

The New
**Encyclopædia
Britannica**

in 30 Volumes

MACROPÆDIA
Volume 15

Knowledge in Depth



FOUNDED 1768
15TH EDITION



Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
William Benton, Publisher, 1943-1973
Helen Hemingway Benton, Publisher

Chicago/London/Toronto/Geneva/Sydney/Tokyo/Manila/Seoul/Johannesburg



108
P 414
60196

scholar realizes the extent to which Western culture has become secularized and compartmentalized. In Western culture one may seek out a body of writing under such special rubrics as "rhetoric," "religion," "ethics." But in some Oriental or Middle Eastern cultures, the search may begin and end with religious thought and practices. The Talmudic rabbis, with their disputatious hermeneutics and their attitudes toward Oral Law, gave centuries of Jews a pattern of reasoning and communication. No less so did the *Tao-te-Ching*—the basic text of the Chinese religious system of Taoism—shape a mentality that is as inherent in certain Chinese poetry as in the oratory, dance, painting, architecture, and government of that ancient culture. And for all the Western studies one might encourage into the haiku, surely only one thoroughly grounded in the mysterious doctrines of Zen Buddhism can fully understand how that imagistic poetry itself "works." Moreover, as rhetorical doctrine, the form and function of the "sayings" of a modern, secular Oriental revolutionary may not be so far distant from the form and function of the ancient analects of the sage Confucius. Though rhetoric is to be found in every use of language, only Western man has attempted to divide its precepts discretely from the great body of ethical, moral, or religious precepts that condition the very nature of his culture.

In sum, the basic rhetorical perspective is simply this: all utterance, except perhaps the mathematical formula, is aimed at influencing a particular audience at a particular time and place, even if the only audience is the speaker or writer himself; any utterance may be interpreted rhetorically by being studied in terms of its situation—within its original milieu or even within its relationship to any reader or hearer—as if it were an argument. (T.O.S.)

Rhetoric in philosophy: the new rhetoric

There is nothing of philosophical interest in a rhetoric that is understood as an art of expression, whether literary or verbal. Rhetoric, for the proponents of the new rhetoric, is a practical discipline that aims not at producing a work of art but at exerting through speech a persuasive action on an audience.

NATURE OF THE NEW RHETORIC

The new rhetoric is defined as a theory of argumentation that has as its object the study of discursive techniques and that aims to provoke or to increase the adherence of men's minds to the theses that are presented for their assent. It also examines the conditions that allow argumentation to begin and to be developed, as well as the effects produced by this development.

This definition indicates in what way the new rhetoric continues classical rhetoric and in what way it differs from it. The new rhetoric continues the rhetoric of Aristotle insofar as it is aimed at all types of hearers. It embraces what the ancients termed dialectics (the technique of discussion and debate by means of questions and answers, dealing especially with matters of opinion), which Aristotle analyzed in his *Topics*; it includes the reasoning that Aristotle qualified as dialectical, which he distinguished from the analytical reasoning of formal logic. This theory of argumentation is termed new rhetoric because Aristotle, although he recognized the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic, developed only the former in terms of the hearers.

It should be noted, moreover, that the new rhetoric is opposed to the tradition of modern, purely literary rhetoric, better called stylistic, which reduces rhetoric to a study of figures of style, because it is not concerned with the forms of discourse for their ornamental or aesthetic value but solely insofar as they are means of persuasion and, more especially, means of creating "presence" (i.e., bringing to the mind of the hearer things that are not immediately present) through the techniques of presentation.

The elaboration of a rhetoric thus conceived has an undeniable philosophical interest because it constitutes a response to the challenge of Logical Empiricism. The Logical Empiricists proclaim the irrationality of all judgments of value—i.e., those judgments that relate to the

ends of men's actions—because such judgments can be grounded neither in experience nor in calculation, neither in deduction nor in induction. But it is not clearly necessary, after discarding the recourse to intuition as an insufficient basis for a judgment of value, to declare all such judgments equally arbitrary. This amounts to considering as futile the hopes of philosophers to elaborate a wisdom that would guide men in their public as well as their private lives. The alternative offered by the new rhetoric would furnish a complementary tool to traditional logic, which is limited to the technique of demonstration, or necessary proof according to the rules of deduction and induction; it would add the technique of argumentation. This would allow men not only to verify and to prove their beliefs but also to justify their decisions and their choices. Thus, the new rhetoric, elaborating a logic for judgments of value, is indispensable for the analysis of practical reasoning.

