THE PRINCIPLE OF MINIMUM DIFFERENTIATION HOLDS UNDER SUFFICIENT HETEROGENEITY

BY A. DE PALMA, V. GINSBURGH, Y. Y. PAPAGEORGIOU, AND J.-F. THISSE

The so-called Principle of Minimum Differentiation, stated by Hotelling, has been challenged by many authors. This paper restores the Principle by showing that n firms locate at the center of the market and charge prices higher than their marginal cost of production when heterogeneity in consumers’ tastes is “large enough.”

I. INTRODUCTION

It was Hotelling’s [12] belief, subsequently shared by many others, that competition between two sellers of an homogeneous product leads to their agglomeration at the center of a linear, bounded market. The underlying idea is that any firm would gain, through an increase of its market share, by establishing close to its competitor on the larger side of the market. This apparently reasonable process was shown to be invalid by Lerner and Singer [15] in the case of three firms. Indeed, given two firms at the center of the market, the third will locate immediately outside either. The firm squeezed between the other two, in turn, will experience a vanishing market. Consequently, it will itself move immediately outside either, thus generating instability. Furthermore, whenever price is a decision variable, Hotelling’s prediction does not hold even in the case of two firms (d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse [5]). When both firms locate together, price competition à la Bertrand drives down to zero equilibrium prices, hence profits. Thus firms have an advantage to spatially differentiate so as to enjoy the benefits of a local monopoly. All this destroys the so-called Principle of Minimum Differentiation.²

We reformulate here the Hotelling problem and show that the Principle is restored when products and consumers are sufficiently heterogeneous. More precisely, we recognize that (1) inherent characteristics of firms cause differentiation in their products, (2) consumers have specific preferences for these products, and (3) firms cannot determine a priori differences in consumers’ tastes. At the individual level, since now firms cannot predict with certainty the decision of a particular consumer, they endow him with a probabilistic choice rule. At the aggregate level, it is assumed that the probability functions predict the actual frequencies perfectly well. This approach agrees with recent advances in discrete choice theory, which are especially relevant to choices involving location and quality.³ Introducing therefore random behavior in the theory of spatial compet-

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² For a detailed discussion of Hotelling and his successors, see Grafton [11].

³ General references to discrete choice theory include Luce [17], Manaki and McFadden [18], McFadden [19], and Tversky [25]. Examples of locational choice include Carlton [1] and Leonard [14]. Examples of quality choice include Shocker and Srinivasan [23] and Urban and Hauser [26].

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tion seems natural. Although a large number of models are available as alternative representations of such behavior, only a few have been found useful in applications. Of these, we retain the logit model since it admits simple expressions. In consequence, individual demands are smoothly distributed between firms which, in turn, give rise to overlapping market areas supported by casual experience. Building the demand system from these individual demands, it is shown that the Principle holds when the degree of heterogeneity is sufficiently large.

Spatial competition theory with homogeneous products and consumers displays several examples of nonexistence of equilibrium (see e.g. d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse [4], Eaton and Lipsey [7], Economides [8]). This has led some to introduce mixed strategies to re-establish existence (Dasgupta and Maskin [2], Shaked [22]). However, Gal-Or [9] has shown that mixed strategies in the Hotelling model are not sufficient to ascertain the Principle of Minimum Differentiation. By contrast, our approach permits restoration of both the existence property and the Principle within a more natural framework to the extent that, intuitively, mixed strategies do not have sufficient predictive power to account for most locational decisions.4

Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is described and illustrated for two firms competing in location. Instead of patronizing a single firm, as under homogeneity, consumers now distribute their purchases between firms according to a probability rule which appears to fit observed shopping behavior. Section 3 is devoted to the model of spatial competition between \( n \) firms when prices are parametric and uniform. It is shown that firms do agglomerate at the center of the market when the variation in tastes is sufficiently large. In this result, we observe that the likelihood of a central agglomeration decreases for higher average transportation costs and more firms. Section 4 deals with price competition between identically located firms. By contrast with the Bertrand case, equilibrium prices are shown to be strictly positive and proportional to the degree of heterogeneity. Competition in both location and price is handled in Section 5, where the results of Sections 3 and 4 are extended. Finally, Section 6 displays conclusions and possible extensions.

