

Conclusion

A framework of analysis for political parties abroad

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Much of the literature on party politics is situated in the context of national states. Even if political parties have also been increasingly studied at infra- and supra-state levels, the extraterritorial dimension of political parties, or political parties abroad (PPA), has been mostly overlooked and is clearly undertheorized.

In recent decades, globalization and transnationalization have led to important reforms in terms of voting rights and representation of emigrants. These transformations concern millions of citizens and have important political consequences. They constitute opportunities and challenges for political parties who face the choice of engaging or not in this new arena. However, the literature has surprisingly devoted so far little attention to the implications of these trends for party politics.

The purpose of this volume was to put parties abroad for the first time at the centre of the focus. Our main goal was to investigate (1) what parties abroad are, (2) when and why they emerge and develop, (3) how they organize and (4) what roles they play. In order to answer these factors and analyze the multiple faces of parties abroad, the volume adopted an inductive and comparative perspective. Indeed, since the volume investigates an emerging phenomenon, our strategy was to adopt an inductive approach starting from empirical evidence to proceed in the conclusion to theory building based on 12 case studies. This conclusion comes back to our four initial questions and puts the empirical insights of our case studies in a comparative perspective. In doing so, we offer the foundations of a real, original knowledge on parties abroad.

What are political parties abroad?

Parties abroad may be characterized and classified according to the location of their headquarters: in the home country (the 'referent' country of which the emigrant is a citizen) or abroad (outside the 'referent' country of the party). Therefore, they can be a branch of a mother party in the home country or provide a distinct political offer to emigrants. They can also be differentiated based on the focus of their politics, especially their more or less conflicting relationship to the home country. As highlighted in the literature on transnationalism (see introduction of this volume), the political involvement of emigrants can sometimes be related

to the 'hot' activism of diasporas and exiled minorities in conflict with a state of origin (diaspora politics). In that case, the focus of politics is the continuation abroad of a political struggle that is rooted at home (most often in authoritarian or dictatorial regimes). In other cases, the political activities of emigrants are related to a peaceful participation in the politics of their home country (emigrant politics). These two criteria (location of headquarter and relation with the home country) lead to a classification of political parties abroad in four party types.

The main focus of this volume has been parties abroad that are a branch of a mother party at home, be it in a conflicting or peaceful relationship with their home country.

The development of emigrant party branches abroad is often closely linked to that of external citizenship and voting abroad (see chapters 1 to 3 in this volume) or to the granting of direct representation in national parliaments in liberal democracies (see chapters 4 to 6 in this volume). However, this is not always the case (see what follows, and chapters 7, 8 and 9 in this volume). These party branches are far from being anecdotal. Their weight can be decisive on national politics. For example, in the 2000s, the New York branch of the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (Dominican Revolutionary Party – PRD) claimed 23,000 members (Portes, Escobar, and Radford 2007). In the presidential election in 1996, Dominicans from abroad contributed as much as 15–30% of the campaign's budget (Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003), and New York is an essential part of the campaign of any candidate in a Dominican election.

Full emigrant parties constitute extreme cases of distinct political offer abroad. The typical case is the Italian parties in South America. While the majority of

Table C.1 Transnationalism and parties abroad

	<i>Location of the party headquarter</i>	<i>Home country</i>	<i>Outside the home country</i>
Relation with the home country	Emigrant politics	Emigrant party branches <i>Examples: Democrats Abroad; branch of LREM Abroad</i>	Emigrant parties <i>Examples: Movimento Associativo Italiani all'Estero; Alliance Solidaire des Français de l'Étranger</i>
	Diaspora politics	(Anti-)Diaspora parties <i>Examples: the branches of RCD (Tunisia), PRI (Mexico) or AKP (Turkey) abroad</i>	Forbidden parties <i>Examples: PKK; National Democratic Party of Tibet; PCE during the Francoist dictatorship</i>

Source: Authors' own compilation.

Italians abroad vote for candidates from the dominant parties in the peninsula, the South American constituency is dominated by two distinct parties: the *Movimento Associativo Italiani all'Estero* (Association of Italians Abroad – MAIE), created in 2007, and the *Unione Sudamericana Emigrati Italiani* (South American Emigrants Italian Union – USEI), created in 2006 (Sampugnaro 2017; Tintori 2011). Similar parties also exist in relation to the Philippines, such as Overseas Filipino Workers and their Families (Migrante Party List) or Acts – Overseas Filipino Workers Coalition of Organizations (Burgess 2018; Lindio-McGovern 2013). In France, we can mention the *Alliance Solidaire des Français de l'Étranger* (United Alliance of French Abroad – ASFE) (Kernalegenn 2019). Such parties are, however, usually weak and rarely succeed.

