sional indicates in what way the new rhetoric is opposed to the tradition of modern, purely literary rhetoric, which reduces rhetoric to a purely verbal art of expression, whether literary or oral. Rhetoric, for the proponents of the new rhetoric, is a practical discipline that aims not at producing a work of art but at exerting through speech a persuasive action on an audience.

NATURE OF THE NEW RHETORIC

The new rhetoric is defined as a theory of argumentation that has as its object the study of discursive techniques and that aims to provoke or to increase the adherence of men's minds to the theses that are presented for their assent. It also examines the conditions that allow argumentation to begin and to be developed, as well as the effects produced by this development. This definition indicates in what way the new rhetoric is opposed to the old rhetoric, which is limited to the technique of demonstration, or induction; it would add the technique of argumentation. The discourse may be addressed to highly qualified audiences, such as the members of an academy or some learned society. A new rhetoric, in which the speaker presupposes that the audience accepts a thesis that actually is contested by them, even implicitly.

Taken in a broad sense, the new rhetoric can treat the most varied questions and be addressed to the most diverse audiences. The discourse may address only the individual deliberating within himself or it may involve another person in a dialogue. The discourse may be addressed to various particular audiences or to the whole of mankind—to what may be called the universal audience—in which case the orator appeals directly to reason.

Classical rhetoric was traditionalized in the form of explications of the users, a pattern of reasoning and communication that would guide men in their private lives. The alternative offered by the new rhetoric would furnish a complementary tool to traditional logic, which is limited to the technique of demonstration, or necessary proof according to the rules of deduction and induction; it would add the technique of argumentation. This would allow men not only to verify thoroughly their beliefs but also to justify their decisions and their choices. Thus, the new rhetoric, elaborating a logic for judgments of value, is indispensable for the analysis of practical reasoning.

SYSTEMATIC PRESENTATION OF THE NEW RHETORIC

Personal relations with the audience. Argumentation, whether it be called rhetorical or dialectical, always aims at persuading or convincing the audience to whom it is addressed. The new rhetoric, on the other hand, aims at influencing a particular audience at a particular time and place, even if the only audience is the speaker or writer himself; any utterance may be interpreted rhetorically by being studied in terms of its situation—within its original milieu or even within its relationship to any reader or hearer—as if it were an argument. (T.O.S.)

Rhetoric in philosophy: the new rhetoric

There is nothing of philosophical interest in a rhetoric that is understood as an art of expression, whether literary or verbal. Rhetoric in philosophy—and in the new rhetoric, in particular—is a practical discipline that aims to build his argumentative discourse on the theses for which it seeks evidence. Argumentation must seek to build his argumentative discourse on the theses for which it seeks evidence. Argumentation, it cannot be conceived in an impersonal manner. On the contrary, it is essential that it be adapted to the audience if it is to have any effectiveness. Consequently, the orator—the person who presents an argument either by speech or in writing to an audience of listeners or readers—must seek to build his argumentative discourse on the theses already accepted by his audience. The principal fallacy in argumentation is the petitio principii ("begging of the question"), in which the speaker presupposes that the audience accepts a thesis that actually is contested by them, even implicitly.

If the discourse is addressed to a nonspecialized audience, its appeal will be to common sense and common principles, common values; yet it may call for "the kind of writing that would guide men in their private lives. The alternative offered by the new rhetoric would furnish a complementary tool to traditional logic, which is limited to the technique of demonstration, or necessary proof according to the rules of deduction and induction; it would add the technique of argumentation. This would allow men not only to verify thoroughly their beliefs but also to justify their decisions and their choices. Thus, the new rhetoric, elaborating a logic for judgments of value, is indispensable for the analysis of practical reasoning.

Adaptation to the audience

Basis of agreement and types of argumentation. The orator, in order to succeed in his undertaking, must start from theses accepted by his audience and eventually reinforce this adherence by techniques of presentation that render the facts and values on which his argument rests present to the listener. Thus, the orator can have recourse to literary devices, using figures of rhetoric and other techniques of style and composition that are well-known to writers.
an agreement about common values must be accompanied by an attempt to interpret and define them, so that the orator can direct the agreement to make it tally with his purposes. If the discourse is addressed to a specialized group—such as a group of philosophers or jurists or theologians—the basis of agreement will be more specific.

To pass from the premises accepted by the audience to the conclusions he wishes to establish, the orator can use arguments of various types of association and dissociation. A detailed analysis of such arguments would require a whole treatise; the best known, however, are arguments by example, by analogy, by the consequences, a pari (arguments from dissimilar propositions), fortiori (argument from an accepted conclusion to an even more evident one), a contrario (argument from an accepted conclusion to the rejection of its contrary), and the argument of authority. The traditional figures of rhetoric are usually only abridged arguments, as, for instance, a metaphor is an abbreviated analogy.

Associative arguments transfer the adherence from the premises to the conclusion; for example, the act-person association enables one to pass from the fact that an act is courageous to the conclusion that the agent is a courageous person. Argumentation leads to the dissociation of concepts if appearance is opposed to reality. Normally, reality is perceived through appearances that are taken as significant; Whence, however, an argument can lead to error regarding the real. Because the status of appearance is equivocal, one is forced to distinguish between those appearances that correspond with reality and those that are only illusory. The distinction will depend on a conception of reality that can serve as a criterion for judging appearances. Whatever is conformable to this conception of the real will be given value; whatever is opposed to it will be denied value.

