A Simple Identification Strategy for Gary Becker's Time Allocation Model

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March 2015

ECARES working paper 2015-10
A simple identification strategy for Gary Becker’s time allocation model*

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March 17, 2015

Abstract

The implementation of Gary Becker’s (1965) time allocation model is hampered by the fact that values of the different time uses are usually not observed. In practice, one often assumes that the value of time is uniform across time uses by using market wages. This approach implies a fundamental identification problem. We demonstrate that the identification problem can be solved if production shifters are available.

JEL Classification: D11, D12, D13.

Keywords: time use, home production, identification, production shifter.

1 Introduction

About half a century ago, Gary Becker published the classic paper “A theory of the allocation of time” in the Economic Journal. Together with Gorman (1956) and Lancaster (1966), this seminal work laid the foundations of the household production theory. It had an enormous influence on the subsequent literature (see Chiappori and Lewbel, 2014, and Heckman, 2014). The key characteristic of Becker’s time allocation model is that households combine market goods and time uses to produce nonmarket goods,
which directly provide utility. This beautiful theory though is faced with an important empirical issue that is related to the lack of observability of the ‘prices’ of the different time uses. The usual approach then is to assume that the prices of female and male time uses are uniform and equal to their respective wages. However, this approach is faced with a fundamental identification problem.

In this short note, we present a simple approach to solve this identification issue. The approach is based on the observability of a set of variables that are related to the total factor productivities associated with the production of the nonmarket goods. Interestingly, as we will discuss, there exists a close conceptual relationship between these production shifters and the notion of stable tastes that Stigler and Becker (1977) considered in their seminal contribution.

The rest of the note is structured as follows. We present Becker’s (1965) time allocation model in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the identification problem associated with the empirical implementation of the theoretical model. We discuss our simple solution to obtain identification in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.

2 Becker’s time allocation model

In what follows, we focus on Becker’s (1965) setting in which households are assumed to behave as single decision makers with rational preferences.\(^1\) A household is assumed to derive utility from the consumption of nonmarket goods (‘basic commodities’ in Becker’s words). Examples of such nonmarket goods are a clean home, eating or child rearing. These nonmarket goods are produced by means of market goods and time. Let us denote nonmarket goods by the vector \(z = (z^1, ..., z^k)’\). Market goods and time used in the production of nonmarket good \(i\) are denoted by the vectors \(q^i\) and \(t^i\) respectively, while they are associated with the price vector \(p^i\) and the vector \(w^i\) that captures the values of the different time uses. In what follows, we will denote the vector of time spent on market labor by \(t^m\) while \(w^m\) are the associated market wages. The former vector of time use consists of, for example, female and male time spent on market labor, or the time spent on various jobs. The market goods are financed by means of earnings \(w^m t^m\) and nonlabor income \(y\). A household’s preferences over nonmarket goods is represented by a utility function \(u\), which is strictly increasing, twice continuously differentiable and quasi-concave in its arguments \(z\). Each nonmarket good \(i\), with \(i = 1, ..., k\), is associated with a production function \(f^i\) in the following way:

\[
z^i = f^i(q^i, t^i),
\]

where \(f^i\) is strictly increasing, twice continuously differentiable and concave in its arguments. Following Pollak and Wachter (1975), we further assume that there are

\(^1\)At this point, this implies no loss in generality for our discussion. We will come back to this in our concluding section, where we consider more general consumption models that explicitly include intra-household allocation issues.
constant returns to scale in the household technologies and that there is nonjointness in production: a given input can only be used for the production of a sole nonmarket good.

The household’s maximization problem is then equal to:

$$\max_{z, q^1, ..., q^k, t^1, ..., t^m} u(z)$$ (2)

subject to

$$z^i = f^i(q^i, t^i) \text{ with } i = 1, ..., k,$$ (3)

$$\sum_{i=1}^{k} p^i q^i = y + w^m t^m,$$ (4)

$$\sum_{i=1}^{k} t^i = T - t^m,$$ (5)

where $T$ is a vector that gives the total time available (for females and males for example). An important insight by Becker (1965) is that time can be converted in market goods by using less time in the home production process and more time spent on the labor market. As a result, the constraints (4) and (5) can be rewritten as the single full income constraint:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{k} p^i q^i + w^m \sum_{i=1}^{k} t^i = y + w^m T.$$ (6)