2. THE LOCATION MODEL FOR TWO FIRMS

2.1. The space \( X \) is the interval \([0, l]\). Locations and distances from the origin are identically denoted by \( x \in X \).

**Assumption 1:** Every unit interval in \( X \) generates a unit demand for a given product.

There are two firms. Firm 1 locates at \( x_1 \) and firm 2 at \( x_2 \), where \( x_1 < x_2 \). The sub-intervals \([0, x_1], [x_1, x_2], [x_2, l]\) are named regions 1, 2, and 3 respectively.

4 Probabilistic models have similarly proved useful in restoring transitivity of the majority rule (Denzau and Kats [6]), and in establishing the existence of equilibrium under variable returns to scale (Miyao and Shapiro [20]).
ASSUMPTION 2: The product is produced at no cost and is sold at a given price \( p \) by firms.

Following Hotelling, it is common practice in the theory of spatial competition to represent the (indirect) utility of a consumer located at \( x \) and purchasing from firm \( i \) as \( u_i[x] = a - p - c|x - x_i| \), where \( a \) is the valuation of the product and \( c \) the transportation rate (recall that each consumer buys one unit of the product). That the valuation is invariant over products and consumers reflects the hypothesis of homogeneity made by Hotelling and his successors.

In this paper, the point is made that both products and consumers are heterogeneous. Products are differentiated by inherent attributes of firms, and consumers are endowed with specific tastes about these attributes. This implies that each consumer now possesses a system of different valuations which are not observable a priori. Hence firms cannot predict with certainty the behavior of a particular consumer. In other words, the utility of a consumer located at \( x \) and purchasing from firm \( i \) can be determined up to a probability distribution as

\[
(1) \quad u_i[x] = \nu_i[x] + \mu \epsilon_i,
\]

where \( \epsilon_i \) is a random variable with zero mean and unit variance, and \( \mu \) is a positive constant. It is perhaps worth noticing, at this stage, that the utility of a particular consumer is treated as a random variable in order to account for a lack of information on the part of firms regarding the tastes of that consumer, and not (necessarily) in order to reflect a lack of rationality in his behavior.

We now assume that the variations in valuations can be captured by choosing an appropriate distribution for \( \epsilon_i \). In consequence, firms can predict aggregate consumer behavior perfectly. Since firms do not price-discriminate, such knowledge is sufficient to determine their policy.

Given that consumers maximize utility, the probability \( P_i[x] \) that a consumer located at \( x \) will purchase the product from firm \( i \) is defined by \( \Pr(u_i[x] \geq u_j[x], i \neq j) \). To obtain some simple expression for \( P_i[x] \), we suppose, following McFadden and others (see Manski and McFadden [18]), that the \( \epsilon_i \) terms in (1) are identically, independently Weibull-distributed. Accordingly, \( P_i[x] \) is given by the logit model:

Assumption 3:

\[
P_i[x] = \frac{e^{(a - p - c|x - x_i|/\mu)}}{\sum_{j=1}^{2} e^{(a - p - c|x - x_j|/\mu)}}.
\]

In our model, the value of \( \mu \) reflects the degree of heterogeneity in consumer tastes: the larger the latter, the larger the former. From now on we concentrate on firm 1.

2.2. Using Assumption 3, the probability of purchasing from firm 1 is

\[
(2) \quad P_i^1 = \frac{1}{1 + H}, \quad P_i^2 = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(c/\mu)(b + 2(x_i - x_i))}}, \quad P_i^3 = \frac{1}{1 + K},
\]
for a consumer in region 1, 2, and 3 respectively, where $\delta = |x_1 - x_2|$ is the distance separating the two firms, $H = \exp(-c\delta/\mu)$, and $K = \exp(c\delta/\mu)$.

