Good and bad FDI: The growth effects of greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions in developing countries

Philipp Harms and Pierre-Guillaume Méon

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Good and bad FDI: The growth effects of greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions in developing countries*

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Abstract: We explore the effect of foreign direct investment on economic growth in developing countries, distinguishing between mergers and acquisitions (“M&As”) and “greenfield” investment. A simple model underlines that, unlike greenfield investment, M&As partly represent a rent accruing to previous owners, and do not necessarily contribute to expanding the host country’s capital stock. Greenfield FDI should therefore have a stronger impact on growth than M&A sales. This hypothesis is supported by our empirical results, which show that greenfield FDI enhances growth, while M&As have no effect, at best, in a panel of up to 78 developing and emerging countries over 1987-2005.

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1. Introduction

Foreign direct investments (FDI) are usually considered a desirable form of capital inflows to developing countries. In particular, they are believed to directly add to the host economies’ capital stock and to substantially contribute to the transfer of managerial and technological expertise (Kose et al., 2010, Kemeny, 2010, Merlevede et al. 2014), and to export upgrading (Zhu and Fu, 2013). Moreover, they are presumed to be more stable and less prone to reversals than other forms of capital flows (Levchenko and Mauro 2007, Tong and Wei 2009). For these reasons, FDI is often viewed as the financial equivalent of “good cholesterol” (Hausmann and Fernández-Arias, 2001) or the “poster child for the benefits of financial globalization” (Kose et al., 2006, p.27).

Given the overall enthusiasm about FDI, it is not surprising that numerous studies have tried to empirically identify the effect of foreign direct investment on growth (see, e.g., Borensztein et al., 1998, Alfaro et al., 2004, 2010, Carkovic and Levine, 2005, Bloningen and Wang, 2005, Lensink and Morissey, 2006, Aizenman et al., 2011). However, no consensus has emerged to date on whether the expected positive influence can actually be found in the data. In their metastudy, Doucouliagos et al. (2010) count that only 43% of the regressions they survey report a significantly positive coefficient, while 17% are significantly negative and 40% insignificant. These diverse results may reflect the heterogeneity of studies in terms of methodologies, samples and specifications. What is often overlooked, though, is that not only empirical work on FDI is heterogeneous. FDI itself is.

The official benchmark definition of foreign direct investment specifies that a financial-account transaction is counted as FDI if a company’s stake in a subsidiary exceeds ten percent (OECD, 2008a). However, this definition pools together two very different forms of foreign investment: greenfield investment, whereby foreign investors build a new productive unit from scratch, and mergers and acquisitions (M&As), whereby foreign investors acquire existing assets. While the former implies an accumulation of capital, the latter is essentially a transfer of ownership. These two forms of foreign investment are fundamentally different, and there is no reason to a priori believe that their effects on host countries’ capital stocks, productivities, and growth rates are the same. This, however, is the restriction that standard regressions impose when they relate growth to total FDI inflows, and it is the gap we are trying to fill with this paper.

Distinguishing between greenfield investment and M&A sales is particularly important for developing countries: in these countries, the average reliance on FDI flows has
increased remarkably over the past decades. During the same period, the relative importance of the two entry modes has varied substantially across countries. Accounting for the composition of FDI flows may therefore improve our understanding of the relationship between financial liberalization and a country’s growth performance. This, in turn, may offer guidance on whether public policies should target a particular form of FDI or encourage all forms of direct investment.

To our knowledge, the distinction between greenfield FDI and M&As has so far only been addressed by Calderón et al. (2004) and Wang and Wong (2009). However, both studies use annual observations of growth and of FDI inflows, and therefore run the risk of putting too much emphasis on business-cycle fluctuations. By contrast, we want to explore whether the two types of FDI differ in their effect on long-run growth. To achieve this goal, we start in Section 2 by presenting a simple model that supports the conjecture that greenfield FDI and M&A sales have different effects on future output: while in both cases the entry of foreign firms raises aggregate productivity, greenfield FDI expands the host country’s capital stock, whereas M&A sales partly represent a rent that accrues to the firms’ previous owners without resulting in additional investment. The rent originates in the standard assumption that foreign investors manage domestic firms more effectively. They therefore place a higher value on domestic assets than incumbent owners, which leaves the latter with the possibility to sell their firms at a price that is higher than the cost of setting up a new firm. We thus conclude that a dollar of greenfield FDI has a stronger impact on the growth of output than a dollar of M&A-type FDI. After a first look at the data in Section 3, we describe our empirical strategy in Section 4. Section 5 reports the results of the growth regressions we ran using a panel data set that comprises a large number of developing countries and emerging markets. Our empirical results show that greenfield FDI has a significantly positive effect on economic growth, while M&A sales do not. As we demonstrate, this finding is quite robust across various definitions of greenfield FDI and across various subsamples. Moreover, it is neither driven by reverse causality nor by unobserved heterogeneity. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.

1 In section 3, we will present data both on the overall evolution and on the composition of FDI inflows.
2. A Model of Greenfield Investment, M&As and Growth

In this subsection, we develop a simple model to analyze how the impact of a given volume of FDI on economic growth depends on the nature of this FDI. Our model shares several features with the framework developed by Nocke and Yeaple (2007, 2008) – in particular, the notion that setting up a new plant through greenfield FDI is associated with a one-time fixed cost whereas the acquisition of an existing plant through an M&A is not. However, while the contributions of Nocke and Yeaple explore the influence of firms’ characteristics on the choice of entry mode, we treat this choice as exogenous so as to investigate how different forms of entry affect growth, in line with our subsequent empirical analysis.

The economy we consider consists of \( n \) symmetric sectors. Every sector allows for a continuum of firms indexed on the unit interval, each of which produces a differentiated good. Whether a firm actually starts producing depends on its profitability. Firms are monopolists, and the value of a firm’s output at time \( t \), \( y_t \), is proportional to its profits, i.e. \( y_t = \gamma \pi_t \) with \( \gamma > 1 \). Profits, in turn, are proportional to productivity, i.e. \( \pi_t = \theta A_t \). In the spirit of the contributions by Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004), the firm-specific productivity parameter \( A \) varies across firms. For simplicity, we assume that it is constant over time, and uniformly distributed on the unit-interval. The parameter \( \theta \), by contrast, depends on firm ownership: we assume that \( \theta = 1 \) if the firm is owned by domestic residents, and \( \theta = \theta^F > 1 \) if it is owned by foreigners. Setting up a new firm is associated with a one-time sunk cost \( \kappa \), which is identical across sectors.

