

POVERTY, AND THE IDEA OF “CENSUS” AT THE END OF THE RENAISSANCE: MORALITY OF LARGE NUMBERS¹

À partir des années 1570 apparaît chez plusieurs auteurs le projet d’une approche quantitative du politique, un projet qui définit la préhistoire de la statistique. Ce projet se formule à l’aide de la proposition d’un retour à l’institution du censeur. Il témoigne de combien l’enjeu moral, et en particulier de la question de la moralité collective et de la corruption des mœurs, fut au cœur et à la racine du mouvement qui amena à l’émergence d’une politique des populations. Dans ce cadre, et pour des motifs relevant eux aussi de la moralité, apparaît la nécessité d’une connaissance véritablement scientifique de la pauvreté.

The new idea of using a quantitative approach and of a computing rationality in the field of Politics emerges in the end of the sixteenth century: it is in that period that the project of reckoning both subjects and possessions takes shape clearly. At first, this new rationality is conveyed through the idea of a return to the ancient institution of the censors on which I shall mainly focus here. Through an analysis of this institution, I will demonstrate how, in the “statistical” project (and in the modern fiscal prospective that it leads to), the quantitative and moral stakes go hand in hand. In this manner, the core of a governmental project of collective moral control can be defined at the margins of political reflection centred on the concept of sovereignty (and no longer able to envisage the fact of corruption). This idea will lead me to consider the question of poverty and wealth, but also of work and of idleness and, more generally, the question of corruption in the economic, moral and political fields.

Thus I am in no way concerned here with censorship of books or ideas. And I will ignore very frequent references to the ancient institution

1 I would like to thanks Marie-Gaëlle Buisson for her great help with the translation of this article.

of the censors which are concerned with their ability to limit, just as sumptuary laws do, the excesses of nobility: for example Erasmus asserts that “the ancients, realizing that most evils arose from extravagant prodigality, passed sumptuary laws and created the office of censor to restrain immoderate expenditures on banquets, dress, or building¹”. Similarly we find many and just as much frequent references to the fact that censorship provided the ancients with a specific institution to curb corruption: Machiavelli, for whom the question of corruption was of course central, states that “the Censorship [...] was one of the most important provisions that helped to preserve the liberties of Rome [...]”. For the Censors being the supreme arbiters of the manners and customs of the Romans, they became the most potent instrument in retarding the progress of corruption in Rome²”.

However, these two references which are emblematic of the political thought of the early sixteenth century, help us to clarify the theoretical framework within which we shall survey the idea of a return to the institution of the censors at the end of the century and within which the call for a quantitative approach can be situated. On the one hand there is the question of the management of riches, and in this perspective we shall begin with the simple moral rejection of excesses related to wealth, and then reach a more general primary approach which shall consider wealth in its relation to poverty: a demand for a just and efficient taxation policy thus arises, and also, at a further stage, one for a poverty policy. On the other hand, and this legitimates the reference to Machiavelli, it is the whole issue of corruption which justifies this appeal to the censor. The Machiavellian notion of politics admitted the possibility of corruption and defined itself almost exclusively through this possible corruption or through the positive ability to resist it³. At the end of the sixteenth century, however, this humanist and republican notion was supplanted

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- 1 D. Erasmus, *The Education of a Christian Prince*, chap. vi, transl. L. K. Born, New York, Columbia University Press, 1936, p. 227.
 - 2 N. Machiavelli, *Discorsi sopra la Prima Deca di Tito Livio*, book I, chap. 49, in *The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli*, transl. from the Italian by Ch. E. Detmold, Boston, J. R. Osgood and company, 1882, vol. II.
 - 3 Cf. Th. Berns, *Violence de la loi à la Renaissance – L'originnaire du politique chez Machiavel et Montaigne*, Paris, Kimé, 2000; Th. Berns, « Exposition du politique au mal ou absorption du mal par le politique : Machiavel et la philosophie », *Les Archives de philosophie du droit et de philosophie sociale (ARSP)*, vol. 87, 2001, 3, p. 363-372.

by a conception of politics organized around the idea of sovereignty, a conception thus defining itself through the theoretical rejection of the possibility of corruption, through its non-exposition to corruption (and to struggles, divisions, formations of factions, etc. described by Machiavelli¹). The censor provides other instruments than the law of the sovereign around which politics now organizes itself, and which, by virtue of its being one and definite, is no longer able to answer the question of corruption. I wish to high light the embedding of the idea of Statistics² into the field of the foucaldian 'gouvernementalité', into a field that is essentially different from the politico-philosophical field defined by sovereignty.