Parties abroad also develop in a more conflictual relation with their home country, which can lead to the development of asymmetrical party branches abroad, or even full parties abroad that are banned or forbidden in their home country. Chapters 10, 11 and 12 in this volume show how, in authoritarian regimes like Algeria, Turkey, or pre-revolution Tunisia, parties develop party branches abroad asymmetrically, with a different status for the ruling party and for parties in the opposition.

Forbidden parties constitute extreme cases of distinct political offer that has their leadership established abroad rather than in the home country. These are political parties that settle or develop abroad, in exile, at the end of a civil war, a conquest, a coup or the reinforcement of a dictatorship, and sometimes in the hope of a revolutionary change of the power in place. They emerge in contexts of diaspora politics. They can go so far as to maintain a government in exile, recognized by a more or less important part of the international community (McConnell 2009). They are not allowed to legally exist in the home country but can still be active underground. Following the civil war (1936–1939), the Republican Spanish political parties, whether left-wing (Spanish Socialist Workers Party – PSOE; Spanish Communist Party – PCE) or sub-state nationalists (ERC, EAJ-PNV, etc.), resettled in exile, especially in France and Latin America. The four main parties managed to remain active until the democratic transition and resettled in Spain (Alted Vigil and Domergue 2003). In the 1940s, many political parties in Eastern Europe also relocated abroad following the Nazi or Soviet invasion, and organized a government in exile, as was the case for Poland (Jaroszyńska-Kirchmann 2004). Parties banned and repressed in their home country, such as Ennahda in pre-revolution Tunisia (see chapter 10 in this volume), may also reorganize in exile.

The separatist movements, continuing their struggle from abroad, form a specific but particularly important instance of this category. They often have a vital role in financing the separatist struggle, making their cause known to the international community or even serving as a rear base for combatants. Some cases have been well addressed by research, such as the Kurdish case (see chapter 12 in this volume). As early as the 1950s, Kurdish political organizations were present in Europe, and especially in Germany, and in the 1980s and 1990s the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) developed there, dominating the Kurdish diaspora (Bengio

and Maddy-Weitzman 2013; Lyon and Uçarer 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). The case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) also falls in this category. It developed in the early 1980s a global network of cells in about 40 countries, raising funds and public awareness of their cause (Fair 2005; Fuglerud 1999; Goreau-Ponceaud 2009). The Tibetan case is another example. Exiled Tibetans established an entire democratic political system in Dharamshala, India, with a Tibetan Parliament in exile animated (but not dominated) by two political parties: the National Democratic Party of Tibet, created in 1994, and the People's Party of Tibet, created in 2011 (Brox 2012).

Note that this typology excludes immigrant parties, which are parties created to defend migrants in their host countries and participate in the elections and political life of the host country. Such parties, as *Democratie* in the Netherlands or *Partito dei Romeni d'Italia – Identità Romana* (Party of Romanians in Italy – Romanian Identity) in Italy, are migrant parties, but as they develop only in relation to the host country and not to the home country, they cannot be considered as parties abroad and are not included in our typology (Otjes and Krouwel 2019).

Why parties abroad?

The case studies presented in this volume have paid particular attention to how parties abroad emerge and develop. In this conclusion, we compare and assess the barriers and opportunities for the development of parties abroad observed in these **most** different cases. As the classic literature on parties² points, the development of party organizations was not an obvious path. Several normative and pragmatic barriers to their development existed. These barriers were progressively lifted while incentives to create parties increased, especially with the expansion of suffrage and parliamentarization (Scarrow 2006). Parties abroad also face opportunities and constraints in their development (Table C.2). Their specificity is that these opportunities and constraints are the result of the context both in the home and host countries.

The legal and institutional framework in the host country can constitute a barrier to the development of parties abroad. Not all host countries do authorize and recognize foreign political groups, and they do not necessarily allow all political groups to flourish. For instance, Canada is reticent to the organization of foreign electoral events on its territory (Lafleur 2013b). However, especially when they are connected to an authoritarian regime in the home country, the host country can adopt an open attitude towards groups representing political refugees fleeing from the authoritarian regime, or on the contrary support the representatives of the regime in place. For instance, Germany facilitated the flourishing of suppressed groups at home (Kurd refugees – see chapter 12 in this volume) while France had a laissez-faire attitude towards their ally in Tunisia (see chapter 10 in this volume). However, in these cases of constraining legal framework in the host country, parties often emerge illegally and their existence is regularized post hoc.

