability and crises

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Europeanization is an old concept. Its origins go back to the modernization process in the nineteenth century when it was defined as the desire to emulate the economically well-developed West, which consisted mainly of European countries like the United Kingdom, France and Germany (Hitchins, 2005). In the first part of the twentieth century, Europeanization was synonymous with ‘Westernization’ and denoted a process of ‘political, social, economic and intellectual transformation’ (Kohn, 1937, p. 259) under the influence of industrialized societies. While in some parts of the world the diffusion of European ‘models’ occurred through coercive mechanisms, it has also taken the form of imitation and voluntarist borrowing. During the modernization era of the nineteenth century, Europeanization referred to the spread of forms of living and production, religion, language, and political principles, institutions and identities of the ‘West’, which were imported or imposed in other regions of Europe and beyond. The concept of Europeanization was linked to the idea of ‘exporting beyond European territory forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe’ (Olsen, 2002, p. 924). It is also defined ‘as historical and current process of negotiating modernity’ and can be ‘fluid, contentious or confrontative’ (Beichelt et al., 2019, p. 5).

The popularity of the concept increased over time. After the Second World War, on the European continent, the integration process has given rise to a fascinating intellectual and academic debate seeking to understand the establishment of the first European Communities. Scholars of International Relations (IR) and comparative politics sought to understand why states give up part of their sovereignty: How do sovereign states choose to cease to be totally sovereign (Haas, 1958, p. xv)? Why have sovereign governments in Europe repeatedly chosen to coordinate their core economic policies, and surrender sovereign prerogatives (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 1)?

While scholars sought to provide comprehensive explanations of the integration process, since the passage of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the focus shifted from the explanation of the integration process to the analysis of its effects. Over time, through the successive revisions of the treaties, the European Communities (EC) and later the European Union (EU) have extended their decision-making competencies to a wide array of policies. These range from trade to competition, agriculture- and market-related policies, to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and various sensitive policy areas that are at the core of state sovereignty, such as economic governance, justice and home affairs, social and employment issues, and foreign and security policies (Puetter, 2014). While the SEA accelerated the path of integration through market-related policies, after the passage

of the Maastricht Treaty the EU entered into a new stage, with an increased but uneven transfer of competencies from the domestic to the supranational level.

Against the backdrop of an accelerated path of EU integration, scholars began to look at the consequences of these dynamics on member states. A new body of research emerged scrutinizing the effects of the ‘transfer of sovereignty to the EU level’ and of ‘the emergence and development at the EU level of distinct structures of governance’ (Cowles et al., 2001, p. 3) to explain specific changes observed at the domestic level. While European integration was understood as ‘the delegation of policy competencies to the supranational level to achieve particular policy outcomes’ and ‘the establishment of a new set of political institutions, with executive, legislative and judicial powers’ (Hix and Goetz, 2001, p. 3), Europeanization was defined as the ‘effect’ or the ‘responses by actors to the impact of the European integration’ (Ladrech, 2010, p. 1). For other scholars, Europeanization is seen as a macro-process understood as ‘the formation of a common ideational and institutional space [...] upon which populations and elites orientate themselves in an equal way. [...] There, where the national used to stand, comes the European space into play and changes it thereof’ (Beichelt, 2009, p. 119, authors’ translation). However, almost all scholars who used the concept tended to link it to the study of norms and policy transfers (Saurugger and Surel, 2006; Delpeuch, 2009; Dumoulin and Saurugger, 2010).

Since then, Europeanization established itself as a concept entailing a process of change induced by the dynamics of European integration. International Relations scholars have examined the impact of international organizations and compared them with the EU’s domestic institutions (Linden, 2002; Petiteville, 2006; Peters, 2016). Historians have examined the transformation of the nation state (Milward, 1992). Sociologists have been more concerned with the diffusion of norms and ideas in relation to the policymaking of and within the EU, paying particular attention to the ‘broader societal processes’ that might lie behind the EU’s impact in national contexts (Favell and Guiraudon, 2011, p. 12). Political scientists have studied the impact of the integration process in relation to three fundamental dimensions: the politics, policies and polities of the EU member states and of non-EU countries, with a particular focus on policy transfers and diffusion and compliance with EU norms and values (Radaelli, 2000a, 2000b; Beichelt, 2009; Jopp and Diedrichs, 2009).

A new research agenda emerged around the following questions: How does EU integration affect the policies, politics and polities of EU member states? Under what conditions? What is the overall outcome of Europeanization? Should we expect convergence or at least harmonization? (Graziano and Vink, 2007; Beichelt, 2009; Dakowska and Tulmets, 2011; Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2012; Coman et al., 2014). While member states have become ideal cases to study the effects of the integration process, scholars have also questioned the EU’s ‘transformative power’ (Manners, 2002) in its relations with the world, seeking to understand how the EU spreads its norms and values beyond its borders.

The aim of this chapter is to provide an account of Europeanization by looking at the evolution of this concept in EU studies and IR. It shows how this concept has been used to explore and understand the effects of EU integration on the polity, policies and politics of EU member states and how it has extended into the field of foreign policy. We then explore how Europeanization has spread outside the EU through enlargement and neighbourhood policies, to scrutinize the relations of the EU with the rest of the world.

The chapter is organized as follows: The following section traces the origins of this concept, its definition and research designs. Through different empirical illustrations, it shows that

since the beginning of the 1990s, fast-forward integration has given rise to uneven forms of Europeanization within the EU and beyond. Next, the chapter examines how Europeanization been challenged by a wide range of forms of resistance to integration and how recent crises faced by the EU have shaped not only European integration, but also processes of Europeanization.

## 2. EUROPEANIZATION: ONE CONCEPT, DIFFERENT RESEARCH DESIGNS AND A DIVERSITY OF OUTCOMES

### 2.1 Definitions and Research Designs

In 2000, Claudio Radaelli (2000a, p. 4) defined Europeanization as:

[The] processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.

Since then, this process has been conceptualized in different ways, as *top-down* Europeanization, in reference to the obligation of member states to implement policies agreed at the EU level through regulations and directives, and as *bottom-up* Europeanization, to define the ‘uploading of national preferences onto the EU policy-making’ (Ladrech, 2010, p. 14). Each understanding of the process has given rise to a specific research design, summarized below.

The first research design – *top-down Europeanization* – was conceptualized by Börzel and Risse (2000), who argued that Europeanization results from: (a) a necessary gap (or ‘misfit’) between domestic arrangements and models promoted by the EU, thus resulting in adaptational pressure; (b) facilitating actors in the national arenas who see themselves as empowered by the new opportunity structure provided by the EU and/or are engaged in a process of socialization and learning; and (c) those whose mediation leads to an impact on national political processes which can be conceived as absorption, accommodation or transformation.

