

11 Green parties and elections

Caroline Close and Pascal Delwit

Introduction

Born in the 1980s, Green parties are often presented as the vector of postmaterialist values (Inglehart, 1977), of the *New Politics* ideals (Poguntke, 1993), of the *New Left Policy Agenda* (Kaelberer, 1993) or of the libertarian left (Kitschelt, 1988). They rapidly accessed the parliamentary arenas in a couple of countries: in Switzerland in 1979, in Belgium in 1981, in Germany and in Finland in 1983, in Luxembourg in 1984. During the second half of the 1980s, they entered the legislative assemblies in Austria (1986), in Italy (1987), in Sweden (1988) and in the Netherlands (1989).

Several authors at that time predicted a bright future for Green parties (Galtung, 1986, p. 85). However, looking back at how they have performed in the last decades, the picture appears quite mixed. Analysing the electoral performances of these parties, Mair (1999) has put into question their ability to emerge as relevant actors in the Western political landscape. According to Mair, Green parties in Western Europe have failed to brand themselves as the precursors of a new global realignment and have remained electorally quite marginal. By contrast, Dietz (2001) considers that Green parties have become important electoral political actors at the national level in most EU member states. Fifteen years later, how should we consider the electoral fate of these parties?

In this chapter, we first examine the electoral performances of Green parties in Europe at the national and European levels. Then, we propose a sociological analysis of their electorate. We examine the profile of Green voters in terms of social background, political preferences, form and degree of social and political activism and attitudes towards politics and democratic institutions. Whereas the first part of the chapter highlights the distinct paths that Green parties have followed, the second part insists on the commonalities of the Green electorate across Europe.

Electoral results of Green parties in Europe

Consociational democracies

Consociational democracies (Lijphart, 1981) are characterised by significant fragmentation, a proportional political dynamics and consensus-based decision-making process, in order to ensure 'diversity in unity' (Croisat and Quermonne,

1999, p. 35). In Europe, these democracies present quite high levels of political and economic development. This latter aspect is regularly identified as one of the conditions for the electoral and political development of Green movements. Six consociational democracies are examined here: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland – although the inclusion of Germany in this category has been much discussed in the literature (see Table 11.1).¹ Most of the Green parties in these states were born in the late 1970s or early 1980s.

In five out of six cases – Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and Switzerland –, Green parties have initially followed a similar path.² They achieved an electoral and political breakthrough in the 1980s (Kitschelt, 1988). This initial success persisted in the 1990s. Rapidly, they became ‘relevant’ parties (Sartori, 1976) and secured a stable share of the vote (between 5 and 10 per cent). The Netherlands is an exception to this initial common pattern. Two Green organisations have co-existed: a small one – *De Groenen* – and a more important one that resulted from the merger of four parties – *GroenLinks*. *GroenLinks* faced electoral difficulties until the 1998 national election where it succeeded in capturing 7.3 per cent of the votes.

In the late 1990s/early 2000s, the patterns diverged in three different directions. The first pattern is characterised by relative ‘stabilisation’, as found in Belgium and Germany. There, Green parties reached an electoral peak or ‘ceiling’ and fluctuated around this peak. In Belgium, *Ecolo* and *Groen* attained their best score at the 1999 national elections: 14.4 per cent of the votes, still today the most remarkable performance among European Green parties. However, *Ecolo* and *Groen* were not able to replicate this success. They endured a severe drop in 2003 following their participation in government (Delwit, 2012). Their score stabilised in the 2007, 2010 and 2014 elections, oscillating between 8 and 9.5 per cent of the votes. In Germany, *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* reached their ceiling earlier. In 1987, the party secured 8.3 per cent of the vote and then stagnated around this peak in the 1990s and 2000s, even if it managed once to exceed the symbolic threshold of 10 per cent at the 2009 national election. However, comparing the Belgian and German cases is challenging given the German post-reunification context of the 1990s. Indeed, the Greens were less well imbedded politically and electorally in Eastern than in Western Germany (Poguntke, 1998).

The second model is characterised by a relative growth, as in the case of Switzerland, Austria and Luxembourg. The first Green deputy ever was elected in Switzerland; yet the electoral growth of the Green Party of Switzerland (GLP) has been slow. The first time the party managed to exceed the 5 per cent threshold occurred in 1991. This score stabilised during the 1990s. In the 2000s, the party entered a new phase by stabilising its score between 7.4 and 9.6 per cent. The Austrian Greens (*Die Grünen*) experienced an almost linear progression: around 5 per cent in the 1980s, between 5 and 8 per cent in the 1990s and between 10 and 12 per cent in the 2000s. The Austrian Greens have appeared as the democratic alternative on the left side of the political spectrum, especially for those voters who were tired of the grand coalition governments led by the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Conservatives (ÖVP). In Luxembourg too, the electoral evolution

Table 11.1 Electoral results of Green parties in consociational democracies (%)

	The Netherlands		Belgium		Switzerland		Austria		Luxembourg			Germany	
	De Groenen	GroenLinks	Ecolo	Groen	PES		Die Grünen	VGÖ	ALÖ/GAL	déi gréng	GLEI	GAP	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
1979					0.6								
1980													1.5
1981			2.5	2.6									5.6
1983					1.9		1.9	1.4		4.2			
1984													
1985			2.5	3.7									
1987			2.6	4.5	4.9		4.8	0.1	0.02				8.3
1989	0.4	4.1										3.7	3.7
1990							4.8	2.0					5.0
1991			5.1	4.9	6.1								
1993	0.1	3.5											
1994							7.3	0.1		9.9			7.3
1995			4.0	4.8	5.0		4.8						
1998	0.2	7.3											6.7
1999			7.4	7.0	5.0		7.4			9.1			
2002		7.0					9.5						8.6
2003		5.1	3.1	2.5	7.4								
2004										11.5			
2006		4.6					11.1						8.1
2007			5.1	4.0	9.6		10.4						
2008													
2009										11.5			10.7
2010		6.7	4.8	4.4									
2011					8.4								
2012		2.3											
2013							12.4						8.4
2014			3.3	5.3						10.1			

of the Greens appears linear: between 4 and 7.5 per cent in the 1980s, around 9 per cent in the 1990s and an average of 11 per cent in the 2000s. In 2013, these results allowed the Greens to join an unprecedented ‘rainbow’ coalition that associated the Liberals, the Socialists and the Greens, expelling the Christian Democrats (CVP) in the opposition.³

The third model pertains to the evolution of *GroenLinks* in the Netherlands. *GroenLinks* experienced electoral decline. In 2012, it even suffered a bitter defeat with only 2.3 per cent of the vote. On the same side of the political spectrum, the party is challenged by the Socialist Party (SP), a Maoist-rooted organisation that is extremely active, but also by the Party for the Animals (PvdD), which gained two seats in the House of Representatives in 2006.