Using (2), the probability of purchasing from firm 1 is constant over the regions 1 and 3 and monotonic over region 2. Furthermore $P_1^1 = 1 - P_1^3 = P_2^1$.

Finally

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial x} P_1^2 < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \text{sign} \left( \frac{\partial^2}{\partial x^2} P_1^2 \right) = \text{sign} \left( e^{-\left(\frac{c}{\mu}\right)(\delta + 2(x_1 - x))} - 1 \right).$$

The inflexion point of $P_1^2$ is at

$$x = x_1 + \frac{\delta}{2}.$$

Thus if $x_1 < x < x_1 + \delta/2$, then $P_1^2$ is strictly concave and if $x_1 + \delta/2 < x < x_2$ it is strictly convex.

Consider Figure 1. The origin of the graph associated with $P_1$ is on the SW corner and the origin of the graph associated with $P_2$ is on the NE corner. It can be seen that each probability function is derived from the other as a composition of two reflections, one around the vertical axis passing through $x$ (which corresponds to exchanging names) and another around the horizontal axis passing through $1/2$ (which corresponds to $P_1 + P_2 = 1$). Hence the two shaded areas are the same. This type of symmetry is justified because any two consumers symmetrically located relative to $x$ face the same distribution of distances from firms, the only difference being the exchange of names between firms. The invariance of probabilities in regions 1 and 3 is a direct consequence of the assumptions that transportation cost is linear in distance and that utility is linear in transportation cost. More generally, the spatial structure of $P_1$ is consistent with the "law of intervening opportunities" (Stouffer [24]): the probability of purchasing from a firm is high where one necessarily encounters that firm before any other, and low where one necessarily encounters that firm after another. This, for firm 1, refers

**Figure 1.**
to regions 1 and 3 respectively. Probabilities in region 2 on the other hand, where no intervening opportunities exist, are determined by the distance from the two competing firms in a way which agrees with experience (Golledge [10]).

Using (2)

\[ \frac{\partial}{\partial \mu} P_i(x) \geq 0 \quad \text{for} \quad x \neq \bar{x}. \]

Symmetry and (5) imply that \( P_i = \frac{1}{\mu} \) at the midpoint between \( x_1 \) and \( x_2 \) which, here, is also the inflexion point \( \bar{x} \). This, in turn, defines the areas of dominance for the two firms, i.e. the areas over which the probability of patronizing a firm is higher than that of the other. Furthermore

\[ \lim_{\mu \to 0} P_i(x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{for } x < \bar{x}, \\ 0 & \text{for } x > \bar{x}, \end{cases} \]

\[ \lim_{\mu \to \infty} P_i(x) = \frac{1}{\mu} \quad \text{for } x \in X. \]

An intuitive explanation of (6) and (7) is that, as \( \mu \) approaches zero, costs (including transportation costs) become an increasingly important determinant of utility relative to the differentiated product characteristics. The opposite happens when \( \mu \) approaches infinity. These results are summarized in Figure 2 where \( 0 < \mu_1 < \mu_2 < \infty \).

2.3. Without loss of generality, let \( p = 1 \). Using Assumptions 1 and 2, and (2), the profit of firm 1 is

\[ \pi_i = \pi_1 + \pi_2 + \pi_3 = \int_0^{x_1} P_1(x) \, dx + \int_{x_1}^{x_2} P_2(x) \, dx + \int_{x_2}^{l} P_1(x) \, dx \]

\[ = x_1 + \frac{\delta}{2} \frac{l - x_2}{1 + H} \frac{1}{1 + K}. \]