In what follows, we will first consider the set of firms and sectoral output in financial autarky, i.e. before foreign investors are allowed to enter the domestic economy. We will then allow for FDI inflows into all sectors, distinguishing between two “regimes”: In the

\[ \text{these relationships can be rationalized by using a standard framework in which monopolistic firms face a constant elasticity of demand and use a constant returns to scale technology, and in which barriers to entry into a given market preserve individual firms' monopoly position.} \]

\[ \text{The idea that foreign firms have a productivity advantage has been central to the theory of multinational firms since the early contributions on this topic, such as Caves (1974) and Hymer (1976). While the evidence on the relationship between foreign ownership and productivity is mixed for industrialized countries (Griffith, 1999, Griffith et al., 2004, Benfratello and Sembeneelli, 2006, Schiffbauer et al., 2009), there is strong evidence that multinational firms in developing countries are characterized by a higher productivity (Aitken and Harrison, 1999, Arnold and Javorcik, 2009, Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare, 2010), and that they pay higher wages (Velde and Morrissey, 2003, Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004, OECD, 2008b).} \]
“greenfield FDI regime”, foreign investors are free to set up new firms, while the existing
domestic firms keep being run by their domestic owners. In the “M&A regime”, by contrast,
all existing domestic firms in a sector are sold to foreign investors. We allow for the
possibility that FDI into different sectors follows different regimes, but we assume that all
FDI in a given sector follows the same regime. Our goal is to explore whether the impact of a
given volume of FDI on sectoral output growth depends on the nature of this FDI, i.e. the
choice of regime, and how the different types of FDI affect the growth of the entire economy.
To determine the number of firms that are active in financial autarky, we observe that there
is a critical productivity level \( \hat{A} \), which has to be exceeded to give a domestic investor an
incentive to start a new firm. This threshold value is determined by the fact that the present
value of future operating profits must equal the fixed cost of setting up the firm. It is
implicitly defined by the following equation:

\[
\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \left( \frac{1}{1+r} \right)^t \pi(\hat{A}) = \kappa^H
\]  

(1)

In (1), the LHS represents the value of the firm, given by the stream of future profits,
which are discounted at a constant interest rate \( r \). The RHS reflects the fixed costs incurred by
domestic investors. The superscript \( H \) indicates that these costs may be different for domestic
and foreign investors. Using the fact that \( \pi = A \), it is easy to show that the threshold value \( \hat{A} \)
is characterized by:

\[
\hat{A} = r \kappa^H
\]  

(2)

Hence, only firms with \( A \geq \hat{A} \) are operating under financial autarky. We assume that \( \hat{A} < 1 \),
i.e. there are some domestic firms operating in the initial situation. Note that the threshold
value \( \hat{A} \) remains constant as long as \( \kappa^H \) and \( r \) do not change, which we assume. Sectoral
output under financial autarky at any point in time \( t \) is given by the following expression:

\[
Y_t = \int_{A}^{\hat{A}} \gamma A dA
\]  

(3)

where the lower boundary \( \hat{A} \) is defined by (2).
At the end of period $t$, the sector is opened up to FDI inflows from abroad. In the “greenfield FDI regime”, foreign investors are allowed to set up new firms, while existing firms keep operating. To determine the volume of sectoral FDI in that regime, we observe that there is a critical productivity level $\tilde{A}$, which a potential firm has to exceed to attract a foreign investor. Allowing for the possibility that the sunk costs for foreign investors ($\kappa^F$) differ from $\kappa^H$, we can derive the following expression:

$$\tilde{A} = \frac{r \kappa^F}{\theta^F}$$

(4)

We focus on the interesting case where $\hat{A} > \tilde{A}$. This condition requires that the productivity advantage of foreign-owned firms dominates a potential disadvantage in setting up a firm abroad, i.e. $\kappa^F / \theta^F < \kappa^H$. It is in line with the traditional theory of multinational firms which posits that foreign firms must have a productive advantage to compensate for the cost of the initial investment (Caves, 1974, Hymer, 1976).

The volume of period-$t$ greenfield FDI in a given sector is equal to the sum of all fixed costs that foreign investors incur to start new firms:

$$FDI_{t}^{GRF} = \int_{\hat{A}}^{\tilde{A}} \kappa^F \, dA$$

(5)

Under the greenfield FDI regime, the sector’s output in period $t+1$ is given by:

$$Y_{t+1}^{GRF} = \int_{\hat{A}}^{\tilde{A}} \gamma A \, dA + \int_{\hat{A}}^{\tilde{A}} \gamma \theta^F \, dA$$

(6)

with $\hat{A}$ given by (2), and $\tilde{A}$ by (4). Note that, due to our assumption that $\hat{A} > \tilde{A}$, greenfield investment expands the range of goods produced in the sector under consideration, i.e. there is an adjustment at the extensive margin. The activities of greenfield investors in period $t$ thus have a twofold effect on output in period $t+1$: they raise the national capital stock by setting

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4 For simplicity, we abstract from the possibility that foreign producers crowd out domestic firms, and also ignore potential productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic firms.

5 Without this assumption, foreign investors would have no incentive to enter the domestic market, and FDI inflows would be zero.
up firms that did not exist before, and they increase total factor productivity by raising the share of firms that are managed more effectively.

While the “greenfield FDI” regime is characterized by foreign investors setting up new firms, the “M&A regime” is characterized by existing firms in a sector being sold to foreign owners. As foreign investors are assumed to manage firms more effectively, they expect higher profits than incumbent owners. The value of domestic firms to foreign investors is therefore larger than the costs incumbent owners had to incur when setting them up. As a result, foreign investors are willing to pay a price that is larger than fixed costs. We assume that every firm owner meets a sufficiently large number of potential buyers, such that all the bargaining power rests with the seller, and the firm’s price reflects the buyers’ reservation price. As a consequence, incumbent domestic owners get a rent from selling their firms to foreign investors. In the M&A regime, the volume of FDI inflows thus does not reflect aggregate fixed costs, but foreign investors’ willingness to pay, which is equal to the present value of their future profits. Total FDI in a given sector at time $t$ under the “M&A regime” is then given by:

$$ FDI_{t}^{M\&A} = \int_{A}^{1} \frac{\theta^{F} A}{r} dA $$

and sectoral output in period $t+1$ is defined by:

$$ Y_{t\rightarrow t+1}^{M\&A} = \int_{A}^{1} \gamma \theta^{F} A dA $$

The lower boundary of the integral in (8) implies that the M&A regime does not result in an adjustment at the extensive margin, i.e. the set of operating firms is left unchanged. However, in contrast to the greenfield FDI regime, all firms in the sector benefit from the productivity advantage associated with foreign ownership.

Our goal is to determine, which type of FDI has a stronger impact on sectoral output. This is stated in the following lemma:

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6 The assumption that all the bargaining power rests with incumbent owners simplifies the algebra, but is not necessary for our key results. As we show in the Appendix, these results still hold if we assume a more equal distribution of bargaining power.
Lemma 1: Writing \( \frac{Y^k_{t+1}}{Y_t} = \beta^k \frac{FDI^k_t}{Y_t} \) with \( k \in \{GRF, M & A\} \), it holds that \( \beta^{GRF} > \beta^{M & A} \).