Every concept can be subjected to a similar dissociation of appearance and reality. Real justice, democracy, and happiness. The former, being in conformity with the criteria of what justice, democracy, and happiness really are, will keep the value normally attached to these notions. The appearance—that is taken for real by common sense, or by the expert opinion or by the authority—cannot be depreciated because it does not correspond to what actually deserves the name of justice, democracy, or happiness. By means of this technique of dissociating concepts, philosophers can direct the listener’s action toward what they hold to be true values and can reject those values that are only apparent. Every ontology, or theory about the nature of being, makes use of this philosophical process that gives value to certain aspects of reality and denies it to others according to dissociations that it justifies by developing a particular conception of reality.

Scope and organization of argumentation. A discourse that seeks to persuade or convince is not made up of an accumulation of disorderly arguments, indefinite in number; on the contrary, it requires an organization of selected arguments presented in the order that will give them the greatest force. After its analysis of the various types of arguments, the new rhetoric naturally deals with the study of the art of raising by the scope of the argumentation, the choice of the arguments, and their order in the discourse.

Although formal demonstrative proof is most admired when it is simple and brief, it would seem theoretically that there would be no limit to the number of arguments that could be usefully accumulated; in fact, because argumentation is concerned not with the transfer from the truth of premises to a conclusion but with the reinforcement of the adherence to a thesis, it would appear to be effective to add more and more arguments and to enlarge the audience. Because the argumentation that has persuaded some may fail to have any effect on others, it would appear to be necessary to continue the search for arguments better adapted to the enlarged audience or to the fraction of the audience that has been hitherto ignored.

In practice, however, different reasons point to the need to set bounds to the scope of an argumentative discourse. First, there are limits to the capacity and the will of the audience to pay attention. It is not enough for an orator to speak or write; he must be listened to or read. Few people are prepared to listen to or read a book of 1,000 pages. Either the subject must be of such a nature that the trouble or the hearer must feel some obligation to the subject or orator. Normally, when a custom or an obligation exists, it binds not the hearer but the orator, setting limits to the space or time allotted to the presentation of a thesis. Second, it is considered impolite for an orator to draw out a speech beyond the normally allotted time. Third, by the mere fact that he occupies the platform, an orator prevents other people from expressing their point of view. Consequently, in almost all circumstances in which argumentation can be developed, there are limits that are not to be overstepped.

It thus becomes necessary to make a choice between the available arguments, taking into account the following considerations: first, arguments do not have equal strength nor do they act in the same manner on an audience. They must be considered relevant for the thesis the speaker upholds and must provide valuable support for it. It is essential that they do not—instead of reinforcing the adhesion—call into question the premises that the orator doubts that would not have occurred to the audience had they not been mentioned. Thus, proofs of the existence of God have shaken believers who would never have thought of questioning their faith had such proofs not been submitted to them. Second, there is constant interaction between the orator and his discourse; thus, the speaker’s prestige intensifies the effect of his discourse, but, inversely, if his arguments are weak, the audience’s opinion of his intelligence, competence, or sincerity is influenced. Therefore, it is best to avoid using weak arguments; they may induce the belief that the speaker has no better arguments to support his thesis. Third, certain arguments, especially in the case of a mixed audience whose beliefs and aspirations are greatly varied, may be persuasive for only one part of an audience. Therefore, arguments should be chosen that will not be opposed to the beliefs and aspirations of some part of the audience.

Thus, by stressing the revolutionary effect of a measure, for example, one stifles the opposition to that measure on the part of those who wish to prevent the revolution, but one draws the measure to the favour of those who wait for the revolution to break out. For this reason arguments must be directed toward the people that those who have more limited appeal; they are capable of convincing all the members of what could be called the universal audience, which is composed of all normally reasonable and competent men. An argumentation that aims at convincing a universal audience is considered philosophically superior to one that aims only at persuading a particular audience without bothering about the effect it might have on another audience in some other context or circumstances.

Further, for a discourse to be persuasive, the arguments presented must be organized in a particular order. If they are not, they lose their effectiveness, because an argument that is neither strong nor weak and an absolute serial order for every audience but one in relation to a particular audience that is prepared to accept it or not. In the first place, the orator must have a certain amount of prestige, and the problem in question must raise some interest. Should the orator be a small child, a man of ill-repute, or supposed to be hostile to the audience, or should the question be devoid of interest for the audience, there is little chance that the orator will be allowed to speak or that he will be listened to. Thus, an orator is normally introduced by someone who has the public ear, and the orator then uses the orator's, or beginning part of his discourse, not to speak about his subject but to gain the audience’s sympathy.

Effective arguments can modify the opinions or the dispositions of an audience. An argument that is weak be-
cause it is ill-adapted to the audience can become strong and effective when the audience has been modified by a previous intervention. Similarly, an argument that is ineffective because it is not understood can become relevant once the audience is better informed. Research into the effectiveness of discourse can determine the order in which arguments should be presented. The best order, however, will often be whatever is expected, whether it be a chronological order, a conventional order, or the order followed by an opponent whose argumentation has to be refuted point by point.