Thirty years or more after their birth, Green parties in consociational democracies have succeeded in becoming nonmarginal political actors and in acquiring an undeniable relevance in their political system. Nevertheless, even the most successful of them have rarely exceeded 10 per cent of the votes. In some cases, this was a sufficient score to ensure their participation in national government (Belgium, 1999–2003; Germany, 1998–2005; Luxembourg, 2013), but this remains a rare event. While they emerged as the vectors of *New Politics*, Green parties are in some cases challenged on that topic by new or renewed actors, which are mainly situated on the left side of the political spectrum – The Left in Germany, the Socialist Party in the Netherlands, the Workers’ Party in Belgium, The Left in Luxembourg. Many of these organisations are entrenched in the eco-socialist project and are more distant than the Greens from power and political institutions.

Scandinavia and Northern Europe

The five Nordic states – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – use proportional electoral rules, which should *a priori* facilitate the emergence of new parties and their access to the parliamentary arena. Nevertheless, these countries differ according to the configuration of their political systems. Historically, and to a certain extent still today, in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, the party system has been dominated by the Social Democrats. However, this has never been the case in Finland and Iceland.

Assessing the performances of Green parties in Denmark is difficult (see Table 11.2). The current member of the European Green Party (EGP) is the Socialist People’s Party (SF). This party was founded in 1959 as a split from the Danish Communist Party and was led by its former leader in disgrace, Aksel Larsen. It has long appeared as a communist organisation that developed away from the Soviet legacy and opened itself to new societal issues related to postmaterialism (Gotovitch, et al., 1992). The SF holds the status of observer in the EGP, while being a member of the Nordic Green Left Alliance, in which it connects with organisations like the Left Party of Sweden, the Left Alliance of Finland as well as the Socialist Left Party of Norway. In parallel, a Green party (*De Gronne*) emerged in the early 1980s but was never able to break through. It was expelled from the

Table 11.2 Electoral results of the Nordic Greens in legislative elections (%)

	<i>Denmark</i>		<i>Norway</i>	<i>Sweden</i>	<i>Finland</i>
	<i>SF</i>	<i>De Gronne</i>	<i>MDG</i>	<i>MG</i>	<i>VL</i>
1975	5.0				
1977	3.9				
1979	5.9				
1981	11.3				
1982				1.7	
1983					1.5
1984	11.5				
1985				1.5	
1986					
1987	14.6	1.3			4.0
1988	13.0	1.3		5.5	
1989			0.4		
1990	8.3	0.8			
1991				3.4	6.8
1993			0.1		
1994	7.3			5.0	
1995					6.5
1997			0.2		
1998	7.6			4.5	
1999					7.3
2001	6.4		0.1		
2002				4.6	
2003					8.0
2005	6.0		0.1		
2006				5.2	
2007	13.0				8.5
2009			0.3		
2010				7.3	
2011	9.2				7.3
2013			2.8		
2014				6.8	

EGP because it evolved in the opposite direction of the SF, that is, it reconciled with the radical left. It is therefore necessary to be cautious when interpreting their electoral results. We report the results of the SF, but it would be a mistake to consider its electoral evolution as that of a Green party.

In Norway and Denmark, the two Green parties are totally evanescent political organisations. They have failed to find a niche between the Social Democrats and

left parties. However, in 2013, the Norwegian Greens (MDG) won one per cent of the vote and one seat in the House of Representatives for the first time in their history.

There is no Green party *as such* in Iceland. The Left–Green Movement (*Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð*) promotes eco-socialism and locates on the left of Social Democracy. It is also a member of the Nordic Green Left Alliance.

In light of these facts, only two Green parties can be described as ‘relevant’ in the Nordic countries: the Green Party in Sweden (MG) and the Green League of Finland (VL). The Swedish Green party first crossed the electoral threshold in 1988. With 5.5 per cent of the vote, it gained access to parliamentary representation. However, this performance long remained exceptional. It had to wait until the 2010 election to exceed this level by winning 7.3 per cent of the vote. In-between, the Greens oscillated between 3.4 and 5.2 per cent, flirting with the electoral threshold. In 1991, the Greens did not reach it and were left without parliamentary representation. In 2014, the result was slightly below the 2010 performance (6.8 per cent).

The Finnish Green League, also born in the early 1980s, has a different destiny. The party won its first seat in 1983. Since then, it has experienced a slow but steady increase, reaching 8.5 per cent of the vote in 2007. In the 2011 election, the Green League suffered a significant drop for the first time (–1 percentage point). It is hard to say whether this indicates that the party reached a ceiling or whether this is due to the vicissitudes of a particular election. The Green League has regularly been part of the government coalition since 1995.

Assessing the electoral fate of Green parties in the Nordic states, the picture appears quite disparate. The Greens are absent in Iceland and almost invisible in Norway and Denmark. In Sweden and Finland, the two Green parties have established themselves as parliamentary actors, but with modest electoral profiles.

In the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland, Green parties face different electoral systems. In the UK, the single-member plurality system raises important barriers to the entry of new outsider parties. Ireland uses the single transferable vote system, which is proportional but operates in low-magnitude districts where the strategy of the parties in terms of voting instructions is important.

The Green Party of the United Kingdom is one of the earliest. In September 1990, the Green Party was split into two organisations acting on different territorial areas: the Green Party of England and Wales (GPEW) and the Scottish Green Party (SGP). Both parties have won only marginal scores in recent British electoral history;⁴ roughly between 0.5 and 1 per cent. These scores should be put in perspective given that the Greens do not present candidates in all constituencies. In 2010, for the first time in their history, they were able to gain a seat in the House of Commons. With 16,238 votes compared to 14,986 for the Labour candidate and 12,275 for the Conservative candidate in the constituency of Brighton Pavilion, Catherine Lucas became the first Green MP in the UK history. However, the Green Party is first and foremost a political organisation characterised by extra-institutional activism.

The picture is slightly different at the level of regional assemblies, particularly in the Scottish Assembly.⁵ At its first election in 1999, the Scottish Greens won a seat. In 2003, the party reached 6.9 per cent and won six seats. In 2007 and 2011, the party suffered a net decline with a score averaging 4 per cent. In the Welsh Assembly, the Greens usually reach a score between 2.5 and 3.5 per cent, which has never permitted them to access regional representation.

In Ireland, the Green Party is a minor political actor. It has never exceeded 5 per cent of the votes. However, in 1989, it won its first seat and then gradually expanded its parliamentary representation. The six seats it won in 2007 allowed the party to take part in the government for the first time, first with the Progressive Democrats and *Fianna Fáil*, then only with *Fianna Fáil*. However, this experience proved disastrous given the dramatic financial and economic crisis that Ireland faced during this legislature. In the 2011 election, the Green Party lost all its parliamentary representation.

