

## Rethinking Intra-Party Cohesion: Towards a Conceptual and Analytical Framework

Journal:	<i>Party Politics</i>
Manuscript ID	PP-2019-0018
Manuscript Type:	Article
Keywords:	intra-party cohesion, analytical framework, conceptual clarity, Hirschman
Abstract:	<p>Intra-party cohesion is a concept extensively used to assess institutional change and behaviour in legislative and party politics. In spite of its popularity, there is confusion about its meaning mostly derived from its multidimensional nature. This paper aims to clarify the understanding of this term across three different fields of research (legislative studies, party factionalism, and Hirschman's theory applied to intra-party dynamics) and to build a conceptual framework that integrates several analytical dimensions. It uses quantitative network-based analysis of bibliographic data to provide a descriptive account of connections between these fields of the literature. Based on this, it identifies major challenges in the study of intra-party cohesion and reveals the necessity to investigate it beyond ideology and legislative arena. To this end, we argue and illustrate how Hirschman's theory applied to three levels of analysis allows us to formulate a framework suitable for the study of intra-party cohesion.</p>

SCHOLARONE™  
Manuscripts

## Rethinking Intra-Party Cohesion: Towards a Conceptual and Analytical Framework

### Abstract

Intra-party cohesion is a concept extensively used to assess institutional change and behaviour in legislative and party politics. In spite of its popularity, there is confusion about its meaning mostly derived from its multidimensional nature. This paper aims to clarify the understanding of this term across three different fields of research (legislative studies, party factionalism, and Hirschman's theory applied to intra-party dynamics) and to build a conceptual framework that integrates several analytical dimensions. It uses quantitative network-based analysis of bibliographic data to provide a descriptive account of connections between these fields of the literature. Based on this, it identifies major challenges in the study of intra-party cohesion and reveals the necessity to investigate it beyond ideology and legislative arena. To this end, we argue and illustrate how Hirschman's theory applied to three levels of analysis allows us to formulate a framework suitable for the study of intra-party cohesion.

**Keywords:** intra-party cohesion, analytical framework, conceptual clarity, Hirschman

### Introduction

Intra-party cohesion (IPC) is important in politics but has shaky theoretical foundations. Earlier studies showed that the existence of unified parties has a direct impact on government's survival, coalition behaviour, bargaining power of the party in public office, electoral strategies and performance, parties' representativeness and accountability to voters (Giannetti & Benoit 2008; Carey 2009; Kam 2009). At the same time, even when political parties are not monolithic structures, dissent and conflicts may shape their ideological and policy stances, change organizations (e.g. splits, mergers, switching), reinvigorate the democratic debate within parties, and enhance electoral performance and adaptation (Mair 1990; DiSalvo 2012; Gherghina 2014).

While the relevance of IPC is well established, the concept involves multiple dimensions that have rarely been systematically theorized into one common framework. Existing research has conceptualized the term in a unidimensional manner and most studies paid extensive attention to the empirical dimensions rather than concept formation. This paper seeks to critically review the way in which IPC has been defined and measured across the literature in various fields of politics and to propose a typology. In doing so, our endeavour distinguishes between three areas of research that have looked at IPC but have remained quite impermeable to each other: (1) studies about the party in public office as

1  
2  
3 one of the three faces of a party organization, (2) the literature on party factionalism and (3)  
4 studies applying Hirschman's (1970) framework of "exit, voice and loyalty" to the study of  
5 intra-party politics. Each of these fields developed its own debates on the definition and  
6 measurement of different types of IPC, and had to face various methodological challenges.  
7 These conceptual and methodological debates indicate how this concept can be used as the  
8 lowest common denominator between these fields. Moreover, a great deal of (recent)  
9 research has focused on legislative cohesion, with some punctual connections with the  
10 literature on factions, but with very few appeals to Hirschman's framework. The central  
11 argument of this paper is that social-psychological and economic theories of organizations  
12 revolving around Hirschman's framework may prove very useful to deepen, enlarge and  
13 systematize our understanding of IPC.  
14

15  
16 The relevance of systematizing our understanding of IPC and of its multiple  
17 dimensions can be outlined at theoretical, methodological and empirical levels. Moving  
18 beyond the specificities of this political phenomenon, we construct a typology aiming to  
19 capture all situations in which IPC occurs. The important theoretical contribution resides in  
20 the accommodation of several analytical dimensions that were treated in isolation until now.  
21 The analytical complexity of the resulting typology covers a broad range of situations and  
22 can represent a solid basis for further studies. One of the immediate consequences is the  
23 possibility for a better inter-disciplinary studies and exchange of ideas having the same point  
24 of reference. At methodological level, a typology that is not context, case, or research area  
25 sensitive allows for comparative studies both across disciplines and across time.  
26 Furthermore, the typology presented in this paper enhances straightforward  
27 operationalization of a term that had been rarely measured in a comprehensive way before.  
28 From an empirical point of view, an unequivocal understanding of IPC leads to richer  
29 interpretation of the causes and consequences, talking to a broader audience than in the  
30 current situation when analyses appear to be research field oriented.  
31

32  
33 The paper uses an inductive approach and starts with a network analysis of cross-  
34 referenced scientific articles on IPC between 1925 and 2017. This identifies the fields of  
35 research in which it was used, with emphasis on the main authors and works, and maps their  
36 connections. The second section describes how IPC has been defined in the identified fields  
37 of research. It highlights the common and complementary elements brought to the term by  
38 different conceptualization. Based on these theoretical approaches, the third section  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 suggests a general analytical framework (a typology) that includes several dimensions of IPC.  
4  
5 The final section discusses the methodological implications and challenges that scholars  
6  
7 might face when studying IPC.  
8  
9

### 10 **Mapping the literature: A network-based analysis of bibliographic data**

11  
12 In order to visualize the most influential publications on IPC, the relationship between fields  
13  
14 of research and their development over time, we apply a network based analysis of cross-  
15  
16 referenced journal articles. We complement this visualization by a review of the central  
17  
18 debates and of the theoretical and methodological aspects of these publications. The  
19  
20 selection of articles involved a three-step process that resulted in 533 publications and 3,196  
21  
22 citation links. First, citations indexes were imported from the Web of Science bibliographic  
23  
24 database. Second, we used keywords related to the study of IPC (party 'cohesion', 'unity',  
25  
26 'loyalty', 'discipline', 'agreement') and dissent (party 'switching', 'defection', 'split', 'fission',  
27  
28 'division', 'faction', 'exit, voice, loyalty'). Third, we scrutinized each abstract and kept only  
29  
30 the publications related to IPC.<sup>1</sup>

31  
32 Two different software tools (CiteNetExplorer and VOSViewer) were used to import  
33  
34 the collected citations indexes. CiteNetExplorer displays networks of citation relations  
35  
36 between published articles through a timeline-based visualization (van Eck & Waltman 2014,  
37  
38 p.293). VOSViewer takes a distance-based approach and identifies the most cited works and  
39  
40 their related publications. It can also be used to visualize keyword co-occurrence in a citation  
41  
42 network (van Eck & Waltman 2014). One of the main limitations of this approach is that Web  
43  
44 of Science only includes articles (as well as a few chapters and conference proceedings  
45  
46 referenced online), thus neglects studies published as monographs and edited volumes. This  
47  
48 slightly biases the analysis. However, by using CitNetExplorer option 'include non-matching  
49  
50 references', the network still includes major books (or chapters) cited in Web of Science  
51  
52 articles but which are not included in the database (and thus not displaying cross-  
53  
54 references). A second limitation involves that recent publications often do not appear on the  
55  
56 graphs, as arguably their citation score is not yet high.