Put differently, Europeanization depends on the fit between European provisions and the national institutional arrangements: the more similar the policy models, the higher the compliance and the faster the implementation (Knill and Lenschow, 1998). Europeanization also depends on the preferences and the will of domestic actors to adapt to EU prescriptions. Considering a larger number of variables, Börzel and Risse hypothesized that a ‘misfit’ can be overcome by adaptational pressure from above, such as infringement proceedings, or from below, in the form of domestic mobilization (2000, p. 3). However, empirical research showed that the response to adaptational pressures was neither passive, nor automatic. This led a number of scholars to question this first research design of Europeanization and to develop interactive theoretical accounts (Palier and Surel, 2007) and a bottom-up conceptualization.

The second research design – *bottom-up Europeanization* – defines the process as constant interactions between actors located at different levels (regional, national, European, and international) or as horizontal diffusion processes where the EU is not necessarily involved (Irondelle, 2003; [Rivinet, 2011](#)). Even more challenging are the cases where the power of the EU is unclear (Fosterstone and Papadimitriou, 2008, p. 2). One claim is that Europeanization is the result of policy feedback (Pierson, 1993). This entails that EU policies not only impact

the domestic level, but once established, they also alter resources and preferences among domestic actors, and will feed back and further shape EU policy (Börzel, 2003). Another claim has been made by sociology-driven scholars who have depicted Europeanization in terms of strategic or normative usages of Europe by domestic actors (Woll and Jacquot, 2004). This development stemmed from the view that Europeanization research had to ‘consider multiple feedback loops and complex causal relations’ (Radaelli and Saurugger, 2008, p. 215). Others maintained that Europeanization denotes a complex interactive top-down and bottom-up process ‘in which domestic politics, politics and public policies are shaped by European integration and in which domestic actors use European integration to shape the domestic arena’ (Dyson and Goetz, 2003, p. 20).

To sum up, over the 1990s research on Europeanization increased to (a) designate a process of transfer; (b) which is not uniform; (c) that implies different degrees of change; (d) is not unidirectional; (e) has no fixed geographical boundaries; and (f) includes regions outside of Europe, because Europeanization never occurs in isolation (Coman and Crespy, 2014b, p. 14).

Against this theoretical backdrop marked by diverse debates, empirical research showed that the modalities of EU integration determine to a large extent the scale of Europeanization. Scholars have identified a variety of mechanisms of Europeanization such as: positive integration (where the EU prescribes a policy model), negative integration (where the EU dismantles national regulations) or framing integration (where EU integration alters ideas, beliefs and expectations). Europeanization may result from different forms of constraints or forms of voluntary adaptations (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008, p. 25). As Radaelli argued, Europeanization may take place in a variety of ways, including ‘via the constraining power of legislation, ideational and learning processes of socialization and convergence around shared paradigms of public policy, [and] the re-calibration of identities and material resources (including budgets, financial constraints and bail-out plans)’ (2012, p. 2). Typically, as illustrated below, formal coercive mechanisms (Saurugger, 2012; see also the chapter in this volume by Kuhlmann about policy transfer and causal mechanisms) are likely to be more successful in bringing about lasting change than soft forms of governance relying on cognitive and ideational and/or short-term instrumental adaptation on the side of agency.

Ultimately, scholars of Europeanization demonstrated that the effects of the integration process have resulted in a variety of outcomes conceptualized by Radaelli (2000a) as forms of absorption or accommodation (meaning that member states are able to incorporate EU ideas, without substantially modifying their politics and/or policies), transformation (linked to the idea that member states replace their policies and institutions by substantially different ones defined at the EU level), inertia (lack of change) and retrenchment (which denotes the paradox of seeing domestic policies less Europeanized than before, despite the dynamics of integration).

## **2.2 Empirical Fields: Polity, Politics and Policies**

The Europeanization research agenda has given rise to an impressive number of studies scrutinizing the EU’s impact on politics, policies and polity in both EU and non-EU member states. Given the limits of this chapter, it will be impossible to provide an accurate account of this reach and diverse body of research. However, as this chapter shows, not only the policies of EU member states, but also their polities (institutions) and politics (interest groups, electoral politics, political parties) are changing, as a result of the dynamics of integration.

*Polity:* Historians of EU integration have demonstrated that the integration process did not weaken the nation state but strengthened (Milward, 1992) and transformed it. There is a widespread consensus in the literature that the integration process has changed the balance of power at the domestic level leading to an empowerment of the executives (Laffan, 2007), the courts (Alter, 2009), and a gradual ‘de-parliamentarization’ or weakening of national parliaments (Holzhacker, 2007). The impact of the integration process on polity is uneven, depending on the nature of the political regimes and their constitutional traditions.

*Politics:* The Europeanization literature has examined how the integration process alters the range of action of these actors, their relations as well as interests, values and preferences. As Peter Mair (2013) argued, in many EU member states, the economic and social policy programmes of mainstream political parties – both of the centre-left and the centre-right – have converged over time, making them all but indistinguishable to the voters. Political parties changed their structures, programmes, organizations and affiliations, and these changes may or may not be related to the influence of the EU. Daniele Caramani (2015) observed ideological convergences among parties of the same families in Europe.

*Policy:* The picture is even more diverse regarding policies. Although the EU has been portrayed as a ‘regulatory state’ (Majone, 1994) where regulation is about the ‘promulgation of an authoritative set of rules, accompanied by some mechanism for monitoring and promoting compliance with those rules’ (Levi-Faur, 2007, p. 103) and regulation often goes hand in hand with Europeanization, the overall emerging picture is one of ‘variegated Europeanization’ (Dyson, 2008, p. 20). The extent to which domestic changes match the EU’s demands depends on a variety of factors stemming from structures (material and institutional conditions) or agency (interests and ideas).

## 2.3 In Search of Europeanization in the Post-Maastricht Era

The focus on Europeanization in EU studies and IR coincided with the enforcement of the Maastricht Treaty and the expansion of the EU’s decision-making activity to new areas such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and foreign policy, both linked to core state powers. The section below provides an overview on how the dynamics of European integration did or did not alter domestic policies in these fields, through hard or soft mechanisms of change.

### 2.3.1 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)

The integration project brought together member states whose policies are embedded in different models of capitalism and market economies. Economic policy coordination has been a matter of concern since the establishment of the European Communities. It was not only a protected area of sovereignty, but also one characterized by an increased diversity. The first decades of integration have been marked by tensions between statist (France, Italy) and coordinated market economies (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg) and disagreements about what constitutes preferable models of economic governance at the EU level (Fioretos, 2012, p. 302). As a result, in the 1970s, despite various attempts to strengthen policy coordination, ‘the integration process failed to help governments to respond to the international economic crises of that decade’ (Fioretos, 2012, p. 297), while in the 1980s and the 1990s ‘the internal market program failed to lead to a convergence in national models of capitalism, marking the beginning of a long-lasting division between liberal and coordinated

market economies' (Fioretos, 2012, p. 298). When the economic crisis erupted in 1970s, the integration process did not help member states cope. Throughout the 1980s, tensions increased between coordinated and liberal economies with important consequences for the future integration (Fioretos, 2012, p. 296). Despite the attempts to establish the single market and the adoption of the SEA in 1986 – which created opportunities for economic coordination through the replacement of unanimity voting with qualified majority voting (QMV) in most economic areas – domestic models of capitalism did not converge.