Southern Europe

The situation of Green parties in southern Europe is extremely precarious despite more favourable electoral systems than in the UK (Table 11.3).

The Portuguese Greens (*Partido Ecologista Os Verdes*) participated in all national elections in alliance with the Communist Party (PCP), a much larger organisation. Similarly, in Spain, the Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV) participated in national elections on its own only once. At all other elections, the party was a member of the Coalition of the Left (*Izquierda Unida*). Since 2008, the Italian Greens were also part of a coalition 'The Left – The Rainbow' (*La Sinistra – The Arcobaleno*) with the Communist Refoundation Party, the Party of Italian Communists and the Democratic Left. In 2013, they joined the 'Civil Revolution' coalition that gathered the same parties – without the Democratic Left – and was also joined by Italy of Values. Prior to this, the Italian Greens generally ran independently, obtaining minor results (around 2.5 per cent of the votes) but enough to gain 10 to 20 deputies and senators.

In France, the Greens have long achieved inconclusive results. In 1986, although the system of proportional representation was exceptionally introduced, the hope of winning seats did not materialise. In 1993, the Greens reached a substantial score in terms of vote (7.6 per cent) but did not win any seats. In the aftermath of this failure, the party abandoned the so-called 'neither left nor right' strategy and favoured an alliance with the left. This new strategy was first implemented in 1997. It allowed the French Greens to access the National Assembly. Even better, in the context of the plural left, it allowed them to participate in government. Since then, the Greens have maintained this strategy. They obtain low results in national elections – between 3 and 5 per cent of the votes – but manage to win parliamentary seats (17 in 2012). However, these results should be put in perspective given that the Greens do not run candidates in all constituencies.

Table 11.3 Electoral results of Green parties in Southern Europe (%)

	<i>France</i>	<i>Cyprus</i>	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Spain</i>		<i>Italy</i>	<i>Malta</i>
	<i>EELV</i>	<i>KOP</i>	<i>OP</i>	<i>Los Verdes</i>	<i>ICV</i>	<i>Verdi</i>	<i>AD</i>
1981	1.1						
1986	1.2			0.2			
1987						2.5	
1988	0.4						
1989				0.8			
1992						2.8	1.7
1993	7.6			0.8			
1994						2.7	
1995							
1996		1.0		0.3		2.5	1.4
1997	4.1						
1998							1.2
1999							
2000			0.3	0.3	0.5		
2001		2.0				2.2	
2002	4.4						
2003							0.7
2004				0.2			
2006		1.9				2.1	
2007	3.2		1.1				
2008				0.2			1.3
2009			2.5				
2011		2.2					
2012	5.5		2.9				
			0.9				
2013							1.8

In Cyprus, Greece and Malta, Green parties are extremely weak. In Malta, the Democratic Alternative (AD), founded in 1989, has never exceeded 1.8 per cent of the votes and never won a seat. This is partly due to the very low magnitude of the electoral districts. The AD is trapped in a perfect bipartisan system. Therefore, the party can only focus on the ‘cultural struggle’ since its prospects to enter the parliamentary arena are insignificant. In Cyprus, the Ecological and Environmental Movement (Kinima Oikologon Perivallontiston – KOP) first took part in the national election in 1996 and got 1 per cent of the vote. Since then, it has participated in all elections. Since 2001, the party has been able to win a seat at each

election. KOP is still a minor actor, but it can no longer be considered as marginal. In Greece, the Ecologist Greens (OP) first took part in the election of 2000. They achieved their best result at the polls in May 2012, with almost 3 per cent of the vote, but were not able to win seats. A month later, however, the party lost two points as a result of strategic voting in an election where the Conservatives and the Radical Left were neck and neck to win the first place.

Green parties are far from being relevant actors in the southern European countries. With the exception of France, and to a certain extent Italy in the 1990s, Green parties are confined to low electoral scores. In these political landscapes still largely polarised between the left and the right, the Greens are struggling to find a clear positioning and a specific audience. Given the prevalent socio-economic agenda, and because socialist parties are embodying the progressive side of the new societal cleavage, the Greens do not appear as a credible alternative.

Central and Eastern Europe

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Czechoslovak Greens represented the best hope for the Green parties during the first democratic elections. However, they only met partial success – 4.1 per cent – and did not win any seat. This initial disappointment was difficult to overcome, and the Czech Greens (SZ), after the split of Czechoslovakia, did not go the polls until 1998. In 1998, the result – 1.1 per cent – was disappointing, to say the least. During the next eight years, the party achieved only modest scores or did not even run for election. In 2006, however, the SZ took everyone by surprise by collecting 6.3 per cent of the vote and six seats. After lengthy negotiations, the Greens took part in a right-wing government, a decision that harmed them. In the 2010 election, the Green Party attracted only 2.4 per cent of the votes and lost all its MPs. Despite a slight increase in 2013, the Greens remain without parliamentary representation. The low relevance of the Slovak Greens (SZ) is even more striking. For the 1994 elections, the small Green party formed a cartel with the Social Democrats and the ex-Communists but then disappeared from the national electoral landscape for two legislatures. In 2002, the party collected 0.99 per cent of the vote then again disappeared until 2012, when it got 0.3 per cent. The fate of the Greens in Poland is not much better. The Green Party (*Zieloni*) was founded in 2003 and has never participated as an independent actor in any national election. In Hungary, the party affiliated to the European Green Party (EGP) does not refer directly to political ecology in its label. Founded in 2009, Politics Can Be Different (LMP) made a remarkable breakthrough in the 2010 election by winning 7.5 per cent of the vote and five seats. In 2014, the party slightly declined – 5.3 per cent.

In Eastern Europe, the Green parties are equally evanescent. In Bulgaria, two Green parties are recognised by the EGP, the Bulgarian Green Party (ZPB) and the Greens (*Zelenite*). The former was established in the second half of the 2000s and has been marginal. It won 0.5 per cent of the vote at the 2009 national elections. In 2013, it was one of the tiny components of the Coalition for Bulgaria, organised around the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). The latter Green organisation

is equally insignificant. The Greens took part in the 2013 national elections but gained only 0.7 per cent of the votes and no parliamentarians. In Romania, the Green Party (PV) was established in 2006. It went to the polls on its own in 2008, it collected just 0.3 per cent of the vote. Challenged by the emergence of a rival organisation, the Green Movement (MV), the PV agreed with the latter to both join the ‘Social Liberal Union’ cartel organised around the Social Democrats and the national Liberals. Each of them won a seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the MV merged into the PV.