Firstly, I would like to contrast the statistical approach linked to the institution of the censors, with the simple requirement of a quantitative but secret knowledge of the State that would take as its model the record book kept by Emperor Augustus rather than depend on the institutionalized gaze of the censor. We read in a compilation of political maxims, published in 1576 in France, that:

l'Empereur Auguste fit un registre escrit de sa propre main, où estoit contenu par le menu, toute la richesse et puissance de la domination Romaine : combien il y avoit de citoyens, et d'alliez en armes ; combien de vaisseaux sur mer, combien de Royaumes et provinces subiectes à l'Empire : avec ce tout le domaine, les tributs, tailles, subsides et autres impositions, en somme tout le revenu annuel de la republique, combien il falloit dependre et frayer par chacun an, tant pour les necessitez ordinaires, que pour les dons et largesses et autres extraordinaires. Tellement qu'il est impossible, qu'un père de famille sceust mieux l'estat de sa maison privée, ni plus particulièrement, qu'il savoit celuy quasi de tout le monde : et à la verité il est plus aisé d'admirer, que d'imiter ceste diligence, veu le temps nous sommes. Mais j'ose bien dire, que c'est un des plus grands preceptes, qu'on sçauroit donner à un prince, soit pour sa grandeur, soit pour le bien des ses affaires & le soulagement de ses subjects, que cestui-là d'avoir entiere cognoissance des dependances de son estat et de ses droicts, et pour les reigler luy mesme, sans en attendre à autrui³.

1 Cf. Th. Berns, *Souveraineté, droit et gouvernementalité. Lectures du politique à partir de Bodin*, Paris, éditions Léo Scheer, collection « Non et non », 2005.

2 For a general history of the Statistics, see J. Hecht, « L'Idée de dénombrement jusqu'à la Révolution », in F. Bédarida (et al.), *Pour une histoire de la statistique*, Paris, édition Economica, 1987, p. 21-81.

3 *Plusieurs avis et conseils de François Guicciardin, tant pour les affaires d'estat que privées. Avec Quarante et Deux articles concernants ce mesme subject*, transl. and ed. by A. de Laval, Paris, 1576, p. 41, maxim 179. The quotation is one of 42 anonymous maxims. Joan. A. Chokier, *Thesaurus politicorum aphorismus*, Moguntiae, I. T. Schönvvetteri, 1613, p. 138. Cf. R. de

At the end of the century, Scipione Ammirato wrote a discourse on the question “*Qual dovrebbe esser il libro segreto di ciascun principe*”, insisting on the fact that Augustus

scrisse di propria sua mano un libro [...]. Erano in questo libro scritti tutti i tesori del popol Romano, tutti i soldati, così de cittadini, come de socii, le armate, i regni, le provincie, i tributi, ovvero gabelle, et spese necessarie, e i presenti.

Earlier in the discourse he stated that:

*I grandi mercanti hanno un libro, il qual chiamano il libro segreto, il qual non è lecito, che vada per le mani di tutti i ministri del banco, ma se lo tiene il Mestro appresso di se, essendo il quello per via breve ridotta la somma di tutto il suo havere. Che così debba far un Principe delle faccende del suo stato*¹.

In quantifying the state, the purpose of book-keeping of this kind is always to assess what is possessed, and such assessments are justified by the possibility of war, war around possessions: the State is nothing more yet than the state of the prince's possessions.

What serves as a model is not only the book of record kept by the prince, but also books kept by the merchant or the father. Both however are secret books. Of course such secrecy must be understood in relation to a tradition of reason of State, and of the Arcana imperii. We shall go beyond this and see how, on the contrary, the reference to the institution of the censors significantly led to the opening of another kind of knowledge, a public or at least institutionalized form of knowledge, essentially generating and creating reciprocity. The model carried by the institution of censorship will also break away from the secret and unilateral dimensions of the prince's knowledge.