57  
58 Figure 1 displays the full citation-network as obtained in CitNetExplorer. Only the 70  
59  
60 most frequently cited publications (including non-matching references cited at least 10

---

<sup>1</sup> Works on topics such as voters' loyalty, switching or split-ticket voting, inter-party agreement, or coalition unity were removed from the analysis since they were not directly linked to IPC.

1  
2  
3 times) are visible, but the software allows zooming and ‘drilling down’ further into the  
4 network. The vertical axis represents time, while the horizontal axis reflects the relatedness  
5 of the publications, i.e. the closer the ‘nodes’, the more related the publications. To identify  
6 specific research areas, we cluster the empirical evidence: four subgroups may be identified,  
7 which all appear connected in some way.  
8  
9  
10  
11

12 On the left of Figure 1, the purple cluster mostly includes studies on the US Congress,  
13 as shown by the filiation with Fenno (1978) and Mayhew (1974). This cluster has been  
14 concerned with the evolution of American parties and with the ongoing debate about the  
15 importance and strength of parties and individual legislators in the democratic process. This  
16 debate has led to question the real impact of the party (discipline) on legislators’ behaviour,  
17 a relationship that has been tested by heavily relying on roll-call data, as introduced by  
18 Mayhew.  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24

25 Directly related to and embedded into these studies, publications identified in the  
26 blue cluster also deal with IPC in a legislative context, but seek to expand American-based  
27 theories and methods – as shown by the filiation with Rice (1925; 1928) and his cohesion  
28 index – outside the US Congress. The most-cited publication of the blue cluster is the  
29 foundational article on the electoral incentives for candidates to distinguish themselves from  
30 their party and co-partisans (Carey & Shugart 1995).<sup>2</sup> Other extensively cited works have  
31 expanded these ‘incentives’ to the broader institutional context, and have tested the impact  
32 of various institutional devices on legislators’ behaviour in comparative perspective, e.g. the  
33 impact of the vote of confidence as shown by the link with Huber (1996) or that of candidate  
34 selection methods as shown by the link with Gallagher & Marsh (1988). Among these  
35 comparative studies, we find the work of Carey (2007) and his ‘competing principals’ theory.  
36 As illustrated by their position further to the right of the network and by their filiation with  
37 Özbudun (1970), these studies on legislative IPC have moved from the study of presidential  
38 systems to that of (mostly Western) parliamentary systems. Furthermore, the blue cluster of  
39 research has been enriched by studies on the European Parliament about the role of  
40 institutional incentives and ‘principals’ or the methodological use of roll-call voting data.  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53

54 On the left-side of this blue cluster, closer to the purple group, some studies have  
55 examined legislative IPC in young democracies or transition countries: in Brazil, Russia or  
56 comparatively in Eastern Europe. As illustrated by their citation links, these studies have  
57  
58  
59

---

60 <sup>2</sup> In Figure 2 this is reflected by ‘personal vote’.

1  
2  
3 primarily been interested in the 'electoral connection' (Mayhew 1974; Cain et al. 1987), that  
4 is, with the effect of the electoral system on legislators' behaviours – and by extension, with  
5 the potential effect of electoral rules on political (in)stability in these new democracies.  
6  
7  
8  
9

### 10 **Figure 1 about here**

11  
12  
13 The nature and content of the green cluster on Figure 1 does not strike at first glance: it  
14 seems to gather several foundational works entrenched in structural approaches to parties  
15 and party systems (Duverger 1954; Sartori 1976; Panebianco 1988), institutional and rational  
16 approaches to (legislative) parties (Strøm 1990; Cox 1997), government formation (Laver &  
17 Shepsle 1996) and coalition dynamics (Riker 1962; Laver & Schofield 1990). Looking beyond  
18 these highly cited works, the cluster seems to gather two sub-groups. The first sub-group,  
19 positioned to the left-side of the network and embedded in the blue and purple cluster, is  
20 concerned with the reasons for legislators' switching and with the consequences of such  
21 behaviour. The second sub-group gathers the literature on factionalism with studies  
22 primarily concerned with the definition and typology of factions, with their role in dynamics  
23 of party change and splits and with their bargaining power in processes of coalition building,  
24 portfolio allocation and party policy formulation. These two sub-groups stand within the  
25 same cluster given (1) their shared interest in the consequences of defection, switching and  
26 factionalism on government dynamics and party system stability, (2) their relationship with  
27 dynamics of party fission and fusion, (3) their common case studies, especially the parties  
28 and party systems in Japan and Italy, suggesting that factionalism and switching are related  
29 phenomena.  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43

44 The orange cluster in Figure 1 includes publications related to Hirschman's  
45 framework (1970) and to the *Economic Theory of Democracy* (Downs 1957) which had some  
46 influence on Hirschman's framework. One seminal article is identified within Hirschman's  
47 network, but is actually at the cross-roads of several research areas (Kato 1998). This work  
48 examines legislative IPC within Japanese parties through the lenses of Hirschman's  
49 framework and considers faction belonging as a potential factor for exit (switching) or voice  
50 (dissent). Apart from Hirschman (1970), Downs (1957) and Kato (1998), most cited articles  
51 include the logic of collective action. Relevant publications linking Hirschman's framework to  
52 IPC includes, apart from Kato (1998), those of Langston (2002) who analyses elites' exit voice  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 or loyalty in the Mexican dominant (and factionalized) PRI party, and an analysis of party  
4 members' exit, voice or loyalty response to the re-foundation of the Italian Communist party  
5 (PCI) in the early 1990s (Eubank et al. 1996). Other studies not identified in the orange  
6 cluster do appeal to Hirschman's framework: some deal with party switching (Heller &  
7 Mershon 2008) or apply labour economics and management approaches to legislative IPC  
8 (Garner & Letki 2005).  
9

