

The Transformations of the Socialist Family: Organisational Aspects

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It is understating the case to say that the family of social democrat parties in Europe is currently facing a political, cultural and identity crisis that is unprecedented in scale in times of peace. In addition to analysis of public policies, a certain number of traditional indicators showcase this particularly difficult period. The trends in terms of electoral results and of their being part of governments, two central elements singled out by Giovanni Sartori to assess the relevance of a party, are evidence of this¹.

Another aspect of the changes in social democracy refers to the organisational set-up of socialist and social democrat parties. Of course, the latter has never been homogeneous and with one voice. However, the current upheaval is crucial because the socialist family was originally, as a party that was external in its origins², a family with an organisational format that was new and key in determining its destiny. When they saw the light of day at the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century, socialist and social democrat parties made a mark with the arrival of a new model for party organisation; to be more precise, a new party, social and societal model. The social democrat parties quickly revealed themselves as *Mass Parties* according to the terminology of Maurice Duverger, based “on branches, more centralised and more robustly articulated”³. More broadly even, they are *parties of social integration* faced with political groupings of *individual representation*⁴ or

¹ G. SARTORI, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, London, ECPR Press, 2008 (new edition).

² M. DUVERGER, *Les partis politiques*, Paris, Points Seuil, 1992, p. 139.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁴ S. NEUMANN, ‘Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties’, in NEUMANN (ed.), *Modern Political Parties*, Chicago, The University of Chicago, 1956, p. 404.

parties of a *worker's alternative society*⁵ which were constructed. What does the organisational model cover which is gradually borrowed in the analytical research? To reply to this question, it is important to make a preliminary traditional observation: what refers to the *social democrat organisational model* concerns in the first place two of three types of profiles isolated for a long time in the analysis of socialist parties in Europe: the 'social democrat' and 'labour' types identified for example by Alain Bergougnieux and Gérard Grunberg. The former refers to a centralised, robustly organised party 'organically linked to a big trade union movement, itself unified, which mainly accepts the pre-eminence of the party'⁶. In terms of doctrine it is based on the Marxist approach of the class struggle. The labour movement refutes it. It looked for 'the absence of any discrimination' at the place of the working class and, so doing, its 'full politico-social integration'⁷. Finally, the socialist type covers parties from countries with late industrial development. In the trade union world, the anarcho-trade union tradition is dominant. The links between parties and trade unions are, from that point on, marked by the seal of cooperation and conflict, with the trade unions refusing the pre-eminence of political action for the parties⁸.

Although different ideologically speaking and in their relations to trade unions, these two types meet the criteria of the definition that will be developed subsequently. On the other hand, the so-called 'socialist' type, which essentially relates to the socialist parties from southern Europe, traditionally falls outside the model in the analyses carried out on this family of parties. The social-democrat organisational model refers back, as we have noted, to the history of a *Mass Parties*. In other words, to a party both very structured and with a very large number of members. For the most part, these come from the reference *community* of the social democrat parties, the working class. In the period after the Second World War, the Danish (SD) and the Swedish (SAP) social democrat parties and the Norwegian labour party (DNA) appear as 'ideal types'. In raw figures, the data is impressive. But they appear even more so if we put the number of members (MP) in the context of the total number of voters of the party (VP) or what we can broadly identify as the base for potential recruitment, the number of those registered to vote in the elections (RV).

At the end of the war, the Danish social democrats reached a figure of 243,000 members and this even rose to 296,175 in 1948. This campaigning force, this party of the community, appears even more striking when it is put in the context of the voters of the party or to registered voters. In the first four votes after the Second World War, more than a third of social democrat voters were members of the party when the electoral performances were remarkable; respectively 32.8 per cent, 40 per cent, 39.6 per cent and 40.4 per cent. The table is clearer still by referring back to the registered voters: more than one voter in ten was a member of the Danish social

⁵ M. WINOCK, *Le socialisme en France et en Europe. XIX^e et XX^e siècle*, 1992, Paris, Seuil, p. 108.

⁶ A. BERGOUGNIUX, G. GRUNBERG, *L'utopie à l'épreuve. Le socialisme européen au XX^e siècle*, Paris, Editions de Fallois, 1996, p. 27.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 50 and following pages.

democrat party in the first four votes and nearly one in ten was still a member in the 1956 and 1960 elections.

This mass and community characteristic is at a somewhat less conclusive level for the Norwegian labour party but it is still noteworthy. The party ended up with 204,055 members in 1955 and showed a member/voter ratio oscillating between 20 per cent and 31 per cent in the first five votes after the war when the DNA was also achieving brilliant results, flirting with an absolute majority in terms of votes: 41 per cent, 45.7 per cent, 46.7 per cent, 48.3 per cent and 46.8 per cent. The ratio to those registered to vote was also amazing here: between seven and ten potential voters were then members of the Norwegian labour party.

The situation of the Swedish social democrat party was, in the end, the most striking. However, it is important to approach it with caution as, at this moment, the SAP was essentially an indirect party. By taking account of this indication, the *community* side of the Swedish social democrats was amazing. In this period, the party ended up with 801,068 members in 1960. In the five votes after the Liberation, around four voters out of ten of the party were paid up members. More broadly, 15 per cent of the registered voters were affiliated to the social democrat party, which is itself the *big* party of the Kingdom of Sweden in this period. During the said elections, the social democrat party came away with, respectively, 46.1 per cent, 46.1 per cent, 44.6 per cent, 46.2 per cent and 47.8 per cent of the votes.

Table 1. Number of members of social democrat parties in Sweden, Denmark and Norway and ratios in respect of voters of the party and in respect of those registered on the electoral lists immediately after the war

	SAP			DNA			SD		
	MP	MP/VP	MP/RV	MP	MP/VP	MP/RV	MP	MP/VP	MP/RV
1945				191,045	31.35	9.74	243,532	36.25	10.22
1947							287,736	34.50	11.82
1948	635,658	35.52	13.50						
1949				204,055	25.40	9.45			
1950							283,907	34.91	11.28
1952	746,004	42.82	15.52	178,102					
1953				178,004	21.43	7.89	283,525	33.89	11.03
1956	777,860	44.98	15.87						
1957				163,991	18.94	7.14	265,174	29.13	9.57
1958	780,686	43.94	15.64						
1960	801,068	39.40	16.11				259,459	25.34	9.13
1961				164,799	19.15	7.04			

These briefly presented elements show one of the facets of the strength and organisational specificity of the social democrat party, which was very important at the beginning: the members are a striking element of electoral and political influence and strength. In addition, they contribute to equipping the new social democrat

organisations with minimum financial means to deploy⁹. But this configuration is much older than the post Second World War period and much broader than just the element of *mass membership*.