Proof: See the Appendix.

Lemma 1 states that – for a given amount of FDI – a sector’s output growth is higher if the sector adopts the greenfield FDI regime than in case of the M&A regime. What is left to do is to characterize the relationship between economy-wide greenfield FDI and M&A sales (as a share of total output) and the aggregate growth rate. This is accomplished by aggregating sector growth rates, which leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 1: The total volume of greenfield FDI (relative to GDP) has a stronger effect on aggregate output growth than the total volume of M&A sales (relative to GDP).

Proof: See the Appendix.

The economic intuition behind our finding is straightforward: while both types of FDI are growth-enhancing (since foreign ownership comes along with higher productivity), the additional output generated per dollar of FDI is higher in the greenfield FDI regime. This is because, in this case, the initial payment of greenfield investors is smaller than the firms’ value (which is proportional to its output), while M&A inflows exactly reflect this value, generating a rent for their previous owners. Hence, engaging in M&As – i.e. purchasing an existing firm – is more expensive than setting up a firm from scratch in our model, and this depresses the ratio of future output to FDI.

Our model highlights a particular reason why greenfield FDI and M&A sales may differ in their impact on growth, and offers a result that readily lends itself to an empirical test. Obviously, our strong conclusion rests on a set of simplifications – most notably, the partial-equilibrium nature of our analysis as well as the fact that – unlike in Nocke and Yeaple (2007, 2008) – the choice of FDI type in a given sector is exogenous. However, we believe that the basic insight that every dollar of greenfield FDI expands productive capacity while a share of M&A sales merely represents a rent to incumbent owners would still prevail in a more sophisticated framework.

Still, some of the assumptions on which our analysis was based may not be satisfied, and this may either reinforce or dampen the superior impact of greenfield FDI. On the one
hand, we have abstracted from spillover effects, through which the presence of foreign multinationals may enhance the productivity of domestic firms. If greenfield FDI is associated with stronger spillovers – e.g. because new plants are more innovative and technology-intensive than existing ones (Marin and Bell, 2006, Marin and Sasidharan, 2010) – the discrepancy between the two types of FDI in terms of their effect on growth may be even stronger than suggested by our model.

On the other hand, our theoretical framework may be too harsh on M&As by assuming that the proceeds from the sale of domestic firms are spent on anything but capital. If a share of those proceeds is spent on domestic investment then M&As will also contribute to capital accumulation, and this may affect the ranking of the two types of FDI. Finally, the growth effects of greenfield FDI may be weaker or even negative if new firms disrupt existing domestic supply chains (Rodríguez-Clare, 1996), or reduce the productivity of domestic firms (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Again, this would imply that the difference between greenfield FDI and M&A sales is muted or even reversed.

3. Greenfield FDI vs. Mergers and Acquisitions: A First Look at the Data

Data on total FDI inflows and on sales of assets associated with mergers and acquisitions (“M&A sales”) are provided by UNCTAD (2007, 2008) for a large number of countries. We follow Calderón et al. (2004) and Wang and Wong (2009) in defining “greenfield FDI” inflows as the difference between total FDI inflows and M&A sales.

A look at Figure 1 suggests that M&A sales as a share of total FDI in developing countries increased substantially around the turn of the millennium – due, probably to a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the context of large-scale privatizations. Conversely, the stark decline of M&As in the years 2002 and 2003 is in line with the notion that business-cycle and

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8 Recall that once existing firms have been sold in the “M&A regime”, domestic investors, knowing their low productivity level, have no incentive to further expand the set of firms. Mencinger (2003) presents some evidence for EU candidate countries that sales of domestic assets were spent on consumption and imports. This suggests that our notion is not too far-fetched.
financial conditions in the US and Europe may be an important determinant of this type of capital inflows, as di Giovanni (2005) argues. Total FDI, by contrast, has proven to be quite resilient during this period.

Our approach to interpret the difference between total FDI inflows and M&A sales as “greenfield investment” is straightforward if we are inspired by a model in which all FDI takes place simultaneously and reflects either the acquisition of domestic firms or the setting up of new subsidiaries by foreign multinationals. However, when taking this model to real-world data, we need to address a number of potential problems: First, there might be an issue with the timing of transactions. As UNCTAD (2007, p.92) emphasizes, “[... ] M&A statistics are those at the time of the closure of the deals, […]. The M&A values are not necessarily paid out in a single year.” To mitigate that problem, we transform our data into five-year averages. The rationale for choosing that strategy is that the bulk of the value of announced deals should be disbursed by the end of a five-year period.

The second issue concerns the fact that a large share of FDI flows reflects payments within existing firms. The IMF defines total FDI inflows as the sum of equity purchases, reinvested earnings, and other capital flows – with the latter predominantly reflecting intra-company loans. Given this disaggregation, it is not obvious that the difference between total FDI and M&A sales coincides with the conventional idea of (capital-stock enhancing) greenfield investments. To gauge the relative importance of these components, Figure 2a offers a more detailed view on FDI inflows to developing countries and emerging markets for the time span we consider. While these data are taken from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics, Figure 2b presents the data provided by UNCTAD, with “greenfield FDI” defined as the difference between total FDI inflows and M&A sales.

*** Insert Figure 2 around here ***

First, these figures illustrate that the IMF’s and UNCTAD’s data on aggregate FDI inflows roughly coincide. They also show that, while the contribution of reinvested earnings and other capital is important, equity inflows represent by far the largest component of total FDI. Finally, for our derivation of greenfield FDI to make sense, equity inflows should be at least as large as M&A sales. A comparison of Figure 2a and Figure 2b confirms this conjecture.

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9 At the country level, the correlation between quinquennial FDI inflows from the two sources is 99.7 percent.
Nevertheless, our interpretation of the difference between total FDI inflows and M&A sales might be contested. It might be argued that, while equity inflows and reinvested earnings add to a (new or existing) firm’s capital stock, this does not necessarily apply to intra-company loans labeled as “other capital” in the IMF’s statistics. To meet this challenge, we will later test the robustness of our empirical results to using alternative measures of greenfield FDI: as a first alternative to our standard measure – the difference between total FDI inflows and M&A sales – we will remove other capital inflows from total FDI inflows before subtracting M&A sales. This purges our measure of greenfield FDI from its intra-company loan component. The second alternative defines greenfield investment as the difference between FDI-related equity inflows (as reported in the IMF’s balance-of-payments statistics) and M&A sales, thus removing the other capital and the reinvested earnings component of FDI. As we will demonstrate, using the alternative definitions of greenfield FDI yields qualitatively similar results.