SYSTEMATIC PRESENTATION OF THE NEW RHETORIC

Personal relations with the audience. Argumentation, whether it be called rhetorical or dialectical, always aims at persuading or convincing the audience to whom it is addressed of the value of the theses for which it seeks assent. Because the purpose of all argumentation is to gain or reinforce the adherence of an audience, it must be prepared with this audience in mind. Unlike demonstration, it cannot be conceived in an impersonal manner. On the contrary, it is essential that it be adapted to the audience if it is to have any effectiveness. Consequently, the orator—the person who presents an argument either by speech or in writing to an audience of listeners or readers—must seek to build his argumentative discourse on theses already accepted by his audience. The principal fallacy in argumentation is the *petitio principii* ("begging of the question"), in which the speaker presupposes that the audience accepts a thesis that actually is contested by them, even implicitly.

Taken in a broad sense, the new rhetoric can treat the most varied questions and be addressed to the most diverse audiences. The audience may involve only the individual deliberating within himself or it may involve another person in a dialogue. The discourse may be addressed to various particular audiences or to the whole of mankind—to what may be called the universal audience—in which case the orator appeals directly to reason.

Classical rhetoric was traditionally addressed to an audience made up of a crowd of generally incompetent hearers gathered in a public place; argumentation, however, can be addressed to highly qualified audiences, such as the members of an academy or some learned society. As a result, effectiveness is not the only means of testing the value of an argument, for this value also depends on the quality and competence of the minds whose adherence is sought. An argument may persuade an audience of less informed persons and remain without effect on a more critical audience. For Plato, the argumentation worthy of a philosopher should convince the gods themselves.

Basis of agreement and types of argumentation. The orator, in order to succeed in his undertaking, must start from theses accepted by his audience and eventually reinforce this adherence by techniques of presentation that render the facts and values on which his argument rests present to the listener. Thus, the orator can have recourse to literary devices, using figures of rhetoric and other techniques of style and composition that are well-known to writers.

If the discourse is addressed to a nonspecialized audience, its appeal will be to common sense and common principles, common values, and common loci, or "places." Agreement about common values is general, but their object is vague and ill-defined. Thus, the appeal to universal values, such as the good and the beautiful, truth and justice, reason and experience, liberty and humanity, will leave no one indifferent, but the consequences to be drawn from these notions will vary with the meaning attached to them by the different individuals. Therefore,

Adaptation
to the
audience

Types of arguments

an agreement about common values must be accompanied by an attempt to interpret and define them, so that the orator can direct the agreement to make it tally with his purposes. If the discourse is addressed to a specialized group—such as a group of philosophers or jurists or theologians—the basis of agreement will be more specific.

To pass from the premises accepted by the audience to the conclusions he wishes to establish, the orator can use arguments of various types of association and dissociation. A detailed analysis of such arguments would require a whole treatise; the best known, however, are arguments by example, by analogy, by the consequences, a *pari* (arguing from similar propositions), a *fortiori* (arguing from an accepted conclusion to an even more evident one), a *contrario* (arguing from an accepted conclusion to the rejection of its contrary), and the argument of authority. The traditional figures of rhetoric are usually only abridged arguments, as, for instance, a metaphor is an abbreviated analogy.

Associative arguments transfer the adherence from the premises to the conclusion; for example, the act-person association enables one to pass from the fact that an act is courageous to the consequence that the agent is a courageous person. Argumentation leads to the dissociation of concepts if appearance is opposed to reality. Normally, reality is perceived through appearances that are taken as signs referring to it. When, however, appearances are incompatible—an oar in water looks broken but feels straight to the touch—it must be admitted, if one is to have a coherent picture of reality, that some appearances are illusory and may lead to error regarding the real. Because the status of appearance is equivocal, one is forced to distinguish between those appearances that correspond with reality and those that are only illusory. The distinction will depend on a conception of reality that can serve as a criterion for judging appearances. Whatever is conformable to this conception of the real will be given value; whatever is opposed to it will be denied value.