10  
11  
12  
13  
14 Finally, among the publications that were not classified into any cluster in Figure 1,  
15 there is a small set of publications, mostly on British parties and especially on their divisions  
16 over the European integration issue. Along these works, we also find publications on  
17 ideological IPC within Canadian parties, especially among the party on the ground. The rest  
18 of the unclassified publications are barely related to the rest of the network, and a quite  
19 substantial number of them are in fact book reviews. Table 1 summarizes the main  
20 characteristics of these groups. The blue cluster is by far the largest, both in terms of  
21 publications and citation links. Together with the purple cluster of works, it accounts for  
22 roughly 60% of the total number of investigated publications. This indicates the dominance  
23 of the legislative oriented approach towards IPC. The green cluster oriented towards party  
24 factionalism accounts for approximately one quarter of the number of articles. The cluster  
25 with the lowest number of articles and citations among the four is related to Hirschman's  
26 theory. The fifth cluster gathers several topics ranging from grassroots party politics to  
27 European integration topics outside the parliamentary arena.  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40

#### 41 **Table 1 about here**

42  
43  
44  
45 Figure 2 uses VOSViewer and its clustering option to complement the data presented so far  
46 in Figure 1 and Table 1. It presents the result of a network analysis of keywords co-  
47 occurrence citation (based on articles' title and content of the abstract). The graphical  
48 depiction strengthens the idea of a dominant research on legislative behaviour. The strong  
49 impact of the works in the blue cluster from Figure 1 is visible in (light and dark) blue in  
50 Figure 2 as shown by the keywords 'institutions', 'selection', 'incentives', 'principals' (which  
51 appears in light blue on the left of 'party discipline') and 'behaviour' (located between  
52 'cohesion' and 'institution'). A particular case is the analysis of roll-call voting data where the  
53 keyword can be observed on the upper right corner. The group of publications about  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 legislative discipline and general issues related to the party in the public office (specifically,  
4 in the United-States) are visible on the upper-left corner, in green. The keywords associated  
5 with research about the potential effect of electoral rules on political (in)stability is visible in  
6 pink.  
7  
8  
9

10 The keywords related to party factionalism (the green cluster in Figure 1) appear in  
11 turquoise and red. The keywords in turquoise are for legislators' switching, while the ones in  
12 red deal with factionalism and overlap to some extent with the legislative IPC. The density  
13 and importance of keywords encountered in studies about factionalism indicate that this has  
14 been a research area in which IPC is often encountered. The studies using Hirschman theory  
15 (orange cluster in Figure 1) are barely visible through the keywords 'voice' and 'loyalty' and  
16 seem embedded into the factionalism literature (the red keywords in Figure 2). Even the  
17 keywords used in unclassified publications (Table 1) are more prominent: in yellow the ones  
18 about British politics and European integration; or cut across two fields of research (red and  
19 green), somewhere around the keywords 'ideology', 'preferences' and 'curvilinear disparity'.  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29

### 30 **Figure 2 about here**

31  
32  
33  
34 Several conclusions can be drawn from this network analysis. The centrality of the keyword  
35 'cohesion' (Figure 2) suggests that the concept of IPC could be used as the lowest common  
36 denominator between these various fields. The analysis has shown the overall dominance of  
37 legislative studies, that is, IPC in the party in public office. By contrast, it has illustrated the  
38 weakness and lack of connection with studies on IPC in the other faces of the party, although  
39 we found a few studies on (ideological) IPC in the party on the ground, and a few case  
40 studies on party splits at party congresses. Hirschman's framework is hardly integrated in  
41 the whole picture, but more recent publications seem to have brought it back into the study  
42 of members' relationship to their party organization in case of (dis)satisfaction (Kemp 2002;  
43 van Haute 2015) or in terms of ideological congruence (van Haute & Carty 2012; Kölln & Polk  
44 2016). On these grounds, the following section uses IPC as a common concept that  
45 transcends these various literatures. It discusses its multiple dimensions within and across  
46 disciplines, underlines commonalities, and provides a closer look at Hirschman's approach.  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

### Characterizing IPC and insights from 'Exit, Voice & Loyalty'

This section starts with a review of the definition(s) and analytical dimensions used for IPC across the fields of research identified during the network analysis. Intra-party cohesion is a multi-layered concept. At individual level, it can be understood either as an attitude or as a behaviour. At aggregate level, IPC can describe the state of a party, for instance along a scale or a degree of cohesion, or the force pushing its members to act collectively, i.e. 'a party acting in unison' (Hazan 2003). While IPC as a behaviour has been examined as both a dependent and independent variable (see above), IPC as an attitude (e.g. homogeneity of preferences, loyalty) has more often been examined as an independent variable that could affect IPC as a behaviour (e.g. voting unity, switching). The conception of IPC as a state/attitude or as a force/behaviour, its status in the research design as well as the level of analysis (individual or party) at which it is observed have important consequences for its measurement.

The network analysis shows that in legislative studies IPC as a behaviour seems to have prevailed and a large body of research has been dedicated to studying its determinants. IPC as a behaviour has been equated with party unity (and sometimes also used interchangeably with party *discipline*), and has been used to describe the act of MPs from the same party voting in a unitary manner (Janda 1993, p.174; Olson 2003, p.164). A party appears united when all MPs vote the same way, or disunited when some MPs vote against the party line, or in a different way than the rest of their fellows. Scholars have developed several tools to grasp the *degree* of voting cohesion, such as the index of cohesion (Rice 1925) or the index of agreement (Attiná 1990).

Some scholars have considered legislative IPC as a *process* rather than an outcome and they have accordingly pointed out the role of several endogenous mechanisms. This approach distinguishes between cohesion and unity, changes the status of cohesion from dependent to independent variable (Andeweg & Thomassen 2011), and examines how unity is reached at the level of the individual legislator. Voting unity would result mainly from three *sequential* mechanisms (van Vonno et al. 2014) that could be described as dimensions of IPC –and each of which are regularly conceptually equated with IPC. First, MPs' homogeneity of preferences, also referred to as shared policy preferences (Kam 2001; Hazan 2003) or party agreement (van Vonno et al. 2014) – although (Close & Núñez 2017) argue

1  
2  
3 that homogeneity of preferences and party agreement should be considered as two  
4 different dimensions of IPC. Second, the MPs' internalization of the norm of party solidarity  
5 (Hazan 2003) or MPs' sense of party loyalty (Andeweg & Thomassen 2011; van Vonno et al.  
6 2014) has been analysed as a psycho-sociological attachment to the party, related to a form  
7 of social identity or party identification (Raymond & Overby 2014; Raymond & Worth 2016).  
8 Third, party *discipline*, which can take the form of positive incentives, such as promises of  
9 career advancement, or can involve threat of sanction (e.g. demotion) if the MP does not  
10 conform to the party line. Party discipline would be enforced by the party leaders as an  
11 'ultimum remedium' (Andeweg & Thomassen 2011) when neither agreement nor loyalty is  
12 effective. While agreement and loyalty are attitudes, and can be conceived as the 'voluntary  
13 pathway' to IPC, discipline is rather an institutional or organizational constraint, or  
14 'compulsory pathway' to IPC (Andeweg & Thomassen 2011; van Vonno et al. 2014).

