

Contents

Acknowledgments	ii
Typographical conventions	vii
Introduction	1
0.1 Main objective and plan	1
0.2 Preliminary discussion of word meaning	5
0.2.1 Word meaning: abstract definition	6
0.2.2 Character and content	7
0.2.3 Extension-determining meaning	18
0.2.4 Additional terminological specifications	24
0.3 Naturalism	25
0.4 Some further limitations of this dissertation	28
0.4.1 Individuation of words and languages	29
0.4.2 How this dissertation came about	31
Part I: Word Meanings Out There	33
Chapter 1: Semantic Deference	35
1.1 Approaching semantic deference	35
1.1.1 Introductory examples	35
1.1.2 Structure of the phenomenon of semantic deference	36
1.2 Semantic deference as a technical notion	46
1.2.1 Definition	46

1.2.2	Semantic deference and meaning externalism	49
1.2.3	A deferential mechanism?	51
1.2.4	Recanati's deferential operator: a Kaplanian analysis	52
1.2.5	The Groundedness Thesis	62
Chapter 2: Grounding Semantic Deference		65
2.1	Epistemic deference, semantic deference and collective grounding	65
2.2	Radical externalism (and some of its issues)	72
2.2.1	The gold standard of externalism	72
2.2.2	Deferring to the world?	77
2.2.3	The problem of polemical terms	78
2.3	Extending the picture	83
2.3.1	Jackman's temporal externalism	83
2.3.2	Teleological externalism	86
2.3.3	De Brabanter & Leclercq's multiple externalisms	92
2.3.4	Semantic deference and pragmatics	99
Chapter 3: Challenging Semantic Deference		109
3.1	Skepticism concerning natural kinds	110
3.1.1	Hägqvist & Wikforss' (2018) arguments against natural-kind essentialism	111
3.1.2	A remark on the scope of natural-kind skepticism	113
3.1.3	Teleological externalism without natural kinds	115
3.2	Skepticism concerning the move from deference to objective meanings	119
3.3	The normative fallacy	125

Chapter 4: Naturalizing Semantic Deference	132
4.1 An alternative account	132
4.1.1 Lexicalizing semantic deference	132
4.1.2 The layers of a semantic theory	133
4.1.3 First outline of an alternative account	139
4.2 The argument from error revisited: a usage-based account	143
4.2.1 Sundell’s usage-based account	145
4.2.2 Marconi’s notion of convergence	152
4.2.3 A systematic illusion?	156
4.2.4 Semantic values: programmatic remarks	166
4.3 On what is “out there”: exploiting Millikan’s externalism	169
4.3.1 Naturalness in Millikan’s (2017) clumpy world	171
4.3.2 Functional kinds, hybrid kinds and conventional meanings	178
4.4 A naturalistic typology of word meaning	195
Part II: Word Meanings Within	208
Chapter 5: What Are Lexical Meanings?	210
5.1 Lexical meanings as cognitive kinds	210
5.2 Ingredients for lexical meanings	215
5.2.1 Grammatical competence: combinatorial profile and types	216
5.2.2 Inferential competence: meaning postulates and other word-to-word relations	219
5.2.3 Referential competence: referential procedures and schemas	226
5.2.4 The deferential pointer or language parameter	235
5.3 The format of lexical meaning	245
5.3.1 Truth-Conditional Pragmatics and the Wrong Format view	246

5.3.2	The Wrong Format view: thin or thick?	248
5.3.3	The hybrid Wrong Format view: polysemy and the hierarchy of lexical information	253
Chapter 6: Lexical Meaning and Utterance Content		266
6.1	Circumscribing utterance content	267
6.1.1	Utterance content within Speech Act Theory	267
6.1.2	The two roles of “what is said”	272
6.2	The scaffolding view of a word’s contribution	276
6.2.1	Ad hoc concepts and stable concepts	277
6.2.2	Mental files	284
6.3	Problems with the scaffolding view	296
6.3.1	Problem 1: The dissolution of utterance content	296
6.3.2	Problem 2: Accounting for linguistic thought	307
6.4	Lexically imprinted concepts, understanding and interpretation	317
Chapter 7: Summary and Applications		329
7.1	Completing the typology of word meaning	329
7.2	Case studies	338
7.2.1	The Fools’ <i>gold</i>	338
7.2.2	Bringing our <i>water</i> on Twin-Earth	343
7.2.3	<i>Arthritis</i> hangover	348
Conclusion		360
Bibliography		364

Typographical conventions

Italics are used for mentioned words. They are also used when especially important theoretical terms or expressions are introduced in the discussion. Finally, italics are also used for rhetorical emphasis.

“Double quotation marks” are used to quote other sources and to signal that a term is used in the sense of another author. They are also used for informal glosses of meanings and conceptual contents. Finally, they are used as “scare quotes”, i.e., to adopt a critical distance with respect to the choice of certain words.

‘Single inverted commas’ are used for quotes inside quotes.

SMALL CAPITALS are used for concepts when a particular theoretical role for them needs to be emphasized (e.g., when they are taken to be mental files). In many instances, concepts and conceptual contents are also referred to without any particular typographical signaling.

ITALICIZED SMALL CAPITALS are used for lexically imprinted concepts (see Chapter 6).