In another maxim of the same French compilation of 1576, the quantitative knowledge of the State had been linked with the institution of the censors:

le dénombrement par le menu des villes, des bourgs, des villages, des chasteaux, des metairies, terres seigneuries, fiefs, juridictions, ressorts, bornes et limites de chacune

Mattei (*Il problema della Ragione di Stato*, Milan-Naples, Ricciardi, 1979, p. 47) evokes the *Rationarum* of the Duke Cosimo de Medici and compares them with the books kept by the Roman imperators.

1 S. Ammirato, *Discorsi sopra C. Tacito*, lib. I, disc. 5, Venetia, Matthio Valentino, 1607, p. 13-14.

province, subjecte à un estat, et de tous les habitans d'icelle, de quelque âge et qualité qu'ils soient, et de leurs biens tant meubles qu'immeubles avec certaine contribution pour teste, c'est proprement ce que les Latins appellent censum agere. C'est ceste belle institution et establissement loué pardessus tous les autres des Romains, et que l'on dit avoir servi à leur grandeur, autant que nul autre : et à la vertité qui bien le considerera, il profite à plusieurs choses, et est si facile à imiter¹.

But we find the very first structured call for a revival of the institution of the censors in Jean Bodin. Let us turn to the first chapter of Book VI of *la République* de Bodin², which deals with the second part of the definition of the republic (*cf. Rép. I, 1, p. 27*), that is, no longer the question of the "*puissance souveraine*", which is the main concern of the work, but the question of the government "*de ce qui est commun à la République*" (*Rép. VI, 1, p. 7*) which is considered in the first chapters of Book VI. Bodin has essentially in mind the problems of finances and taxes. In this context, let us consider a possible variation of administration which no longer has to do with sovereignty but rather with government³: "*car il y a bien difference de l'estat, et du gouvernement : qui est une reigle de police qui n'a point esté touchée de personne*", and which deals with the distribution of office, profits, information and honours, in no way affecting the State, or the sovereign form of the republic (*Rép. II, 2, p. 34*).

Advocating a restoration of the ancient institution of the censors, in charge of "*l'estimation des biens d'un chacun*" (*Rép. VI, 1, p. 7*), Bodin strenuously insists on different roles of the censors which clearly go beyond the only question of taxation and no longer related to the question of sovereignty. Censorship is useful "*soit pour entendre le nombre et qualité des personnes, soit pour l'estimation et declaration des biens d'un chacun, soit pour reigler et morigerer les sujets*" (*Rép. VI, 1, p. 7-8*).

Thanks to such a knowledge of the population and possessions, the institution of the censors would serve as a way "*d'egaler les charges et imposts selon les biens d'un chacun*" (*Rép. VI, 1, p. 15*). In that way, "*il seroit pourveu aux justes plaintes et doleances des povres, que les riches ont accoustumé*

1 *Plusieurs advis et conseils de François Guicciardin, tant pour les affaires d'estat que privées. Avec Quarante et Deux articles concernant ce mesme subject, op. cit., Advis et conseil 197, p. 44.*

2 J. Bodin, *Les Six livres de la République*, Lyon, Gabriel Cartier, 1593. Reproduction in Fayard, *Corpus des œuvres de philosophie de langue française*, 6 vol., 1986.

3 The very complex issue of taxes has also to do with the legal paradigm of sovereignty through the common assent to taxation.

de charger, et s'exempter" themselves and, as a result, "*les seditions, qui sont ordinaires en toutes Republique, pour l'inequalité des charges, cesseroient*" (Rép. VI, 1, p. 16). This knowledge of the possessions and wealth of everyone not only supports the project of a fair tax, but also a less precise project to tracking down unacceptable financial situations, such as those of "*cessionnaires*", "*banqueroutiers*", "*usuriers*". The main purpose is to avoid "*la povreté extreme des uns, et richesses excessives des autres*" that lead to "*seditions, troubles et guerre civiles*" (Rép. VI, 1, p. 16-17).

Moreover, with the censors being in charge of the "*dénombrement des sujets et des biens d'un chacun*" (Rép. VI, 1, p. 10), a whole bureaucratic machinery is set up. Through the records it would keep, this machinery would primarily serve as a way to avoid "*un million de proces*" (Rép. VI, 1, p. 13) by registering the names and ages of the subjects. Bodin moreover perceives that such an institution would provide the opportunity to know the needs of the subjects and the numbers available for elections and for war, for public duties or the colonies. Thus what appears clearly here is the idea of a statistical tool. Because censorship, finally, makes it possible to "*cognoistre de quel estat, de quel metier chacun se mesle, dequoy il gaigne sa vie*", it appears also as a way to "*bannir les vagabonds, les faineans, les voleurs, les pipeurs, les rufiens [...] : on les verroit, on les marqueroit, on les cognoistroit par tout*" (Rép. VI, 1, p. 14).

