

Contents

1	Introduction	13
1.1	State of the art	13
1.1.1	General background	14
1.1.2	Models of games studied in this document	15
1.2	Contributions	17
1.3	Related work	20
I	General Context	23
2	Games played on graphs	25
2.1	Graph	26
2.2	Game played on graphs	26
2.2.1	Non-initialised games played on graphs	26
2.2.2	Initialised games played on graphs	28
2.3	Strategies and strategy profiles	29
2.4	Positional strategies	30
2.5	Equilibria	32
2.5.1	Nash Equilibrium	32
2.5.2	Subgame Perfect Equilibrium	33
2.5.3	Strong Nash Equilibrium	34
2.6	Examples of games played on graph	34
2.6.1	Sequential games or games played on trees	35
2.6.2	Qualitative reachability games	37
2.6.3	Quantitative reachability games	38
2.6.4	Mean-payoff games	39
2.6.5	One-target games	40

3	Dynamical vision	43
3.1	Motivating example	44
3.2	Definition of dynamics	45
3.3	Properties of dynamics	47
3.4	Examples	51
3.5	Best Reply and fair termination	53
3.5.1	Best Reply Property	53
3.5.2	Fairness	54
3.6	Common feature of dynamics	56
4	Minors of games	59
4.1	Introduction	60
4.1.1	Motivations	60
4.1.2	Content	61
4.2	Simulations: preorders on the dynamics graphs	62
4.2.1	Partial simulations and simulations.	63
4.2.2	Bisimulations and transitive closure.	64
4.3	From graph minor to game minor	65
4.4	Game minor to reason about termination	72
4.4.1	The minor of a game terminates as well	73
4.4.2	But not for fairness and best reply	79
4.4.3	Dominant minor	81
4.4.4	Converse	83
II	Particular Games	91
5	Sequential Games	93
5.1	Introduction	94
5.1.1	Structure of the section	94
5.1.2	New definition of sequential games	95
5.1.3	Families of dynamics	96
5.2	Subgame Improvement Dynamics	97
5.2.1	Termination with acyclic preferences	97
5.2.2	Simulation by the transitive closure of $\{SI, A\}$ -dynamics	104
5.2.3	Termination in the presence of ‘cyclic’ players	107
5.3	Improvement dynamics and Coalitions	110
5.3.1	The $\{I, A\}$ -dynamics	111
5.3.2	Terminal profiles of the $\{I, L\}$ -dynamics	112
5.3.3	Order, layerability and pattern	113

5.3.4	Termination of the $\{I, L\}$ -dynamics in the general case .	118
5.3.5	Particular cases for the termination of the $\{I, L\}$ -dynamics	123
5.4	Future works: Imperfect Information	125
5.4.1	Definitions	125
5.4.2	Dynamics	126
6	Reachability and mean payoff games	129
6.1	Introduction	130
6.1.1	Motivations	130
6.1.2	Positional NE	130
6.2	Qualitative reachability game	132
6.2.1	Initialised	134
6.2.2	Non-initialised	136
6.3	Quantitative reachability game	141
6.3.1	Initialised	141
6.3.2	Non-initialised	143
6.4	Mean payoff game	144
6.4.1	Initialised	144
6.4.2	Non-initialised	145
7	One-target games	149
7.1	Classical notions about networks	150
7.1.1	Internet Protocol and static routing	150
7.1.2	Dynamic routing	151
7.1.3	Interdomain routing	151
7.1.4	The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)	152
7.1.5	BGP convergence	154
7.1.6	Related works	156
7.2	From Internet Routing to game played on graph	158
7.2.1	One target game	158
7.2.2	Concurrent dynamics	160
7.3	Sami <i>et al</i> : Termination implies a unique equilibrium.	161
7.4	Dispute Wheels	168
7.4.1	Griffin <i>et al</i>	168
7.4.2	Strong dispute wheels for a necessary condition	170
7.4.3	Finding an SDW in practice	175
7.5	Future works: Imperfect Information	176

8	Future works	179
8.1	Sequential games	180
8.2	Reachability and mean payoff games	180
8.3	One Target games	181
A	Proof of Lemma 5.25	189