15  
16 The literature review and network analysis also indicate that studies of IPC in the  
17 party in public office looked at legislators 'exiting' their party, either to join another party,  
18 form a new political organization or sit as independent in the parliament (Heller & Mershon  
19 2009). Party switching has been described as 'the ultimate lack of cohesion' (Pedersen &  
20 Kaldahl Nielsen 2017) or as an extreme form of partisan disloyalty (O'Brien & Shomer 2013).  
21 Again, this literature has examined how various dimensions of IPC relate to each other, often  
22 by looking at the extent to which IPC as a behaviour (dependent variable, e.g. staying in the  
23 party) results from IPC as an attitude (independent variable, e.g. homogeneous attitudes).  
24 Ideologically cohesive parties would experience less switching and legislators whose  
25 preferences are closer to that of their party would be less likely to switch (Heller & Mershon  
26 2008; O'Brien & Shomer 2013; Desposato 2006). Also, legislators would be more likely to  
27 switch to parties that are ideologically close to their preferences (Desposato 2006;  
28 Mainwaring & Perez-Linan 1997). Interestingly, party switching may also be a reaction to  
29 party discipline: legislators would switch to escape strong party discipline (Heller & Mershon  
30 2008).

31  
32 The network analysis suggests a certain overlap of switching and factionalism studies.  
33 Arguably, collective defections in the party in public office often relate to the existence of  
34 intra-party factions (Cox & Rosenbluth 1995; Kato 1998); although usually factions are not  
35 limited to the parliamentary arena. Central publications on factionalism have been  
36 concerned with the definition and classification of factions, thus, with what factions *are*

1  
2  
3 (state). As shown below, other relevant publications have adopted a more dynamic  
4 approach, and have asked what factions *do* (force), and what are their functional roles  
5 within the larger party organization. The most mentioned definition is that a faction is ‘any  
6 intraparty combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common  
7 identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively –as a distinct bloc within  
8 the party– to achieve their goals’ (Zariski 1960).<sup>3</sup> IPC in the form of faction varies along  
9 several dimensions. Three dimensions have been discussed in the literature: 1) strength  
10 where they may vary from ephemeral or loosely organized to more institutionalized groups  
11 (Belloni & Beller 1978; Hine 1982; Bettcher 2005; Panebianco 1988) such as those found in  
12 some Italian, Japanese and Australian parties (Boucek 2012; Kohno 1992; McAllister 1991;  
13 Bettcher 2005); 2) motivations or ‘purpose’ with some factions of an ideological or ‘principle’  
14 nature (Rose 1964; Bettcher 2005), while others would be built around shared interests, or  
15 as ‘leader-follower’ groups (Key 1949), although these types often overlap; and 3)  
16 geographical scope with factions that can occur within one of the faces of the party,  
17 transcend these faces, or constitute one of the faces (e.g. the parliamentary *Fraktion*), can  
18 occur within one or across levels (local, central, provincial) or branches of the party, or  
19 reflect regional diversity within the party (Stern et al. 1971).

20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

Depending on their characteristics, factions can fulfil several functions. If well-organised, they can offer a greater ‘voicing’ power than individualized forms of dissent. If they rely on ideological motivations, they can be used to express policy disagreement, and operate when the policy orientation of the party is at stake, e.g. within the party in public office or when defining the party platform during congresses etc. If they are more of an interest-based nature, they are more likely to express dissatisfaction with material incentives provided by the organization, and will try to impact the distribution of resources (allocation of seats, ministerial portfolios, allocation of resources to specific branches etc.). If built on a leader-follower incentive, they will be mostly active in intra-party contests of leader and candidate selection. These voicing processes may occur at different or all levels or arenas of the party organization. For example, disagreement or dissatisfaction expressed at party congresses may conduct to altering the platform (Ceron 2012), changing the leadership, and, when voice is expressed *collectively* through organized factions, can result in reversing the balance of power between competing groups. Adopting a dynamic approach, Boucek (2009)

---

<sup>3</sup> Factions themselves thus seem to require a minimum of *attitudinal* and *behavioural* internal cohesion.

1  
2  
3 investigates factionalism as a process, occurring through three sequences or forms of  
4 factionalism: cooperative (different groups are recognized within the party), competitive  
5 (diffusion strategies allowing for 'voice' between intra-groups) and degenerative (when  
6 factions become too numerous and self-seeking). While the other forms of factionalism may  
7 be constructive for the organization – ideological debates, leadership renewal etc.–,  
8 degenerative factionalism has detrimental consequences, which are expressed through 'exit'  
9 in the forms of party split or collapse.

### 17 *Integrating Hirschman's approach*

19 This review of IPC definitions and measurements across these fields of research indicates the  
20 usefulness of Hirschman's framework to grasp the processes of IPC. Hirschman's original  
21 framework (1970) was developed in the field of economics and attempted to frame how a  
22 consumer react to a product quality decline: exit (leave the firm, stop buying the product),  
23 voice (express discontent) or remain loyal. Loyalty has been viewed as an attitudinal factor  
24 affecting the choice between two behaviours, voice and exit. The framework has been  
25 successfully applied in other fields but considerably less to politics.<sup>4</sup>

32 Studies applying Hirschman's framework to the study of IPC brought useful  
33 amendments to the original theory. The first concerns the perception of quality decline:  
34 while the original model takes for granted that all members recognize the quality decline in  
35 the organization at the same time, within a party, individuals might have conflicting  
36 preferences towards what should be a 'satisfying' or a high quality product (Barry 1974;  
37 Dowding et al. 2000). Thus in a context of party crisis or rupture, be it an organizational or  
38 ideological (both often occurring simultaneously), some discontented members might voice  
39 in order to push for change, while others might voice in order to resist change and their  
40 opinion might differ towards the kind of change that is being proposed (Salucci 2008).

49 A second amendment involves that voice and exit are not mutually exclusive  
50 categories, but rather positively correlate (Kato 1998) and the same applies for different  
51 types of voice (Amjahad 2011; Close 2011). Research highlights a dynamic relationship  
52 between these behaviours. Party members would adopt silence, voice and exit successively  
53  
54  
55

---

57 <sup>4</sup> The framework was applied to political phenomena by Hirschman in two chapters of his 1970 book, being  
58 qualified as his 'weakest' chapters (Barry 1974). In addition to the works cited in the network analysis, recent  
59 studies applying Hirschman's framework to politics include those of Bartolini (2005) and Clark et al. (2017). See  
60 also John and Dowding's (2016) review article on Hirschman's contribution to political science.