In the 1990s, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht foresaw important changes toward a common currency through progressive adaptation, brought about by coercive mechanisms and rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). On one hand, monetary policy was centralized with decisions taken at the supra-national level by the European Central Bank (ECB). On the other hand, economic policy was subject to coordination among member states. The EMU gave rise to two processes of coordination: one was top-down due to the ECB's monetary policy, and the other was bottom-up, occurring in structural economic reforms to labour markets and welfare states (Dyson, 2000, p. 652; Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008). In other words, while monetary policy was centralized and defined by the ECB, the labour market, wage policy and welfare state reforms took different forms, reflecting the tenacity of individual traditions (Dyson, 2000, p. 660), embedded in different models of capitalism with different employment, market and economy structures (Schmidt, 2002).

Against this backdrop, the introduction of the Euro was seen as a hypothetical source of increased convergence. This was, however, 'limited, contingent, and not necessarily a one-way process' (Dyson, 2008, p. 21). From the beginning, the EMU faced collective action problems in fiscal policies (notably the crisis of the SGP in November 2003) and in economic reforms (especially in labour markets) where responsibility remained at the national level (Dyson, 2008, p. 2). In 1993, the currency crisis showed that the majority of governments would not be able to meet the convergence criteria by the 1997 deadline. By 1997, five member states had already been 'excused' from failing to get their budgets deficits below 3 per cent of the GDP, or reduce their public debt down 60 per cent of the GDP (*Politico*, 14 May 1997). In 2002, it appeared that member states were unlikely to introduce structural reforms. As many observers argued, the SGP has been a pact of 'wobbly stability' (*Politico*, 25 September 2002) since its inception. Neither at its beginning, nor prior to 2010, did member states ever follow its rules *à la lettre*.

Until the beginning of the Eurozone crisis in 2010, the Europeanization of Southern Europe and its integration into the Eurozone was one of the success stories of EU integration (Coman and Crespy, 2014a). The Euro had been born into the political economy of good times (Dyson, 2008, p. 13). The prevailing narrative was one of modernization of the Southern periphery (Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001). Although in recent years the limits of Europeanization have been increasingly criticized (Dyson, 2008; Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008; Quaglia and Furlong, 2008), earlier literature on Europeanization tended to emphasize countries' transformations. Scholars spoke of a 'new Italy' (Giuliani, 2000), the latest 'Spanish miracle' (Cabarello, 2002) or, in the case of Greece, of 'suitable accommodation' (Featherstone, 2008; see also Coman and Crespy, 2014a, p. 53).

As Dyson explained, the Euro generated powerful convergence pressures through the single monetary policy. In contrast, institutional and policy patterns, not to mention outcomes, have been even more diverse in wage policies and in welfare-state policies (2008, p. 21). As

a result, the EMU's institutional structure gave rise to a mix of uncoordinated policies at the domestic level (Dyson, 2008). In other words, Europeanization led to more diversity than convergence. It has been too quickly assumed that the mere existence of mechanisms (hard or soft) lead to deep transformation. In reality, large sections of domestic socio-economic and normative structures have proved resilient to Europeanization (Coman and Crespy, 2014a, 2014b). What this body of research shows is that the impact of EU integration on domestic policies, politics and polity translates into a variety of outcomes, such as formal or substantial adaptation and implementation of the rules or behavioural and discursive adaptation. Although Europeanization has not led to convergence, it has increased similarities in domestic policies.

### 2.3.2 Foreign policy

The concept of Europeanization of foreign policy has been used in two perspectives: to study the emergence of EU foreign and security policies in the 1990s and to scrutinize the changes in the foreign policy of EU member states.

In the 1990s, Europeanization was sometimes confused with integration process. Work on the Europeanization of foreign policy developed in terms of impact of the integration process on the foreign policy of EU member states.

A first body of research analysed how the EC/EU created a development policy (Holland, 2002), especially a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in the context of the end of the Cold War and the war in former Yugoslavia. They also sought to show how EU member states like France and the UK have mainly influenced the making of a common foreign policy (Irongelle, 2003). They have examined the unique institutions and priorities which emerged at the EC/EU level, and their implementation and limits (e.g. Carlsnaes and Smith, 1994; Christiansen and Tonra, 2004).<sup>1</sup>

A second body of research focused on the impact of the making of a European foreign policy on older EU member states like France, the UK, Germany, Ireland and Denmark (Tonra, 2001; Gestam, 2004; Dakowska and Tulmets, 2008; Hill and Wong, 2011a, 2011b). Only a few authors have compared the way newer EU member states have adapted their development and foreign policies along the EU's priorities and procedures, and how these countries have, in turn, impacted the EU (e.g. Evers, 2003; Lightfoot, 2010; Hill and Wong, 2011a, 2011b; Lightfoot and Horký-Hlucháň, 2013; Tulmets, 2014a). For Hill and Wong (2011a, pp. 4–5):

[A] Europeanised foreign policy is one which: – Takes common EU positions, whether formally or informally established, as its major reference point, despite operating in other multilateral forums. – Does not generally defect from common positions even when they cause difficulties for the state concerned, whether in its bilateral relations or its domestic politics. – Attempts to pursue its national priorities principally (but not exclusively) through the means of collective EU action. – Subscribes positively to the values and principles expressed by the EU in its international activity, to the extent of becoming part of a shared image and identity, in the eyes of both other Europeans and outsiders.

Europeanization in the field of foreign policy is thus 'a process of change manifested as policy convergence (both top-down and side-ways) as well as national policies amplified through EU policy (bottom-up projection)' (Hill and Wong, 2011b, p. 4). EU foreign policy provides a way away from power politics as well as 'a terrain upon which the future of the EU is being decided' (Bickerton, 2011, p. 31). Thus, Europeanization in this field also affects the polity, policies and politics of EU member states. To White, a leading question remains: 'How can we explain this dialectic between unity and diversity when dealing with common European

foreign policies? Can we perhaps say that the CFSP has had a significant impact on the ontological dimension – “who are we?” (White, 2001, quoted by Jørgensen, 2004, p. 18).

The expanding literature in the field of FPA and European foreign policy (cf. Carlsnaes and Smith, 1994; Nystedt, 2000; White, 2001; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Christianon, 2007; Smith, 2010; Carlsnaes and Guzzini, 2011), especially on CFSP and ESDP (Christiansen and Tonra, 2004; Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014; Keukeleire, 2015), has examined policy transfers from one policy to the other. For example, the way the EU is capable of exporting its specific experience of peace-keeping and conflict prevention through non-codified, ‘soft’ methods, is particularly informative. Whitman and Wolff highlight that experience gained in specific regions (like the Western Balkans), or through EU CSDP missions, shaped security aspects of other foreign policies (cf. contributions in Whitman and Wolff, 2010a, 2010b). Enlargement processes have also affected the shape and scope of EU integration, yet most of the literature in EU (and also IR) studies – founded on theoretical approaches, often used in core Western European universities – still fail to integrate insights and approaches of newer member states (cf. Tulmets, 2012, 2014a). The impact of accession, understood here in terms of the participation of recent member states in the EU decision-making process, is therefore often overlooked in the studies providing theoretical and practical evolutions of internal and external EU policies. There are a few exceptions, like the academic work of Bulmer and Lequesne (2013) and, in the field of foreign policy, Hill and Wong (2011b).