The legal and institutional framework in the home country constitutes another strong opportunity or constraint on the development of parties abroad.

Table C.2 Key explanatory variables for the emergence of parties abroad

External stimuli	Legal and institutional framework in the host country	Allowing or forbidding political activities from abroad on its territory
	Legal and institutional framework in the home country	Level of control over state apparatus Voting rights and ballot access Party-centred or candidate-centred electoral system Existence of specific representation Level of restriction of campaign rules
	Ethnic identity	Strength of link with home country: (sub)national, ideological, religious
	Structure of the emigrant population	Size Density Social structure (media, schools, associations)
Internal stimuli	Cost–benefit calculus	Top-down or bottom-up mobilization by elites
	Change in dominant faction or leadership	Internal change that leads to a change in the relationship between the party and the emigrants' community

Source: Authors' own compilation.

In authoritarian regimes, the dominant party tends to benefit from opportunities linked to their control of the state (see chapters 10, 11 and 12 in this volume). The boundaries between the party and the state are blurred both at home and abroad, and parties can use diplomacy and foreign affairs as tools to develop abroad. Similarly, non-state institutions established with state resources, such as the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs, have also become tools for the AKP to recruitment and mobilizing supporters and develop abroad (see chapter 12 in this volume). Likewise, Ben Ali's regime strived to control Tunisians abroad by the means of federations and cells of the *Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique* (RCD), notably in France, where its headquarters in Paris was also officially the headquarters of the *Rassemblement des Tunisiens de France* (see chapter 10 in this volume). The general coordinator of all the European cells was directly appointed by the Tunisian President. However, this incentive can turn into a barrier in the case of a diaspora composed of emigrants who fled the authoritarian regime and who hold very anti-dominant party views. In that case, emigrants are viewed as a political liability or as traitors by the home country and the incentives to mobilize the resources of the state to develop the party abroad become negative. It was, for instance, the case with Mexican emigrants in the

US, who were characterized by very anti-PRI views and were depicted as traitors by the dominant party, who consequently did not invest in reaching out to these emigrants (see chapter 3 in this volume).

In democratic regimes too, the legal and institutional framework constitutes an opportunity or constraint for the development of parties abroad. More specifically, the case studies emphasized that four dimensions matter: voting rights, electoral rules, representation and campaign rules.

First, the ballot access rules do matter. Countries that grant their emigrants voting rights create an incentive for parties to develop abroad. Indeed, with the extension of voting rights to emigrants, it becomes essential for parties to be present abroad in order to capture these new votes. This follows the same logic as the development of parties along with the expansion of suffrage in the 19th century.

Second, the electoral rules also matter. Very much as at home, countries that apply candidate-centred electoral systems such as majoritarian, single-member district systems create less incentives to develop parties abroad than countries applying party-centred electoral systems such as proportional representation and multi-member districts. For instance, Japan applies a candidate-centred electoral system and emigrants' votes are grouped in existing districts at home. These are low incentives for parties to develop branches abroad as individual candidates run their own district-level organizations for parliamentary elections. Similarly, in South Korea, given the electoral rules, the electoral linkages with citizens is mainly based on individual legislators and their personal networks rather than party linkages. Parties are relatively weak at home and abroad (see chapter 7 in this volume).

Third, home countries that grant their emigrants specific representation in ad hoc constituencies create an additional incentive for parties to develop abroad compared to home countries that count emigrants vote in existing constituencies at home. It is the case in France, Romania, Ecuador and Algeria. In these countries, the adoption of new rules and the creation of ad hoc constituencies and MPs for emigrant votes have been strong incentives for the development of parties abroad (see chapters 4, 5, 6 and 11 in this volume).

Last, the rules regarding campaigning and fundraising abroad can constitute barriers to the development of parties abroad. Indeed, running a field campaign abroad can make the difference during elections, as Lafleur (2013b) demonstrated with the Italian case.

For instance, Mexico has adopted very restrictive rules in terms of campaigning abroad that have limited the ability of candidates to reach out to emigrants (see chapter 3 in this volume). Similarly, South Korea prohibits the establishment of local branches or offices for electoral campaigns abroad (see chapter 7 in this volume). These rules undermine the ability of parties to get involved in electoral campaigns and by extension to develop their organization abroad.

Legal and institutional rules at home and in the host country therefore constitute strong incentives or barriers for parties to develop abroad. Especially, we find that the extension of suffrage and political representation of emigrants play an important role. However, parties often go around legal and institutional barriers.