1  
2  
3 –through a kind of *sequential* ‘voicing’ process– through time, but also throughout different  
4 arenas: first, voicing in a small committee, then in a larger party meeting, then outside the  
5 party, for instance in the media. Besides, voice can create exit as much as exit may  
6 encourage voice: credible exit by those who have previously voiced might encourage other  
7 members of the organization to put pressure on it by voicing from within (Kato 1998).  
8  
9

10  
11  
12 A third amendment refers to the concept of loyalty, which has been mainly conceived  
13 as a social-psychological variable affecting the choice between different types of response  
14 behaviours. Again, the sequential aspect of the framework can be highlighted: members can  
15 feel dissatisfied, but in case of dissatisfaction, they will voice or exit, constructively or  
16 destructively, their dissatisfaction depending on how ‘committed’ (Saunders et al. 1992) or  
17 ‘attached’ (Cannings 1992) they feel to their organization. Party loyalty would refrain  
18 grassroots members to exit (Amjahad 2011; Close 2011), but the effect on voice is more  
19 uncertain: loyalty can either encourage silence or voice.<sup>5</sup> This uncertainty seems to result  
20 from potential conflicting loyalties: loyalty to the party organization or loyalty to the  
21 ideology embodied by the party (Salucci 2008); loyalty to the party or to one or another  
22 leader; loyalty to the central party organization or to the local branch of the party (Close  
23 2011), or to any other sub-group (faction) within the party. In order to remain loyal to an  
24 ideology, members may consider exiting an organization that deviates from this ideology  
25 (Salucci 2008). In a similar vein, feeling more loyal to a sub-branch or sub-group of the party  
26 may increase members’ likelihood of voicing their disagreement or dissatisfaction with the  
27 central party organization. Besides, as factions involve ‘a sense of common identity’ (Zariski  
28 1960), they may create conflicting loyalties for their members that can impact on exit: while  
29 party loyalty may refrain members from exiting the organization, factional loyalty may have  
30 the exact opposite effect.  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48

### 49 **A conceptual framework and its applicability**

50 Hirschman’s framework and its subsequent amendments form the basis of the analytical  
51 framework we suggest further on. This is meant to provide a common framework for the  
52 study of IPC as a dynamic phenomenon, its causes and consequences and cuts across the  
53 three faces of the party. Figure 3 proposes a typology that seeks to systematize the  
54  
55  
56  
57

---

58  
59 <sup>5</sup> Party loyalty can affect dissatisfaction: more loyal grassroots members would feel more satisfied than less  
60 loyal members (Amjahad 2011).

1  
2  
3 understanding of the concept, clarify the research design, and will allow identifying the  
4 appropriate methodological tools to measure the different types of IPC. It accounts for two  
5 dimensions: the responses that are mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive within the  
6 party and the existence of several layers where such responses occur. The responses  
7 included in the typology are in the form of Hirschman's framework available at three layers  
8 that transcend the faces of the party: micro (individual), meso (party groups or units) and  
9 macro (party level). Since the typology focuses on IPC, the macro level is the political party  
10 and it differs from the meso level in the sense that the latter deals with various groups of  
11 members in the party. The typology is a parsimonious analytical tool that distinguishes  
12 between IPC as attitudinal and behavioural understandings of IPC (a common problem of  
13 many studies), as a static or dynamic process and the faces of the party where effects can be  
14 observed. The typology also combines descriptive and analytical issues, and the means  
15 through which IPC can be reached either through voluntary or compulsory pathways (e.g.  
16 socialisation versus disciplinary incentives) and bottom-up or top-down processes (e.g.  
17 discipline imposed to grassroots from the central office; or grassroots pushing the party  
18 leaders or parliamentary caucus to act cohesively).

### Figure 3 about here

32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38 The cells of the typology are populated with illustrative cases of IPC to provide an indication  
39 about its broad applicability. To start with the micro level, party switching is one of the most  
40 common form and it is measured at the level of the party in the public office (MP defection),  
41 within the party in central office (party elite departures) or at the level of the party on the  
42 ground (membership loss). All these are instances of exit in which party members at all  
43 levels leave as a reaction to various decisions within their party (i.e. ideological, socio-  
44 psychological etc.). At the same time, the decision to defect may be caused by poor  
45 organization of the party or by strategic incentives such as seeking for re-election under the  
46 label of a party that is doing better in the polls (Gherghina 2016). Examples of voice include  
47 all those instances in which (dis)agreement (or sometimes dissatisfaction) between  
48 members and their party is calculated at the individual level. Two such instances are the  
49 MPs' distance from the mean or median party position or the MPs' subjective distance  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 (measured as the difference between the MPs' self-positioning and the perceived position of  
4 the party) to their party (Kam 2001).

5  
6  
7 This ideological IPC measured at the level of MPs' attitudes was related to their  
8 actual IPC behaviour. Disagreement can be associated to voice, and may vary in strength and  
9 frequency – with usually a few of the MPs or party members expressing publicly their  
10 disagreement, except in times of party crisis. Survey methods have been used to measure  
11 ideological IPC in the party on the ground and to identify potential 'misfits' (van Haute &  
12 Carty 2012; Kölln & Polk 2016), i.e. members having preferences quite distant from those of  
13 their party or party fellows. In the party in the central office, ideological IPC amongst  
14 activists and officials has been grasped through text analysis of speeches and internal  
15 debates held during party congresses (Ceron 2015a; Greene & Haber 2016). A third  
16 dimension of IPC measured at the individual level is loyalty, which has been used to describe  
17 either a behaviour (legislator toeing the party line) or a social-psychological attitude  
18 affecting (the choice between) voice or exit.<sup>6</sup> Similarly to agreement, party membership  
19 surveys asked members to express a degree of attachment to their party, to the leader of  
20 the party, or to different regional branches of that party (Amjahad 2011; Close 2011; van  
21 Haute 2011). Candidate or MP surveys tend to grasp loyalty as an intended behaviour, with  
22 typical questions asking respondents to state if, in case of disagreement with their party,  
23 they ought to vote along their party line or to follow their own opinion. Legislative voting  
24 data measure actual loyal behaviour.

25  
26  
27 The meso level deals with groups of members and is well illustrated by the literature  
28 examining the structure of opinion within political parties (Norris 1995; Narud & Skare 1999;  
29 Holsteyn et al. 2015). This body of research used attitudinal surveys to assess the degree of  
30 ideological IPC between intra-party groups (leaders, MPs, middle-level elites, activists,  
31 grassroots and voters). As such, this approach sought to identify more or less 'radical' groups  
32 within the party, with potential links with the existence of factions. Collective party  
33 switching refers to situations in which either groups of MPs or territorial branches leave the  
34 party due to various reasons. In terms of collective voice, several methods and tools have

---

35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60  
<sup>6</sup> The concept of loyalty is ambiguous in Hirschman's framework. It is not our aim to decide whether it should be seen as behavioral response to decline in quality, or as a social-psychological attitude affecting the choice between response behaviors. Both approaches are valuable to the understanding of IPC. Scholars should nevertheless acknowledge the distinction and clarify their position depending on their case study and research design.