4. A Disaggregated View on the Growth Effects of FDI: Empirical Strategy and Data

4.1. The Regression Equation

In what follows, we will estimate variants of the following regression equation:

$$
\ln y_{it} - \ln y_{i,t-1} = \alpha + \beta \ln y_{i,t-1} + \gamma FDI_{it}^{M&A} + \delta FDI_{it}^{Greenfield} + \sum_{\ell=1}^{N} \phi_{\ell} x_{\ell}^{i} + \xi_{t} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (9)
$$

where the left-hand side is the growth rate of real per-capita GDP in country $i$ over a five-year period, $\ln y_{i,t-1}$ is the (log of) initial per-capita GDP at the start of that period. $FDI_{it}^{M&A}$ and $FDI_{it}^{Greenfield}$ are the two types of FDI inflows – mergers and acquisitions sales and “greenfield FDI” relative to GDP – in that period. We also experimented with including further lags of FDI, but it turned out that these did not have a significant effect in any specification. The set of control variables $x_{\ell}^{i}$ that is used to avoid omitted variable bias will be described below. The time dummies $\xi_{t}$ are meant to capture period-specific effects – such as global growth

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10 Our results do not hinge on our decision to use FDI (net) inflows instead of total net FDI flows – i.e. the difference between net inflows and net outflows. While some “emerging market multinationals” have engaged in large-scale foreign investment in the most recent past, FDI outflows are negligible for most of the countries and years in our sample. This is also reflected by a high correlation of 99 percent between (net) FDI inflows and total (net) FDI flows.
surges and recessions – that might blur the separate effect of FDI. Since the disturbance \( \epsilon_{it} \) possibly does not have a constant variance, and since it is potentially correlated across time periods, our inference will be based on standard errors that are clustered at the country level. Later on, we will also add country fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity.

Using a panel data set instead of the purely cross-sectional structure as in Barro (1991) offers the huge advantage of potentially controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. To do so, one must define subperiods within the whole period of study. We follow the standard practice in growth regressions of using five-year averages. As Islam (1995) and Caselli et al. (1996) argue, a quinquennial structure allows to abstract from business cycle fluctuations, and therefore to study long-run growth effects.

4.2. Data

Since we are predominantly interested in the growth effects of M&A-type FDI and greenfield-type FDI – with the latter defined as the difference between total FDI inflows and M&A sales – our sample is constrained by the availability of these data. As reported in Section 3, data on M&A sales as well as data on total FDI inflows are provided in the UNCTAD’s World Investment Report (UNCTAD 2007, 2008), and are available on an annual basis since 1987. To estimate the parameters of equation (9), we are using the intervals 1987-90, 1991-95, 1996-2000, 2001-05.\textsuperscript{11}

As for the normalization of FDI flows, we divide five-year averages of M&A/greenfield FDI (in current US dollars) by average GDP (in current US dollars) in the same interval. This yields the variables \( FDI_{it}^{M&A} \) and \( FDI_{it}^{Greenfield} \). To demonstrate that our results do not hinge on that particular choice, we will also explore the effect of FDI relative to the recipient country’s population.

The first set of control variables we use consists of growth determinants suggested by the human-capital augmented Solow model, as introduced by Mankiw et al. (1992): the average years of secondary schooling in the population, the average share of investment in GDP, and the average population growth rate.\textsuperscript{12} As suggested by neoclassical growth theory, we expect secondary schooling and the investment share to have a positive effect on growth.

\textsuperscript{11} Since data on M&A inflows are only available from 1987 on, the “five-year average” for the 87-90 period is actually a four-year average. As we will show below, our results do not hinge on this adjustment and do not change if we omit the first period.

\textsuperscript{12} Details on the definition and the sources of all variables as well as summary statistics are given in the Data Appendix.
while the population growth rate should have a negative effect. As further control variables, we add the average inflation rate (in logs), a standard measure of trade openness – exports plus imports relative to GDP – as well as the “Investment Profile” indicator from the International Country Risk Guide, which reflects the risk of expropriation and of other activities that infringe on investors’ property rights. Finally, we include a dummy for oil-exporting countries as well as regional dummies for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.

When merging all available data, we obtained an unbalanced panel data set comprising 78 low-income and middle-income countries observed up to four times between 1987 and 2005.

5. A Disaggregated View on the Growth Effects of FDI: Results

5.1. Benchmark Results

As a benchmark, we start by regressing growth on greenfield FDI and M&A sales, restricting the set of control variables to initial GDP per capita. The result is displayed in column (1.1) of Table 1. It turns out that the coefficient of greenfield FDI is significantly positive, while M&A sales do not have a significant effect on growth. Moreover, the difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant. As documented by the p-value reported in the bottom row of the table, we can reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal well beyond the five-percent level.

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13 Since greenfield FDI contributes to capital formation in the recipient economy it would be ideal to separately consider the growth effects of FDI and “domestic investment”. However, disentangling these two magnitudes poses numerous challenges – in particular, since the respective data are collected by different institutions, following different rules etc. To avoid overrating the effect of greenfield FDI, we include both FDI and total investment (as a share of GDP) in the regression: if greenfield FDI and domestic investment are positively correlated, the coefficient of greenfield FDI would be biased upward if we omitted total investment. By contrast, the coefficient of greenfield FDI is likely to underrate the total impact of foreign investment if we explicitly account for total investment, because the latter partly picks up FDI’s contribution to gross fixed capital formation. Taking a conservative stance, we considered the latter problem the lesser of two evils.

14 To improve the readability of our tables, we do not display the coefficients of the oil dummy, the regional and time dummies, as well as the constant. Those results are available upon request.

15 We start by excluding countries with less than one million inhabitants. As we will demonstrate below, this choice is inconsequential for our main results.
The discrepancy between the two coefficients becomes more pronounced when we add the control variables mentioned above. As indicated by column (1.2), the coefficient of M&A sales remains insignificant but is now negative, while the coefficient of greenfield FDI increases substantially: raising greenfield FDI over GDP by one percentage point raises average annual growth by almost 0.5 percentage points.\textsuperscript{16} Although the correlation between the two types of FDI inflows is rather low (0.24), we tested whether M&A sales had an effect on growth once greenfield FDI was omitted. It turned out that this was not the case, with the coefficient of M&A sales remaining insignificant even if this was the only FDI variable in the regression.\textsuperscript{17}

So far, we have included both FDI types and overall investment (relative to GDP) in our regression. This might be problematic since greenfield FDI adds to the national capital stock in the recipient economy, such that gross fixed capital formation would be accounted for twice in our regression. Moreover, if M&A sales and investment are positively correlated, the inclusion of the investment share may result in underrating the effect of M&As.\textsuperscript{18} Given these considerations, we ran a regression without the investment share. As shown in column (1.3), it turned out that this modification does not alter our key finding: the coefficient of greenfield FDI is positive and significant, while the coefficient of M&A sales is not significantly different from zero. Moreover, the positive coefficient of greenfield FDI increases once we omit total investment. Referring to our model, which suggests that FDI affects growth both by raising the capital stock and by enhancing total factor productivity, we interpret this as

\textsuperscript{16} The low t-statistic of the investment rate in column (1.2) is puzzling at first glance – especially given the findings of Sala-i-Martin (1997), who argues that gross fixed capital formation is one of the most robust determinants of economic growth. When exploring this issue in more depth, we found that it is the inclusion of the variable “Investment Profile” that renders the investment share insignificant. This is not surprising, given that capital accumulation is strongly affected by the quality of institutions. Once we omitted “Investment Profile” from the set of control variables, the investment share turned significant at the five percent level while our key result – a significantly positive effect of greenfield FDI, combined with no effect of M&A sales – prevailed.