The implication of the constant returns to scale assumption in addition to nonjointness in production is that the cost function $c$, which gives the minimum outlay on inputs needed to produce a vector of nonmarket goods $\mathbf{z}$ for given prices $(p^1, ..., p^k)$ and wages $(w^1, ..., w^k)$ can be rewritten as:

$$c(p^1, ..., p^k, w^1, ..., w^k, \mathbf{z}) = \sum_{i=1}^{k} c^i(p^i, w^i, z^i) = \sum_{i=1}^{k} b^i(p^i, w^i)z^i,$$ (7)

where $q^i = \frac{\partial c^i(p^i, w^i, z^i)}{\partial p^i}$ and $t^i = \frac{\partial c^i(p^i, w^i, z^i)}{\partial w^i}$ equal the demand for market goods and time for a given $z^i$. Further, we have that $\frac{\partial c^i(p^i, w^i, z^i)}{\partial z^i} = b^i(p^i, w^i)$. This index can be interpreted as the full cost of one unit of the nonmarket good $i$, which depends on the prices of the market goods and the time uses needed in this good’s production process. Making the appropriate substitutions, we can then rewrite the full income constraint (6) as:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{k} b^i(p^i, w^i)z^i = y + w^m T.$$ (8)
The combination of the household’s utility function $u$ with the above full income constraint is now very similar to a standard consumption allocation problem that aims at choosing the utility maximizing bundle $z$ for given prices $b^i(p^i, w^i)$, with $i = 1, ..., k$, and a given full income $y + w^m T$. As Heckman (2014) noted, this is actually an instance of Gorman’s (1959) separability analysis, where the utility function $u$ is separable in the arguments to produce the nonmarket goods $z$ and the production functions exhibit nonjointness and constant returns to scale. More specifically, in the first stage, households optimally allocate budgets $b^i(p^i, w^i) z^i$ to each nonmarket good, with $i = 1, ..., k$, where the budgets depend on the price indices $b^i(p^i, w^i)$ and the full income. In a second stage, the households maximize each $z^i$ subject to the prices of market goods and time uses used in its production and the budget determined in the first stage.

3 A fundamental identification problem

A potential problem associated with the empirical implementation of the time allocation model is that the nonmarket goods $z$ are usually unobserved. As we will demonstrate later, this is no real issue. A far more important problem is that the values of the different time uses are usually not observable. A popular approach to deal with this problem is to assume that each household member’s possible time uses have a uniform price, which equals that individual’s market wage. However, this approach is faced with a fundamental identification problem, in the sense that different structural models are observationally equivalent.

This can be demonstrated as follows. Let us first focus on the optimal choice of inputs to produce given amounts of nonmarket goods $z$. Recall that this is the second stage of Gorman’s separability analysis that was described in Section 2. The household’s optimal choices of the inputs in the household production technologies are observable functions of the total budget spent on nonmarket good $i$, denoted by $y^i$, the household members’ market wages $w^m$ and the prices $p^i$ (with $i = 1, ..., k$):

$$q^i = g^i_q(p^i, w^m, y^i),$$

$$t^i = g^i_t(p^i, w^m, y^i).$$

The observability of these functions implies that the household production functions $f^i$, with $i = 1, ..., k$, that give rise to the nonmarket goods $z$, can be recovered up to a monotonically increasing transformation. This is a direct application of integrability results in standard demand analysis. More specifically, the observed Marshallian demand functions (9) can be rewritten as (with $i = 1, ..., k$):

$$\frac{\partial c^i(p^i, w^m, z^i)}{\partial p^i} = g^i_{c_p}(p^i, w^m, c^i(p^i, w^m, z^i)),$$

$$\frac{\partial c^i(p^i, w^m, z^i)}{\partial w^m} = g^i_{c_w}(p^i, w^m, c^i(p^i, w^m, z^i)).$$
which is a system of partial differential equations to be solved for the cost function $c^i$ as a function of market prices $p^i$ and market wages $w^m$. A necessary and sufficient condition to find a proper cost function associated with nonmarket good $i$ is that the observed demand equations satisfy Slutsky symmetry and negativity. As is well-known from standard demand analysis, the household production functions, given the fact that outputs are unobserved, are only identified up to a monotone increasing transformation. Note that, given constant returns to scale, the possible transformations are those that imply homothetic technologies. The chosen cardinalization is a matter of normalization though.

Up to now, we were able to identify the household production technologies represented by a given cardinalization for $z$. Let us now focus on the first stage of Gorman’s separability analysis, which is associated with the choice of the utility maximizing bundle $z$ for given price indices $b^i(p^i, w^m)$, with $i = 1, ..., k$, and a given full income $y + w^mT$. Standard demand analysis would suggest that the observable demand functions

$$z = g(b^1(p^1, w^m), ..., b^k(p^k, w^m), y + w^mT),$$

which depend on the price indices and the full income allow us to recover the utility function $u$ if the Slutsky conditions are satisfied. However, the problem is that there is no independent variation in these price indices given changes in prices or market wages. That is, changes in prices or market wages will always be associated with input changes in the production of all the nonmarket goods and simultaneously they also induce a change in the price indices that determine the allocation of the household’s budget to $z$. Therefore, it is generally impossible to disentangle preferences from technologies: a continuum of utility and production functions will give rise to observationally equivalent behavior (see also Chiappori and Mazzocco, 2014). As remarked by Heckman (2014), a particularly important structural model that belongs to the above mentioned continuum of utility and production functions is the standard labor supply model. This model is characterized by the maximization problem:

$$\max_{q^1, ..., q^k, l} v(q^1, ..., q^k, l)$$

subject to

$$\sum_{i=1}^k p^i q^i + w^m l = y + w^m T,$$

where $v$ is an appropriately defined utility function and $l = \sum_{i=1}^k t^i$ is a vector containing the household members’ leisure (which equals the total time available minus the time spent on market work) which is valued by their market wages $w^m$. The observational equivalence between the standard labor supply and Becker’s time allocation model is of course a very important empirical issue.
4 A simple solution