Lastly one cannot overlook that part of the role of censorship is also to take charge of this crucial aspect of the Republic "*qui devrait estre public, [et] est laissé à la discretion d'un chacun*", that is to say "*l'institution de la jeunesse*" (Rép. VI, 1, p. 24, where Bodin also refers to his *Discours au Sénat et au Peuple de Toulouse sur l'éducation à donner aux jeunes gens dans la République*). Here again, through the exemplarily continuous action of education, the aim is to make up for the limits of the sporadic action of law: because "*pour neant on faict des loix si la jeunesse, comme dit Aristote*" (Pol. V, 30), "*n'est informée de bonnes meurs*" (Rép. VI, 1, p. 24).

Clearly we are in presence of a power which permanently incites, rather than momentarily sanctions as the law does, and which leads to a control of society by itself, thanks to the public opinion and no longer to the law¹. Basing his argument on the ancient institution, there is no doubt that Bodin explicitly advocates a power for censorship that no

1 See D. Reynié, « Le Regard souverain », in C. Lazzeri, D. Reynié (dir.), *La Raison d'État : politique et rationalité*, Paris, PUF, 1992, p. 43-82.

longer stands in the sphere of sovereignty and law: "*la censure n'est pas jugement*", it is based on "*aucune jurisdiction*", it is "*un regard, une parole*", it makes one "*trembler*" et "*rougir*" (*Rép.* VI, 1, p. 27 et p. 28). Bodin is referring here to Cicero, *Rep.* IV, vii). What laws have no hold on, even falls within the purview of the censor: one paragraph in this chapter deals with the:

plus grands et plus frequents vices chastiez par la Censure, qui sont passez par souffrance des loix. On sçait assez, que les plus detestables vices, et qui plus gastent la Republique, ne viennent jamais en jugement.

Bodin has here in mind "*la perfidie*", "*le parjure*", "*les yvrogneries, les jeux de hazard, les paillardises et lubricitez*". "*Vagabonds, [...] faineants, [...] rufiens [...] corrompent et de faict et d'exemple tous les bons sujets*". Censorship alone will make it possible to "*chasser ceste vermine*" (*Rép.* VI, 1, p. 22-23).

Beyond questions of finances, censorship thus not only appears as a new means of knowledge and information, that is Statistics, but also as a way to make the subjects govern and know themselves (*i.e.* governmentality): the text is explicit, censorship would be a way to "*reigler et morigerer¹ les sujets*" (*Rép.* VI, 1, p. 8), to "*censurer et noter la vie et les mœurs d'un chacun*" (*Rép.* VI, 1, p. 20-21), not only leading to an accurate census of the population by the government, but also allowing, in this regard, to provide against any form of "*abus*" and any form of corruption of the morals (*Rép.* VI, 1, p. 21-22).

This moral role of statistics is more clearly stressed when, replying to the opponents of any form of census of population and possessions², Bodin states that:

je respons, qu'il n'y a que les trompeurs, les pipeurs, et ceux qui abusent les autres, qui ne veulent pas qu'on descouvre leur jeu, qu'on entende leurs actions, qu'on sçache leur vie : mais les gens de bien, qui ne craignent point la lumière, prendront tousjours plaisir qu'on cognoisse leur estat, leur qualité, leur bien, leur façon de vivre (*Rép.* VI, 1, p. 17-18).

1 Morigérer or *morigerari* in Latin: to make (the subjects) obedient and docile.

2 Because the census implies the public violation of the private sphere, the violation of the biblical interdiction of the population count (II Samuel, 24-25), and the confusion of politics and economics against the great Aristotelian division; *cf.* Th. Berns, *Gouverner sans gouverner. Une archéologie politique de la statistique*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2009.