It is worth noticing that \( \pi_i \) is now a continuous function of \( x_1 \) over \( X \) as long as \( \mu > 0 \). In other words, heterogeneity eliminates discontinuities in the profit
function. This is to be contrasted with the homogeneity case in which discontinuities arise when firms cross each other. Moreover, in Figure 2, increasing $\mu$ favors firm 1. This remains true as long as firm 2 is more centrally located because the profit loss of firm 1 in region 1 due to increasing $\mu$ is more than compensated by the corresponding gain in region 3. As the degree of heterogeneity becomes arbitrarily large, the profit of firm 1 approaches 1/2 from below. On the other hand, since differences in profits are generated only within the regions of intervening opportunities 1 and 3, $\pi_2 - \pi_1$ decreases for smaller $\delta$. At the limit, when there are no intervening opportunities left, $\pi_1 = \pi_2 = 1/2$.

2.4. Consider the best location reply (BLR) of firm 1 relative to firm 2, in other words the profit-maximizing location for firm 1 given the location $x_2$ of firm 2. Toward this purpose, we use (8) to obtain

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial x_1} \pi_1 = \frac{\mu(K-H) + 2c(l-x_i-x_2)}{2\mu(1+K)(1+H)}.$$  

Assume that $x_2 \geq l/2$. (The case $x_2 \leq l/2$ obtains by symmetry.) When $\mu = 0$ there is no BLR. That is, firm 1 aspires to follow as close as possible firm 2 in order to capture as much as possible of the market. But for any $x_i < x_2$ there is a location in-between which yields a higher profit for firm 1. On the other hand, for every positive $\mu$ there is BLR, typically corresponding to a location quite distinct from $x_2$. The way such BLR varies can be determined as follows. Totally differentiating (9) at $x_1^*$, we obtain

$$\frac{\partial x_1^*}{\partial x_2} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial x_1^*}{\partial \mu} < 0,$$

where $x_1^*$ is the BLR. Furthermore, as $\mu$ varies on $[0, \infty]$, $x_1^*$ varies on $[l/2, x_2^*]$; and $x_1^*$ is a continuous, decreasing function of $\mu$. Thus, for every $x_i \in [l/2, x_2^*]$, there is a $\mu \in [0, \infty]$ such that $x_1^*_\mu = x_i$. These results are summarized in Figure 3 which describes the BLR of firm 1 for $0 \leq x_2 \leq l$ and for $0 < \mu_1 < \mu_2 < \infty$.

3. THE LOCATION MODEL

3.1. In this section we discuss conditions under which an agglomeration of $n$ non-cooperating firms occurs, when firms decide only upon their location. This is a special case in which prices are supposed to be given and equal (to one by normalization). Let $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ be the location of firms 1, $\ldots$, $n$. A Nash location equilibrium (NLE) is an $n$-tuple $(x_1^*, \ldots, x_n^*)$ such that $\pi_i(x_1^*, \ldots, x_i^*, \ldots, x_n^*) \geq \pi_i(x_1^*, \ldots, x_i^*, \ldots, x_n^*)$ for any $x_i \in [0, l]$ and $i = 1, \ldots, n$. An agglomerated Nash location equilibrium (ANLE) is an NLE with $x_1^* = \cdots = x_n^*$. Thus, in the case of an ANLE, the above condition for equilibrium amounts to $\pi_i(x_1^*, x_j^*) = x_i^*$ for $j = 1, \ldots, n$ and $i \neq j$. Therefore, it is therefore sufficient to consider the case in which one firm, say firm 1, locates at $x_1$ and the rest locate at $x_2$. Given that (1) holds for all firms, Assumption 3 is now replaced by Assumption 3'.

Assumption 3': \( P_i(x) = e^{\mu x}/(e^{\mu x} + (n-1) e^{\mu x}/2) \).