In Mexico, candidates start their campaign before the official declaration of candidacy, which allow them to bypass the restrictive campaign rules (see chapter 3 in this volume). In South Korea, parties bypass the ban on party branches abroad by setting up other means such as friendship groups, allowing them to evade the party law (see chapter 7 in this volume).

Furthermore, favourable institutions do not always precede the development of parties abroad. For instance, the Greek, Taiwanese and Israeli legislation does not grant voting rights to citizens living abroad. Yet, parties have developed activities and structures abroad in these countries. Therefore, winning votes cannot be the primary incentive for the development of Syriza, Kuomintang or Likud abroad (see chapter 7, 8 and 9 in this volume). Winning votes might not be the main incentive in Mexico either, where turnout is very low among the emigrant community and winning emigrants' votes won't make a big difference (see chapter 11 in this volume).

Institutional and legal barriers can therefore constitute strong barriers to the development of parties abroad. But they are not the only limitations faced by political parties abroad (Caramani and Grotz 2015; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019). Emigrants sometimes have very weak to no link with their home country and therefore weak interest for home politics. Home politics has little impact on their day-to-day life in their host country. Consequently, even when granted voting rights, turnout can be very low among emigrants, such as for British emigrants (Collard and Kernalegenn 2019). These are non-incentives for parties to develop abroad. Furthermore, the cost of investing abroad can be high for parties, especially if emigrants are scattered in a large number of countries or localities with a weak density. There is a curvilinear relationship between the size of the emigrant community and the incentives for parties to invest abroad: parties won't be interested if that community is too small, and it will fear it if it is too big. Besides, their opinions are hardly known since they are not surveyed by opinion polls. It is therefore difficult to target them and to predict their behaviour. Yet despite these barriers, parties engage in the development of activities and organizational structures abroad. It means that there must be alternative incentives for parties to do it.

The classic literature on parties pointed that some emerged within a social movement or to represent a specific group, around a salient issue (structural and societal explanation). The development of parties abroad too can be linked to structural and societal explanations. The sociology of migrations and the representation of specific interests of emigrants. First and foremost, being able to identify a clear ethnos rather than demos can act as the main organizing political principle of parties abroad.

For instance, Israeli parties develop activities abroad to maintain relations with the large Jewish diaspora (see chapter 8 in this volume). Citizenship and voting rights do not play a role here; rather, it is the identification of a common ethnos that serves as incentive. In order to be able to recognize emigrants as part of the ethnos, barriers have sometimes to be lifted, as it has been the case in Mexico or Ecuador (see chapters 3 and 6 in this volume). In these countries, the status

of emigrants has evolved, going from traitors to heroes. This change in status has pushed parties to recognize all emigrants as part of a common ethnos, which in turn lifts the barriers to their integration in party politics. Several factors can facilitate the identification of an ethnos among emigrants: their concentration in communities or homogeneous neighbourhoods in cities, the existence of national media to maintain a link and inform emigrants abroad on the national political context and the existence of separate schools that can act as socialization institutions and community building, including for a nation labelled as civic, such as France (see chapter 5).

The ethnos does not necessarily have to be a national ethnos. A party representing social cleavages can ‘transplant’ itself easier to host countries where emigrants can be identified based on sub-group identities (ethnicity, religion, birthplace, socioeconomic status, etc.) or prior political identities. Existing researches have already highlighted this phenomenon, for example in the cases of Lebanon (Burgess 2018) or Belgium (Lafleur 2013a). Similarly, groups gathering Kurds from Turkey in Germany have been formed in a partially decentralized and bottom-up fashion; they tend to control Kurdish associations, which facilitates the development of HDP in Germany (see chapter 12 in this volume). Similarly, the Greek Left activists among emigrants in France preserved a loose communication platform entitled ‘Parisi Kinima.’ This preexisting social basis was instrumental in the development of Syriza in Paris (see chapter 9 in this volume). Even more strikingly, in Taiwan, the party system is based on a sub-ethnic divide between Natives and Mainlanders. This is the main driver of the development of Taiwanese parties abroad (see chapter 7 in this volume).

This leads us to the role of political actors and their weight in the cost-benefit calculus to create a party abroad. This calculus is made based on the ~~previously mentioned~~ legal, institutional and sociological contexts at home and in the host country. As already mentioned previously, the dynamics differs depending on the type of regime and the type of party. In authoritarian regimes, the process of developing the party in power abroad tends to be top-down, and the state organizes and controls its development abroad, as shown in chapters 10 and 12. The development of opposition parties is more bottom-up as in the case of HDP in Turkey (see chapter 12 in this volume).