From before the First World War, some parties already had impressive structures. What was then the *leading party* of international socialism, the German social democrat party (SPD) led the way as a political group with an exceptional organisational *format*. Already at the beginning of the twentieth century, over 300,000 citizens had joined it. And this number increased up to the eve of the First World War. At this moment, the SPD went beyond a million members, no more no less. The party apparatus also quickly revealed a powerful, smooth running and more and more professionalised bureaucracy. It is at the heart of the pioneering book and the theses on *oligarchisation* of Roberto Michels, *Political parties*, which appeared in 1913¹⁰.

Table 2. Evolution of the number of members of the SPD from 1906 to 1914

1906	384,227	1911	836,562
1907	530,466	1912	970,112
1908	587,336	1913	982,850
1909	633,309	1914	1,085,905
1910	720,038		

There are other examples with socialist parties. In 1914, the Danish social democrat party already laid claim to 57,000 members and its Norwegian counterpart 53,800. As for the Swedish social democrat party, it was then at 84,410 members. The Austrian social democrats had 89,618 members in 1913. Without getting close to the prestigious SPD, the Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière (SFIO – French Section of the Socialist International), which was established in 1905, came close to 100,000 members.

Table 3. Number of members of socialist parties at the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century

	SD	SPÖ	SFIO	DNA	SAP
1895					10,250
1896				6,000	15,646
1897	1,000				27,136
1898	6,000				39,476
1899	1,500				44,489
1900				10,655	44,100

⁹ G. VOERMAN, 'Le paradis perdu. Les adhérents des partis sociaux-démocrates d'Europe occidentale. 1945-1995', in M. LAZAR (ed.), *La gauche en Europe depuis 1945. Invariants et mutations du socialisme européen*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1996, p. 561.

¹⁰ R. MICHELS, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, Hearst's International Library, 1915.

1901	27,416				48,241
1902					49,190
1903	22,000				54,552
1904				17,000	64,835
1905			34,688		67,325
1906	29,000		43,462	19,100	101,929
1907			53,913		133,388
1908			56,963	27,800	112,693
1909			57,977	27,700	60,813
1910			69,085	32,926	55,248
1911			69,578		57,721
1912			72,692	43,500	61,000
1913	48,000	89,628	75,192		75,444
1914	57,000		93,218	53,800	84,410

As we have said, the *party's strength* is only one of the aspects of the organisational and political power of the social democrat parties. On the periphery of the parties, mass societal organisations were being built up. The same went for the world of trade unions, which recorded spectacular growth in the aftermath of the First World War. Many trade union organisations have an organic link with the party. In the UK, it was even the Trade Union Congress (TUC) which founded the Labour Party (1900-1906). In Belgium, the cooperative movements attracted the admiration of the nascent socialist family¹¹. It was, to a large extent, the powerful wing of the Belgian Labour party (POB) and one of the instigators of the network of one of the prime locations for worker socialisation, the *Maison du peuple*. Mutual help organisations or mutualités [mutualities] took part in the network dimension of social democracy. And they did not stop at the social or health aspects. Schools, training centres and a press service together helped the new political family to shine.

Sport for the masses, which took off after 1918, was also caught up in this. From 1911, the Socialist Workers' Sport International [SWSI] was set up with the Belgian, French, German, British, Swiss, Italian and Austro-Hungarian delegations. At its birth, it already claimed to have 242,300 members. After the war, it was reestablished in Lucerne in 1920 and announced 370,000 members. In 1927, the figure rose to 1,584,810. A peak was reached in 1929, with 1,701,926 members, a majority of whom were German.

¹¹ P. DELWIT, 'Le parti socialiste', in P. DELWIT, E. VAN HAUTE et J.-B. PILET (eds), *Les partis politiques en Belgique*, Bruxelles, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2011, p. 105-125.

Table 4. State of play for membership of the unions of the SWSI (the Socialist Workers' Sport International) on 1 January 1919¹²

	Number of associations	Number of members		Youth		Pupils		Total
		Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	
Germany	15,730	663,362	115,465	131,500	40,298	96,824	72,072	1,135,251
America	12	473	35	8	1	12	10	551
England		4,000						4,000
Austria	2,667	170,478	21,770	40,249	23,386	8,391	8,521	275,462
Belgium	444	8,005				2,310		10,759
Denmark		20,000						20,000
Estonia	4	270	10	60				344
Finland	305	24,099	6,124	5,000	2,000			37,528
France	60	2,800	150	422	38	500	92	4,062
France FSGTdAL*	14	1,510	49	140	14	238	64	2,029
France FSTdAL	249	8,950	1,400	3,200				13,799
Holland		1,136	540	486	349	966	569	4,046
Hungary		800	300	150	200	50	50	1,550
Latvia	99	2,328	304	1,023	361			4,115
Palestine	18	2,150	850	960	620	390	220	5,208
Poland (Polish Union)	72	10,000						10,072
Poland (Jewish Union)	80	2,891	963				450	4,384
Poland (German Union)	7	760	570	320	290	400		2,347
Poland (Ukrainian Union)	81	4,095						4,176
Romania	11	1,350	340	875		297		2,873
Switzerland	276	18,775	2,279			1,629	403	23,362
Czechoslovakia (Czech Union)	1,084	43,520	14,695	8,100	6,969	16,388	16,753	107,509
Czechoslovakia (German Union)		23,674	3,518	4,992	2,316	6,949	6,463	47,912
Yugoslavia		1,800						1,800
Total		1,017,226	169,362	197,485	76,842	135,344	105,667	1,701,926

* Fédération sportive de gymnastique et de travail [a workers' sports federation]

¹² Source : F. VANDERSMISSEN, *Le sport ouvrier*, Bruxelles, L'Eglantine, 1929, p. 30.