Using this assumption, we obtain

\[
\begin{align*}
P_i^1 &= \frac{1}{1 + (n-1)H}, & P_i^2 &= \frac{1}{1 + (n-1) e^{-(\sigma/\mu)(\delta + 2x_i)}} \cdot \\
P_i^3 &= \frac{1}{1 + (n-1)K}.
\end{align*}
\]

(11)

and, consequently, (8) becomes

\[
\pi_i = \frac{x_i}{1 + (n-1)H} + \delta - \frac{\mu}{2c} \ln \frac{1 + (n-1)K}{1 + (n-1)H} + \frac{l - x_i}{1 + (n-1)K}. \quad (12)
\]

The type of symmetry identified in Figure 2 is now lost because, for \( n > 2 \), \( x_i \) and \( x_2 \) are no longer equally attractive. The general form of (4) is

\[
\bar{x} = x_i + \frac{\delta}{2} - \frac{\mu}{2c} \ln (n-1). \quad (13)
\]

The inflexion point \( \bar{x} \) of \( P_i^3 \) moves along the line \( P_i = \frac{1}{2} \) toward \( x_i \), with increasing \( n \). As long as there is an inflexion point, it continues to partition \( X \) in two areas of dominance. For \( n > 1 + \exp (e\delta/\mu) \), however, \( P_i^3 \) becomes strictly convex over region 2 and there is no area of dominance corresponding to firm 1, i.e., the probability of patronizing \( x_i \) is everywhere lower than that of \( x_2 \). These results are summarized in Figure 4. Figure 5, on the other hand, illustrates variations in heterogeneity where \( 0 < \mu_1 < \mu_2 < \mu_3 < \infty \). The impact of increasing heterogeneity on both the inflexion point and the shape of curves in region 2 is similar to that of an increasing number of firms.
3.2. Using (12)

\[
\text{sign} \frac{\partial}{\partial x_1} \tau_1 = \text{sign} \left( K - H - \frac{2x_1c((n-1)+H)}{\mu(1+(n-1)H)} \right.
\]
\[
+ \frac{2(1-x_2)c((n-1)+K)}{\mu(1+(n-1)K)} \right).
\]

This will serve as a basis for most arguments of the section.

**Proposition 1:** If \( \mu \) is finite, then an ANLE can exist only at the center.

**Proof:** It suffices to establish that, for any peripheral agglomeration of \( n \) firms, a firm will benefit by moving slightly toward the center if the location of the rest is fixed. This is obvious for \( \mu = 0 \) where the profit of the displaced firm will change from \( 1/n \) to larger than \( 1/2 \). For \( \mu > 0 \), consider \( n-1 \) firms at \( x_2 < 1/2 \) and the remaining firm 1 at \( x_2 + \xi \) with \( \xi > 0 \) and arbitrarily small. Since \( \delta \) is now arbitrarily small, \( H = 1 - c\xi/\mu \) and \( K = 1 + c\xi/\mu \) are approximately true. Replace
those in (14) and take the limit as \( \xi \to 0 \) to obtain

\[
\left. \frac{\partial}{\partial x_1} \pi_i \right|_{x_2} = \frac{1}{\mu} (n-1)(l-2x_3).
\]

Thus, if \( \mu < \infty \), the profit of a firm increases by moving slightly toward the center if the location of the rest is fixed. \( \Box \).

Clearly, the agglomeration of two firms at the center is an NLE for any \( \mu \geq 0 \). However, we have the following proposition.

**Proposition 2:** For \( n > 2 \), if \( \mu < c(l-2/n)/2 \), then there is no ANLE.

**Proof:** We shall first demonstrate that, under these circumstances, a firm will benefit by moving slightly away from the central agglomeration of \( n \) firms. For \( \mu > 0 \) and \( n > 2 \), consider \( n-1 \) firms at \( l/2 \) and the remaining firm 1 at \( l/2 - \xi \). Using the approximation of \( H \) and \( K \) in Proposition 1 on (14) yields, for \( \xi \) arbitrarily small,

\[
\left. \frac{\partial}{\partial x_2} \pi_i \right|_{l/2, \xi} = \text{sign} \left( 2 + \frac{c(l-2)}{\mu n} \right).
\]

Hence the profit of a firm increases by moving slightly away from the central agglomeration if and only if

\[
2 + \frac{c(l-2)}{\mu n} < 0.
\]

The result then follows immediately from Proposition 1. \( \Box \).