What about the states that emerged out of the collapse of Yugoslavia? There, Green parties have only developed in Slovenia and Croatia. In Slovenia, the Green movement was embodied in the Youth Party, later renamed Youth Party – European Greens (SMS – *Zeleni Evrope*). Established in 2000, it immediately managed to enter the House at the 2000 national election, reaching 4.3 per cent of the vote and four seats. However, the SMS could not reiterate this score. In 2004, it dropped to 2.1 per cent and lost its representation. During the 2008 election, it formed as a minor partner in an electoral cartel with the Slovenian people’s party. The alliance reached 5.2 per cent and won five seats, none of them for the SMS. Three years later, it won 0.9 per cent of the votes. In 2014, the party did not run for the election. On that occasion, another environmental organisation went to the polls, the Greens of Slovenia (ZS), but won only 0.5 per cent of the votes. In Croatia, the Green List (ZL), founded in 2005, recently merged into the Croatian Sustainable Development Party (ORaH). In Serbia, a Green party exists on paper, but it has never taken part in any national election. The same situation applies in Montenegro for the ‘Positive Montenegro’ party, which is a member of the EGP, and in Macedonia for the Democratic Renewal party.

The situation of Green parties in the Baltic States is contrasted. In Lithuania, the Greens are virtually nonexistent. The Lithuanian Green Party (LZP) only went to the polls in 1992 and won 0.1 per cent of the vote. The party did not participate in the subsequent elections until recently. The picture is quite different in Latvia. At its first election in 1993, the Latvian Green Party (LZP) won 1.2 per cent of the vote. Thereafter, the party launched a strategy of electoral cartels: In 1995, it allied with the National Independence Movement, and the cartel got 6.1 per cent of the votes and eight seats. In 1998, a cartel was created with the Labour Party and the Christian Democratic Union, but it led to a small 2.3 per cent and no seats. From 2002, a new cartel has been established, this time with the Latvian Farmers’ Union (LZS). The formula has been much more promising. In 2002, the coalition won 9.4 per cent of the vote and 12 seats. Four years later, it won 16.7 per cent and 18 seats. In 2010, it won 19.7 per cent and no less than 22 seats. With this strategy, the Latvian Green party has become the most relevant party in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and an occasional government partner that has even occupied the post of prime minister during a few months. The Estonian Greens (EER), established in 1991, went first to the polls in 1992. Their score was small – 2.6 per cent – but allowed them to win a seat. However, the party could not sustain this performance and remained absent from the electoral scene for 15 years. In 2007, it came back and realised an unexpected breakthrough: 7.1 per cent of the vote,

which allowed it to win six seats. But again, the Estonian Greens were not able to consolidate their performance. Four years later, the party only got 3.8 per cent of the vote and consequently lost its parliamentary representation.

Electoral results of Green parties at the European elections

Green parties also compete in European elections. These elections have been qualified as *second-order elections* (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985), based on four characteristics: a higher level of abstention than in national elections (Delwit, 2002; Koepke and Ringe, 2006); a better result for small parties (including the Greens) due to lower levels of strategic or utilitarian voting and higher levels of ‘vot[ing] with the heart’ (Hix and Marsh, 2007, p. 497); a sanction vote against governing party(ies) given the national – and not European – focus of these elections (lower for junior coalition partners, see Hix and Marsh, 2007); lower results for government parties as a result of a strengthening of ‘vot[ing] with the heart’.

Table 11.4 shows that Green parties do indeed perform better in European elections than in national elections. This is especially striking in the case of the French Greens or the Swedish Greens.

However, these findings have to be nuanced. First, this global picture does not contradict what was observed at the national level. Green parties are mainly relevant in Western Europe and in some Scandinavian countries. Southern and Central-Eastern Europe remain mission lands for the Greens. Second, the results do not take abstentions into account. Since abstention in the European elections is substantially higher than in national elections, performance must be relativised. The Greens not only benefit from the ‘vote with the heart’ effect, but also from the fact that their electorate has a higher education capital than the average electorate (see below). This segment is, all things being equal, the least affected by the higher level of abstention in the European elections. Third, the dynamic is not linear but rather cyclic, with three electoral breakthroughs: 1989, 1999 and 2009. However, these breakthroughs were not necessarily consolidated in the following election(s).

Overall, this overview of Green parties’ electoral performances reveals a mixed record. On the one hand, one can point out that, whatever their degree of success or failure, no Green party has disappeared so far (Rihoux, 2001, p. 21). On the other hand, as was pointed out by Mair (1999), after their electoral breakthrough in the 1980s, Green parties have been struggling to reach new thresholds and new electoral bases. The Greens appear as an electorally stagnant family. However, the failure announced by Mair is not verified.

At the heart of Europe, Green parties have established themselves as political actors that count. Several of them have or have had executive responsibilities at the national or the subnational level, although it remains exceptional. Moreover, their electoral performances fluctuate between 5 and 10 per cent, and Green parties face difficulties to pass the ceiling of 10 per cent. Outside of this heartland, Green parties are characterised by low relevance, with the exception of the Swedish and Finnish Greens.

Table 11.4 Electoral results of Green parties in European elections (%)

	1979	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014
Austria				6.8	9.3	12.9	9.7	14.5
Belgium	3.4	8.2	13.9	11.6	16.0	8.7	13.5	11.0
Bulgaria						0.5		0.9
Croatia								9.4
Cyprus						0.9	1.5	*
Czech Republic						3.2	2.1	3.8
Denmark	4.7	9.2	9.1	8.6	7.1	8.0	15.9	10.9
Estonia						2.7	2.7	0.3
Finland				7.6	13.4	10.4	12.4	9.3
France	4.4	3.4	10.6	2.9	9.7	7.7	17.3	8.9
Germany	3.2	8.1	8.4	10.1	6.4	11.9	12.1	10.7
Greece						0.7	3.5	0.9
Hungary						5.3	5.3	5.0
Ireland		0.5	3.7	7.9	6.7	4.3	1.9	4.9
Italy			3.8	3.2	1.7	2.5		0.9
Latvia						4.3	3.8	8.3
Lithuania								3.6
Luxembourg		6.1	10.5	10.9	10.7	15.0	16.8	15.0
Malta						9.3	2.3	2.9
Netherlands		5.6	7.0	6.1	11.8	7.4	9.1	7.2
Poland						0.3		0.3
Portugal								
Romania						0.4		0.3
Slovakia							2.1	0.5
Slovenia						2.3	1.9	0.8
Spain								
Sweden				18.2	9.5	6.0	11.0	15.3
United Kingdom	0.1	0.5	14.4	3.1	6.4	6.1	8.3	8.3

* The Green Party has made an alliance with the Social Democrats (EDEK).

In 1998, Müller-Rommel isolated eight ‘successful Green Parties’ in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland (Müller-Rommel, 1998). More than 15 years later, the dynamics haven’t changed much with the exception of the Latvian Greens and possibly the French and Hungarian Greens.