In opposition to the Olympic Games, the SWSI organised three worker Olympiads between the two wars: In Frankfurt at the end of July 1925, in Vienna at the end of July 1931 and in Antwerp from 25 July to 1 August 1937¹³.

This new alternative world sheds light on the crucial element of the *social democrat* organisational model: the powerful link¹⁴, central and identity-based, to the working class. ‘Social democracy was historically set up as the prevalent form of the political organisation of workers in capitalism,’ says Moschonas¹⁵. A number of parties incorporated the worker label – the *Parti Ouvrier Belge - Belgische Werklieden Partij* (Belgium), the *Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij* (Netherlands), the *Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichs* (Austria), the *parti ouvrier socialiste luxembourgeois* (Luxembourg), the *Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti* (Sweden), the *Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière* (France) and the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (Spain) – or the link to labour – *Labour Party, Norske Arbeiderparti...* – in the name. The socialist *family* was ‘the’ family of the *working class*, which developed powerfully with the acceleration of the industrial revolution and which was the class called on to play the key role in the coming of socialism. By this yardstick, the social democrat parties are *community parties*¹⁶, a “community of solidarity”¹⁷ compared to the vagaries of work under capitalism and in the future into which it is heading.

In the period between the two world wars, this organisational construction went awry in some areas hit by the arrival of fascism. We are thinking in particular of Germany and Austria after 1933. But, in parallel, it was developing in northern Europe¹⁸. And in the aftermath of the Second World War, this model gained ground even if several dimensions of the alternative society have disappeared or have declined considerably: in the areas of sport¹⁹, cooperatives and school in particular.

From an organisational perspective, the *socialist family* revealed an exceptional capacity. Of course, not all the parties belonged to this model and to this political

¹³ P. DIETSCHY, *Histoire du football*, Paris, Tempus, 2014, p. 44-45.

¹⁴ M. LAZAR, ‘Invariants et mutations du socialisme en Europe’, in Marc Lazar (ed.), *La gauche en Europe depuis 1945. Invariants et mutations du socialisme européen*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1996, p. 20.

¹⁵ G. MOSCHONAS, *La social-démocratie de 1945 à nos jours*, Paris, Montchrestien-Clef, 1994, p. 123.

¹⁶ P. DELWIT, ‘La social-démocratie européenne et le monde des adhérents: la fin du parti communauté ?’, in P. DELWIT (ed.), *Où va la social-démocratie ?*, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2004, p. 229-252.

¹⁷ G. VOERMAN, ‘Le paradis perdu. Les adhérents des partis sociaux-démocrates d’Europe occidentale. 1945-1995’, in M. LAZAR (ed.), *La gauche en Europe depuis 1945. Invariants et mutations du socialisme européen*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1996, p. 574.

¹⁸ M. TELÒ, *Le New deal européen. La pensée et la politique sociales-démocrates face à la crise des années trente*, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1988.

¹⁹ In 1946, the Confédération sportive internationale du travail [International Workers and Amateurs in Sport] succeeded the Internationale sportive ouvrière [Socialist Workers’ Sport International] but its weight and its influence have been considerably reduced. J.-L. DEBATTY, ‘Le sport ouvrier socialiste. Esquisse d’une histoire en Belgique et en Europe jusqu’en 1945’, *Analysis*, 27 December 2011, n. 89, p. 3.

force. In France and in Italy, the socialist parties were the second force of the left in their political system and could not demonstrate the characteristics of the model. Far from it. The majority of the working class of these two states joined and/or voted for the communist party in their state, the French Communist Party (PCF) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI)²⁰. But in the democratic Europe that emerged from the Liberation, this observation was the exception. For another twenty-five to thirty years, the socialist family showed its political, social and societal power.

At the dawn of the 1970s, there were several signs showing a shift that gradually grew at the end of the decade, in the 1980s and subsequently accelerated. All the components of the model for the movement were affected and disrupted.

The shift was seen first for the parties and their *community* of affiliates. For a number of socialist groupings, the total number of members hit a ceiling at this time and started to decline. Subsequently, there was a slump, sometimes even a spectacular one. For the parties from central Europe – Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria... – this observation was systematically confirmed. The case of the SPD was symptomatic. After the Second World War, it had, once again, reached over one million members, in 1976 and in 1977. In 1976, one voter out of twenty-five registered (MP/I) was a member of the social democrat party. But that was a kind of swansong. In the early 80s, an erosion came to light, which was not even held in check by the reunification process. In 2011, for the first time since 1945, the SPD moved under the bar of 500,000 members. And in the contemporary period, its low water mark came to 440,000 affiliates. The ratio to registered voters was only at 0.7 per cent and only one voter for the party in twenty-five was a member despite the disastrous election result of the legislative vote in September 2017.

The Austrian case is no less revealing. The SPÖ is the *community* party par excellence. In his autobiography, Eric Hobsbawm relates this eloquent anecdote that he experienced on the spot:

“As Peter’s father was a railway worker, his family was red: in Austria, and above all in the countryside, apart from with the farmers, the idea would not have come to any worker to be of another colour.”²¹

After the Second World War, the SPÖ went beyond the mark of 700,000 members in the 70s, a period during which it gained an absolute majority in the chamber of representatives. But, for the Austrian social democrats, the slump also came in the 80s. Its acceleration was impressive subsequently. Whilst one registered voter in eight was still a member of the SPÖ in 1986, it was only one in twenty-three in 2013, the year when the level of affiliates was at 205,241.

In Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands, the evolution of the number of members showed a trend in organisational profiles that is somewhat diverging. The Swiss socialist party, with a historically relatively modest format, for a long time showed a lot of stability in terms of its number of members: between 50,000 and 60,000 up to the 1980s. A turning point came then in the form of people leaving

²⁰ See: P. DELWIT, *Les gauches radicales en Europe. XIX^e-XXI^e siècles*, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2016.

²¹ E. HOBBSAWM, *Franc-tireur. Autobiographie*, Paris, Pluriel, 2005, p. 29.

the party. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Swiss socialists lost more than 10,000 members. Since then, the erosion has continued. The total number of members barely exceeds 30,000 now.