#### **2.4 The EU’s External Action: Enlargement, Neighbourhood and Regional Integration Policies**

Europeanization does not only concern EU member states, but also countries interested in coming closer to the EU. After the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the prospect of enlarging the EU to include the former communist countries strengthened the idea that the EU has an obligation to promote democracy through its policies, both internally and externally. Therefore, in 1993, by offering Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) the opportunity to become member states and by defining the associated political conditionality at the European Council in Copenhagen, the EU outlined the contours of its normative power (Manners, 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004): democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law became some of the explicit aims of the EU in its relations with the rest of the world. By incorporating these values in the treaties, the EU was firmly committed to their preservation inside its own legal order as well as inside the national legal orders of its member states.

In the 1990s, the CEECs represented a promising empirical field to test the hypotheses of Europeanization and the transformative power of the EU. First, according to many, the adoption of EU rules implied ‘the most massive international rule transfer in recent history’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 6). Second, the external incentives set by the EU were reinforced by the asymmetry of power between the EU and the CEECs (Juncos, 2011), which hypothetically creates a strong convergence toward EU policy models. Third, applying the Europeanization conceptual framework to these countries strengthens the assumption according to which the degree of adaptational pressure generated by Europeanization depends on the ‘fit’ and ‘misfit’ between European institutions and domestic structures (Cowles et al., 2001). Brusi argued that the lack of consolidated institutions in the former communist countries ‘may facilitate the incorporation of EU rules because the given formal institutional



arrangements are not embedded in a social and cultural infrastructure and are therefore more amenable to institutional engineering' (Brusis, 2005, p. 24). Thus, analysing the process of change in the post-communist context in terms of Europeanization became not only fashionable but also a *prêt-à-porter* conceptualization, supposedly enabling researchers to understand and explain how the EU affects structures and agencies (Coman and Crespy, 2014a).

Examining the role of the EU in the world, scholars have also explored the nature of ECs/EU, pointing out that the ECs/EU acts as a 'civilian power' (cf. Duchêne, 1973; Teljeur and Jhaert, 2013). Others coined new concepts, like 'normative power Europe' (Manners, 2002; Taniuchi, 2006) and '(normative) empire Europe' (Zielonka, 2006; Del Sarto, 2016), to highlight the EU, after creating its own foreign policy in the 1990s and Europeanizing the foreign policy of its members, was well equipped to transfer its own norms and policies abroad. The focus on these areas shed light on new facets of Europeanization, revealing that it also occurs through forms of emulation when states or regions voluntarily allow Europeanization to take over their norms and policies (Cobarrubias and Johannsson Nogués, 2008). Other authors have shown that the export of norms and values abroad represents a mix of international and European norms (Petiteville, 2006; Tulumets, 2014b). In other words, the EU is not always a source of change, and is also one among many others.

To examine how the EU spreads its policies and institutions, scholars focused on hard and soft mechanisms of change (see also the chapter by Kuhlmann in this volume), developing theoretical frameworks on the role of EU conditionality and external governance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Schimmelfennig and Lavenex, 2010) and on external incentives approaches (Börzel and Risse, 2012; Damro et al., 2018). Europeanization in the EU's foreign policy is also considered to affect the polity, policies and politics of EU partner countries.

EU conditionality is the main mechanism explaining adaptation and compliance (Grabbe, 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Tulumets, 2005a, 2005b; Pridham, 2006; Sasse, 2008). While some scholars argued that 'the impact of the EU on the domestic politics and institutions of the post-communist states has been profound' (Ladrech, 2010, p. 109), over time, others have promoted a more cautious approach with regard to the transforming power of the EU (Hughes et al., 2004; Tulumets, 2005a, 2005b). Actually, conditionality explains the timing of the reforms adopted prior to accession, not their substance or effective implementation (Coman and Crespy, 2014b). The Europeanization hypothesis was correct in maintaining that the EU 'opened up a critical juncture for reform' (O'Dwyer, 2006, p. 222). The outcome, however, is uneven. Certainly, conditionality proved to be effective when the EU coerced the countries that were reluctant to comply using the threat of exclusion (Slovakia under Mečiar), postponing accession (Romania and Bulgaria), or loss of financial support (Bulgaria). The European Commission sanctioned inertia and rewarded any form of absorption and accommodation (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Certainly, the EU offered an 'important legitimizing force for "selling" these reforms to the CEECs' electorate' (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004, p. 200). But, despite its insistence on the speed of transformation, the choice of tools through which the conditions were to be achieved remained very much in the hands of domestic political elites. As Goetz pointed out, 'the differential impact of European integration on the administrative arrangements of current member states has more to do with the relative weakness of European integration as an independent source of domestic institutional change than with the strength of national administrative cores or traditions' (2001, p. 1040; cf. also Lippert and Umbach, 2005).

While scholars have pointed out the limits of Europeanization in the EU's relations with candidate and third countries, more recently, they have been looking at limits to Europeanization after EU accession, showing that the EU had little means for putting pressure on countries once their accession was effective. The cases of Romania and Bulgaria allowed for the development of a literature that explored what EU pressure meant when it was applied to newer member states and in policy fields where compliance remained difficult, like public procurement, corruption and other aspects of good governance and the rule of law (Sedelmeier, 2006, 2008; Noutcheva, 2007, 2012; Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Trauner, 2009; Braun, 2011). In 2019 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier presented a revised version of their 'external incentive' approach, still valid for the Western Balkans and Turkey, though with less success as expected, and they excluded the neighbourhood context of their analysis because of the lack or absence of an EU accession perspective (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2019).

When the EU launched its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003–2004, it followed the conditionality approach developed for the Eastern Enlargement to organize its relationships with neighbours situated in the East (the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) and in the South (the Maghreb countries) (Sasse, 2008; Kratochvíl and Tulmets, 2010; Korosteleva et al., 2014; Delcour, 2017). The EU's conditional approach was, in fact, adapted in a rather experimentalist way to the ENP and also to other EU policies (like development), without precluding its absolute success (Delcour and Tulmets, 2008). For example, while after the Arab Spring in 2011, the European Commission insisted in its ENP evaluation on the 'more for more' approach as a way to financially reward positive reforms, after the war in Syria in 2012 and in Ukraine in 2014, the Commission put forward the 'less for less' approach, ranging from the suppression of financial support to sanctions like visa bans, arms export bans and sanctions on exports. Discussions also opened up on how far EU conditional approaches and Russian exigencies are clashing or not in their common neighbourhood (Vieira and Tulmets, 2018).