The profile of Green voters

This second section looks beyond differences in electoral fates and analyses commonalities of the Green electorate across Europe. More specifically, it explores the distinctiveness of the Green electorate in terms of their social characteristics, political preferences, form and degree of social and political activism and attitudes towards politics and democratic institutions. Analysing attitudinal data from the latest round of the European Social Survey (ESS), the results reveal that the 'Green vote' is mainly determined by voters' social characteristics and political preferences but should also be connected to citizens' preferred forms of political activism. These results give evidence of the relative stability of the Green electorate.

Explaining the Green vote

Because Green parties put the emphasis on 'values that might be important for the survival of mankind instead of promoting the welfare of particular groups' (Dolezal, 2010, p. 537), the Green vote was mostly considered as an issue- or value-based vote that transcended the old 'class-politics' or traditional societal divisions, and the Green electorate was depicted as socio-demographically heterogeneous.

However, more systematic studies have challenged this initial view (Poguntke, 1993; Müller-Rommel, 2002; Dolezal, 2010). Scholars have shown that Green voters share specific sociological characteristics: They are proportionally younger (Franklin and Rüdiger, 1992), more female (Knutson, 2004, pp. 198–200), with a higher level of education (Knutson, 2004). Support for the Greens is higher among students and housewives and lower among the retired (Dolezal, 2010) and among middle-class employees in the public sector (Poguntke, 1993; Müller-Rommel, 2002; Knutson, 2005). Scholars have also shown that the Green electorate is anchored in traditional cleavages: Green voters would share a left-leaning, state-intervention view on economic issues (Müller-Rommel, 1985; Kitschelt, 1988; Kriesi, 1999); they would clearly adopt progressive positions on issues such as gender equality, same sex marriage, abortion rights, and so forth, and be less integrated in the traditional Christian churches (Dolezal, 2010); and the support for the Greens would be higher among residents of big cities (Kriesi, 1993; Dolezal, 2010), as the Green movement was born in populated, industrial, secular and multicultural areas.

However, the emergence of Green parties in the late 1970s is often related to the emergence of a *new* structuring conflict in Western societies. Inglehart referred to a divide between materialist and postmaterialist values (Inglehart, 1977; Kitschelt, 1989), which resulted in growing environmental concerns among Western citizens. This 'new cultural cleavage' (Kriesi, et al., 2006) would also include other types of values and issues. Hooghe, et al. (2002) conceive this new conflict as an opposition between a Green–Alternative–Libertarian (GAL) pole and a Traditional–Authoritarian–Nationalism (TAN) pole. Kriesi, et al. (2006) add to these dimensions a fundamental opposition between 'demarcation' and

‘integration’, the demarcation pole being ‘characterized by an opposition to the process of European integration and by restrictive positions with regard to immigration’ (Kriesi, et al., 2006, p. 924).

Consequently, in terms of political attitudes, Green voters should care a lot about Green issues (Franklin and Rüdiger, 1992) and support individuals’ autonomy and liberty against any form of domination or cultural regulation; they should display cosmopolitan orientations, be more supportive of international and supranational institutions and be more concerned with the rights of immigrants (Poguntke, 1993).

Our analysis aims at testing whether the Green electorate can still be differentiated on the basis of their social characteristics and political preferences, but also according to the type and degree of social and political activism and their attitudes towards politics and democratic institutions. Since the Greens ‘wanted to promote a model of participative democracy’ (Villalba, 2005, p. 82) or of ‘popular participation’ (Kitschelt, 1988, p. 195), we expect Green voters to be more socially and politically active than the rest of the electorate, especially in New Social Movements (Kriesi, 1999) and in unconventional forms of participation (demonstration, petition, boycott, etc.) (Poguntke, 1987). By contrast, we expect Green voters to be less entrenched in traditional forms of political activism such as party membership.

Regarding Green voters’ attitudes towards politics and institutions, we expect Green voters to be relatively more interested in politics than other voters, in line with the findings about their educational profile. Second, we formulate two alternative hypotheses regarding their level of trust in institutions and satisfaction with the state of affairs in their country. If the Green vote constitutes a form of protest vote (Kitschelt, 1988), we should find a relatively lower level of trust and satisfaction among Green voters. However, because the Green voters tend to be more entrenched on the ‘winner’ side of the globalisation process, they could show higher levels of trust and satisfaction than other categories of voters. The analysis allows clarifying which interpretation is the more relevant.

Data and method

The analysis relies on the latest round of the ESS (2012). Green voters are identified with the question asking the respondents which party they voted for in the last national election. Abstainers and respondents who did not answer the question are excluded from the analysis; the statistical models (logistic regression) thus compare Green voters with voters for all other parties.

The original ESS 2012 database includes 29 countries from the European Union and beyond. Our analysis focuses on 15 of these 29 countries in which a Green electorate could be identified (Table 11.5).⁶ In many southern European states (Spain, Portugal, Italy), the Greens have taken part in elections in coalition with other parties, which makes the delineation between Green voters impossible. This leaves us with only France and Greece for southern European countries.

Table 11.5 Distribution of Green voters by country (2012 round of the ESS)

Country	Party acronym/short name	Vote for another party	Green vote	Total
Austria	Grüne	1,027	199	1,226
		83.8%	16.2%	100%
Belgium	Groen!/Ecolo	1,162	134	1,296
		89.7%	10.3%	100%
Czech Republic	SZ	1,273	46	1,319
		96.5%	3.5%	100%
Denmark	SF	1,186	141	1,327
		89.4%	10.6%	100%
Estonia	EER	1,248	26	1,274
		98.0%	2.0%	100%
Finland	VL	1,332	166	1,498
		88.9%	11.1%	100%
France	EELV	1,147	66	1,213
		94.6%	5.4%	100%
Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	1,635	199	1,834
		89.1%	10.9%	100%
Greece	OP	1,172	38	1,210
		96.9%	2.3%	100%
Hungary	LMP	950	52	1,002
		94.8%	5.2%	100%
Ireland	Green Party	1,614	38	1,652
		97.7%	2.3%	100%
Netherlands	GL	1,364	40	1,404
		97.2%	2.8%	100%
Sweden	MG	1,301	140	1,441
		90.3%	9.7%	100%
Switzerland	GPS	632	70	702
		90.0%	10.0%	100%
United Kingdom	GPEW	1,419	19	1,438
		98.7%	1.3%	100%
Total		18,462	1,374	19,836
		93.1%	6.9%	100%

The analysis examines the influence of four sets of independent variables on the Green vote. With regard to socio-demographic characteristics, age is measured as a continuous variable; gender is a dummy variable; education has been recoded in three categories (primary, secondary and higher education). The religion variable is measured with two indicators: religious belonging and practice (measured as

frequency of religious service attendance apart from special occasions). The ‘occupation’ variable includes eight categories: self-employed or independent, private sector employee, public sector employee, student, unemployed, housewife/house husband, retired and others. The type of residence variable distinguishes between rural (countryside or small village), semiurban small town) and urban (big city).