This profile is similar to that of the *partij van de arbeid*, but the drop came earlier. Having achieved a peak in 1959 with 147,074 members, the PVDA saw the situation deteriorate from the 1960s before stabilising the following decade. Subsequently, the fall in the number of members was very clearly confirmed. In one decade, the labour party lost 30,000 members without being able to stop the haemorrhaging. In 2015, for the first time it showed a number of members lower than 50,000.

The Belgian case unveils another state of affairs. Following the abandonment of indirect membership at the Liberation, the Belgian socialist party maintained and even reinforced its ability to attract the masses. From 1946 to 1981, it moved from 125,000 members to 283,817. Since then, the movement has gone the other way and the two socialist groups in Belgium now, the socialist party and the *Socialistische Partij.anders* are faced with an accelerated decline, leading them to around 110,000 members currently.

Table 5. Trends in the number of members and in proportion to the party's voters (M/Ep) and to registered voters (M/I) of the socialist parties and social democrats in central Europe

	SPD			SPÖ			SPS			PvdA			PSB-BSP		
	M	M/Vp	M/RV	M	M/Vp	M/RV	M	M/Vp	M/RV	M	M/Vp	M/RV	M	M/Vp	M/RV
1945				357,818	24.9	10.4									
1946										116,551	8.6	2.2			
1947							51,300	20.4	3.7						
1948										119,509	9.5	2.2			
1949	736,218	10.6	2.4	614,366	37.8	14							123,728	8.3	2.2
1950													127,158	7.5	2.3
1951							50,504	20.2	3.6						
1952										111,351	7.2	1.9			
1953	607,456	7.6	1.8	657,042	36.1	14.3									
1954													153,014	7.9	2.6
1955							54,906	20.8	3.8						
1956				687,972	36.7	14.9				142,139	7.6	2.3			
1957	626,189	6.6	1.8												
1958													187,000	9.9	3.1
1959				710,378	36.4	15.1	57,412	22.2	3.9	147,074	8.1	2.3			
1961	644,780	5.6	1.7										199,000	10.3	3.3
1962				698,705	35.6	14.5									
1963							57,269	22.4	3.7	138,567	7.9	2.1			

1965	710,448	5.5	1.8										189,303	12.9	3.1
1966				699,432	36.3	14.3									
1967							55,551	23.8	3.5	130,960	8.1	1.8			
1968													207,538	14.3	3.4
1969	778,945	5.5	2												
1970				719,389	32.4	14.3									
1971				703,093	30.8	14.1	53,452	11.8	1.5	96,337	6.2	1.2	235,335	16.4	3.8
1972	954,394	5.6	2.3							94,229	4.7	1.1			
1974													254,462	18.2	4
1975				693,156	29.8	13.8	53,694	11.3	1.4						
1976	1,022,191	6.3	2.4												
1977										101,116	3.6	1.1	252,570	16.8	4
1978													259,212	18.5	4.1
1979				721,262	29.9	13.9	52,703	11.9	1.4						
1980	986,872	6.1	2.3												
1981										109,625	4.5	1.1	283,817	18.8	4.1
1982										105,145	4.2	1			
1983	925,630	6.2	2.1	694,598	30	13.1									
1985													248,685	14.5	3.6
1986				669,906	32	12.3				102,493	3.4	1			
1987	910,063	6.5	2										248,844	13.3	3.5
1989										96,132	3.4	0.9			
1990	919,129	5.9	1.5	605,493	30.1	10.8							225,654		
1991							40,000	10.4	0.9				226,970	14.5	3.2
1994	849,374	5	1.4	512,838	31.7	8.9				69,651	3.2	0.6			
1995				487,597	26.4	8.5	39,010	9.5	0.8				198,115	13.4	2.8
1998	775,036	3.8	1.3							61,084	2.4	0.5			
1999				384,328	25.1	6.6	37,142	8.5	0.8				175,099	14.3	2.4
2002	693,894	3.8	1.1	328,686	18.3	5.6				57,182	4	0.5			
2003							34,809	7.1	0.7	60,602	2.3	0.5	144,036	7.8	1.9
2005	597,538	3.7	1												
2006				292,839	17.6	4.8				61,913	3	0.5			
2007							33,249	7.4	0.7				132,179	9.4	1.7
2008				268,628	18.8	4.2									
2009	512,520	5.1	0.8												
2010										54,504	2.9	0.4	134,242	9	1.7

2011							31,226	6.8	0.6					
2012										54,279	2.3	0.6		
2013	474,820	4.2	0.8	205,241	16.3	3.2								
2015							29,880	6.3	0.5					
2017	432,796	4.5	0.7							46,162	7.7	0.4		

The same dynamics can be seen in the Scandinavian countries. In Denmark, a decline, earlier, also came into play. Since 1965, the party has claimed 'only' 188,000 members. And the *community* fall in membership has continued. During the 1980s, the party fell below 100,000 members. Twenty years later, it is under the threshold of 50,000. And in the contemporary period, the Danish social democrat party has less than 40,000 members, showing a proportion to registered voters of less than one per cent and a proportion to its electorate of barely 4.3 per cent. Its Norwegian counterpart has maintained a very solid base of members up to the middle of the 80s. But subsequently it also recorded a notable decline. In 1994, with 97,922 affiliates, it moved, for the first time, under the bar of 100,000 members. This erosion has continued and the party has now announced a membership of between 50,000 and 60,000 people.

Assessment of the Swedish case is more complex. Up to 1990, the SAP was an Indirect party. The break in the organic link with the trade union - Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO) - led the party to change its statutes and to turn into a Direct party. The backlash was spectacular. The SAP went from 1,116,218 members in 1988 to 260,346 two years later. Of course, at the country level, there continues to be a very significant level of *membership*. But it is with another *organisation* that we are now dealing. As with other Nordic social democrat parties, there has been a deterioration since. In 2012, the party moved beyond the threshold of 100,000 for the first time.

The situation for the Finnish social democrat organisation (SDP) is different. It never had the organisational and political power of its Danish, Norwegian and Swedish counterparts. After oscillations between 1945 and the middle of the 1980s, the SDP also recorded, since the middle of the 1980s, a fall in the number of members. From 101,725 in 1976, the number subsided to 79,417 in 1991, 56,640 in 2003 and 41,503 in 2015.