Besides conditionality, a second approach developed in the context of EU enlargement: the European external governance approach, designed to examine how EU norms are transferred and adopted by candidate or neighbour countries. Scholars such as Lavenex (2002) and Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) have argued that there are both rational and ideational reasons explaining compliance with EU norms. In some cases, candidate countries respond to the unilateral imposition of norms, thus to the rational approach of conditionality, while in others, they adopt EU norms and values which they found to fit with their identity and convictions (Sedelmeier, 2006). Drawing on rational choice and constructivist explanations, scholars found that the original EU strategy to reproduce the positive experience of enlargement did not work for countries which have only a 'European aspiration' and no candidate status (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova) or no EU perspective at all (the Maghreb countries). Against this backdrop, a few scholars investigated under which conditions EU norms are or are not transferred to countries geographically close to the EU, especially to those participating in the ENP (Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001; Buzogányi and Costa, 2009; Wolczuk and Langbein 2012; Delcour, 2013). While early works tended to opt for an institutionalist approach and the transfer of 'hard' norms in a hierarchical or unilateral way, further analyses also considered the transfer of 'soft' norms, benchmarks, knowledge and ways of behaving in a more horizontal or transnational approach (Sedelmeier, 2001; Tulmets, 2005a, 2005b, 2010, 2014b; Noutcheva,

2008). Current work sheds light on the domestic reasons of non-Europeanization (cf. second part of the chapter).

As noted above for conditionality, approaches in terms of external governance are very useful to analyse policy diffusion. However, they tend to neglect the interactive, cross-fertilizing approach between the EU and its partners, as well as between EU policies and policy modes. For example, the experience of EU enlargement policy was clearly used to redefine other EU foreign policies, like the ENP and development policies (Kelley, 2006; Saurugger and Surel, 2006; Delcour and Tulmets, 2008). This adaptation process from one policy to another particularly helped the EU legitimize its internal policies abroad. It also allowed candidate countries a stronger socialization into EU norms and standards, especially into those which did not specifically belong to the EU *acquis*, were not codified or lacked a ‘hard’ legal basis. Adopting this analytical lens shows a *suis generis* EU, a ‘pioneer Europe’ experimenting with new policy approaches (Delcour and Tulmets, 2008). It also shows that it remains a not-so-coherent, polyarchic entity, which, despite a strong ‘narrative’ on normative power, adapts the best it can to a changing international order (Joerges and Neyer, 2007; Sabel and Zeitlin, 2011). Some scholars have also stressed the importance of horizontal Europeanization in investigating the role of non-state actors in the EU’s external relations (Beichelt et al., 2014). Adopting a sociological view is therefore far more interesting to examine policy transfers, adaptation and hybridization processes happening from one EU foreign policy to another, and also from a multi-centred EU to its international environment. It avoids starting from the normative idea of a homogeneous EU entity, which seemingly masters different ways of exporting stability abroad.

A third, more recent approach explores the way the EU exports its experience of regional integration to other regions in the world, like South America, Africa and Asia. A new research agenda developed which addressed the diffusion of the EU as a ‘model’ of regional integration (Börzel and Risse, 2012) through mechanisms of direct diffusion (coercion, utility calculation, socialization and persuasion) and mechanisms of emulation (competition, lesson-drawing and mimicry) (Börzel and Risse, 2012, pp. 6–10). In this case, like in the case of enlargement, scholars established a fertile dialogue between research on Europeanization and policy transfers to explore the phenomena of circulating and diffusing norms (Delcour and Tulmets, 2019a, 2019b). For example, Balme (2019) indicates that Chinese actors happened to take over EU and international norms from below in the field of environment. Departing from the diffusion model proposed by Börzel and Risse, Parthenay (2019) finds that, in the case of Central America, the EU mainly exports approaches inspired by new public management to trigger regional integration.

The next section shows how over the last decade the literature on Europeanization has been challenged by resistances to integration and new crises.

### 3. FROM EUROPEANIZATION TO INCREASED POLITICIZATION AND RESISTANCES TO EU INTEGRATION

While a significant part of the literature on Europeanization showed how domestic actors from EU and non-EU member states have interacted with other EU, international or national actors, another significant part revealed forms of resistances to EU integration. Adaptation to the EU

is not a passive process; it gives rise to increased politicization and forms of opposition to the transformation of policies, politics and polity.

### **3.1 The End of the Permissive Consensus within the EU**

When in the 1990s political actors sought to deepen political and economic integration, it became clear that the era of the permissive consensus – in which treaties were negotiated behind closed doors and unquestioned by Europeans – has come to an end. Since the Euro coins were introduced in 2002, a large number of citizens associated the common currency with rampant inflation (Coman and Crespy, 2014b). An increasing number of political parties instrumentally use identity politics to put the blame on European integration (Menz, 2005, p. 28). Mobilizations against EU integration, although present since the first years of the ECs, grew bigger over time. The EU integration has thus become more politicized, giving rise to new forms of contention (Della Porta and Caiani, 2009).

These forms of resistance to EU integration have been analysed from two distinct perspectives: on one hand, in the literature on Euroscepticism and social movements, and on the other, by scholars of public policy and legal studies with an interest in inertia and non-compliance with the EU (Crespy and Saurugger, 2014, p. 1). A new body of research was developed, seeking to understand the rise of Euroscepticism, a catch-all concept used to label different forms of resistance to integration and its effects expressed both by political parties and social actors (Lacroix and Coman, 2007). Scholars have shown that Euroscepticism has institutional, ideological and cultural origins, both in the older and newer member states (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001; Kopecky and Mudde, 2002; Beichelt, 2004). Alternatively, Crespy and Verschuere argued that the concept of Euroscepticism is not only exhausted but also negatively connotated, preferring the concept of ‘resistances to integration’, defined as ‘manifestations of hostility towards one (or several) aspect(s) of European integration perceived as a threat with respect to one’s values’ (2009, p. 377). According to Crespy and Verschuere, these resistances reflect the gap between actors’ perceptions of what the EU is and beliefs about what it should be (2009, p. 384). Moreover, much of the contention stems from different lines of conflict, opposing: (i) a supranational ‘super-state’ versus a ‘Europe of the nations’; (ii) a Christian Europe versus a ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ or even a ‘fortress Europe’ versus a ‘cosmopolitan Europe’; (iii) the model of a ‘social Europe’ versus a ‘(neo)liberal Europe’; (iv) a ‘military power Europe’ versus a ‘pacifist Europe’ (Crespy and Verschuere, 2009, p. 385).

While the literature on Euroscepticism underlined forms of resistance to EU integration, the literature on Europeanization scrutinized domestic actors and the factors associated with responding or not to the EU’s pressures of adaptation. Both types of studies have shown that, when it comes to researching the effects of EU integration, one should keep in mind that EU politics and policies are no longer disconnected from domestic politics and policies and vice versa (Beichelt, 2009; Coman and Crespy, 2014b).