We now discuss a refined time allocation model that can be identified on the basis of observable data. Assume that there exists a vector $s = (s^1, \ldots, s^k)'$ of observable variables that do not contain any price or income information. Assume next that these variables and the production functions are related as follows (with $i = 1, \ldots, k$):

$$z^i = f^i(q^i, t^i)s^i.$$  \hfill (10)

In addition to the earlier discussed properties of homotheticity and nonjointness in production, the production functions are thus assumed to be related to the variables $s$ in a very specific way. In particular, each household production technology $i$ is associated with a production shifter $s^i$, which affects the overall productivity but not the optimal relative choice of the inputs $q^i$ and $t^i$ to produce an amount of $z^i$. The variable $s^i$ can thus be interpreted as some observable total factor productivity.

We note that, contrary to taste shifters, production shifters are variables that affect observable choices only through their impact on the household production technologies and not via preferences. A potential production shifter in the household production function of child rearing may be minus the average age of the children in the household.\textsuperscript{2} It may well be the case that two similar households, which differ with respect to the average age of the children, have the same relative allocation of time and money invested in children, while the absolute amounts differ given that early childhood investments are more efficient than late childhood investments (see Cunha and Heckman, 2007, and Cunha, Heckman and Schennach, 2010).\textsuperscript{3} Another example of a production shifter could be education (see Michael, 1973).

Interestingly enough, we can relate production shifters to the influential paper on tastes by Stigler and Becker (1977). In their paper, these authors defend the interpretation that preferences are stable and that they do not differ in important ways over people. Differences in observed behavior then are not explained by ad-hoc taste differences, but rather through differences in the household production functions that impact the income and prices faced by households. As we will demonstrate next, production shifters turn out to be very useful to identify Becker’s (1965) time allocation model with uniform time use values.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{2}Note that, by construction, the impact of an increase of a production shifter $s^i$ will have a positive impact on the quantity of the nonmarket good $z^i$ (see equation (10)). Consequently, specific production shifters need to be carefully defined.

\textsuperscript{3}Of course, the similarity between this example and the work on early versus late childhood interventions is highly incomplete since we focus here on a static model, while the latter literature mainly focuses on the dynamic aspects of skill formation.

\textsuperscript{4}Note that the production shifter concept introduced here is strongly related to a similar concept used by Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2012). These authors use production shifters to obtain identification of a generalization of Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir’s (2005) collective labor supply model with home production. We remark that the collective approach allows us to relax the specific way of how production shifters enter the production functions.
Let us again focus on Gorman’s (1959) two-stage budgeting approach. Given our specific assumption about how production shifters enter the production functions (see equation (10), the household’s optimal choices of the inputs to produce a nonmarket good \( i \) only depend on the market wages \( w^m \), the prices \( p^i \) and \( y^i \), the total budget spent on nonmarket good \( i \). Consequently, once we condition on the former variables, production shifters play no role in the input allocation. In other words, the second stage of the two-stage budgeting process is exactly the same as the one discussed above (see equation (9)). This allows us to identify the household production technologies represented by a given cardinalization for \( z \) (see again equation (10)).

What remains to be proven is that we can also identify the first stage of Gorman’s separability analysis, which is associated with the choice of the utility maximizing bundle \( z \). Recall first that the production functions are assumed to be homothetic in prices and wages. Secondly, our assumption about the specific impact of the production shifters (in equation (10)) implies that the full income constraint now equals (compare with equation (8)):

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{k} \frac{b^i(p^i, w^i)}{s^i} z^i = y + w^{m'T}.
\]

(11)

The demand equations associated with the nonmarket goods are therefore equal to:

\[
z = g\left(\frac{b^1(p^1, w^m)}{s^1}, \ldots, \frac{b^k(p^k, w^m)}{s^k}, y + w^{m'T}\right).
\]

Contrary to what we had in the time allocation model without production shifters, we can now recover the utility function \( u \), up to a monotone increasing transformation, if standard Slutsky conditions are satisfied. This happens through the variation in the production shifters \( s \), and thus the ‘prices’ \( \frac{b^1(p^1, w^m)}{s^1}, \ldots, \frac{b^k(p^k, w^m)}{s^k} \), while holding constant market prices \( p^1, \ldots, p^k \) and wages \( w^m \). Changes in the production shifters change the allocation of the full income to the different nonmarket goods, while holding constant the relative allocation of the inputs used to produce these nonmarket goods.

5 Conclusion

We have demonstrated that the fundamental identification problem associated with the practical implementation of Becker’s (1965) time allocation model can be solved by means of a series of production shifters. In this short note, we focused on Becker’s unitary approach, which assumes that households behave as single decision makers. Importantly, however, a related identification strategy can also be used in more general models that account for intra-household allocation issues, as demonstrated in Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2012).
References