Table 6. Evolution in the number of members (M) and the proportion to the party's voters (M/Ep) and to the registered voters (M/I) of the socialist parties and the social democrats in northern Europe

	SAP			DNA			SD			SDP		
	M	M/Vp	M/RV	M	M/Vp	M/RV	M	M/Vp	M/RV	M	M/Vp	M/RV
1961				164,799	19.15	7.04						
1962										44,828	9.99	1.65
1964	881,035	43.90	17.29				229,275	20.77	7.42			
1965				150,262	17.01	6.24						
1966							188,859	17.67	5.97	5,681	8.01	1.85
1968	888,294	36.70	16.31				176,729	18.13	5.51			

1969				157,536	15.69	6.11						
1970	890,070	39.45	15.77							60,707	10.22	1.96
1971							165,645	15.41	4.97			
1972										76,869	11.56	2.42
1973	952,519	42.38	16.74	145,724	19.19	5.42	130,476	16.66	3.77			
1975							122,394	13.40	3.52	99,463	14.55	2.66
1976	1,074,495	46.22	18.07									
1977				152,935	15.73	5.50	111,139	9.66	3.13			
1979	1,188,959	50.46	19.68				109,389	9.01	2.93	99,722	14.42	2.58
1981				153,335	16.76	5.11	99,546	9.70	2.64			
1982	1,229,703	48.54	20.06									
1983										95,461	11.99	2.42
1984							97,318	9.16	2.54			
1985	1,203,785	48.39	19.26	174,143	16.40	5.62						
1987							84,015	8.52	2.15	87,872	12.64	2.19
1988	1,116,218	48.08	17.63				79,414	8	2.03			
1989				127,099	14.01	3.98						
1990							76,941	6.35	1.95			
1991	260,346	12.62	4.06							79,417	13.17	1.96
1993				103,475	11.39	3.17						
1994	259,191	10.31	3.99				65,773	5.72	1.65			
1995										70,176	8.93	1.72
1997				64,415	7.12	1.95						
1998	177,316	9.26	2.69				57,445	4.69	1.44			
1999										62,195	10.15	1.50
2001				52,880	8.63	1.57	55,103	5.49	1.38			
2002	152,402	7.21	2.27									
2003										56,640	8.30	1.34
2005				51,575	5.98	1.51	56,808	6.55	1.42			
2006	120,091	6.18	1.74									
2007							51,073	5.80	1.27	51,360	8.64	1.26
2009				50,264	5.30	1.42						
2010	108,584	5.94	1.52									
2011							42,024	4.78	1.03	47,161	8.40	1.07
2013				52,661	6.02	1.45						

2014	101,674	5.26	1.39									
2015							39,345	4.25	0.95	42,709	8.71	0.96
2017				54,856	6.84	1.45						

In the socialist type model, another *picture* emerges. Be it the SFIO at the end of the war, the Spanish socialist workers' party (PSOE) or the Portuguese socialist party at the moment of democratisation, the number of members is much more modest in the early stages even if the French socialists had 300,000 members within two years. The ratio to registered voters and even to voters of the party is considerably more tenuous.

As such, the socialist parties of southern Europe have for a long time maintained and even improved their situation in terms of members, making the distinction between social democrat, labour and socialist types less and less valid. The Spanish socialist workers' party announced up to 500,000 members even if this announcement should be taken with care. We are far from it now. For the organisation of the recent primary that had the aim of designating the Secretary General, the PSOE certified the electoral corpus representing all the members of the party at 187,815.

As regards the Portuguese socialists, the most up to date data also reveal a sharp decline. According to the data, the party now has no more than around 50,000 members. In France, the First Secretary of the party announced 111,450 affiliates in 2016 but "between 60,000 and 70,000" in 2017.

Table7. Evolution in the number of members (M) and the proportion to the party's voters (M/Ep) and to the registered voters (M/I) of the socialist parties and the social democrats in Southern Europe

	PSOE			PSP			PS(F)		
	M	M/Vp	M/RV	M	M/Vp	M/RV	M	M/Vp	M/RV
1945							335,703	7.4	1.4
1946							354,878	8.5	1.4
1951							126,898	4.6	0.5
1956							117,331	3.6	0.4
1958							115,000	3.6	0.4
1962							91,000	4.0	0.3
1967							82,000	1.9	0.3
1968							81,000	2.2	0.3
1973							107,757	2.4	0.4
1975				77,625	3.6	1.3			
1976	9,141	0.2	0	91,562	4.9	1.4			
1978							180,000	2.8	0.5
1979	101,082	1.8	0.4	107,732	6.6	1.6			
1980				115,762	7.2	1.7			

1981							195,501	2.2	0.6
1982	119,101	1.2	0.4						
1983				130,279	6.4	1.8			
1985				46,655	3.9	0.6			
1986	185,663	2.1	0.6				177,284	2.1	0.5
1988							202,083	2.3	0.5
1989	242,661	3,0	0.8						
1991				59,869	3.6	0.7			
1993	350,416	3.8	1.1				113,005	2.6	0.3
1995				81,358	3.2	0.9			
1996	365,000	3.9	1.1				111,536		
1997							147,237	2.3	0.4
1999				114,974	4.9	1.3			
2000	407,821	5.2	1.7						
2002				66,917	3.2	0.8	129,500	2.1	0.3
2004	460,000	4.2	1.3						
2005				90,629	3.5	1,0			
2007							238,520	3.7	0.5
2008	360,000	3.2	1,0						
2009				78,152	3.8	0.8			
2011	216,952	3.1	0.6	85,000	5.5	0.9			
2012							197,000	2.6	0.4
2015	189,167	3.42	0.55	ND					
2016	190,000	3.50	0.55						
2017							65,000	3.9	0.13

Table:PSOEistheSpanishSocialistWorkersParty,PSPisthePortugueseSocialistPartyandPS(F)is the French Socialist Party

For the socialist family, the evolution in raw and net figures is therefore striking. The large majority of parties have lost their mass membership nature. And those that have kept it appear in danger of departing from that model soon. With this observation, we would however highlight a certain absence of singularity. Several pieces of work have highlighted, in recent years, a mass deregistration in political parties²² and the transformations of political engagement²³. In a more specific way, this refers above

²² I. VAN BIEZEN, P. MAIR, and T. POGUNTKE, 'Going, going, ... gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe', *European Journal of Political Research*, 2012, vol. 51, n. 1, p. 24-56.