### **3.2 Non-Compliance and Resistances Outside the EU**

While the literature on Europeanization developed steadily, some political scientists and historians warn against seeing Europeanization everywhere. Questioning the ontology, epistemology and methodologies of Europeanization (Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009, 2012), scholars have recommended caution, especially in analysing these processes over a longer

timespan (e.g. Haupt and Kocka, 2009; Flockhart, 2010; Grollier, 2012; Beichelt et al., 2019). More recently, scholars have given preference to the concept of policy transfers in EU external relations. They also focus on the role that domestic conditions play in the processes of diffusion and reception of EU norms abroad, looking at interactions between actors and especially at non-implementation and resistances on the ground (cf. Delpeuch and Vassileva, 2010; Delcour, 2013; Delcour and Wolczuk, 2013; Saurugger and Terpan, 2013, 2015; Tulmets, 2014b; Björkdal et al., 2015; Natorski, 2016). Thus, scholars have shown that partner countries are able to resist the EU's normative conditions, like Algeria and Azerbaijan, which provide the EU with gas and oil and are therefore able to express their own views in bilateral negotiations (Weber, 2014; cf. also contributions in Hadjiiski et al., 2017).

Against this backdrop, recent research tends to confirm that analyses on EU foreign policies, like enlargement (e.g. Tulmets, 2005b; Nimmayer and Dakowska, 2008), neighbourhood policies (e.g. Delcour and Tulmets, 2008; Delcour, 2013) or policies of diffusion and norm import (Börzel and Risse, 2012; Björkdal et al., 2015; Wiener, 2015) should include a more relational aspect, beyond the unilateral process favoured in early work on the Europeanization of EU candidates and neighbour countries. The EU is not the only international actor seeking to promote change. Furthermore, one needs to consider interactions between the EU and other IOs in the definition of norms and benchmarks in specific fields (Peters, 2016; Coman, 2017; Delcour and Tulmets, 2019a, 2019b; see also in this volume the chapter by Kuhlmann on policy transfer and causal mechanisms, and the chapter by Hadjiiski about international organizations in the transnational diffusion of policy ideas) such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe in the field of minority policy, NATO on security, the OECD and international financial institutions like IMF, World Bank, EBRD on economic and good governance issues. These interactions are crucial if one is to determine a specific European approach on a given issue.

As already mentioned, recent research has concentrated on the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood on issues such as democratization, non-compliance in several policy fields, civil society, and failed states. Being intrinsically normative, the Europeanization approach seems to be less equipped as a concept than other concepts like diffusion, norm/policy transfer or circulation to tackle the political will to come closer to the EU. These approaches, however, are limited once the political regimes of the EU's partner countries are not stable, and when the EU has to face frozen conflicts (like in Transnistria/Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia/Georgia, Crimea and Donbas/Ukraine) or even open conflicts (Israel/Palestinian Authority). As a result, recent developments in the ENP field focus on the conditions under which policy transfers do or do not occur, with an increasing number of analyses on the reception of EU policy in the ENP countries. Several authors have explored processes of adaptation and imitation, as well as partial implementation, non-compliance and resistance to EU norms and policies (Wolczuk and Langbein 2012; Delcour and Wolczuk, 2013; Stewart, 2013; Langbein, 2015). In Armenia and Georgia for example, elites' preferences have played a crucial role in the pushing for or resisting of the adoption of EU templates (Ademmer, 2017; Delcour, 2017). And in Moldova and Ukraine, 'institutional vested interests and poor coordination [...] were identified as key obstacles in transposing EU rules' (Delcour and Tulmets, 2019b, p. 153).

Delcour and Tulmets argue that making the link between implementation and emission processes in EU-neighbour relations represents a way out of the normative approach of Europeanization (2019b). Indeed, in looking also at the process of norm production in the EU regarding the ENP policy, one can conclude that not all problems linked to the failures of EU

policies on the ground lie with the partner countries. As EU norms and values are interpreted in different ways by the EU member states and national foreign policy trajectories continue to play an important role in the way EU policies are implemented, this also explains, to some extent, the inconsistencies and incoherence in the EU's foreign policy, and thus show the limits to Europeanization in the field of foreign policy (Tulmets, 2014a, 2014b).

#### 4. CRISES AS DRIVERS OF CHANGE: FROM (DIS) INTEGRATION TO (DE)EUROPEANIZATION

Crises in the EU can be conceived as 'critical junctures', i.e. turning points leading to the adoption of new rules and instruments aimed at deepening policy or institutional integration. Historical institutionalists (Collier and Collier, 1991; Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2004) have used this concept to theorize how exogenous shocks can rapidly alter continuity and path dependency, which has also been referred to as the 'logic of punctuated equilibrium'. Scholars using an ideational approach, too, have explained that shifts towards new paradigms and ideational change could effectively lead to significant policy change (Hall, 1993; Blyth, 2002; Schmidt, 2008; Beichelt et al., 2019). The concept of 'critical juncture' remains highly relevant to the study of the EU, as the history of integration and specific policy sectors seem to be punctuated by crises that alter their development. More specifically, this concept aims to understand how path dependencies can be broken and agency can be emancipated from structural conditions, creating room for manoeuvre, or a 'window of opportunity,' allowing impulse changes (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). In other words, a crisis generates uncertainty for actors, forcing them to define their interests and how to promote them, which opens a space for political change. Eventually, critical junctures change the track of political events and establish new path dependencies; hence, they can lead to deep structural change (Coman and Crespy, 2014a).

Since the passage and enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been facing the 'decade of crises', some of them being 'fast-burning', others 'slow burning' (Coman, 2018; Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2018). As illustrated in the sections below, these crises have affected both the EU's internal and external policies.

On one hand, an emerging body of research shows that, with regard to the EU's internal policies, some of these crises have led to increased integration and eventually to increased Europeanization at the domestic level; other crises, in contrast, have led to new phenomena such as disintegration and even 'de-Europeanization'. For example, the Eurozone crisis shows how new decisions at the EU level affect domestic politics and policies, while the rule of law debates since 2010 onwards illustrate how domestic deviations from the values enshrined in the treaties lead to new tools and measures at the EU level, which in turn remain without effect at the domestic level. Thus, while previous research (which was explored earlier) showed how EU integration leads to uneven Europeanization, the post-Maastricht era reveals that EU integration can also lead to disintegration and de-Europeanization.

On the other hand, crises also shape the action of the EU in its relations with the wider world. External crises in particular, like the Arab Spring and the war in Ukraine, had a decisive impact on the polity, policies and politics of the EU's foreign and security actions. Regarding the relations of the EU with the outside world, some scholars explored how the EU exports its

norms and policies abroad, and how the EU managed the global economic crisis compared to other regions, like Latin America and Asia (Saurugger and Terpan, 2016).