Thus a yet undisclosed statistical desire would be the purpose of this institution: an institution that must be able to view, see and hear everything. Such an institution, thus inspired by this ideal of transparency and light, generates in its development far more reciprocity than all that is directly and exclusively based on the principle of sovereignty. And so it is here, outside of the field of sovereignty, that the question of corruption is raised at last: what corrupts the law cannot be faced by the law itself and, what is more, the law is only able to view itself as safe from any form of corruption. Governmentality, facing corruption, will be necessarily carried by something else than law. Thus a new ideal of absolute knowledge and mastery arises, allowing to encompass all that sovereignty had to ignore in order to impose itself: justice in the distribution of riches, high morals, work and idleness, registration, education.

It is interesting to note, moreover, that this idea of going back to the institution of the censors shall have posterity: a posterity full of contradictions implied by the multiplicity of registers that such an institution aimed to encompass. Book IV of Lipse's *Politiques*¹ deals with the Prince's prudence, a civil or military prudence. In chapter 11, like Bodin, he asks for a comeback of the ancient institution of the censors, in order to fight the vices that ruin the State. To avoid hatred, the prince must ensure that "*l'Égalité, qui est que la contribution soit juste, esgale et d'une et mesme sorte*" be respected (*Polit.* IV, 11, p. 66). Lipse refers here only to the question of tax:

il y a une seule raison pour ceste égalité, le cens ou description des biens d'un chacun : tout ce qu'il y a de difference aux patrimoines, dignitez, aages, arts et offices se voit comme en un tableau (Polit. p. 67).

Apart from the "chart" and knowledge that would obtain from such an institution, Lipse mainly stresses the fact that this institution could make equality prevail in the field of tax.

But then, from census he "*passé à la censure*", that is to say to "*une adnimation tant aux mœurs que superfluités qui ne sont point défendues par les loix*". Censorship will "*corriger les choses, qui ne méritent pas pour l'heure peine ou supplice*", but which are "*causes et occasion de plusieurs grands maux*" and even "*ruinent peu à peu l'estat de fond en comble*". "*Maistresse de honte et*

1 J. Lipse, *Les Politiques*, liv. IV, Caen, Presses Universitaires de Caen, 1994.

de modestie", censorship produces a "*crainte d'ailleurs, outre celle des loix*". It first deals with "*les Mœurs*", preventing "*la paresse et l'oisiveté*". It will thus ensure that all may be rather "*bons et industrieux que somptueux et riches*". Secondly, censorship will also deal with "*le luxe et superfluité*", that can develop to "*l'infini*" if they are not restricted. Luxury lies in "*ces quatre choses, Argent, Edifices, Banquets et Habillemens*". The purpose is thus to get rid of "*l'usage et l'estime des richesses et de l'argent, peste très dangereuse*" (*Polit.* p. 68-69). Lipse's text does not go any further than this moral indictment of wealth and of the excesses it generates: "*plaisirs*", "*vie dissoluë et des-bordee*" or "*des-ordonnee*" (*Polit.* p. 72) must be avoided because "*c'est un signe de changement en l'estat quand les sujets consomment tout en vivant prodigalement : et en ne cherchant que nouveautez*", they then are "*proches d'entrer sous la Tyrannie*" (*Polit.* p. 71).

The prince must subject himself to censorship too, and – which is the only innovative element – he should not expect to cure "*tout à la fois, mais peu à peu*" : "*il faut du temps*" (*Polit.* p. 72-73). We particularly stress this point as it shows that the action of censorship is different from that of the law, because of its slow and constant rhythm, and not just because of its object which is corruption. This is "*la rougeur au visage*", that Lipse mentions, like Bodin, referring to Cicero (*Polit.* p. 71). But as to the rest, Lipse only half perceives and besides, does not articulate the statistical role of the censors, beyond their responsibilities regarding tax and morals. Unlike Bodin, Lipsius didn't understand the fact that the "census" itself can be censorship of the self, that the simple gaze of the censor, in one and the same movement, generates knowledge and discipline.