1  
2  
3 been used to measure ideological IPC at the aggregate parliamentary group level – degree of  
4 party agreement, homogeneity, dispersion (Warwick 2006) or polarization (Van der Eijk  
5 2001) of preferences. Among the ‘means’ used to reach IPC, a good example is the ‘caucus  
6 meeting’ where, when a party is in government, the members of the parliamentary party  
7 and the members of government can meet, express their positions, voice their disagreement  
8 behind closed doors and try to reach consensus on the government’s policies (Thomas 1996;  
9 Wilson 2015). As such, by allowing the expression of voice, these caucuses work as a means  
10 to increase IPC between the two branches of the party in the public office. Along with this  
11 mechanism, other positive or negative incentives can be used to increase the loyalty of  
12 legislators (party discipline). Collective voice in the form of factions has been measured by  
13 analysing the roll-call voting behaviour of institutionalized factions (Spirling & Quinn 2010).  
14 Legislative data have also been used to assess factions’ size and bargaining power (Boucek  
15 2012), which affect their decision to remain loyal or exit the party organization. Outside the  
16 party in public office, some attempts have been made to grasp factions within the party on  
17 the ground and network analysis seems to offer promising tools to understand their voice  
18 and loyalty (Paulis 2017). When presented by institutionalized factions, congress motions  
19 have served to locate factions in an ideological space (Giannetti & Laver 2009; Ceron 2015a).

20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34 Finally, at the macro level, Hirschman’s concepts do well apply. Party splits usually  
35 occur after a group of party elites and members decide to collectively exit the party; often  
36 following a party Congress where these members have voiced their discontent (Ceron  
37 2015b; Salucci 2008). Like other types of IPC, party splits or fissions are part of the life of a  
38 party (Mair 1990), and can give birth to new political actors or result in merges with existing  
39 parties. Often, these cases of splits occur in factionalized parties (Cox & Rosenbluth 1995;  
40 Harmel et al. 1995), that is, in parties where ‘voice’ is collectively organized and sometimes  
41 even institutionalized in the party statutes. Splits and factions may be specific to one face of  
42 the party, but more generally transcend the three faces of the party organization.  
43 Ultimately, a high degree of loyalty to the party organization could prevent these splits, even  
44 in factionalized party, and keep the party united. Party unity can be reached even when the  
45 party includes discontent members and/or various ideological currents, through several  
46 mechanisms (loyalty, discipline, or organisational arrangements that allow and contain  
47 internal voice).

## Conclusions

This paper provided a typology for the understanding of IPC building on an extensive literature review of the concept. The network-based analysis has allowed visualizing the connection between different fields of research that have grasped this concept. The analysis has illustrated that legislative studies dominated the conceptualization with some theoretical and empirical connections with the literature on factionalism beyond the parliamentary arena. Some connections have been found with Hirschman's framework of exit, voice and loyalty, but the framework has been only modestly applied to the study of IPC. This is somewhat surprising since the Hirschman's framework provides conceptual tools that could easily fit within the study of IPC, especially when conceived as a multidimensional and dynamic process.

The typology combined these bodies of literature to capture different dimensions and aspects encompassed in the concept of IPC. It may provide some guidance to researchers dealing with IPC and bears several important implications. At theoretical level, the types indicate the necessity to draw attention to what occurs within each face of the party organization, beyond the legislative arena, but also between these faces. The party in central office and party on the ground are crucial arenas for participation and decision-making processes that affect the broader democratic and representative process. At methodological level, this conceptualization makes measurement easier, enhances the comparative study of IPC, and helps developing empirical tools to grasp its dynamism. The application of this typology makes the study of IPC and of its multiple dimensions more systematic, increasing its comparability across various settings. At empirical level, with this typology one could, for example, question and examine the (causal) relationship between several dimensions of IPC in and between the different faces of the party, their common or diverging causes, and their potential consequences for the party organization and its ability to perform its democratic functions.

**List of references:**

- Amjahad, A., 2011. Adhérents « acquis » vs. Adhérents « conquis ». Analyse de la « déviance » au sein du parti socialiste en Belgique. In *ST11. Etre partisan. Loyauté, prise de parole et défection dans les partis politiques*. Bruxelles.
- Andeweg, R.B. & Thomassen, J., 2011. Pathways to party unity: Sanctions, loyalty, homogeneity and division of labour in the Dutch parliament. *Party Politics*, 17(5), pp.655–672.
- Attiná, F., 1990. The voting behaviour of the European Parliament members and the problem of the Europarties. *European Journal of Political Research*, 18(5), pp.557–579.
- Barry, B., 1974. Review Article: 'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.' *British Journal of Political Science*, 4(01), pp.79–107.
- Bartolini, S., 2005. *Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Belloni, F.P. & Beller, D.C. eds., 1978. *Faction politics : political parties and factionalism in comparative perspective*, Santa Barbara, Californie: ABC-Clio.
- Bettcher, K.E., 2005. Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy The Organizational and Motivational Dimensions of Factionalism. *Party Politics*, 11(3), pp.339–358.
- Boucek, F., 2012. *Factional Politics: How Dominant Parties Implode or Stabilize*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Boucek, F., 2009. Rethinking Factionalism Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics and Three Faces of Factionalism. *Party Politics*, 15(4), pp.455–485.
- Cain, B., Ferejohn, J. & Fiorina, M., 1987. *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cannings, K., 1992. The voice of the loyal manager: Distinguishing attachment from commitment. *Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal*, 5(3), pp.261–272.
- Carey, J., 2009. *Legislative Voting and Accountability*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carey, J.M., 2007. Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1), pp.92–107.
- Carey, J.M. & Shugart, M.S., 1995. Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas. *Electoral Studies*, 14(4), pp.417–439.