In democratic regimes, the process tends to be more bottom-up and relies on emigrants organized in communities. Local entrepreneurs or former activists are instrumental in the development of parties abroad. For instance, the development of LREM abroad was facilitated in many cities by former socialist activists (see chapter 5 in this volume), and the development of Syriza in Paris was facilitated by activists residing in France for a significant period of time, and with previous partisan experience and prior political socialization; in that case, the development of a party abroad can be a source of reengagement and an opportunity to experience again the rituals of party life (see chapter 9 in this volume). This bottom-up process also means that the mother party at home has often almost no control over the process, at least at the beginning, as it was shown in chapters 1 and 5 in this volume. This can lead to initial difficulties, as in the case of the PRI in Mexico that

faced the development of two separate groups, one in favour of reform and the other more obedient to the mother party at home (see chapter 3 in this volume).

Yet quite rapidly, the process institutionalizes, and the mother party takes back control of the structures and activities developed abroad (see section that follows). This is because national political elites find benefits in investing abroad, despite the costs and barriers pointed out previously (see section on the role of parties abroad). Party sections outside the national context can be used by party leaders to address more directly groups of citizens and be more attentive to their specific interests; they can be used to mobilize potential voters, to develop new ideas and new policies, to spread the party's policies internationally, to gain access to resources and key positions, to expand the party's legitimacy and indirectly affect domestic voters (indirect vote-seeking gain) or to get information from other parties.

How do parties abroad organize?

As mentioned in the previous section, parties abroad often have roots in preexisting social groups and associations. These groups are not always overtly political but nevertheless can be associated with a party. These ad hoc groups of supporters and volunteers can later develop into informal organizations, and then into more formal party branches when the mother party at home initiates a formalization of the party structures. Most often, this bottom-up strategy means that the mother party lacks a clear strategy for membership growth among emigrants, being largely (and belatedly) reactive to migrant initiatives.

When formalizing parties abroad, the most common choice is to replicate the organizational structure of the mother party. Parties amend their statutes to allow emigrants to be party members (as in the case of the PRD in Mexico) and increasingly grant them the same rights as members at home (as in the case of PAN in Mexico that grants them the right to vote in intra-party contests). A procedure is set up to recognize parties abroad. They are then recognized as branches of the mother party and share the same organizational characteristics as branches in the home country in terms of composition of the main bodies and functioning of the branch. These party branches abroad are then often grouped into a federation of party branches abroad. It is the case for LREM in France, for the Tunisian parties Ennahda and RCD, for the Republicans and Democrats Abroad in the US or for the PRD in Mexico (see chapters 2, 3, 5, and 10 in this volume). This means that they enjoy representation in party bodies and that their delegates or representatives can take part in annual meetings or party conferences. A position of manager of party branches abroad can sometimes be created, as in the case of Syriza in Greece (see chapter 9 in this volume). This manager does not necessarily have to have a past history of migration, as in the case of LREM in France (see chapter 5 in this volume). However, path dependency can be a barrier to a formal recognition of parties abroad, as it is the case for the PRI in Mexico that does not formally recognize emigrant politics in its statutes, a heritage from its anti-emigrants' positions.

The progressive institutionalization of parties abroad and the increased control of the party-in-central-office over these branches does not happen without tensions. These tensions are classic in new parties passing thresholds in their life-cycle (Pedersen 1982) and tend to appear at crucial moments in the party life, such as the first candidate selection process for elections, as shown in the case of LREM in France or MPAIS in Ecuador (see chapters 5 and 6 in this volume). However, these tensions can be exacerbated in the case of parties abroad due to the geographical and political distance with the centre, the composition of the emigrant community in the host country, or the high turnover in members and volunteers in the host country. For instance, the Syriza branch in Paris faced difficulties linked to its diverse composition and the generational gap that characterized its members and the high turnover among members. This is a classic source of tension for new parties. But the branch also faced specific challenges due to the hostility of cultural associations of emigrants towards the party, the geographical spread of emigrants across the French territory and the higher turnover among volunteers, as emigrant life is characterized by more mobility than at home. Ultimately, government participation led to the self-dissolution of the Syriza branch in Paris because it felt that the decision was not in line with the party's pre-election positions (see chapter 9 in this volume). At home, these tensions could have been discussed among the various party actors. Abroad, the distance can increase the feeling of gap between the mother party and the local branch.