Johannes Althusius, referring to Bodin and Lipsius to develop his argument, does not bring anything new concerning the statistical role of the institution of the censors which, as he explains, is that of "the sacred collegium, or the presbytery" ("*collegio sacro, seu presbyterio*¹"): after having clearly distinguished "two species of the execution of law: the administration of justice, and censorship" (*Polit.* XXIX, 15), he then devotes a whole chapter to the latter, but he is only concerned, in an even more radical and religious way than Lipse's, with the moral role of the censors, their struggle against the dissolution of morals, excessive

1 J. Althusius, *Politica*, Herbornae Nassaviorum, 1614 (abridged translation by F. S. Carney, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1995, p. 175-180).

riches and idleness (*Polit.* XXX). Nonetheless the organic and corporatist perspective defended by Althusius – Politics seen as *consociatio*, as the art of associating between men, with the multiple and interwoven aspects of public communities it implies, makes the censors' tools appear less necessary (in the same way as Politics does not find its principle and its driving force in sovereignty, but in *symbiosis*, in living together): the citizen is never an individual; he is always but a companion, a *convives*, whose self-government is somehow a presupposition¹.

A few years later Antoyne de Montchrétien also refers to the ancient institution of the censors in his *Traicté d'oeconomie politique* (1615)², a fundamental work that broadened the scope of political economy, against the great Aristotelian share-out of “*l'oeconomie [et ...] la police*”, by turning economy into a element common “*aux républiques aussi bien qu'aux familles*” (*Traicté*, p. 31). Of course this political economy is still a strictly mercantilist one, as it is in Botero, and the questions of poverty and idleness seem to be as important here as they are for the author of *Ragione di stato*.

Bodin is undeniably the source for the Montechrétien's references to the institution of the censors. This institution is the “*gardienne des vertus*” (*Traicté*, p. 342), combatting “*vices qui ne comparoissent jamais en jugement*” (*Traicté*, p. 343). Contrary to what we find in Althusius et Lipse, its function is not only to watch the “*richesse excessive*”, but also “*la pauvreté extrême*”, because it is from that, as we read in Bodin, that “*naissent ordinairement les troubles, seditions et guerres civiles*” (*Traicté*, p. 347). The purpose is to answer “*aux justes doleances des pauvres contre les riches*” in order to “*retrancher toutes occasions de tumulte*” (*Traicté*, p. 346), achieved through a respect of tax that implies “*que chacun donne son bien par declaration et fasse connoistre quel est son revenu*” (*Traicté*, p. 345-346). The mission of the censors is carried through the same ideal of “*lumière*” as we find in Bodin: the aim is “*d'éventer le secret des maisons*” (*Traicté*, p. 348). However, the use of the census and of statistic (*Traicté*, p. 352) lies not only in the trials they avoid and in the economic planning they contribute to develop, as in Bodin though more clearly, but also

1 Cf. Th. Bernis, « Du gouvernement des groupes à l'émergence du sujet de droit » in B. Frydman (dir.), *La Société civile et ses droits*, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2004, p. 21-38.

2 A. de Montchrétien, *Traicté de l'oeconomie politique*, (édit.) Th. Funck-Brentano, Paris, Plon, 1889.

in the possibility they offer to distinguish the "*vrais pauvres*" (*Traicté*, p. 349 et 351) to whom charity is absolutely recommended, a point to which Montchrétien returns and which he develops a number of times in the work. This true poverty must be clearly distinguished from the "*importuns mendiants*" who on the contrary are incited by charity to "*la faineantize et lascheté*" (*Traicté*, p. 349). The institution of the censors makes this distinction possible and is a way to provide for the difficulties of some and to "*chasser*" (*Traicté*, p. 352) ou "*banir*" (*Traicté*, p. 353) others. Poverty thus turns out to be a scientific object.

In that way, "*toutes les parties de ce grand corps d'Estat se prennent et lient plus aisément ensemble*". The institution of censorship, as advocated by Montchrétien, is now explicitly and above all a way to encompass the statistical and quantitative knowledge of the population: by the knowledge of the real poverty or the real wealth of each people, it gives "*la connoissance de ce que vous (le Roi) pouvez et devez entreprendre et faire*" (*Traicté*, p. 353).

The relevance of the statistical perspective outside the field of law and sovereignty, a perspective opened by Bodin in his treatment of the institution of the Censors, lies in the fact that it views poverty from two angles: the knowledge resulting from the censor's regard is in fact always both the prince's knowledge of his population, and the subjects' knowledge of themselves. Moreover it is certainly because this knowledge also concerns the knowledge and the government of the self and not only the knowledge and the government of others, that the public violation of the private sphere and of the "*secret des maisons*" it implies seems acceptable¹.

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1 Cf. Th. Bernis, *Gouverner sans gouverner. Une archéologie politique de la statistique*, op. cit., p. 111.