- 1  
2  
3 Ceron, A., 2012. Bounded oligarchy: How and when factions constrain leaders in party  
4 position-taking. *Electoral Studies*, 31(4), pp.689–701.
- 5  
6  
7 Ceron, A., 2015a. Brave rebels stay home Assessing the effect of intra-party ideological  
8 heterogeneity and party whip on roll-call votes. *Party Politics*, 21(2), pp.246–258.
- 9  
10 Ceron, A., 2015b. The Politics of Fission: An Analysis of Faction Breakaways among Italian  
11 Parties (1946–2011). *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(1), pp.121–139.
- 12  
13  
14 Clark, W.R., Golder, M. & Golder, S.N., 2017. An Exit, Voice and Loyalty Model of Politics.  
15 *British Journal of Political Science*, online fir.
- 16  
17  
18 Close, C., 2011. Le factionnalisme partisan : imbrication ou concurrence des loyautés ? In  
19 *ST11. Etre partisan. Loyauté, prise de parole et défection dans les partis politiques*.  
20 Bruxelles, Université libre de Bruxelles, pp. 1–30.
- 21  
22  
23 Close, C. & Núñez, L., 2017. Preferences and agreement in legislative parties: testing the  
24 causal chain. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*.
- 25  
26  
27 Cox, G.W., 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in Worlds Electoral Systems*,  
28 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 29  
30  
31 Cox, G.W. & Rosenbluth, F., 1995. Anatomy of a split: The Liberal Democrats of Japan.  
32 *Electoral Studies*, 14(4), pp.355–376.
- 33  
34  
35 Desposato, S.W., 2006. Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil's  
36 Chamber of Deputies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(1), pp.62–80.
- 37  
38  
39 DiSalvo, D., 2012. *Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868-2010*, New  
40 York: Oxford University Press.
- 41  
42  
43 Dowding, K. et al., 2000. Exit, voice and loyalty: Analytic and empirical developments.  
44 *European Journal of Political Research*, 37(4), pp.469–495.
- 45  
46  
47 Downs, A., 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, New York: Harper & Row.
- 48  
49  
50 Duverger, M., 1954. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*,  
51 London: Lowe and Brydone.
- 52  
53  
54 van Eck, N.J. & Waltman, L., 2014. Visualizing Bibliometric Networks. In Y. Ding, R. Rousseau,  
55 & D. Wolfram, eds. *Measuring Scholarly Impact. Methods and Practice*. Springer  
56 Switzerland, pp. 285–320.
- 57  
58  
59 Van der Eijk, C., 2001. Measuring Agreement in Ordered Rating Scales. *Quality and Quantity*,  
35(3), pp.325–341.
- 60  
Eubank, W.L., Gangopadahay, A. & Weinberg, L.B., 1996. Italian Communism in Crisis A Study

- 1  
2  
3 in Exit, Voice and Loyalty. *Party Politics*, 2(1), pp.55–75.  
4  
5 Fenno, R.F., 1978. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*, Longman.  
6  
7 Gallagher, M. & Marsh, M. eds., 1988. *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The*  
8 *Secret Garden of Politics*, London: Sage Publications.  
9  
10 Garner, C. & Letki, N., 2005. Party Structure and Backbench Dissent in the Canadian and  
11 British Parliaments. *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science*  
12 *politique*, 38(2), pp.463–482.  
13  
14 Gherghina, S., 2014. *Party Organization and Electoral Volatility in Central and Eastern*  
15 *Europe: Enhancing Voter Loyalty*, London: Routledge.  
16  
17 Gherghina, S., 2016. Rewarding the “traitors”? Legislative defection and re-election in  
18 Romania. *Party Politics*, 22(4), pp.490–500.  
19  
20 Giannetti, D. & Benoit, K. eds., 2008. *Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments*, London:  
21 Routledge.  
22  
23 Giannetti, D. & Laver, M., 2009. Party Cohesion, Party Discipline and Party Faction in Italy. In  
24 D. Giannetti & K. Benoit, eds. *Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments*. Taylor and  
25 Francis, pp. 146–168.  
26  
27 Greene, Z. & Haber, M., 2016. Leadership Competition and Disagreement at Party National  
28 Congresses. *British Journal of Political Science*, 46(03), pp.611–632.  
29  
30 Harmel, R. et al., 1995. Performance, leadership, factions and party change: An empirical  
31 analysis. *West European Politics*, 18(1), pp.1–33.  
32  
33 van Haute, E., 2015. Joining isn’t Everything: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Party Organizations.  
34 In R. Johnston & C. Sharman, eds. *Parties and Party Systems. Structure and Context*.  
35 Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, pp. 184–201.  
36  
37 van Haute, E. ed., 2011. *Party Membership in Europe: Exploration into the anthills of party*  
38 *politics*, Bruxelles: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles.  
39  
40 van Haute, E. & Carty, R.K., 2012. Ideological misfits A distinctive class of party members.  
41 *Party Politics*, 18(6), pp.885–895.  
42  
43 Hazan, R.Y., 2003. Does Cohesion Equal Discipline? Towards a Conceptual Delineation. *The*  
44 *Journal of Legislative Studies*, 9(4), pp.1–11.  
45  
46 Heller, W.B. & Mershon, C., 2008. Dealing in Discipline: Party Switching and Legislative  
47 Voting in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2000. *American Journal of Political*  
48 *Science*, 52(4), pp.910–925.  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Heller, W.B. & Mershon, C., 2009. Introduction: Legislative Party Switching, Parties and Party  
4 Systems. In W. B. Heller & C. Mershon, eds. *Political Parties and Party Switching*. New  
5 York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 3–28.  
6  
7  
8 Hine, D., 1982. Factionalism in West European parties: A framework for analysis. *West*  
9 *European Politics*, 5(1), pp.36–53.  
10  
11  
12 Hirschman, A.O., 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations,*  
13 *and States*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
14  
15  
16 Holsteyn, J.J. Van, Ridder, J.M. Den & Koole, R.A., 2015. From May's Laws to May's legacy On  
17 the opinion structure within political parties. *Party Politics*, p.1354068815603242.  
18  
19  
20 Huber, J.D., 1996. The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies. *The American*  
21 *Political Science Review*, 90(2), pp.269–282.  
22  
23  
24 Janda, K., 1993. Comparative Political Parties: Research and Theory. In A. Finifter, ed.  
25 *Political Science: The State of the Discipline II*. Washington, D.C.: American Political  
26 Science Association, pp. 163–191.  
27  
28  
29 John, P. & Dowding, K., 2016. Spanning Exit and Voice: Albert Hirschman's Contribution to  
30 Political Science. In L. Fiorito, S. Scheall, & C. E. Suprinyak, eds. *Research in the History*  
31 *of Economic Thought and Methodology, Volume 34B*. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing  
32 Limited, pp. 175–196.  
33  
34  
35  
36 Kam, C.J., 2001. Do Ideological Preferences Explain Parliamentary Behaviour? Evidence from  
37 Great Britain and Canada. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 7(4), pp.89–126.  
38  
39  
40 Kam, C.J., 2009. *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge  
41 University Press.  
42  
43  
44 Kato, J., 1998. When the Party Breaks Up: Exit and Voice among Japanese Legislators. *The*  
45 *American Political Science Review*, 92(4), pp.857–870.  
46  
47  
48 Kemp, J., 2002. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Behaviour of Dissatisfied Labour Party Members*.  
49 Nuffield college: University of Oxford.  
50  
51  
52 Key, V.O., 1949. *Southern politics in State and Nation*, New York: A.A. Knopf.  
53  
54  
55 Kohno, M., 1992. Rational Foundations for the Organization of the Liberal Democratic Party  
56 in Japan. *World Politics*, 44(03), pp.369–397.  
57  
58  
59 Kölln, A.-K. & Polk, J., 2016. Emancipated party members Examining ideological  
60 incongruence within political parties. *Party Politics*, p.1354068816655566.