²³ E. VAN HAUTE (eds), *Party Membership in Europe : Exploration into the anthills of party politics*, Bruxelles, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2011 ; E. VAN HAUTE, A. GAUJA (ed.),

all to mass party organisations²⁴. We will come back to that, the *disappearance* of communities almost mechanically impacts the *parties of community*: social democrat parties, communists, Christian democrats and Peasants parties are affected first and foremost. What's more, the interest of members in parties would be less fulsome in the current phase than it was for a century. The interlinking between the party and the state, through the intermediary of the laws of public funding for parties, provided new resources and modern means of communication made the mobilisation of militants less useful in a context of refocussing party and political life more strongly than ever during this electoral period²⁵. The arrival of television had already gradually refocussed the social democrat parties around leader figures.

The networked socialist world has not been spared by this evolution. Numerous peripheral organisations of social democrat parties have quite simply collapsed or are undergoing major changes. The main one among them, the trade unions, are experiencing deep changes. This is embodied in remarkable changes in their work for 40 or so years. We would first note a form of material and symbolic detachment of socialist trade unions towards the social democrat party of their state. And the other way around. Trade union organisations, originally organically linked to the social democrat party, have undone this bond. This fact was not new everywhere. By way of example, the *Fédération générale du travail de Belgique* (FGTB), which was born out of the ashes of the *Centrale générale du travail de Belgique* (CGTB) has broken the bond that existed until then with the Belgian workers' party and has shown its *independence* from the Belgian socialist party since 1945. However, there have been several illustrative cases in the last twenty-five years²⁶.

The second fundamental transformation refers to the upheavals in trade unionism itself. The trade union world is facing up to a number of key changes. Its weight and its influence have considerably decreased for thirty years. The fall of trade union members²⁷ and the rate of Trade Union density are illustrations of that. In most countries, there has been a fall in the rate of Trade Union density from the early 1980s. It has occasionally been spectacular. In Austria, the Trade Union density fell by 28 points between 1980 and 2013. In Germany, it fell from 34.9 per cent to 18.1 per cent; in the Netherlands from 348 to 17.8 per cent. The situation for the UK is also illustrative. In the space of thirty-three years, the rate fell by 25.9 percentage points. Sometimes the dynamic is less striking but most of the time the erosion is very real, as in Denmark (-11.8 points in Trade Union density), in Norway (-6.2 points) or in Sweden (-10.3 points).

Party Members and Activists, London, Routledge, 2015 (paperback : 2017).

²⁴ P. DELWIT, 'Still in Decline? Party Membership in Europe', in E. VAN HAUTE (ed.), *Party Membership in Europe: Exploration into the anthills of party politics*, Bruxelles, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2011, p. 25-42.

²⁵ R. S. KATZ and P. MAIR, 'Changing models of Party Organization and Party Democracy', *Party Politics*, 1994, vol. 1, n.1, p. 5-28.

²⁶ R. GUMBRELL-MCCORMICK, and R. HYMAN, *Trade Unions in Western Europe*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 136.

²⁷ J. WADDINGTON, *Trade union membership in Europe. The extent of the problem and the range of trade union responses*, Bruxelles, ETUC, 2005.

Table 8. Evolution in Trade Union density levels

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2013
Austria	67.9	66.2	62.8	57.4	55.8	52.1	47.6	41.9	37.4	33.9	29	27.8
Belgium	39.3	37.8	39.9	49.1	51.3	49.7	51.1	52.8	56.2	53.7	53.8	55.1
Denmark	56.9	58.2	60.3	68.9	78.6	77.5	74.6	75.9	73.9	70.7	67	66.8
Finland	31.9	38.3	51.3	65.3	69.4	69.1	72.5	80.4	75	70.6	68.6	69
France	19.6	19.5	21.7	22.2	18.3	13.6	9.8	8.7	8	7.7	7.7	7.7
Germany	34.7	32.9	32	34.6	34.9	34.7	31.2	29.2	24.6	21.7	18.6	18.1
Ireland	45.3	48.2	53.2	55.3	57.1	54.2	51.1	45.1	38	34	32.7	29.6
Luxembourg			46.8	45.7	50.8	52.1	46.4	43.5	42.5	41.4	35.1	
Netherlands	41.7	37.4	36.5	37.8	34.8	27.7	24.6	25.9	22.9	20.6	18.6	17.8
Norway	60	59	56.8	53.8	58.3	57.5	58.5	57.3	54.4	54.9	53.7	52.1
Sweden	72.1	66.3	67.7	74.5	78	81.3	80	83.1	79.1	76.5	68.2	67.7
Switzerland	31	28.2	24.9	27.8	27.5	24.8	22.5	22.7	20.2	19.3	17.1	16.2
United Kingdom	40.4	40.3	44.8	43.7	51.7	46	39.7	34.4	30.2	28.6	26.6	25.8

In addition, the slump in figures affected in the first place the industrial sectors particularly hit at the end of the 1970s by the emergence of the economic crisis and a movement of partial deindustrialisation in Europe. The historically most combative branches were the hardest hit. Trade unions for minors and textiles collapsed. In the UK alone, the number of miner workers came to a million in the aftermath of the Second World War²⁸. The metalworking and steelworking sectors fell back considerably. At the same time, the tertiary sector saw a spectacular rise. Workers in the service economy and the non-commercial sector have a weaker propensity to become trade unions than their colleagues from the secondary sector. “[...] the trade union decline was part of the end of the ‘workers’ movement’ that spanned the century”, highlighted Dominique Andolfatto and Dominique Labbé²⁹.

In addition, the size of companies was substantially reduced. Enterprises – metal sector, steel sector, textiles etc – where thousands if not even tens of thousands of workers were brought together have shut their doors or markedly reduced their members. It is in this type of enterprise that trade unionism was most powerful. By contrast, trade union penetration is much weaker in the world of small- and medium-sized enterprises. “The smaller the enterprise, the weaker the trade unionisation and the lower the trade union representation”, observes Salvo Leonardi³⁰. We would add

²⁸ B. JONES, *Dictionary of British Politics*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2010, p. 171.