But the institutionalization and the increased control from the party-in-central-office is not always seen as an intrusion from parties abroad, who can welcome the support from the mother party. For instance, the Syriza branches abroad sought out the help of national party leaders back home and asked for their recognition as legitimate components of the party life; they welcomed the cadre appointed by the party headquarters in Athens as a sign of recognition from the mother party (see chapter 9 in this volume). Similarly, party representatives from Taiwan frequently visit their overseas branches during party leader and presidential elections to solicit votes and donations, which is also seen as a sign of integration in the mother party (see chapter 7 in this volume). During the 2017 presidential election campaign in France, LREM's groups abroad welcomed the increased involvement of the national headquarters in their activities, not only for its legitimizing effect but also because it meant receiving professional programmatic and campaigning material (see chapter 5 in this volume).

What role for political parties abroad?

The specificity of the legal and institutional framework in the host and home countries deeply affect the role of parties abroad. While at home, parties have increasingly turned to their governmental functions; abroad, the inclusion of emigrants in the process of representation is still often underdeveloped. With limited direct representation and weight on governmental functions, parties abroad are skewed towards the relation with emigrants abroad to the detriment of their functions as organizations or in government (Table C.3).

Table C.3 The functions of parties abroad

	<i>Functions</i>	<i>Compared to parties at home</i>
In relation to the electorate	Simplify and structure electoral choices (interest aggregation)	+
	Channels of communication and policy formulation towards three principals: the home country, the mother party, and (sometimes) the host country	
	Socialization and integration (provide services and activities) towards home and host countries	+
As an organization	Participation and mobilization (voter registration, campaign)	– (except if voting rights)
	Recruitment of political staff: recruit and train leaders and/or candidates	–
	Networking and lobbying (with the host country, sister parties or special interests)	+
In government	Create majorities, organize government, lead opposition and debate	– (except if sizable parliamentary representation)
	Representation	– (except if sizable parliamentary representation and specific constituency)

Source: Authors' own compilation.

Initially, especially in the case of bottom-up origins, parties abroad often engage in sociocultural activities in order to build a network of activists abroad, **often** connected to preexisting associations or groups. They provide help and services to new emigrants, organize sport or cultural activities, social events such as lectures, movie screenings, pub or coffee evenings, marches, or small gatherings for celebratory events (e.g., on Independence Day, or Midsummer's Eve – see Estonia in chapter 1 in this volume), or sub-groups (e.g., for women) and educational activities such as language classes (see chapter 7 in this volume). These activities are illustrative of their transnational character: they are geared to develop ties with the host country but at the same time cultivate a sense of community among emigrants from a common home country. In doing so, parties abroad not only create channels of communication with the emigrant community in place and contribute to the socialization of emigrants and their integration into the political system but also generate symbols of identification and loyalty towards the home and host countries.

The party abroad is often subordinated to these pre-established groups. For instance, in Mexico, the hometown associations (HTAs) are the main actors, and Mexican parties seeking support in the US are largely subordinate to these much more well-established HTAs; many HTA members share membership in other non-migrant civic organizations in the host country, such as labour unions. This helps building linkages with the broader community in the host country (see chapter 3 in this volume). In the same way, in Israel, parties develop links with the World Zionist Organization or youth movement. They benefit from representation in these organizations and gain access to financial resources and policy, or even electoral influence. In other instances, especially in the context of authoritarian regimes, parties create and control broader organizations (see chapters 10, 11 and 12 in this volume). Through this penetration, even in the absence of voting rights, parties create a link with the communities they want to relate to abroad (potentially future voters), especially sectorial ones, and they make sure to support cultural aspects linked to the home country, such as language.

Progressively, with their institutionalization, parties abroad start developing the usual party branch activities: organizing section meetings and setting up communication channels (Facebook page or party journal – see the cases of LREM and Syriza in chapters 5 and 9 in this volume). In doing so, they tend to copy the activity structure of the mother party at home. Weak institutionalized parties at home will develop weakly structured branches abroad (see the case of MORENA in Mexico in chapter 3 in this volume). They develop political activities and become a full component of the emigrants' network (see the case of the HDP in Germany, chapter 12 in this volume).

In a context of expansion of voting rights and representation, their mobilization cycles aren't necessarily determined by 'local life' anymore but are also dependent on party politics back home. Election years become their busiest years, while non-election years focus on political discussion and awareness raising (see the case of the US in chapter 2 in this volume).