Langston, J., 2002. Breaking Out Is Hard to Do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico's One-Party

- 1  
2  
3 Hegemonic Regime. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 44(3), pp.61–88.  
4  
5 Laver, M. & Schofield, N., 1990. *Multiparty Government. The Politics of Coalition in Europe*,  
6  
7 Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
8  
9 Laver, M. & Shepsle, K.A., 1996. *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and*  
10  
11 *Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*, New York: Cambridge University Press.  
12  
13 Mainwaring, S. & Perez-Linan, A., 1997. Party Discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional  
14  
15 Congress. *Lua Nova Revista de Cultura e Política*, 22(44), pp.107–136.  
16  
17 Mair, P., 1990. The Electoral Payoffs of Fission and Fusion. *British Journal of Political Science*,  
18  
19 20(1), pp.131–142.  
20  
21 Mayhew, D.R., 1974. *The Electoral Connection*, New Haven: Yale University Press.  
22  
23 McAllister, I., 1991. Party Adaptation and Factionalism within the Australian Party System.  
24  
25 *American Journal of Political Science*, 35(1), pp.206–227.  
26  
27 Narud, H.M. & Skare, A., 1999. Are Party Activists the Party Extremists? The Structure of  
28  
29 Opinion in Political Parties. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 22(1), pp.45–65.  
30  
31 Norris, P., 1995. May's Law of Curvilinear Disparity Revisited Leaders, Officers, Members and  
32  
33 Voters in British Political Parties. *Party Politics*, 1(1), pp.29–47.  
34  
35 O'Brien, D.Z. & Shomer, Y., 2013. A Cross-National Analysis of Party Switching. *Legislative*  
36  
37 *Studies Quarterly*, 38(1), pp.111–141.  
38  
39 Olson, D.M., 2003. Cohesion and Discipline Revisited: Contingent Unity in the Parliamentary  
40  
41 Party Group. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 9(4), pp.164–178.  
42  
43 Özbudun, E., 1970. *Party Cohesion in Western Democracies: A Causal Analysis*, Sage  
44  
45 Publications.  
46  
47 Panebianco, A., 1988. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge  
48  
49 University Press.  
50  
51 Paulis, E., 2017. Exploring Party Cohesion among the Party on the Ground: The Impact of  
52  
53 Party Activists' Social Networks on the Cohesion of their Local Party Branch. In  
54  
55 *Rethinking Intra-Party Cohesion in Times of Party Transformation*. Nottingham.  
56  
57 Pedersen, H.H. & Kaldahl Nielsen, M., 2017. Party Switching: The Ultimate Lack of Cohesion  
58  
59 within Party in Public Office. In *Rethinking Intra-Party Cohesion in Times of Party*  
60  
61 *Transformation*.
- Raymond, C.D. & Overby, L.M., 2014. What's in a (Party) name? Examining preferences,  
discipline, and social identity in a parliamentary free vote. *Party Politics*, Online Fir,

1  
2  
3 pp.1–12.  
4

5 Raymond, C.D. & Worth, R.M., 2016. Explaining voting behaviour on free votes: Solely a  
6 matter of preference? *British Politics*, pp.1–10.  
7

8 Rice, S.A., 1928. *Quantitative Methods in Politics*, A.A. Knopf.  
9

10 Rice, S.A., 1925. The Behavior of Legislative Groups: A Method of Measurement. *Political*  
11 *Science Quarterly*, 40(1), pp.60–72.  
12

13 Riker, W.H., 1962. *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, New Haven: Yale University Press.  
14

15 Rose, R., 1964. Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain. *Political Studies*, 12(1), pp.33–46.  
16

17 Salucci, L., 2008. Left no more: Exit, Voice and Loyalty in the Dissolution of a Party. In Boston.  
18

19 Sartori, G., 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, Cambridge:  
20 Cambridge University Press.  
21

22 Saunders, D.M. et al., 1992. Employee voice to supervisors. *Employee Responsibilities and*  
23 *Rights Journal*, 5(3), pp.241–259.  
24

25 Spirling, A. & Quinn, K., 2010. Identifying Intraparty Voting Blocs in the U.K. House of  
26 Commons. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 105(490), pp.447–457.  
27

28 Stern, A.J., Tarrow, S. & Williams, M.F., 1971. Factions and Opinion Groups in European Mass  
29 Parties: Some Evidence from a Study of Italian Socialist Activists. *Comparative Politics*,  
30 3(4), pp.529–559.  
31

32 Strøm, K., 1990. A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties. *American Journal of*  
33 *Political Science*, 34(2), pp.565–598.  
34

35 Thomas, P.G., 1996. Parties in parliament: The role of party caucuses. In B. Tanguay & A. G.  
36 Gagnon, eds. *Canadian Parties in Transition*. Toronto: Nelson Canada, pp. 252–279.  
37


38 van Vonno, C.M.C. et al., 2014. Agreement, Loyalty and Discipline: A Sequential Approach to  
39 Party Unity. In K. Deschouwer & S. Depauw, eds. *Representing the people. A survey*  
40 *among members of statewide and substate parliaments*. Oxford: Oxford University  
41 Press, pp. 110–136.  
42

43 Warwick, P. V., 2006. *Policy Horizons and Parliamentary Government*, Palgrave Macmillan.  
44

45 Wilson, R.P., 2015. Minister's Caucus Advisory Committees under the Harper government.  
46 *Canadian Public Administration*, 58(2), pp.227–248.  
47

48 Zariski, R., 1960. Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations.  
49 *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 4(1), pp.27–51.  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

Figure 1: CitNetExplorer visualization of citation network.



Note: 70 most cited publications with direct citation links (N = 533 publications and 3,196 citation links). Resolution parameter set at 1.00<sup>7</sup>, with minimum cluster size at 10.

<sup>7</sup> This relatively low resolution parameter allows to identify ‘a small number of clusters, with each cluster including a relatively large number of publications’ (Šubelj et al. 2016, p.13).



Figure 3: A Typology of IPC

		LEVEL OF OCCURRENCE / EFFECTS		
		Micro	Meso	Macro
REACTION	Exit	Party switching	Collective party switching	Splits
	Voice	Individual voice Voice during Congress	Collective voice (caucuses)	Factionalism
	Loyalty	Legislators' compliance Members' loyalty	PPO discipline Branch loyalty	Party unity

For Peer Review

**Table 1: Characteristics of the clusters identified in Figure 1**

	<b>Colour of cluster</b>	<b>Number of publications</b>	<b>Number of citation links</b>
<b>Group 1</b>	Purple	92	414
<b>Group 2</b>	Blue	200	1,277
<b>Group 3</b>	Green	125	505
<b>Group 4</b>	Orange	37	67
<b>(Group 5)</b>	Unclassified	79	20
<b>Total</b>		533	2,677

For Peer Review