²⁹ D. ANDOLFATTO, and D. LABBÉ, *Histoire des syndicats (1906-2006)*, Paris Seuil, 2006, p. 319.

³⁰ S. LEONARDI, ‘Le syndicat de demain. La nouvelle composition de classe et l’organisation des travailleurs’, in René MOURIAUX, Jean MAGNIADAS (eds), *Le syndicalisme au défi du 21^e siècle*, Paris, Syllepse, 2008, p. 171.

that a notable part of the most physically demanding posts are in general occupied by immigrant workers, often less inclined to join a trade union.

Origins of the collapse in the social democrat organisational model

How can this unbelievable turnaround be understood? A number of pieces of work have been devoted to addressing this question. Several fundamental evolutions are at the origin of these changes. The first goes back to the fundamental link between the working class and the socialist family. We have highlighted the close, almost total, interlinking between the two. The idea that demographic expansion would *ipso facto* lead to a perennial political majority for social democrats was profoundly anchored in the minds of a number of socialist leaders. The future belonged to them. "In 1920, we obtained 36 per cent of the votes. At the elections before last, nearly 40 per cent and now nearly 43 per cent. In six and a half years, we strengthened by around 7 per cent. How many are we missing? The path that separates us still from power demands about the same time delay that separates us from 1920... Still one or two elections and we will have finished with the bourgeois government," wrote Otto Bauer, a key figure in Austrian socialism³¹. In Austria as elsewhere, this was not the case. Of course, the socio-demographic evolution of the world of workers made it easier to gain absolute majorities in Sweden, Norway, Denmark or Great Britain. All the same, the working class was never socio-demographically in the majority and in the aftermath of the Second World War, this link was gradually abandoned.

It is sometimes in the facts, occasionally explicitly. The most well known example is the Congress of Bad Godesberg (1959). The German social democrat party left behind there not only Marxism as the conceptual framework of its doctrine and its action but also the working class as a reference category. The SPD became the *party of all the people*. This transformation was to be the origin of the conceptualisation of the *Catch-all Party* in the work of Otto Kirchheimer:

"Following the Second World War, the old-style bourgeois party of individual representation became the exception. While some of the species continue to survive, they do not determine the nature of the party system any longer. By the same token, the mass integration party, product of an age with harder class lines and more sharply protruding denominational structures, is transforming itself into a catch-all "people" party. Abandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral *encadrement* of the masses, it is turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral successes. The narrower political task and the immediate electoral goal differ sharply from the former all-embracing concerns; today the latter are seen as counter-productive since they deter segments of a potential nationwide clientele"³².

The collapse in the link was confirmed all the more as the European world of workers was shaken up in the 1970s. The emergence of a new international division

³¹ F. CLAUDIN, *L'eurocommunisme*, Paris, François Maspero, 1977, p. 75.

³² O. KIRCHHEIMER, 'The transformation of Western European Party Systems', in J. LA PALOMBARA, M. WEINER (eds), *Political parties and political development*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 184.

of labour shook everything up. The revolution in maritime transport brought with it considerable delocalisation in several sectors of production in Europe and led to a partial deindustrialisation in Europe. Very important parts of the metal industry, the steel industry, the textile industry and the shipbuilding industry were *transferred* to emerging countries, in particular countries in south east Asia. In Europe, labour employed in these sectors fell sharply and a number of sites shut their doors. At the same time, European mining extraction and as a result the community of miners collapsed. In 1984-1985, the very long British miners' strike, defeated, was its last big show of force. The *working class* was materially and symbolically hit. Until then bearing all the virtues of the future and of progress, it gradually became synonymous with fragmentation and a loss of status. At the same time, the *migration situation* became political, revealing paradoxical situations and effects. In several European countries, part of the working class was foreign and was recruited between the period of the Liberation and the golden 1960s. That led to some indifference towards the destiny of the world of workers. In parallel, within its midst, a conflict solidified between 'sedentary workers and migrant workers'³³ given the fact that jobs were becoming scarcer. Migrant workers were simultaneously accused of 'stealing bread' from nationals and not doing anything and 'benefitting from social security'. Since then, the influence in behaviour, especially electoral and political behaviour, of the *relationship to the other* has grown whilst blurring the socioeconomic cleavage.

At the same time, cultural liberalism brought by new and expanding social categories – employed middle classes – emerged and went against part of the political culture of the working class. The development of new social movements, more organised for an opposition about values than about material conditions³⁴, changed the situation and the look of social democrat parties, which increasingly targeted this social and electoral clientele. Gradually, in socialist parties, those belonging to the *white collar* profile replaced the *blue collars*. As Seyd and Whitely have shown in the labour movement case, the latter, culturally and politically in the minority, gradually abandoned 'the' party³⁵. The *abandonment* by the working class of social democrat parties marked the end of a long period³⁶ which registered both a point of

³³ E. BALIBAR, 'Bifurcation dans la "fin" du capitalisme', in I. WALLERSTEIN, *La gauche globale. Hier, aujourd'hui, demain*, Paris, Editions de la fondation maison des sciences de l'homme, 2017.

³⁴ R. INGLEHART, *The silent revolution: changing values and political styles among Western publics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977.

³⁵ P. SEYD, and P. WHITELEY, *New Labour's grassroots: the transformation of the Labour Party membership*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002.

³⁶ 'The most major transformation that social democracy has experienced has been the change in the sociological composition of the parties. But this is not a recent fact. This is a trend that was developing before 1914 as the parties gradually opened themselves up to new paid categories created by economic development' highlighted Alain Bergougnieux back in 1989.

A. BERGOUGNIUX, 'Un parti ouvrier', in A. BERGOUGNIUX, A. MANIN, *Le régime social-démocrate*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1989, p. 19.

crystallisation and a point of no return to the end of the twentieth century, confirming ‘the hegemony of the middle classes’ in organisations³⁷.

This trend for the world of workers to leave the party was confirmed all the more as from the 1980s a number of social democrat parties incorporated into their rhetoric and their public policies several dimensions of the neoliberal ideas that swept in at the end of the 1970s where one of the elements that is part and parcel of the welfare state – relative full employment – was threatened. The gap, if not even sometimes the separation, of social democracy with the employed popular classes put an end to the social democrat organisational model. For the most part, the social democrat parties are no longer really mass parties and, less still, parties of social integration and community integration. The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century was marked by a process of *normalisation* of party structures and organisations. Between parties of (very) different sensibilities, the organisational set-up is less and less distinctive.