#### 4.1 The Decade of Crises within the EU

##### 4.1.1 The Eurozone crisis: driving change through conditionality vs. flexibility

Over the last decade, the financial and economic crisis opened a critical juncture that might have been used ‘for altering the existing EU institutional path’ (Fabbrini, 2013, p. 50) and its core policies (Falkner, 2016), giving rise to increased contestation or resistances and to politicization in EU member states. The Eurozone crisis has had multi-faceted effects which have, on one hand, accelerated the path of EU integration – in some policy areas more than in others – and changed the balance of power at the EU level, while on the other hand, the crisis has affected member states policies and politics. This flourishing body of research has grown steadily in recent years, pointing out how ‘fast-’ and ‘slow-burning’ crises affect both EU integration and Europeanization alike (Coman, 2018; Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2018).

When the Greek financial deficit was revealed, EU institutional actors took rapid decisions to douse the flames of the crisis with consequences for the path of EU integration and member states. As Jones et al. argued, ‘the series of incremental reforms adopted sequentially in response to the crisis – steps including the establishment of bailout funds, tightening fiscal surveillance, and moving toward banking union – has led to one of the most rapid periods of deepening of integration in EU history’ (2015, p. 3). It was integration without supranationalization, as Bickerton et al. argued (2015,

In 2010, the ECOFIN Council adopted the European Financial Stability Mechanism and the European Financial Stability Facility to help Greece, Ireland and Portugal to face sovereign debt crises and the European Stability Mechanism to safeguard the stability of the euro area (Fabbrini, 2013, p. 51). In 2011, the European Semester was established to increase EU economic policy coordination, and EU institutional actors adopted the so-called Two and Six Pack, strengthening the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, followed by the Euro Plus Pact, designed to foster stronger economic coordination and, in 2012, the Fiscal Compact Treaty was adopted with the aim to reduce public debt (Fabbrini, 2013, p. 51). The euro area has been not only preserved, but also consolidated in times of crisis. New mechanisms of compliance have been introduced or strengthened (like the SGP), giving rise to what Ladi and Graziano define as ‘fast-forward Europeanization’ (2014, p. 111), that is ‘an intensification of hard mechanisms of Europeanization and the broadening of the policy implications of specific EU policy decisions’ (2014, p. 111).

This body of research challenges the literature on Europeanization. In the post-crisis context, the impact of hard mechanisms of compliance, such as conditionality, on domestic policies no longer depends on the willingness of domestic actors to adapt. Their impact depends also on the willingness of EU actors to apply sanctions or not (Coman, 2018). For example, while in the first years of the Eurozone crisis EU institutional actors sought to strengthen the rules of the SGP (Schmidt, 2016), these rules have been re-interpreted with greater flexibility once the stability of the Euro was ensured (Coman, 2018). While some EU institutional actors and member states were in favour of strengthening the rules, others sought to obtain increased flexibility. The use of conditionality and flexibility may have also impacted how the decisions taken at the EU level to save the Euro altered member states’ policies.

Falkner examined the effects of the measures adopted to save the Euro on nine different policy areas and concluded that the crisis did not only bring change in discourse, but also many policy changes (2016, p. 228). She argued that the financial crisis has had effects on a variety of policies such as those related to financial market regulation, competition or economic governance coordination, while it impacted health policies, energy and climate policy, and migration (Falkner, 2016, p. 227). Europeanization thus happened in an uneven way at the policy level and resistances to reforms (politics) were expressed on different grounds in EU countries. The impact on the measures taken at the EU level to save the Euro deserves further research.

In contrast, at the domestic level, the decisions taken to save the Euro have had dramatic effects both for policy and politics. To reduce public spending in the countries affected by the crisis, EU institutional actors decided to decrease public investment and to increase taxation, freeze labour benefits, raise the retirement age and cut pensions, and massively reduce the number of jobs in the public sector. These decisions have given rise to massive protests and the emergence of new populist parties that moved from the periphery of the political spectrum to governmental positions. The Eurozone crisis brought a widening gap in prosperity between the Eurozone's core and periphery members. While some countries of Europe's Northern core – such as Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria – saw their economies rapidly recover, in contrast, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy have been affected by the draconian effects of the crisis: decreasing levels of income, rising unemployment, and cuts in welfare spending and wages (Matthijs, 2017).

#### **4.1.2 Controversies over the rule of law and the limits of Europeanization after accession**

After accession, Poland, Hungary and Romania witnessed heightened tensions between judicial and political actors at the domestic level as the latter sought to adopt measures to reduce the powers of the judicial councils and of the constitutional courts. Scholars deplored the 'growing governmental disdain for the rule of law' and sought to understand how and why political parties seek 'to capture the state for their own ideological or economic gains by dismantling key rule of law institutions' (Bugaric and Ginsburg, 2016, pp. 69–70).

The reforms in Poland and Hungary generated strong demands to improve or at least clarify the action capacity of the EU to safeguard the rule of law within its member states (Batory, 2016; Kochenov and Pech, 2016). EU institutional actors called for new mechanisms to safeguard the common values enshrined in Article 2 TUE at the supranational level (Coman, 2015). As Blauburger and Kelemen argue, 'more can be done to maximize the effectiveness of existing judicial mechanisms' (2017, p. 322). In this context, the Commission established new tools such as the EU Justice Scoreboard and the Rule of Law Framework, which are preliminary steps before triggering Article 7 TUE.

However, the power of these tools to generate compliance has been limited. Neither Poland nor Hungary fully complied with the requirements of the Commission. As a result, in December 2017 the Commission initiated Article 7 against Poland, and in September 2018, the European Parliament initiated Article 7 against Hungary. Despite some reactions from individual member states, the Council and the European Council remained silent, although the Commission put the topic on their agenda. Against this backdrop, many have questioned the ability of the Commission to be the guardian of the treaties and the ability of the EU as a whole to have a transformative power when the common values enshrined in Article 2 are at stake. Against this backdrop, the Commission proposed new hard mechanisms of compliance. In



May 2018, in its proposal of the 2021–2027 financial framework, the Commission put forward a Rule of Law conditionality mechanism which seeks to suspend the allocation of EU funds to member states which fail to respect the values enshrined in the treaties. The aforementioned attempt of the Commission to introduce Rule of Law conditionality has given rise to increased contestation, more specifically in CEECs. This conditionality would eventually strengthen the power of the Commission to handle such sensitive cases, although both experts and academics are divided with regard to the opportunity of introducing such a mechanism, as it would penalize citizens (beneficiaries of EU funds) and not governments.

To shed light on forms of lack of compliance in sectors in which Europeanization has played a role, Daehnhardt coined the term ‘de-Europeanization’, defined as ‘a practice through which a Member State acts intentionally so as to prevent uploading or downloading effects from occurring in the national and European dimensions’ (Daehnhardt, 2011, p. 14). A member state engaging in de-Europeanization deconstructs previous advancements made through the process of Europeanization (Copeland, 2016, p. 1126). De-Europeanization represents a process of disengagement combined with the intentional decision to reverse the impact of Europeanization, without leaving the EU.