Regarding respondents’ political preferences,⁷ we use the position of voters on Likert-type questions or indexes related to issues or dimensions. For the socio-economic dimension, we use the proposition ‘the government should reduce differences in income level’ (a high score indicates a leftist position). For the cultural dimension, we use the proposition ‘gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish’ (a high score indicates a more progressive opinion). For the environmental dimension we use the question on the ‘importance they give to caring about the nature and the environment’ (a high score indicates a tendency to care much about environmental issues). The position on the libertarian/authoritarian dimension is measured with an additive index based on two propositions: the ‘importance that government is strong and ensures safety’ and the ‘importance to follow traditions and customs’ (a high score on the index indicates more libertarian attitudes). For positions on immigration, we use the respondents’ opinion about whether immigrants make their country a worse or a better place to live (a low score indicates ethnocentrism). For positions on EU integration, we use a variable measuring the respondents’ average trust in the EU parliament (a high score indicates a high level of trust).⁸

Regarding the degree and form of social and political activism, we computed three indexes. The social activism is an additive index of three variables: ‘how often socially meet with friends, relatives of colleagues’, ‘how often take part in social activities compared to others of same age’, ‘have worked in another organisation or association last 12 months’. The conventional political activism index is an additive index of three variables: party identification or proximity (‘feel closer to a particular party’), membership of a union or similar organisation and whether the respondent has worked for a political party in the last 12 months. The unconventional political activism index is an additive index of four variables: ‘wore or displayed a campaign badge or sticker’, ‘signed a petition’, ‘took part in a lawful public demonstration’ and ‘boycotted certain products’ in the last 12 months.

Lastly, regarding attitudes towards politics and institutions, the level of interest in politics is a four-category variable (‘very interested’, ‘quite interested’, ‘hardly interested’ and ‘not at all interested’). Trust in institutions is an additive index of five items: trust in the country’s parliament, in the legal system, in politicians, in the police and in the United Nations (a high score indicates a high level of trust). Satisfaction is an additive index of respondents’ satisfaction on three items: the present state of the economy in their country, the way democracy works in general and their national government (a high score indicates a high level of satisfaction).

As several studies show that the profile of Green voters differs across countries (Müller-Rommel, 1985), and given the hierarchical structure of the database, we take into account the ‘clustered’ nature of our database. However, the low number of countries does not permit to conduct a multilevel analysis (Maas and Hox,

2004), and the weak number of Green voters in many countries impedes running the statistical models in each country separately. As a consequence, the logistics models presented in the next section include country ‘dummies’ in order to control for potential country effects.

The profile of Green voters: A cross-sectional perspective

The multivariate analysis presented in Table 11.6 permits the identification of the marginal effect of each predictor. Five models are displayed. Model 1 tests the effect of socio-demographic variables. Model 2 focuses on issue-based or preference-based explanations. Model 3 looks at the impact of the two other sets of variables (activism and attitudes towards politics and institutions). Model 4 tests simultaneously the effect of all these predictors, while Model 5 controls for country effects.⁹

Model 1 confirms that socio-demographic variables remain determinant in explaining the Green vote, even if the pseudo R^2 are not high. The probability of voting for a Green party is higher for younger age categories, women, urban residents and religion belonging. The frequency of attendance of religious services also reduces the likelihood of voting for the Greens, but the relationship loses its statistical significance after controlling for country effect). Only the effect of occupation contradicts expectations based on previous findings: Employees are not more likely than self-employed to vote for the Greens. The results even give a reverse picture, although the effect is weaker and less significant in the case of employees in the public sector (Models 1 and 5). As expected, the unemployed are less likely to vote for the Greens – thus confirming the idea that Green voters are not on the ‘loser’ side of the new cleavage – but the relationship hardly reaches the significant level. As far as students – and the retired – are concerned, there might be a problem of collinearity with ‘age’. Overall, the effect of occupation is unclear. This could result from a long-term decline of ‘class voting’ (Clark and Lipset, 2001). This could also indicate that the Green vote transcends classes and thus differs on that aspect from other more ‘traditional’ parties, as suggested by early studies.

As Model 2 shows, issue-based explanations prove very relevant. Compared to Model 1, the pseudo R^2 are increased, which indicates that the issue-based model has a greater explanatory power than the sociological model. Positions on both the old and the new cleavages appear as significant predictors of the Green vote. The highest coefficient is found for position on the postmaterialist or environmental dimension, followed by positions on the libertarian and cultural progressive dimensions. Interestingly, the position towards the EU shows the weakest (and least significant) coefficient. Green voters might in fact have an ambivalent position towards the EU (Dolezal, 2010, p. 542). On the one hand, they might support the opening of borders and a greater political integration of the EU. On the other hand, they might perceive the EU as being disconnected from citizens and away from the participatory model of democracy that constitutes one of the basic elements of the Greens’ programmes; Green voters may also be critical of the EU’ neo-liberal economic policies.

Table 11.6 The determinants of the Green vote – Results of logistic regressions

Predictors		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
		<i>b</i> (s.e.)	<i>b</i> (s.e.)	<i>b</i> (s.e.)	<i>b</i> (s.e.)	<i>b</i> (s.e.)
Socio-demographics						
Age		-.021*** (.002)			-.019*** (.002)	-.016*** (.002)
Gender (ref. male)		.509*** (.061)			.420*** (.069)	.430*** (.070)
Education (ref. 'primary education')	Secondary	.891*** (.179)			.578** (.202)	.563** (.206)
	Tertiary	1.490*** (.183)			.916*** (.209)	.986*** (.213)
Religion		-.138* (.069)			.020 (.077)	-.158* (.081)
Religious attendance (ref. 'never')	Sometimes	-.216** (.067)			-.114 (.075)	-.067 (.079)
	Often	-.587*** (.107)			-.336** (.121)	-.136 (.124)
Social/ occupational classes (ref. 'self- employed or independent')	Private sector employee	-.253** (.097)			-.237* (.105)	-.230* (.108)
	Public sector employee	-.118 (.100)			-.243* (.110)	-.191 (.113)
	Student	.077 (.210)			.021 (.235)	-.109 (.245)
	Unem- ployed	-.572 (.314)			-.331 (.328)	-.344 (.339)
	House- wife/ husband	-.175 (.185)			-.194 (.207)	-.255 (.212)
	Retired	.190 (.175)			.238 (.195)	.104 (.201)
	Other	.083 (.138)			-.032 (.158)	-.055 (.162)
	Residence (ref. urban)	Semi urban	-.252*** (.068)			-.182* (.076)
Rural		-.475*** (.072)			-.396*** (.079)	-.470*** (.083)
Political preferences						
Left socio- economic			.151*** (.029)		.175*** (.033)	.138*** (.034)