**Proposition 3:** If \( \mu \geq c(l-2/n) \), then the central agglomeration of \( n \) firms is an NLE.

**Proof:** It suffices to establish that a firm at \( x_1 < l/2 \) will benefit by moving slightly toward the central agglomeration of \( n-1 \) firms. Upon replacement of \( 2x_3 \) with \( l \) in (14) we obtain a lower bound for the right-hand side of this expression on \([0, l/2] \). In consequence \( \delta \pi_i / \delta x_1 \) will be positive if that lower bound is nonnegative. This, in turn, holds if and only if

\[
1 + (n-1)(H + K) + (n-1)^2 \geq \frac{c(l-2)}{\mu (n^2 - 2n)}.
\]

Since \( H + K \geq 2 \),

\[
1 + (n-1)(H + K) + (n-1)^2 \geq n^2
\]

for \( 0 \leq x_1 < l/2 \). Combining (18) and (19) we conclude that if \( \mu \geq c(l-2/n) \), then the profit of a firm increases if it joins the central agglomeration. \( \Box \).
In order to clarify our results, assume that a firm decides to move away from the central agglomeration to establish at \( x < l/2 \). The firm is now closer to those located in the interval \([0, x + \delta/2]\). When tastes are similar, the firm captures almost everyone over \([0, x + \delta/2]\), but almost none over \([x + \delta/2, l]\). Consequently the firm gains from leaving its competitors. Once tastes become more heterogeneous, the firm expects to capture a smaller fraction of the customers in the first interval, but to realize more business in the second. Actually, for \( \mu < cl(1 - 2/n)/2 \), the gain on \([0, x + \delta/2]\) is larger than the loss on \([x + \delta/2, l]\) so that it is in the firm's interest to abandon the agglomeration. When \( \mu > cl(1 - 2/n) \), the opposite becomes true and the central agglomeration emerges as an equilibrium. This happens because consumer's choice is now influenced more by tastes and less by the objective characteristics of firms (here delivered price). Then the best choice for firms is central agglomeration. The above necessary and sufficient conditions do not coincide. However, numerical experiments undertaken for three firms suggest that the profit function of, say, firm 1 is single-peaked at \( l/2 \) for \( cl/6 < \mu < cl/3 \) when firms 2 and 3 are at \( l/2 \). How suggestive this result is for the \( n \)-firm case remains to be seen.

In general, we do not know whether other equilibrium configurations exist. Yet, when \( \mu \) is large enough, but finite, the central agglomeration can be shown to be the only possible equilibrium. This can be understood as follows. Note first that the demand addressed to a firm is elastic with respect to the location of that firm and to the location of all its competitors. As \( \mu \) increases, the relative impact of competitors on demand declines, until it becomes significantly affected by that firm's location only. Under these circumstances, as suggested by Figure 3, the center becomes increasingly attractive for any locational pattern of competitors. In consequence, every peripheral firm is inevitably drawn toward the center.

4. THE PRICE MODEL

In this section we keep the location of \( n \) firms fixed at a common point and we investigate the case in which the prices are no longer given but chosen by firms. Let \( p_i \) denote the price of firm \( i \). Since from now on \( p_i \) is a decision variable, we replace Assumption 2 with the following assumption.

Assumption 2': The product is produced at no cost and is sold at a price \( p_i \) to be determined by firm \( i \). Therefore, \( v_i(x) = a - p_i - c|x_i - x| \).