\textsuperscript{17} The result of this regression is not reported in the table, but is available upon request.

\textsuperscript{18} The correlation between M&A sales and the investment share is 0.15. The correlation between greenfield FDI and the investment share is somewhat higher, amounting to 0.23.
evidence that some of the contribution of greenfield FDI to gross fixed capital formation is accounted for by the overall investment share if the latter is included in the regression.

In a next step, we wanted to check whether our results were driven by our definition of greenfield FDI as the difference between total FDI inflows and M&A sales, and we used alternative approaches to identify greenfield FDI (see the discussion at the end of Section 3). Column (1.4) in Table 1 reports the results we got when we removed “other capital” inflows – mostly intra-company loans – from total FDI inflows before subtracting M&A sales. For the results displayed in column (1.5), we used the difference between “equity inflows” (as reported by the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics) and M&A sales, thus removing both intra-company loans and reinvested earnings from our definition of greenfield FDI. While the first approach resulted in a somewhat lower coefficient of greenfield investment and the second approach in a somewhat higher coefficient, the qualitative results from column (1.2) were largely unaffected.

Our model suggests relating the two types of FDI divided by GDP to countries’ subsequent growth. However, this is not the only way to control for country size, and we wanted to test whether our main qualitative finding still occurs when we use total population to control for country size. Column (1.6) documents that we still find a substantial discrepancy between the two types of FDI when we look at inflows per capita.

While the result that greenfield FDI has a stronger effect on growth than M&A sales is in line with our model’s predictions, the finding that M&A sales have no effect at all comes as a surprise. To explain this observation, we have to go beyond the model. First, our benevolent view of the productivity advances that come along with foreign ownership may not always be supported by the facts: if the transfer of firm ownership takes place in times of crises foreign investors need not be characterized by a higher ability to run a firm. They may simply have access to the cash that is denied to domestic firm owners (Krugman, 2000, Loungani and Razin, 2001). Moreover, there may be adverse macroeconomic consequences of M&A-related capital inflows which dominate any productivity gain at the firm-level. As argued by Prasad et al. (2007) as well as Rodrik and Subramanian (2009), financial integration may do more harm than good by resulting in a real appreciation that reduces domestic firms’ international price competitiveness.\footnote{The detrimental effect of an overvalued (real) exchange rate on economic growth is further explored by Rodrik (2008) who shows empirically that it results in an inflated nontradables sector and lower growth. Eichengreen (2008) makes a similar point.} While our model does not spell out such effects, its logic is compatible with this line of reasoning: while greenfield FDI does not generate any extra revenue for
domestic residents – a plausible interpretation of the initial fixed cost would be that it simply reflects the imports of foreign machinery – M&A sales generate a rent to the firms’ previous domestic owners. This rent is not spent on investment, since all attractive investment opportunities have already been exhausted. Hence, M&A sales are likely to result in increased consumption which, in turn, may result in a real appreciation. If this appreciation dominates the potentially productivity-enhancing effect of foreign ownership, M&A sales do not have a positive influence on growth.

5.2. Alternative Estimators
The findings presented in Table 1 may be biased due to country-specific variables, which are correlated with the regressors and which we could not account for explicitly (i.e. unobserved heterogeneity), or due to a reverse causal relationship between growth and FDI. To meet the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, we estimated equation (9) using the country-fixed effects (FE) estimator. Column (2.1) in Table 2 gives the results, indicating that our previous findings were not driven by omitted variable bias: while the coefficient of greenfield FDI is somewhat lower relative to the pooled OLS result, it is still quite close to the previous point estimate and – contrary to the coefficient of M&A sales – statistically significant.

*** Insert Table 2 around here ***

In a next step, we tackled the potential endogeneity of FDI by using the two-stage-least squares (2SLS) estimator.\(^{20}\) Since both greenfield FDI and M&A sales are potentially endogenous, we first estimated a specification that omitted M&A sales, and instrumented greenfield FDI using the initial stock of FDI relative to GDP and the Fraser Institute’s “Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights” index as instruments. While the stock of FDI should positively influence the inflow of additional greenfield FDI by offering established production networks, a favorable legal environment should attract FDI by giving multinational firms access to independent and impartial courts, enforceable contracts, and by shielding them from arbitrary decisions of the host country’s administration. Both instruments are likely to influence greenfield FDI, but unlikely to affect growth beyond what is already captured by the “Investment Profile” indicator, which is a broad measure of the security of

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\(^{20}\) Eichengreen (2008:19) argues that M&As depend on the internal resources of firms in acquiring countries, and that this component of FDI in emerging markets is therefore exogenous to economic conditions in those countries. However, we did not want to take this conjecture for granted.
property rights. The result of that estimation is reported in the second column of Table 2. The first-stage F-statistic of 14.64 indicates that our instruments are jointly relevant – a conjecture that is also confirmed by the low p-value of the Kleibergen-Paap test for underidentification. Finally, the p-value associated with Hansen’s J-test shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous. In addition to the J test, which checks the joint exogeneity of all instruments – i.e. the hypothesis that they do not affect growth beyond the effect already captured by the control variables –, we also ran “difference-in-Sargan” tests on individual instruments. For none of the variables could we reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. To control whether our results are an artifact of using weak instruments, we finally used the conditional likelihood ratio (CLR) approach developed by Moreira (2003) in order to compute confidence intervals and p-values that are robust with respect to weak instruments. The resulting estimates allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of greenfield FDI is actually zero at the one-percent level. Interestingly, the results displayed in column (2.2) suggest that OLS estimation tends to underrate the effect of greenfield FDI. While this may be due to the omission of M&A sales, the IV result suggests that our previous findings are rather conservative.