#### **4.2 Managing Crises in EU External and Foreign Relations: The EU’s Normative and Transformative Power Questioned**

Scholars have analysed the impact of European crises both on EU foreign policies (within and outside) and on the EU’s normative role in the world. Crises are interesting events to study to understand how far the EU can be a source of instability for other regions of the world, but also if the EU can be successful in transferring its experience of crisis management. Given the strong focus of EU and IR studies on the EU as a normative and international power (Börzel and Risse, 2012), the relations between the EU and other parts of the world seem to be less analysed through a more critical angle. Saurugger and Terpan (2016), however, rely on the work of political economists to catch the role of crises as vectors of change. They do not look at the way the EU influences other regions, but rather compare the way the EU and other regional integration processes in the world, like in Latin America and Asia, have coped with the 2008 global economic and financial crisis. They start from the observation that while the crisis ‘seems to lead the European Union to become more formal with its member state relations bringing the most powerful actors to the fore [...] Asian and Latin American regional organisations appear to be influenced in a more limited way’ (Saurugger and Terpan, 2016, p. 1). They find that governments in other regions of the world generally do not invest more in this process in times of crisis, while citizens’ and civil society’s interest in regional integration increases.

Regarding EU foreign policy, scholars have analysed the impact that external security crises have had on the EU and the foreign policy of its member states, like the crisis in former Yugoslavia, which urged the EU to ‘Europeanize’; that is, to give European answers to collective threats on its soil. More recently, crisis situations were identified in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, with the war in Georgia in August 2008, where the EU was unable to provide assistance in the negotiation of a ceasefire and the creation of a mission of observers (EU Monitoring Mission, EUMM). In 2011, the EU was also urged to react to the Arab Spring, but the issue of military intervention in Libya divided the EU, as Germany refused to join France and the UK in a common EU military action. The action was made possible only under an

UN umbrella after a declaration of the UN Security Council. The EU's main challenge was the 2014 war between Ukraine and Russia, after Crimea had declared independence on 18 March 2014. A few months before, the pro-Russian Ukrainian government had refused to sign the Association Agreement that the country had negotiated with the EU in the framework of the ENP, provoking the strong protests of the Maidan, which in February 2018 resulted with a radical change of government. The intervention of three key EU member states – France, Germany and Poland – in this process and of other international actors, did not hinder Russian breach to internal law, which later led to war in the Eastern part of Ukraine (Donbas).

All these events again launched discussions of the EU's capacity to act as a coherent and Europeanized actor. A first sign of the EU's collective action was to adopt sanctions against members of the former pro-Russian Ukrainian government and Russia. While this was a confirmation of the EU's capacity to act as a civilian or normative power, debates opened up again on the definition of the EU as an actor on the international stage (Peters, 2016; Damro et al., 2018) and also on the EU's capacity to build the old project of a European army – and therefore of further Europeanizing the foreign policy of EU member states. With the retreat process of a key actor from the EU (Brexit), discussions have been ongoing since 2016–2017 regarding the possibility for France and Germany to exercise a stronger voice regarding new EU initiatives in the military field, which led the German Chancellor to declare in 2018 that Germany will once again participate in EU military actions. While CEECs, for example, welcome the idea of reinforcing security on European soil, the United States and NATO still represent for them the only guarantee in terms of security in Europe. The issue of a 'multi-speed' Europe, mainly under French–German leadership, that allows for greater cooperation among EU member states to handle certain security issues, has thus become a divisive issue among both older and newer EU members. Some CEECs, especially Poland, fear a new bilateral 'directoire'. They see their fears confirmed in Germany's launch of two North Stream projects with Russia in the Baltic Sea, and by the fact that Poland was excluded from the Normandy format of negotiation, which was led by France and Germany with Russia and Ukraine since war started between the latter two countries in 2014. Despite the general will to cooperate together on foreign and security issues, especially in times of crisis, resistances to Europeanization are thus strongly present within several EU member states (cf. Saurugger and Terpan, 2015).

The EU's foreign policy has many weaknesses, which the EU often tries to hide behind a discourse on the necessity to improve Europeanization. Contrary to its internal policies, it is a process which is still very much lacking in the realm of its external and security actions. This is less visible at the level of polity, as the Lisbon treaty introduced new common institutions and the High Representative for Foreign Relations and Security Policy effectively managed to define common strategies to follow. This can, however, be noticed at the level of policies, where all EU member states continue to follow their own (parallel) foreign policy, sometimes in contradiction to the EU policy. And at the level of politics, some (Euro-sceptic) political parties and domestic actors have the will to resist initiatives that strive toward further integration, while other actors are put totally aside because of their lack of resources and experience in this field.

## 5. CONCLUSION: IS EUROPEANIZATION STILL A RELEVANT ANALYTICAL LENS?

Over the last few decades, the concept of Europeanization has gained an important place in EU studies. Used by scholars of all persuasions to capture a variety of processes induced (or not) by EU integration, the focus on Europeanization opened the black box of domestic politics and showed its interrelations with a diversity of actors located at the EU and global level. While a substantial part of the literature sought to clarify its meanings and propose research designs to capture the dynamics induced by the integration process, another even more important part illustrates how Europeanization occurs in member states and beyond at the level of polity, politics and policies. This reach and diverse body of research shows that domestic politics is no longer insulated from European politics, and European politics is no longer insulated from domestic politics.

Hence, seeking to examine how the EU impacts national polities, policies and politics, scholars have shed light on a variety of processes of change and their uneven outcomes, illustrated in this chapter with references to the EMU, foreign policy and the EU's external action. The study of the impact of the integration process on member states or third countries also revealed a wide range of forms of resistance to EU integration, showing that Europeanization results from interactions between facilitating actors and veto players. Ultimately, the chapter shows that Europeanization is not only challenged by forms of resistances to EU integration, but also by crises which eventually reshape policies at the EU level, and in turn alter domestic realities in member states and beyond, as illustrated by the examples of the Eurozone crisis, the rule of law debate and the effects of internal and external crises on Europeanization in third countries.

By testing the explanatory power of Europeanization in so many contexts and in relation to such a diversity of polities, policies and politics, scholars have underlined not only the strengths of this concept, but also its limitations. This body of research improved our understanding on domestic realities, revealing processes of convergence or divergence, voluntary adaptations to Europe or resistances to ~~constrained~~ Europeanization. It has also shown how difficult it is to trace causality in a multi-level process in which the EU is in constant evolution, driven by European or global drivers of change. The Europeanization literature, despite its limitations, contributed to the development of other fields of research in political science and other disciplines which dealt with institutional and policy change. As this chapter shows, the literature on Europeanization shares not only a set of common questions with the body of research on policy transfer, but also an empirical field within and outside the EU. Europeanization-like policy transfers are concerned with similar processes 'in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting' (Lowitz and Marsh, 2000, p. 5).

### NOTE

1. Recent research on EU foreign policy examined the impact of treaty reforms for the making of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and since the Lisbon treaty (2007), the making of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Christiansen and Tonra, 2004; Smith, 2004; Smith 2010; Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014).

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