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	
	<i>b (s.e.)</i>	<i>b (s.e.)</i>	<i>b (s.e.)</i>	<i>b (s.e.)</i>	<i>b (s.e.)</i>	
Cultural progressive		.461*** (.042)		.285*** (.045)	.249*** (.047)	
Environment		.588*** (.038)		.607*** (.041)	.589*** (.042)	
Libertarian		.434*** (.029)		.361*** (.034)	.320*** (.035)	
Proimmigration		.142*** (.015)		.104*** (.017)	.124*** (.018)	
Pro-Europe		.042** (.014)		.021 (.020)	.041* (.021)	
Social and political activism						
Social activism			.123 (.070)	.020 (.077)	-.024 (.079)	
Conventional political activism			-.378** (.121)	-.107 (.137)	-.422** (.146)	
Unconventional political activism			2.207*** (.113)	1.070*** (.129)	1.020*** (.137)	
Attitudes towards politics and institutions						
Interest in politics (ref. 'Not at all interested')	Very interested		-.052 (.144)	-.299 (.159)	-.437** (.164)	
	Quite interested		-.016 (.129)	-.109 (.139)	-.213 (.143)	
	Hardly interested		.148 (.130)	.124 (.137)	.054 (.140)	
Trust			.050* (.023)	-.045 (.030)	-.028 (.032)	
Satisfaction			.072*** (.027)	.080*** (.023)	-.035 (.025)	
Intercept		-2.258*** (.233)	-10.328*** (.014)	-3.795*** (.157)	-9.132*** (.443)	-8.644*** (.492)
N		19,600	17,939	17,759	16,634	16,634
Log Likelihood		9209.748	8243.231	8580.528	7284.068	6930.553
Cox & Snell R ²		.033	.056	.026	.078	.097
Nagelkerke R ²		.084	.139	.065	.192	.240

Note: $p \leq 0.1$; *: $p \leq 0.05$; **: $p \leq 0.01$; ***: $p \leq 0.001$.

Dependent variable: 'Vote for Green party'.

The pseudo R^2 found in Model 3 suggest that the respondents' degree and form of activism have a rather weak explanatory power. Regarding social activism, there is no significant and clear tendency. However, the analysis supports the idea that Green voters are entrenched in the New Social Movements, as Models 3, 4 and 5 indicate that the more a respondent is involved in unconventional forms of participation, the more likely s/he is to vote for the Greens. By contrast, the more a respondent is engaged in conventional forms of participation, the less likely s/he is to vote for a Green party (Models 3 and 5).

Surprisingly, the level of interest in politics is not a determinant factor of the Green vote. The relationship even contradicts our hypothesis. When controlling for sociological variables, political preferences, activism and attitudes towards institutions (in Model 5), the level of interest in politics diminishes the probability of voting for the Greens. It might be that Green voters are not interested in politics in general or in conventional politics but are rather mobilised on specific 'niche' issues. This is congruent with the roots of Green parties, which have capitalised on diverse social movements that mobilised around particular matters (environmental, feminist, minorities' movements, etc.); this is also congruent with the unconventional forms of activism adopted by Green voters.

Lastly, Model 3 displays weak but positive relationships between trust and satisfaction with institutions and the Green vote, suggesting that the Green vote has lost its protest function. However, when controlling for other variables (especially the country), the relationships lose their significance. This makes sense since the levels of trust and satisfaction are correlated with the national political and economic contexts. Interestingly, if we compare the electoral success of Green parties with the average levels of trust and satisfaction in the 15 countries, we find that Green parties are more successful in countries with relatively high aggregate levels of trust and of satisfaction.¹⁰ However, the relationship at the individual level is not fully confirmed.

Comparing these results with earlier studies, the Green electorate appears quite stable in its characteristics. Compared to the electorate of other parties, Green voters remain younger, more educated, less religious and more urban; and women are still overrepresented. The effect of occupation is mixed, which suggests that Green parties could be considered as transversal parties. The Green vote still appears as an issue-based vote: individuals' political preferences have a strong predicting power, especially towards the environmental issue. Green voters are also positioned on the left side of the socio-economic political spectrum; they share progressive and libertarian attitudes and promote a culturally open society – although they do not seem to blindly support the EU integration process.

Our analysis suggests that other elements also characterise the Green electorate. This is particularly the case of activism: Green voters are significantly more involved in unconventional forms of political participation than other voters. These results are in line with the *New Politics* ideals brought by the Green movement at its inception. This specific 'activist' profile could partly explain the unexpected relationship between political interest and the Green vote: Green voters do not claim to be interested in politics in general, but they are mobilised

around specific issues. Finally, the analysis has revealed mixed results regarding the protest component of the Green vote, which is very much connected to the specific national contexts.

Conclusion

Born in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Green parties in Europe have known very distinctive fates. In the European consociational democracies, Green parties have established themselves as relevant political actors, even if they still rarely cross the 10 per cent threshold. Other countries, mostly Nordic countries, have also faced the emergence of relevant Green parties. Yet, elsewhere in Europe, Green parties have been struggling to perform electorally. In the southern, central-eastern and Baltic countries, Green parties remain weak political organisations, with a couple of exceptions.

If Green parties in Europe have followed distinct electoral paths, their electorate can still be identified as a group sharing specific characteristics that distinguish them from other voters. Sociologically, the young, nonreligious, female, urban and educated individuals are more likely to support the Greens. Besides, the Green vote can be seen an issue-based vote that transcends the old class politics: values that are related to the new cleavage – whatever its label – are determinant. Lastly, Green voters also have a specific ‘activist’ profile: they are clearly more involved in new forms of political participation entrenched in the *New Politics* movement.

These characteristics are very similar that those identified in the early years of the Green movement. This reveals the relative stability of Green parties’ electoral basis, despite their fluctuating electoral results. What remains unclear is whether Green parties are doomed to lose their initial protest element by collaborating with old traditional parties and institutions – as we have shown, government participation has been quite harmful for the Greens – or whether they will manage to remain the promoters of a societal and political revolution, despite the development of their new challengers – the radical, red-green or eco-socialist parties.