Every concept can be subjected to a similar dissociation of appearance and reality. Real justice, democracy, and happiness can be opposed to apparent justice, democracy, and happiness. The former, being in conformity with the criteria of what justice, democracy, and happiness really are, will keep the value normally attached to these notions. The apparent—what is taken for real by common sense or unenlightened opinion—will be depreciated because it does not correspond to what actually deserves the name of justice, democracy, or happiness. By means of this technique of dissociating concepts, philosophers can direct men's action toward what they hold to be true values and can reject those values that are only apparent. Every ontology, or theory about the nature of being, makes use of this philosophical process that gives value to certain aspects of reality and denies it to others according to dissociations that it justifies by developing a particular conception of reality.

Scope and organization of argumentation. A discourse that seeks to persuade or convince is not made up of an accumulation of disorderly arguments, indefinite in number; on the contrary, it requires an organization of selected arguments presented in the order that will give them the greatest force. After its analysis of the various types of arguments, the new rhetoric naturally deals with the study of the problems raised by the scope of the argumentation, the choice of the arguments, and their order in the discourse.

Although formal demonstrative proof is most admired when it is simple and brief, it would seem theoretically that there would be no limit to the number of arguments that could be usefully accumulated; in fact, because argumentation is concerned not with the transfer from the truth of premises to a conclusion but with the reinforcement of the adherence to a thesis, it would appear to be effective to add more and more arguments and to enlarge the audience. Because the argumentation that has persuaded some may fail to have any effect on others, it would appear to be necessary to continue the search for arguments better adapted to the enlarged audience or to

the fraction of the audience that has been hitherto ignored.

In practice, however, three different reasons point to the need to set bounds to the scope of an argumentation: First, there are limits to the capacity and the will of an audience to pay attention. It is not enough for an orator to speak or write; he must be listened to or read. Few people are prepared to listen to a 10-hour speech or read a book of 1,000 pages. Either the subject must be worth the trouble or the hearer must feel some obligation to the subject or orator. Normally, when a custom or an obligation exists, it binds not the hearer but the orator, setting limits to the space or time allotted to the presentation of a thesis. Second, it is considered impolite for an orator to draw out a speech beyond the normally allotted time. Third, by the mere fact that he occupies the platform, an orator prevents other people from expressing their point of view. Consequently, in almost all circumstances in which argumentation can be developed, there are limits that are not to be overstepped.

It thus becomes necessary to make a choice between the available arguments, taking into account the following considerations: first, arguments do not have equal strength nor do they act in the same manner on an audience. They must be considered relevant for the thesis the speaker upholds and must provide valuable support for it. It is essential that they do not—instead of reinforcing adhesion—call the thesis into question again by raising doubts that would not have occurred to the audience had they not been mentioned. Thus, proofs of the existence of God have shaken believers who would never have thought of questioning their faith had such proofs not been submitted to them. Second, there is constant interaction between the orator and his discourse; thus, the speaker's prestige intensifies the effect of his discourse, but, inversely, if his arguments are weak, the audience's opinion of his intelligence, competence, or sincerity is influenced. Therefore, it is best to avoid using weak arguments; they may induce the belief that the speaker has no better arguments to support his thesis. Third, certain arguments, especially in the case of a mixed audience whose beliefs and aspirations are greatly varied, may be persuasive for only one part of an audience. Therefore, arguments should be chosen that will not be opposed to the beliefs and aspirations of some part of the audience. Thus, by stressing the revolutionary effect of a particular measure, for example, one stiffens the opposition to that measure on the part of those who wish to prevent the revolution, but one draws to the measure the favour of those who wait for the revolution to break out. For this reason arguments that have value for all men are superior to those that have more limited appeal; they are capable of convincing all the members of what could be called the universal audience, which is composed of all normally reasonable and competent men. An argumentation that aims at convincing a universal audience is considered philosophically superior to one that aims only at persuading a particular audience without bothering about the effect it might have on another audience in some other context or circumstances.