In all these considerations—concerning the techniques of presentation and argumentation and the arrangement of a discourse—form is subordinated to content, to the action on the mind, to the effort to persuade and to convince. Consequently, the new rhetoric is not part of literature; it is concerned with the effective use of information in all fields.

It has been seen that common principles and notions and common loci play a part in all nonspecialized discourses. When the matter that is debated belongs to a specialized field, the discussion will normally be limited to the issues stated—i.e., those who, because of their more or less extensive training, have become familiar with the theses and methods that are currently accepted and regarded as valid in the field in question. In such instances, the basis of the argumentation will be limited to common loci but to specific loci. The introduction in some field of a new thesis or new methods is always accompanied by criticism of the theses or methods that are being replaced; thus, criticism must be convincing to the specialists if the new thesis or method is to be accepted. Similarly, the rejection of a precedent in law has to be justified by argumentation giving sufficient reasons for not applying the precedent to the case in question.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW RHETORIC

The new rhetoric introduces a fundamental change in the philosophical outlook. Insofar as it aims at directing and guiding human action in all of the fields in which value judgments occur, philosophy is no longer conceived as that which is self-evident, necessary, universal and eternally valid principles but, rather, as the structuring of common principles, values, and loci, accepted by what the philosopher sees as the universal audience. The way the philosopher sees this universal audience, which is the inconstant audience of reason, depends on his situation in his cultural environment. The facts a philosopher recognizes, the values he accepts, and the problems he attends to are not self-evident; they cannot be determined a priori. The dialectical interaction between an orator and his audience is implied; it is the audience on the philosopher who wishes to influence his audience. Therefore, each philosopher reflects his own time and the social and cultural conditions in which it is developed. This is the fundamental truth: in the thought of G.W.F. Hegel, a German Idealist; the history of philosophy is not regarded as an abstract and timeless dialectic that proceeds in a predetermined direction but as an argumentation that aims at universality at a concrete moment in history.

To the extent that the new rhetoric views all informal discourse and all philosophical discourse from the viewpoint of its action on the minds of the hearers, it integrates into the analysis of thought valuable elements from both Pragmatism and Existentialism. In stressing the effects of discourse it allows Analytical philosophy to be given the dynamic dimension that some scholars believe it has heretofore lacked. The new rhetoric can thus contribute to the development of a theory of knowledge and to a better understanding of the history of philosophy.


Rhine River

Culturally and historically one of the great rivers of Europe and the greatest European artery of waterborne traffic, the Rhine River flows 804 miles (1,296 kilometers) from east central Switzerland north and west to the North Sea, into which it drains through The Netherlands. An international waterway since the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, it is navigable overall for some 500 miles, as far as Lake Constance (Bodensee) in Switzerland, and, below Basel, the river forms the boundary between the German Federal Republic and France, as far downstream as Bonn. It then flows through German territory as far as Emmerich, below which its many-branched delta section epitomizes the landscapes characteristic of the Netherlands. The Alpine Rhine reaches its maximum flow in the spring and early summer, when its volume is swollen dramatically by snowmelt among the great peaks that the river has also been enshrined in the literature of its lands, especially of Germany, as in the famous epic Nibelungenlied. In the second half of the 20th century, its importance as a trade route has increased, and political discussion about its role has given way to concern for ecological safeguards in the face of rising pollution levels. The Alpine section of the Rhine lies in Switzerland, and, below Basel, the river forms the boundary between the German Federal Republic and France, as far downstream as the Lauter River. It then flows through German territory as far as Emmerich, below which its many-branched delta section epitomizes the landscapes characteristic of the Netherlands. The Alpine Rhine reaches its maximum flow in the spring and early summer, when its volume is swollen dramatically by snowmelt among the great peaks of the Alps. In this section, the beautiful Lake Constance acts as a filter, and the river emerges as a clear, translucent stream on its far side; the lake also helps to regulate river flow. The hydrological regime (highwater and lowwater) of the navigable Rhine is favored by the well-distributed seasonal precipitation, with a winter maximum in the lower reaches balancing a summer maximum in the Alps. Winiers are generally mild, and ice impedes navigation only in abnormally cold years. The scenic attractions of the German Rhine are marred by occasional industrial zones, with associated problems of pollution from industrial waste, but stretches of the river still present breathtaking vistas and attract tourists from near and far. For related information, see ECONOMY, supra, and also the articles on the states bordering the Rhine. The river also flows through the following countries: AUSTRIA; BAVARIA; BENELUX; BONN; CORK; DUISBURG; GELRED; GERMANY; HAMBURG; HAMBURG; HOENGSTADT; LUXEMBOURG; MUNCHEN; NICES; NUREMBERG; OBO; RUBENS; SCHAUMBURG; SCHAUMBURG; STE-CUCE; SWITZERLAND; THE NETHERLANDS; URBACH; VEREINIGTEN; VIENNA; WORMS; ZURICH.