Conclusion: the end of an organisational paradigm

Through this succinct presentation, we can draw some conclusions. For around thirty or so years, and in the clearest way in the contemporary period, social democrat parties are no longer but a shadow of their organisational glory of yesteryear. They no longer inspire awe, or even fear, in their political and social adversaries. Having lost the firepower of their members, as well as the managing structures of local sections and of intermediary structures, having lost a large part of their trade union power and having abandoned the defence of the world of the worker as a key point of their action, the very large majority of the social democrat groupings have become parties *like the others*. This observation, which could be seen as unsound and even banal, does however explicitly and implicitly set down both the meaning and the contemporary *role* of social democracy.

With a desire for *social and political transformation*, the conquests of social parties have been achieved through an organisation mixing institutional action and extra-institutional power. In a context where extra-institutional action has become incomparably weaker and even futile in certain configurations, the capacity of the socialist family and its organisations to *transform* things is a lot weaker, which can only lead one to wonder about its meaning and its essence in the current phase. This observation allows us to a large extent to capture the state of the socialist *family*, which has never been in such a bad way in a democratic context³⁸, examined in the light of its electoral performances, its internal socio-political indicators or that of its public policies.

Referring to this family precisely, the old types highlighted – socialist, social democrat and labour – virtually no longer have any *raison d’être*, at least on the organisational level. Going by the indicators, the distinctive features of the three types are incomparably less clear than in the past.

³⁷ G. MOSCHONAS, ‘L’éclat d’un pouvoir fragilisé: force et faiblesse du leadership socialiste’, in M. LAZAR (ed.), *La gauche en Europe depuis 1945. Invariants et mutations du socialisme européen*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1996, p. 611.

³⁸ P. DELWIT, ‘To reinvent or disappear’, *The Progressive Post*, Summer 2017, p. 21-23.

Table 9. Organisational and political facts and figures for the socialist/social democrat parties in the contemporary period

Countries	Parties	Year	M	M/Ep	M/I	Election result (Last election)	
Germany	SPD	2017	432,796	4.5	0.7	20.51	
Austria	SPÖ	2017	205,241	16.3	3.2	26.86	
Belgium	PS-SP.a	2010	134,242	9	1.7	22.94	20.50
Cyprus	EDEK	2011	7,600	21.1	1.4	8.93	
Denmark	SD	2015	39,345	4.3	1	26.31	
Spain	PSOE	2016	187,815	4.8	0.6	22.83	
Estonia	SDE	2015	6,186	7.1	0.7	15.19	
Finland	SDP	2015	42,709	8.7	1	16.51	
France	PS	2017	65,000	3.9	0.1	7.44	
Great Britain	LP	2017	285,176	2.2	0.6	39.99	
Greece	PASOK	2009	156,000	5.2	1.6	43.92	6.28
Hungary	MSzP	2014	30,000	1.2	0.2	26.25	
Ireland	LP	2016	5,606	4	0.2	6.61	
Iceland	SAMFY	2016	16,913	155	6.9		5.74
Italy	PD	2013	539,534	6.2	1.2	25.43	
Lithuania	LSDP	2016	21,446	7.5	0.9	15.04	
Luxembourg	POSL	2013	5,548			20.28	
Norway	DNA	2017	54,856	6.8	1.5	27.36	
Netherlands	PvdA	2017	46,162	7.7	0.4	5.70	
Poland	SLD	2015	57,551	4.9	0.2	7.55	
Portugal *	PS	2011	85,000	5.5	0.9	<u>33.57</u>	
Slovakia	SMER	2016	15,605	2.1	0.4	28.28	
Slovenia	SD	2014	12,109	23.4	0.7	5.97	
Sweden	SAP	2014	101,674	5.3	1.4	31.01	
Switzerland	SPS	2015	29,880	6.3	0.5	18.84	
Czech Republic	CSSD	2013	23,202	2.3	0.3	20.46	

* Data for members not available for 2015. The election result indicated is for 2015.

And that is without factoring in the novelties introduced by the fall of the Berlin Wall. In central and eastern Europe, the social democrat parties have at times been old reconditioned communist parties, as in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria or Romania, and at times *sui generis* or historical organisations such as in the Czech Republic or in Estonia.

Given their relationship to popular democracies, the weakness of trade unionism in these states, but also the importance of nationalism and minorities in this space, the social democrat parties do not fit into any of the three historical organisational models, nor do they follow the big historical orientations of social democracy even though the Party of European Socialists is led by the Bulgarian Sergueï Stanichev.

Strictly speaking, these observations are not really new. In 1995, Gerrit Voerman spoke of 'lost paradise' in his analysis of social democrat members³⁹. More recently, Gerasimos Moschonas proposed a nuanced analysis, situating the social democrat family somewhere in the middle⁴⁰, between the party of the masses and the professional electoral party suggested by Panebianco⁴¹. Since then, as we have highlighted, the socialist parties have lost their lustre as parties of the masses.

The accuracy of the observations has become very clear since the end of the Second World War. Never has the socialist family fared so badly in its historical organisational attributes. Never has its electoral support been so weak. Never, undoubtedly, has the social democrat family been so far from the claims and expectations of the *world of workers* and, more broadly, of employed popular classes. For all these reasons, the terms of possible *party overhauls*⁴² are both open-ended and urgently need to be determined.

³⁹ G. VOERMAN, 'Le paradis perdu: Les adhérents des partis sociaux-démocrates d'Europe occidentale, 1945-1995', in M. LAZAR (ed.), *La gauche en Europe depuis 1945. Invariants et mutations du socialisme européen*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1996, p. 561-578.

⁴⁰ G. MOSCHONAS, *In the Name of Social Democracy: The great Transformation from 1945 to the present*, London, Verso, 2002, p. 145.

⁴¹ A. PANEBIANCO, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 264.

⁴² F. ESCALONA, *La social-démocratie, entre crise et mutations*, Paris, Fondation Jean Jaurès, 2011, p. 53-54.