Changes in profits as given by (12) are easily made. Indeed using an obvious extension of Assumption 3, it follows that

\[
P_i = e^{-p_i/\mu} / \sum_{j=1}^{n} e^{-p_j/\mu},
\]

hence that

\[
\pi_i = p_i d / \left(1 + e^{p_i/\mu} \sum_{j \neq i} e^{-p_j/\mu}\right).
\]
Thus the profit is continuous with respect to \( p_i \), which, once more, must be contrasted with the Bertrand case where a discontinuity appears at the undercutting price.

A Nash price equilibrium (NPE) is an \( n \)-tuple \((p^*_1, \ldots, p^*_n)\) such that \( \pi_i([p^*_1, \ldots, p^*_i, \ldots, p^*_n]) = \pi_i([p^*_1, \ldots, p_n, \ldots, p^*_n]) \) for any \( p_i \geq 0 \) and \( i = 1, \ldots, n \).

**Proposition 4:** \( p^*_1 = \cdots = p^*_n = p^* = \mu n/(n-1) \) is the only NPE for an agglomeration of \( n \) firms.

**Proof:** Let \( p_1 \leq p_2 \leq \cdots \leq p_n \). From (21)

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial p_i} \pi_i = \text{sign} \left( 1 - \frac{p_i}{\mu} \left( 1 + e^{-p_i/\mu} / \left( \sum_{j=2}^n e^{-p_j/\mu} \right) \right) \right).
\]

Since

\[
e^{-p_i/\mu} / \left( \sum_{j=2}^n e^{-p_j/\mu} \right) \geq 1 / (n-1),
\]

it follows that \( \partial \pi_i / \partial p_i > 0 \) if \( p_i < \mu n/(n-1) \). Thus there can be no price lower than \( \mu n/(n-1) \) at NPE. Using a similar argument on \( p_n \) we also conclude that there can be no price higher than \( \mu n/(n-1) \) at NPE.

**Q.E.D.**

Heterogeneity in consumer's reactions slows down the undercutting of prices stressed by Bertrand in a way that market prices are stabilized at a positive, common value. The reason is that every firm faces a positive and finite elasticity over its entire demand schedule. Not surprisingly, the resulting equilibrium price depends on \( \mu \) and tends to zero as we approach Bertrand.

5. THE LOCATION-PRICE MODEL

In this section we combine and extend our previous results when both location and price are decision variables. Under these circumstances a Nash equilibrium (NE) is an \( n \)-tuple \((x^*_1, p^*_1), \ldots, (x^*_n, p^*_n)\) such that

\[
\pi_i([x^*_1, p^*_1], \ldots, (x^*_i, p^*_i), \ldots, (x^*_n, p^*_n)]
\]

\[
\geq \pi_i((x^*_i, p^*_i), \ldots, (x_i, p_i), \ldots, (x^*_n, p^*_n))
\]

for any \( x_i \in [0, 1] \), \( p_i \geq 0 \), and \( i = 1, \ldots, n \). An agglomerated Nash equilibrium (ANE) is an NE with \( x^*_1 = \cdots = x^*_n \).

**Proposition 5:** If \( \mu \) is finite, then an ANE can exist only at the center.

**Proof:** Using Proposition 4, \( p^*_1 = \cdots = p^*_n = p^* \) holds for any ANE. The claim then follows from Proposition 1 which implies that, for any peripheral agglomeration of \( n \) firms with prices fixed at \( p^* \), a firm will benefit by moving slightly toward the center if the location of the rest is fixed.