In a next step, we instrumented M&A sales (relative to GDP), omitting greenfield FDI as a regressor. The instruments we used capture factors that should be conducive to the acquisition of domestic firms by foreign investors: the development of domestic financial markets, proxied by the volume of domestic credit to the private sector relative to GDP (lagged by one period) and the initial urban population as a share of the total population to reflect the presence of financial centers and the availability of firms to be acquired. Again, these instruments perform reasonably well in terms of relevance and exogeneity. Column (2.3) of Table 2 shows that the point estimate of the coefficient of M&A-type FDI increases substantially when we use the 2SLS estimator. However, the standard error of this variable is too high to conclude a significant influence – a finding that is confirmed when we compute weak-instrument robust standard errors following Moreira (2003).

Column (2.4) finally presents the results of applying the Blundell-Bond (1998) “systems GMM” estimator to equation (9). The rationale for using this estimator is that this equation can be rewritten as

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21 We also ran regressions using excluded instruments in the second-stage regression one at a time. This exercise demonstrated that none of our instruments had a (direct) effect on growth beyond their effect on greenfield FDI. All these results are available upon request.
\[
\ln y_{it} = \alpha + (1 + \beta) \ln y_{it-1} + \gamma FDI_{it}^{M&A} + \delta FDI_{it}^{Greenfield} + \sum_{k=1}^{N} \phi_k x_{it}^k + \xi_t + \epsilon_{it},
\]

(10)

which reveals the presence of a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side. Applying the fixed effects estimator to such an equation results in biased estimates, since the error term is mechanically correlated with one of the regressors (Nickell, 1981). The “systems-GMM” estimator reacts to this problem by combining two equations: a first-differenced version of (10) is estimated using lagged levels of the regressors as instruments, and the original equation is estimated using lagged differences as instruments. Comparing the results in column (2.4) with those in column (2.1) indicates that ignoring the “Nickell bias” indeed led us to under-estimate the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. More importantly, using the systems-GMM estimator also supports our key results that greenfield FDI has a significantly positive influence on growth while M&A sales have no effect.

Finally, we checked whether the results yielded by our linear specification are hiding some nonlinear influence of FDI, as suggested, e.g., by Borensztein et al. (1998), Alfaro et al. (2004) or Wang and Wong (2009). However, interacting total FDI or its components with a measure of human capital (secondary schooling), a measure of financial development (the volume of domestic credit to the private sector relative to GDP), the International Country Risk Guide’s measure of corruption, or the Freedom House index of political rights did not suggest that the marginal effect of FDI depends on any of these variables. In particular, we could not reproduce the finding by Wang and Wong (2009) that the impact of M&A sales increases in the stock of human capital.22

5.3. Varying Samples

In order to explore whether the previous results were driven by a particular set of data points, we estimated equation (9) for various subsamples. We used the OLS estimator to run these regressions because OLS seems to underrate rather than overrate the effect of greenfield FDI.

*** Insert Table 3 around here ***

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22 These findings are not reported in a separate table, but are available upon request.
Columns (3.1) and (3.2) report the results of excluding upper-middle-income and low-income countries, respectively. While this modification chops off roughly 20 percent of all observations, our key findings are essentially unchanged: greenfield-FDI has a significantly positive effect on growth while there is no such effect for M&A inflows, with the influence of greenfield FDI being somewhat weaker in the “richer” subsample.

As column (3.3) demonstrates, including “small” countries in the sample slightly increases the number of observations without altering our results. Column (3.4) reports the effect of focusing only on the years after the end of the cold war, i.e. from 1991 onward. Again, despite a substantial reduction of the sample, our qualitative findings are largely unscathed. Finally, we removed episodes in which countries where characterized by extreme macroeconomic instability, i.e. by an inflation rate of more than 40 percent.23 Again, the coefficient of greenfield FDI, reported in column (3.5) of Table 3, does not deviate too much from the benchmark result, while M&A sales stay insignificant.24 Given these results, we conclude that our key findings are robust with respect to various perturbations of the sample.

6. Concluding Remarks
Foreign direct investment (FDI) comes in different forms: its greenfield variant implies the creation of new productive units, while its M&A variant reflects a change of ownership of already existing firms. The goal of this paper was to explore whether the two conceptually different types of FDI differ in their effects on economic growth. Our theoretical analysis suggests that they do: while the volume of greenfield FDI reflects the expansion of the host country’s capital stock, some of the proceeds from M&A sales just represent rents for the domestic firms’ previous owners. Despite the productivity gain that is associated with foreign ownership, any dollar of M&A sales therefore has a weaker effect on growth than a dollar of greenfield FDI. Our empirical results support the model’s key prediction: the growth effect of greenfield FDI (relative to GDP) is much stronger than the effect of M&A sales. This finding is robust across various estimation methods and subsamples.

Given the model’s predictions, our empirical result that M&A sales have no growth effect at all comes as a surprise: as we argued above, this may be either due to factors that

---
23 The threshold value of 40 percent was adopted following Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) who characterize countries during such episodes as “freely falling”.
24 The fact that the exclusion of “freely falling” episodes does matter for some variables is illustrated by the considerable drop of the t-statistic for the inflation rate. This echoes the finding of many growth regressions that the negative effect of inflation is predominantly driven by episodes of very high inflation (Barro, 1995).
mute the productivity-enhancing effect of foreign ownership on foreign firms. Or it may be due to macroeconomic side effects – e.g. a real appreciation – that run against the potential firm-level increase in productivity. The possible presence of such a “micro-macro paradox” highlights the importance of complementing firm- and industry-level studies by analyses that take a macroeconomic perspective and also capture the aggregate – and possibly harmful – repercussions of M&A-type FDI.

We believe that further exploring the various transmission channels through which different types of FDI affect growth offers ample scope for future research. Moreover, the large cross-country differences with respect to M&As and greenfield investment demonstrate that we need to further explore the economic and institutional forces that determine the composition of FDI inflows to developing countries.

References


Freedom House 2010. Freedom in the World (online version)


Appendix: Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1: To show the result stated in Lemma 1, we need to demonstrate that
\[ Y_{r+1}^{GRF} / FDI_{r}^{GRF} > Y_{r+1}^{M&A} / FDI_{r}^{M&A}. \]

Using the expressions in (5) to (8) we see that this is the case if
\[ \gamma \int_{\hat{A}} A dA + \gamma \int_{\hat{A}}^A \theta^f A dA \left( \frac{1}{\hat{A}} + \frac{1}{\bar{A}} \right) > \int_{\hat{A}}^A \theta^f A dA \left( \frac{1}{r} + \frac{1}{\bar{A}} \right) \]  

(A1)

Simplifying these expressions and solving the integrals on the LHS yields
\[ \frac{0.5 \left[ 1 - \hat{A}^2 + \theta^f (\hat{A}^2 - \bar{A}^2) \right]}{\hat{A} - \bar{A}} > r \kappa^f \]  

(A2)

Invoking (4) we can rewrite this as
\[ \frac{0.5 \left[ 1 - \hat{A}^2 + \theta^f (\hat{A}^2 - \bar{A}^2) \right]}{\hat{A} - \bar{A}} > \theta^f \tilde{A} \]  

(A3)

Using standard algebra yields
\[ \frac{0.5 \left[ 1 - \hat{A}^2 + \theta^f (\hat{A} + \bar{A}) \right]}{\hat{A} - \bar{A}} > \theta^f \tilde{A} \]  

(A4)

which is equivalent to
\[ \frac{1 - \hat{A}^2}{\hat{A} - \bar{A}} > \theta^f (\tilde{A} - \hat{A}) \]  

(A5)

Given the critical assumption that \( \hat{A} > \bar{A} \), the LHS is strictly positive, while the RHS is strictly negative. This concludes the proof.