Next to education, socialization and integration, parties abroad also mobilize emigrants politically, which corresponds to the participation side of the linkage function. All parties face difficulties in maintaining activism and political engagement of their grassroots (van Haute and Gauja 2015). Our case studies reveal that parties abroad face specific barriers and incentives to mobilize emigrants. The various chapters in this volume bring additional insights to the drivers of political engagement of emigrants in their host or home countries already pointed by the literature on transnationalism (see introduction of this volume). Parties abroad face a higher dispersion of their grassroots on the territory of the host country, which makes the organization of regular party activities more complex. Online tools are sometimes used to compensate for this difficulty (see the case of EKRE in Estonia in chapter 1 in this volume). They can also face the hostility of emigrants' organizations that refuse to cooperate with the party abroad, a crucial advantage in the early days of party building. In authoritarian regimes, the opposition party abroad faces negative incentives for mobilization. As in the home country, its activists are often subject to repression and fear. As shown in chapter 10 in this volume,

the regime can develop attempts to divide its opponents in the host country, using propaganda strategies, infiltrating the opposition and offering incentives for repatriation. In that case, they will tend to develop activities oriented towards party-building and seek to build alliances with other organizations in the host country. However, depending on the legal framework in the host country, emigrants from authoritarian regimes may also enjoy an increased freedom to exercise political dissent in their host country (see the case of HDP in Germany).

Parties abroad also face distinct incentives that can boost emigrants' mobilization. At the system level, home countries that grant more political rights for emigrants, and in which emigrants contribute more economically via remittances, facilitate the mobilization of emigrants by parties (Lafleur 2013b). At the individual level, reactive transnationalism against policies from the national government can act as powerful mobilizers, as seen in the case of the US after the election of Trump as President (see chapter 2 in this volume) or in the case of Syriza in Paris with the vote of a new set of austerity measures that created the need for Syriza sympathizers to mobilize and attend party meetings. A high level of preexisting partisanship of emigrants in the home country constitutes another facilitating factor. This partisanship does not necessarily have to be developed towards the actual parties abroad. As the case of Syriza in Paris has shown, preexisting partisanship towards another party at home can be reactivated and transformed. But parties abroad are also subject to the same incentives to partisan participation as mother parties (Whiteley and Seyd 1996). As shown in the case of the AKP in Germany (chapter 12 in this volume), partisan participation abroad can bring personal rewards, such as to acquire a better job, to gain a better network or more respect in the emigrants' community, to feel part of the community, etc. This is largely in line with the General Incentives Model developed by Whiteley and Seyd, albeit applied to extraterritorial partisan engagement.

Parties abroad also engage in the representation side of the linkage function, if the institutional framework allows it. They engage in various classic online and offline campaign activities, very much as parties at home. They encourage the registration of overseas voters during the election period. They rely on influencers, leaders in the community and vote multipliers, encourage direct contact with voters as campaign strategy, organize campaign events and meetings for specific candidates, manage fundraising events, etc. When parties abroad are more institutionalized, they can sometimes rely on the help of the mother party for campaign material, videos and online content to disseminate (see the cases of LREM in chapter 5 or of the AKP in chapter 12 in this volume). Otherwise, parties abroad play the role of a party branch (the ground war) and the party-in-central-office (the air war). The distance with the mother party provides autonomy and flexibility in their choices of campaign strategies and themes. Emigrants are viewed as a special electorate, distinct from and consequential to the electorate at home. Parties abroad can try to gauge this specific electorate, as in the case of MPAIS in Ecuador (see chapter 6 in this volume) that organizes workshops to get a better idea of policy priorities of this specific electorate and conduct research on the voting intention in the overseas district. The choice of campaign strategies are linked

to the historical sociological composition of the diaspora, as shown in the case of Mexico (see chapter 3 in this volume). They are also related to the capacity of the party abroad to penetrate and mobilize the emigrants' groups and organizations, as shown in the case of EKRE (see chapter 1 in this volume). The ability of parties abroad to exercise representation is bounded by the legal and institutional framework, and potential restrictions to campaign, to hold rallies or community events, engage in fundraising or institute get-out-the-vote efforts.