Further, for a discourse to be persuasive, the arguments presented must be organized in a particular order. If they are not, they lose their effectiveness, because an argument is neither strong nor weak in an absolute sense and for every audience but only in relation to a particular audience that is prepared to accept it or not. In the first place, the orator must have a certain amount of prestige, and the problem in question must raise some interest. Should the orator be a small child, a man of ill-repute, or one supposed to be hostile to the audience or should the question be devoid of interest for the audience, there is little chance that the orator will be allowed to speak or that he will be listened to. Thus, an orator is normally introduced by someone who has the public ear, and the orator then uses the exordium, or beginning portion of his discourse, not to speak about his subject but to gain the audience's sympathy.

Effective arguments can modify the opinions or the dispositions of an audience. An argument that is weak be-

cause
and c
previ
fectiv
once
effect
which
howe
a chr
follow
refute
In a
of pr
of a
action
convic
litera
mal r
It h
comm
Wher
field.
itate
tensiv
meth
in the
argu
speci
or ne
these
must
meth
cedent
suffice
case in

SIGNIFI

The ne
philos
guiding
judgm
the sc
eternal
commu
philos
philos
carni
his c
nizes
to ar
The
diene
influe
its o
whic
thou
of pl
diale
as ar
morr
To
disce
point
grate
from
the e
be g
lieve
thus
edge
In
The
Rhet
Phil
liver
PER

cause it is ill-adapted to the audience can become strong and effective when the audience has been modified by a previous argument. Similarly, an argument that is ineffective because it is not understood can become relevant once the audience is better informed. Research into the effectiveness of discourse can determine the order in which arguments should be presented. The best order, however, will often be whatever is expected, whether it be a chronological order, a conventional order, or the order followed by an opponent whose argumentation has to be refuted point by point.

In all these considerations—concerning the techniques of presentation and argumentation and the arrangement of a discourse—form is subordinated to content, to the action on the mind, to the effort to persuade and to convince. Consequently, the new rhetoric is not part of literature; it is concerned with the effective use of informal reasoning in all fields.

It has been seen that common principles and notions and common loci play a part in all nonspecialized discourses. When the matter that is debated belongs to a specialized field, the discussion will normally be limited to the initiated—i.e., those who, because of their more or less extensive training, have become familiar with the theses and methods that are currently accepted and regarded as valid in the field in question. In such instances, the basis of the argumentation will not be limited to common loci but to specific loci. The introduction in some field of a new thesis or new methods is always accompanied by criticism of the theses or methods that are being replaced; thus, criticism must be convincing to the specialists if the new thesis or method is to be accepted. Similarly, the rejection of a precedent in law has to be justified by argumentation giving sufficient reasons for not applying the precedent to the case in question.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW RHETORIC

The new rhetoric introduces a fundamental change in the philosophical outlook. Insofar as it aims at directing and guiding human action in all of the fields in which value judgments occur, philosophy is no longer conceived as the search for self-evident, necessary, universally and eternally valid principles but, rather, as the structuring of common principles, values, and loci, accepted by what the philosopher sees as the universal audience. The way the philosopher sees this universal audience, which is the incarnation of his idea of reason, depends on his situation in his cultural environment. The facts a philosopher recognizes, the values he accepts, and the problems he attends to are not self-evident; they cannot be determined a priori. The dialectical interaction between an orator and his audience is imposed also on the philosopher who wishes to influence his audience. Therefore, each philosophy reflects its own time and the social and cultural conditions in which it is developed. This is the fundamental truth, in the thought of G.W.F. Hegel, a German Idealist: the history of philosophy is not regarded as an abstract and timeless dialectic that proceeds in a predetermined direction but as an argumentation that aims at universality at a concrete moment in history.