Note, however, that the result stated in Lemma 1 would also prevail if we dropped the assumption that all the bargaining power rests with incumbent owners. If the surplus of a change in ownership was distributed more evenly, the denominator of the right-hand side of expression (A1) would be smaller, while all other parts of that expression would remain unaffected. Specifically, we could write

\[ \frac{\gamma \int_{\hat{A}} A dA + \gamma \int_{\hat{A}}^A \theta^f A dA}{\int_{\hat{A}}^A \kappa^f dA} > \frac{\gamma \int_{\hat{A}}^A \theta^f A dA}{\phi \int_{\hat{A}}^A \frac{\theta^f A}{r} dA} \]  

(A6)
with $\varphi$ increasing in incumbent owners’ bargaining power and $\frac{1}{\varphi} \leq \varphi \leq 1$. The inequality in (A6) would still hold as long as $\varphi$ stayed above a critical threshold whose value would be defined by the parameters of the model.

**Proof of Proposition 1:** We assume that $m \leq n$ sectors adopt the greenfield FDI regime, while the remaining $(n - m)$ sectors adopt the M&A regime. Denoting sector $i$’s growth rate between periods $t$ and $t+1$ by $g_{i,t}^{k} = Y_{i,t+1}^{k} / Y_{i,t}^{k}$ with $k \in \{GRF, M & A\}$ and invoking the initial symmetry of all sectors we can write the growth rate of aggregate output $g_{y,t}$ as

$$g_{y,t} = \frac{1}{n} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{m} g_{i,t}^{GRF} + \sum_{i=m+1}^{n} g_{i,t}^{M&A} \right) \tag{A7}$$

Combining this expression with the fact that $g_{i,t}^{k} = \beta^{k} \frac{FDI_{i,t}^{k}}{Y_{i,t}}$ yields

$$g_{y,t} = \frac{1}{n} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{m} \beta^{GRF} \frac{FDI_{i,t}^{GRF}}{Y_{i,t}} + \sum_{i=m+1}^{n} \beta^{M&A} \frac{FDI_{i,t}^{M&A}}{Y_{i,t}} \right] \tag{A8}$$

Aggregating across sectors and invoking symmetry results in

$$g_{y,t} = \beta^{GRF} \frac{FDI_{t}^{GRF}}{Y_{t}} + \beta^{M&A} \frac{FDI_{t}^{M&A}}{Y_{t}} \tag{A9}$$

Lemma 1 stated that $\beta^{GRF} > \beta^{M&A}$. Hence, the marginal impact of greenfield FDI (relative to GDP) on the economy’s growth rate is higher than the marginal impact of M&A sales. This concludes the proof.

**Data Appendix**

**Main variables**

**Growth of real per-capita GDP:** Growth rate of GDP per capita in constant international dollars over five-year period. Source: Heston et al. (2009), series RGDPCH.

**Initial GDP per capita:** Natural logarithm of initial GDP per capita in constant international dollars. Source: Heston et al. (2009), series RGDPCH.

**FDI/GDP:** Net FDI inflows in US dollars divided by GDP (Five-year average). Source: UNCTAD (2008).


**M&A sales/GDP:** Mergers and acquisitions sales in US dollars divided by GDP (Five-year average). Source: UNCTAD (2007).
**Greenfield FDI/GDP**: Difference between FDI/GDP and M&A sales/GDP.

**Other capital**: Direct Investment Other Capital in Reporting Economy, net. Source: IMF (2010).

**Equity**: Direct Investment Equity in Reporting Economy, net. Source: IMF (2010).

**Grf. FDI without other cap.**: Difference between Greenfield FDI and Other Capital divided by GDP (five-year average).

**Grf. FDI based on equity**: Difference between Equity and M&A sales divided by GDP (five-year average).

**Population**: Population (Five-year average). Source: Heston et al. (2009), series POP.

**M&A sales/Pop.**: Ratio of M&A sales and Population.

**Greenfield FDI/Pop.**: Ratio of Greenfield FDI and Population.

**Secondary schooling**: Number of years of secondary schooling of total population age 15 and older (initial value for five-year period). Source: Barro and Lee (2010).

**Investment/GDP**: Investment Share of Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita, current price (Five-year average). Source: Heston et al. (2009), series ci.

**Population growth**: Growth rate of population over five-year interval. Source: Heston et al. (2009).


**Trade openness**: Sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by GDP (Five-year average). Source: World Bank (2010).

**Investment profile**: Rating of the government’s attitude to inward investment as the sum of three sub-components, each with a maximum score of four points (very low risk) and a minimum score of 0 points (very high risk). The subcomponents are risk of expropriation or contract viability, payment delays and barriers on the repatriation of profits (Five-year average). Source: Political Risk Services Group (2008).

**Oil**: Dummy for 28 oil-exporting economies, referring to the period of 1970 - 2006, using the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and World Development Indicators (WDI) as well as Data on oil production and reserves obtained from BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2007 as data sources. Source: Morsy (2009).
Instruments

**Initial stock of FDI relative to GDP.** Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).

**Fraser Institute index of legal structure and the security of property rights** (five-year average). Source: Fraser Institute (2010).

**Domestic credit to the private sector** as percentage of GDP. Source: World Bank (2010).

**Initial urban population** as percentage of total population. Source: World Bank (2010).

Summary statistics

**Note:** All summary statistics refer to the 264 observations that are included in the benchmark regression of column (2) in Table 1.

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<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Std. Dev.</th>
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<th>Max</th>
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**Figures and Tables**

**Figure 1:** Greenfield FDI and M&A Sales in Developing Countries and Emerging Markets

![Graph showing Greenfield FDI and M&A Sales in Developing Countries and Emerging Markets from 1987 to 2006.](image)

**Source:** UNCTAD (2007, 2008).
Figure 2: FDI inflows – various disaggregations

Figure 2a: Average total FDI inflows to low- and middle-income countries and its components (billions of US dollars). Source: IMF (2009).