Notes

- 1 Although the mixed electoral system is completely proportional, the political system dynamic is closer to a majoritarian logic. However, it should be noted that, during the last three legislatures, two ‘grand coalition’ governments were formed.
- 2 See Tables 1.1 (Austria and Switzerland), 2.2 (Belgium), 5.1 (Germany) and 6.2 (The Netherlands).
- 3 This is really an unusual phenomenon in Luxembourg as the Christian Democrats have only been out of government once, between 1974 and 1979.
- 4 See Chapter 9, Table 9.2 and Table 9.5.
- 5 See Chapter 9, Table 9.4.
- 6 For Austria, we use the 2008 round of the ESS, because the data for Austria is missing in the 2012 round; Luxembourg is not included in the 2012 ESS round. For Greece, we use the 2010 round of the ESS, because the data for Greece is missing in the 2012 round. For the Czech Republic, we use the 2010 round of the ESS, because the question on voting behaviour in the 2012 round does not provide a separate category for the SZ.

- For Denmark, we examine the voters of the SF with caution. We had to exclude the Latvian Greens since they formed a cartel with the Farmers' Union.
- 7 Our operationalisation of political preferences is similar to what Dolezal (2010) has proposed.
 - 8 Another question asks the respondents whether they think that the European integration 'should be pushed further' or whether it 'has already gone too far'. However, this variable was not included in the 2010 round. The (Spearman rho) correlation with the question on 'trust in the EU parliament' equals 0.402 (significant at the 0.001 level).
 - 9 The country coefficients are not included in the table for reason of space and clarity. With Sweden as a reference category, the country coefficients are positive for Austria (greatest coefficient, $b = 1.003$), Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany and Switzerland and are negative for the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (lowest coefficient, $b = -1.701$). All the coefficients are statistically significant, except for Hungary.
 - 10 At one extreme, Greece shows very low levels of trust ($= 3.05$) and satisfaction ($= 2.19$); at the other extreme, the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland show levels that are twice as high (between 6 and 7 for both variables). The Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Estonia, France and the United Kingdom display aggregate levels that range between 3.9 and 5. Belgium, Austria, Germany and the Netherlands are situated in the middle.

References

- Clark, T. N., and Lipset, S. M., eds, 2001. *The Breakdown of Class Politics: A Debate on Post-Industrial Stratification*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Croizat, M., and Quermone, J.-L., 1999. *L'Europe et le fédéralisme*. Paris: Montchrestien.
- Delwit, P., 2002. Electoral Participation and European Polls: A Limited Legitimation. In: G. Grunberg, P. Perrineau and Colette Ysmal, eds, *Europe at the Polls: The European Elections of 1999*. London and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 7–15.
- Delwit, P., 2012. *La vie politique en Belgique de 1830 à nos jours*. 3rd edition. Brussels: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles.
- Dietz, T., 2001. Les verts Européens comptent-ils? In: P. Delwit, E. Kulahci and C. Van de Walle, eds, *Les fédérations Européennes de partis: Organisation et influence*. Brussels: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles. pp. 199–212.
- Dolezal, M., 2010. Exploring the stabilization of a political force: The social and attitudinal basis of Green parties in the age of globalization. *West European Politics*, 33(3), pp. 534–552.
- Franklin, M. N., and Rüdiger, W., 1992. The Green voter in the 1989 European elections. *Environmental Politics*, 1(4), pp. 129–159.
- Galtung, J., 1986. The Green movement: A socio-historical exploration. *International Sociology*, 1(1), pp. 75–90.
- Gotovitch, J., Delwit, P., and De Waele, J.-M., 1992. *L'Europe des communistes*. Brussels: Editions Complexe.
- Hix, S., and Marsh, M., 2007. Punishment or protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections. *The Journal of Politics*, 69(2), pp. 495–510.
- Hooghe, L., Marks, G., and Wilson, C. J., 2002. Does left/right structure party positions on European integration? *Comparative Political Studies*, 35(8), pp. 965–989.
- Inglehart, R., 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Kaelberer, M., 1993. The emergence of Green parties in Europe. *Comparative Politics*, 25(2), pp. 229–243.
- Kitschelt, H. P., 1988. Left libertarian parties/explaining innovation in competitive party systems. *World Politics*, 40(2), pp. 194–234.
- Kitschelt, H. P., 1989. *The Logics of Party Formation: Ecological Politics in Belgium and West Germany*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Knutsen, O., 2004. *Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe: A Comparative Longitudinal Study*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Knutsen, O., 2005. The impact of sector employment on party choice: A comparative study of eight West European countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, 44(4), pp. 593–621.
- Koepke, J. R., and Ringe, N., 2006. The second-order election model in an enlarged Europe. *European Union Politics*, 7(3), pp. 321–346.
- Kriesi, H., 1993. *Political Mobilization and Social Change: The Dutch Case in Comparative Perspective*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Kriesi, H., 1999. Movements of the Left, Movements of the Right: Putting the Mobilization of Two New Types of Social Movements into Political Context. In: H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks and J. D. Stephens, eds, *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 398–423.
- Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschieer, S., and Frey, T., 2006. Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries Compared. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(6), pp. 921–956.
- Lijphart, A., 1981. *Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California.
- Maas, C. J. M., and Hox, J. J., 2004. Robustness issues in multilevel regression analysis. *Statistica Neerlandica*, 58(2), pp. 127–137.
- Mair, P., 1999. Evaluation des performances politiques des partis verts en Europe. In: P. Delwit and J.-M. De Waele, eds, *Les partis verts en Europe*. Brussels: Editions Complexe. pp. 23–42.
- Müller-Rommel, F., 1985. The Greens in Western Europe: Similar but different. *International Political Science Review*, 6(4), pp. 483–498.
- Müller-Rommel, F., 1998. The new challengers: Greens and right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. *European Review*, 6(2), pp. 191–202.
- Müller-Rommel, F., 2002. The Greens in the 1999 European Parliamentary Elections: The Success Story. In: P. Perrineau, G. Grunberg and C. Ysmal, eds, *Europe at the Polls: The European Elections of 1999*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 116–129.
- Poguntke, T., 1987. New politics and party systems: The emergence of a new type of party? *West European Politics*, 10(1), pp. 76–88.
- Poguntke, T., 1993. *Alternative Politics: The German Green Party*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Poguntke, T., 1998. Alliance 90/The Greens in East Germany: From Vanguard to Insignificance? *Party Politics*, 4(1), pp. 33–55.
- Reif, K., 1985. Ten Second-Order Elections. In: K. Reif, ed., *Ten European Elections: Campaigns and Results of the 1979/81 First Direct Elections to the European Parliament*. Aldershot: Gower. pp. 1–36.
- Reif, K., and Schmitt, H., 1980. Nine second-order national elections – A conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results. *European Journal of Political Research*, 8(1), pp. 3–44.

Rihoux, B., 2001. *Les partis politiques: organisations en changement. Le test des écologistes*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Sartori, G., 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Villalba, B., 2005. Ecological Contributions to the European Social Democratic Reform Project. In: P. Delwit, ed., *Social Democracy in Europe*. Brussels, Édition de l'Université de Bruxelles. pp. 79–94.