To the extent that the new rhetoric views all informal discourse and all philosophical discourse from the viewpoint of its action on the minds of the hearers, it integrates into the analysis of thought valuable elements from both Pragmatism and Existentialism. In stressing the effects of discourse it allows Analytical philosophy to be given the dynamic dimension that some scholars believe that it has heretofore lacked. The new rhetoric can thus contribute to the development of a theory of knowledge and to a better understanding of the history of philosophy. (C.Pe.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY. The following works may be regarded as fundamental to the points made in the preceding article: EDWIN BLACK, *Rhetorical Criticism* (1965); WAYNE C. BOOTH, *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (1960); WILLIAM J. BRANDT, *The Rhetoric of Argumentation* (1970); KENNETH BURKE, *The Philosophy of Literary Form* (1941), *A Grammar of Motives* (1945), and *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1950); CHAIM PERELMAN and LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, *La Nouvelle Rhet-*

orique; traité de l'argumentation, 2 vol. (1958; Eng. trans., *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, 1969); JOHN CROWE RANSOM, *The New Criticism* (1941); and STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, *The Uses of Argument* (1958). See also CHAIM PERELMAN, "The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning," in *The Great Ideas Today* (1970).

In addition, the following is helpful in understanding the modern critique of rhetorical traditions: LLOYD F. BITZER and EDWIN BLACK (eds.), *The Prospect of Rhetoric: Report of the National Developmental Project* (1971). RAYMOND F. HOWES (ed.), *Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians* (1961); and R.S. CRANE (ed.), *Critics and Criticism, Ancient and Modern* (1952), are particularly useful in understanding respectively the critics and rhetoricians of Cornell and Chicago, the universities at which modern rhetoric received especially strong impetus. Other works useful in a study of the history of rhetoric include WILBUR SAMUEL HOWELL, *Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700* (1956); GEORGE KENNEDY, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (1963); and WALTER J. ONG, *Ramus: Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (1958). In addition to Ransom's book, I.A. RICHARDS, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1936), helped illuminate the early stages of the modern relationship between rhetoric and literary criticism. A book-length treatment of non-Western rhetoric is ROBERT T. OLIVER, *Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China* (1971).

(T.O.S./C.Pe.)

Rhine River

Culturally and historically one of the great rivers of Europe and the greatest European artery of waterborne traffic, the Rhine River flows 820 miles (1,320 kilometres) from east central Switzerland north and west to the North Sea, into which it drains through The Netherlands. An international waterway since the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, it is navigable overall for some 500 miles, as far as Lake Constance (Bodensee) in Switzerland. Its catchment area including the delta area exceeds 85,000 square miles (220,000 square kilometres), about twice the size of Liberia.

The Rhine has been a classic example of the alternating roles of great rivers as arteries of political and cultural unification and as political and cultural boundary lines. The river has also been enshrined in the literature of its lands, especially of Germany, as in the famous epic *Nibelungenlied*. In the second half of the 20th century, its importance as a trade route has increased, and political dissension about its role has given way to concern for ecological safeguards in the face of rising pollution levels.

The Alpine section of the Rhine lies in Switzerland, and, below Basel, the river forms the boundary between the German Federal Republic and France, as far downstream as the Lauter River. It then flows through German territory as far as Emmerich, below which its many-branched delta section epitomizes the landscapes characteristic of The Netherlands. The Alpine Rhine reaches its maximum flow in the spring and early summer, when its volume is swollen dramatically by snowmelt among the great peaks of the Alps. In this section, the beautiful Lake Constance acts as a filter, and the river emerges as a clear, translucent stream on its far side; the lake also helps to regulate river flow. The hydrological regime (highwater and lowwater) of the navigable Rhine is favoured by the well-distributed seasonal precipitation, with a winter maximum in the lower reaches balancing a summer maximum in the Alps. Winters are generally mild, and ice impedes navigation only in abnormally cold years. The scenic attractions of the German Rhine are marred by occasional industrial zones, with associated problems of pollution from industrial waste, but stretches of the river still present breathtaking vistas and attract tourists from near and far. For related information, see EUROPE, and also the articles on the states bordering the Rhine. See also BONN; COLOGNE.

The Alpine section of the Rhine. The Rhine rises in two headstreams high in the Swiss Alps. The Vorderrhein emerges from Lake Toma at 7,690 feet (2,344 metres), near the Oberalppass in the Central Alps, and then flows eastward past Disentis to be joined by the Hinterrhein from the south at Reichenau above Chur. (The Hinterrhein rises near the Passo del San Bernardino and

The character of the river