Figure 2b: Average total FDI inflows to low- and middle-income countries and its components (billions of US dollars). Source: UNCTAD (2007, 2008).
Table 1: OLS Regressions (Dependent variable: Growth of real per-capita GDP)

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<td>(4.421)**</td>
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<td>Investment/GDP</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.307</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.495)</td>
<td>(1.239)</td>
<td>(1.083)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population growth</td>
<td>-0.705</td>
<td>-0.717</td>
<td>-0.817</td>
<td>-0.764</td>
<td>-0.695</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-2.365)**</td>
<td>(-2.340)**</td>
<td>(-2.921)**</td>
<td>(-2.717)**</td>
<td>(-2.286)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log(inflation rate)</td>
<td>-0.0321</td>
<td>-0.0319</td>
<td>-0.0161</td>
<td>-0.0157</td>
<td>-0.0340</td>
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<tr>
<td>(-2.828)**</td>
<td>(-2.829)**</td>
<td>(-2.022)**</td>
<td>(-2.027)**</td>
<td>(-2.816)**</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade openness</td>
<td>-0.0894</td>
<td>-0.0884</td>
<td>-0.0554</td>
<td>-0.0414</td>
<td>-0.0826</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-2.664)**</td>
<td>(-2.610)**</td>
<td>(-1.733)*</td>
<td>(-1.423)</td>
<td>(-2.615)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment profile</td>
<td>0.0409</td>
<td>0.0430</td>
<td>0.0368</td>
<td>0.0378</td>
<td>0.0403</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 342, 264, 264, 244, 246, 264
Number of countries: 101, 78, 78, 75, 76, 78
Adjusted R-squared: 0.223, 0.444, 0.439, 0.408, 0.427, 0.420
F-test equal coeff.: p-value: 0.04, 0.00, 0.00, 0.01, 0.00, 0.00

Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include a constant, regional dummies, a dummy for oil-exporting countries, and period fixed effects. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
Table 2: Alternative estimators (dependent variable: growth of real GDP per capita)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(2.1)</th>
<th>(2.2)</th>
<th>(2.3)</th>
<th>(2.4)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>FE</td>
<td>2SLS</td>
<td>2SLS</td>
<td>BB</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(FDIGRF instr.)</td>
<td>(FDIM&amp;A instr.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenfield FDI/GDP</td>
<td>1.662</td>
<td>5.489</td>
<td>2.535</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.379)**</td>
<td>(2.952)**</td>
<td>(2.065)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;A sales/GDP</td>
<td>-1.265</td>
<td>4.152</td>
<td>-0.600</td>
<td>-0.569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.287)</td>
<td>(1.011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.385</td>
<td>-0.0997</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-6.073)***</td>
<td>(-1.714)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.73)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second. schooling</td>
<td>0.00416</td>
<td>0.0299</td>
<td>0.0360</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0950)</td>
<td>(2.593)***</td>
<td>(2.359)**</td>
<td>(1.533)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment/GDP</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.396</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.933)</td>
<td>(2.876)***</td>
<td>(1.359)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth</td>
<td>-0.216</td>
<td>-0.686</td>
<td>-0.948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.477)</td>
<td>(-2.414)**</td>
<td>(-4.297)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(inflation rate)</td>
<td>-0.0388</td>
<td>-0.0343</td>
<td>-0.0510</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.377)***</td>
<td>(-3.295)**</td>
<td>(-3.71)***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade openness</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>-0.0910</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.431)**</td>
<td>(-2.490)**</td>
<td>(-1.792)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment profile</td>
<td>0.0362</td>
<td>0.0329</td>
<td>0.0423</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.818)***</td>
<td>(3.030)***</td>
<td>(3.714)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 264, 241, 257, 264
Number of countries: 78, 74, 78, 78
Adjusted R-squared: 0.484, 0.424, 0.407
First-stage F-statistic: 14.64, 9.72
Underidentification (p-value): 0.000, 0.000
Exogeneity instruments (p-value): 0.575, 0.910, 0.967
Robust coefficient / t-stat.: 5.454, 4.231

Second-order autocorr. (p-value): 0.198
F-test equal coeff.: p-value: 0.04, 0.05

Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include a constant, regional dummies, a dummy for oil-exporting countries, and period fixed effects. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsamples</th>
<th>(3.1) Without upper middle income</th>
<th>(3.2) Without low income</th>
<th>(3.3) Incl. small countries</th>
<th>(3.4) Only 1991-2005</th>
<th>(3.5) Only inflation &lt; 40%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greenfield FDI/GDP</td>
<td>2.701 (3.415)***</td>
<td>1.462 (2.221)***</td>
<td>2.084 (4.078)***</td>
<td>2.367 (3.505)***</td>
<td>2.229 (3.907)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;A sales/GDP</td>
<td>-1.071 (-0.868)</td>
<td>-1.215 (-1.299)</td>
<td>-0.403 (-0.454)</td>
<td>-0.889 (-1.027)</td>
<td>-1.206 (-1.458)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.0762 (-3.564)***</td>
<td>-0.0924 (-2.789)***</td>
<td>-0.0752 (-3.963)***</td>
<td>-0.0875 (-4.322)***</td>
<td>-0.0883 (-4.166)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second. schooling</td>
<td>0.0233 (1.847)*</td>
<td>0.0439 (3.491)***</td>
<td>0.0352 (3.142)***</td>
<td>0.0254 (2.199)***</td>
<td>0.0397 (2.885)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment/GDP</td>
<td>0.228 (1.181)</td>
<td>0.168 (1.066)</td>
<td>0.158 (1.076)</td>
<td>0.270 (1.583)</td>
<td>0.266 (1.819)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth</td>
<td>-0.765 (-2.459)***</td>
<td>-0.908 (-2.094)***</td>
<td>-0.585 (-2.000)***</td>
<td>-0.543 (-1.442)***</td>
<td>-1.047 (-3.744)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(inflation rate)</td>
<td>-0.0404 (-3.238)***</td>
<td>-0.0280 (-2.370)***</td>
<td>-0.0343 (-3.079)***</td>
<td>-0.0503 (-3.563)***</td>
<td>-0.0113 (-1.351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade openness</td>
<td>-0.111 (-2.839)***</td>
<td>-0.060 (-1.587)</td>
<td>-0.114 (-3.273)***</td>
<td>-0.114 (-3.342)***</td>
<td>-0.0402 (-1.358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment profile</td>
<td>0.0460 (4.491)***</td>
<td>0.039 (3.493)***</td>
<td>0.0411 (4.778)***</td>
<td>0.0375 (4.012)***</td>
<td>0.0289 (3.420)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>0.453</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-test equal coeff: p-value</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Regressions include a constant, regional dummies, a dummy for oil-exporting countries, and period fixed effects. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level.