Next, parties abroad also simplify and structure electoral choices. Parties abroad are torn between two strategies: acting as advocates of the party's current programme, and local representation. As local representatives of the emigrant community, they aggregate the interests of emigrants and combine policy positions with promises of service provision. They develop specific policies for emigrants and are especially instrumental in lobbying home governments and voicing the interests of emigrants in terms of political rights and citizenship. For instance, American parties abroad push for easier voting procedures and citizenship access for children born abroad or tax reform (see chapter 2 in this volume); Mexican parties in the US strive to improve services at Mexican consulates, migrant security, collective remittance programmes and consular services (see chapter 3 in this volume). Similarly, in South Korea, parties abroad have strived to improve the convenience of overseas voting and were instrumental in establishing the Act of Protection of Korean Nationals Abroad (safety systems for overseas residents) and the Agency of Overseas Koreans. They are also the advocates of expanding support for Korean schools and Korean classes, supporting exchange and educational programmes for overseas Koreans (see chapter 7 in this volume). Parties abroad also act as champions of emigrants towards the host country and insert the emigrant issue into the agenda of the local social and political actors (see chapter 9 in this volume). For instance, Mexican parties in the US lobby local actors to legalize undocumented immigrants, reform US immigration laws and engage in the defence of Mexicans living in the US against racism (see chapter 3 in this volume). Finally, parties abroad also lobby the mother party at home to integrate topics that are important to that group or to lobby the mother party on topics of intra-party debate at home. For instance, the Democrats Abroad engaged in a letter writing campaign to support the Affordable Care Act (see chapter 2 in this volume). In sum, parties abroad act as channels of communication and interest representation towards three principals: the home country, the mother party and the host country. This can complicate their action on the ground.

Parties abroad also act as the ambassador of the mother party in the host countries. They promote the mother party's values and ideology in the international arena. They network with other parties that share a similar ideology through international bodies of parties' alliances. These networking efforts allow them to benefit from valuable material and symbolic resources such as offices, or a legitimacy gain from organizing joint meetings. It is especially useful for opposition parties or parties that struggle to develop abroad due to defiant or geographically spread emigrants' groups (see the case of Syriza, chapter 9 in this volume). However, this transnational cooperation can be made difficult if the ally party in the host country

sits in government when the party abroad sits in the opposition (the former seeking for more ideological moderation than the latter) or is a case of ideological discrepancies (see the case of EKRE and True Finns in chapter 1 in this volume). In this context, parties in the home and host countries would rather seek for cooperation on a cultural level than on a political level.

Parties abroad also engage in more informal activities aimed to create and foster ties with international political and financial elites and lobbies, although these activities are often initiated by individual political actors rather than parties (see chapters 8 or 12 in this volume).

For instance, they may engage in fundraising among business (even if legally limited), especially for intra-party contest such as candidate and leadership elections that are not as strictly regulated as general elections. This funding dimension of political parties abroad is quite frequent for British parties abroad (Collard and Kernalegenn 2019).

Ultimately thus, parties abroad tend to develop activities and roles that are much more anchored among the grassroots than parties at home. In relation to the electorate, parties abroad perform the classic functions of parties: they simplify and structure electoral choices, serve as channels of communication, educate citizens, participate in their socialization and their integration into the political system and generate symbols of identification and loyalty both at home and in the host country. They also channel political participation. However, their functions as organizations are much less developed. Except in contexts where emigrants are granted specific representation (see chapters 4, 5, 6 and 11 in this volume), parties abroad do not engage much in the recruitment and selection of political staff. They may do it indirectly, via informal fundraising activities. They do, however, perform a programmatic function, which has the specificity of being oriented towards three principals: the mother party, the host country and the home country. Finally, and contrary to mother parties at home, the government function of parties abroad is atrophied, with few exceptions, such as (up to a certain point) France, who had a Minister for Overseas French between 2011 and 2017.

These discrepancies between the roles of parties at home and abroad is a gap that the geographical distance does not help to fill. This might constitute one of the major challenges for the development of parties abroad.

Political parties abroad is not a new phenomenon. Their existence is as old as that of political parties. However, in sharp contrast with political parties at home, they are in a process of quick development. The main reasons for this are the important development of the possibility for nonresident citizens to vote in their home country elections from their host country. This has created a new arena for party politics.

However, political parties abroad are not limited to democratic countries generous with their emigrants. It is now a quasi-universal phenomenon. There are many forms of parties abroad, as many as there are functions for parties abroad: from political socialization to get-out-the-vote efforts, to representation of emigrants. Despite important constraints, such as distance, political parties abroad have been able to carry out most of the functions of parties at home.

On one dimension however, political parties abroad are much less developed than parties at home, which is governmental functions. Until now, the political careers abroad are still rare. A small group of countries however have implemented parliamentary representatives or representative institutions for emigrants. In such countries, party politics abroad is even more developed, when it is possible to become Member of Parliament or even Government minister. If this is a new trend, political parties abroad will certainly continue to develop and, in doing so, reinvent the territoriality of democracy and of citizenship.

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