**Q.E.D.**
When firm 1 locates at \( x_1 \), with price \( p_1 \), and the rest locate at \( x_2 \) with price \( p^* \), the probability of purchasing from firm 1 becomes

\[
P_1^1 = \frac{1}{1 + (n-1) e^\lambda H}, \quad P_1^2 = \frac{1}{1 + (n-1) e^\lambda e^{-c/(\mu (\delta + 2(x_1 - x))})},
\]

\[
P_1^3 = \frac{1}{1 + (n-1) e^\lambda K},
\]

where \( \lambda = (p_1 - p^*)/\mu \). Consequently the profit function becomes

\[
\pi_1 = \frac{x_1}{1 + (n-1) e^\lambda H} + \delta - \frac{\mu}{2c} \ln \frac{1 + (n-1) e^\lambda K}{1 + (n-1) e^\lambda H + l - x_2}.
\]

and

\[
\text{sign} \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial x_1} \pi_1 \right) = \text{sign} \left( \frac{K - H - \frac{2x_1 c((n-1) e^\lambda + H)}{\mu (1 + (n-1) e^\lambda H)} + \frac{2(l - x_2 c((n-1) e^\lambda + K))}{\mu (1 + (n-1) e^\lambda K)} \right).
\]

**Proposition 6:** For \( n > 2 \), if \( \mu < c(1 - 2/n)/2 \), then there is no ANE.

**Proof:** For \( \mu > 0 \) and \( n > 2 \), consider \( n-1 \) firms at \( l/2 \) with prices \( p^* \) given in Proposition 4 and the remaining firm 1 at \( l/2 - \xi \) with price \( p_1 > 0 \). Using the approximation of \( H \) and \( K \) in Proposition 1 on (26) we obtain

\[
\text{sign} \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial x_1} \pi_1 \right) = \text{sign} \left( 2 + \frac{c(1 - (n-1) e^\lambda)}{\mu (1 + (n-1) e^\lambda)} \right).
\]

Thus there is no central ANE if

\[
\mu < \frac{c}{2} \left( 1 - \frac{2}{1 + (n-1) e^\lambda} \right).
\]

The result then follows immediately from Proposition 5 and the observation that (28) holds for \( p_1 = p^* \).

**Q.E.D.**

**Proposition 7:** If \( \mu \geq c l \), then the central agglomeration of \( n \) firms with \( p_1^* = \cdots = p_n^* = \mu n/(n-1) \) is an NE.

**Proof:** For \( \mu > 0 \), we consider once more \( n-1 \) firms at \( l/2 \) with prices \( p^* \) and the remaining firm 1 at \( x_1 < l/2 \) with price \( p_1 > 0 \). Upon replacement of \( 2x_1 \) with \( l \) in (26) we obtain a lower bound analogous to that of Proposition 3, which implies that \( \partial \pi_1 / \partial x_1 > 0 \) if and only if

\[
1 + (n-1) e^\lambda (H + K) + (n-1)^2 e^{2\lambda} \geq \frac{c l}{\mu} (n-1)^2 e^{2\lambda} - 1.
\]
Since
\begin{equation}
1 + (n-1) e^A (H + K) + (n-1)^2 e^{2A} \geq (1 + (n-1) e^A)^2,
\end{equation}
it follows that if
\begin{equation}
\mu \geq cl \left( 1 - \frac{2}{1 + (n-1) e^A} \right),
\end{equation}
then the profit of firm 1 increases if it moves toward the central agglomeration. This must hold for any $p_1 \geq 0$. Once at the center, by Proposition 4, firm 1 will charge $p^\ast$. Q.E.D.

Now that profits are no longer driven down to zero when firms are clustered, we may expect that the counter-argument given by d'Aspremont et al. [5] becomes irrelevant in some cases. Indeed, even though strong competition lessens the equilibrium market price under agglomeration, it may not render it low enough to overcome the advantage of higher market share at the center. This happens whenever $\mu$ is larger than $cl$, thus restoring Hotelling's Principle of Minimum Differentiation.

6. CONCLUSIONS

By introducing the spatial dimension, Hotelling expected to smooth market reactions to changes in the strategy of firms, hence to avoid price competition à la Bertrand. We know how discontinuities in demands destroy his reasonable hope. A lot has been subsequently written on non-existence of equilibria, existence of spatial arrangements strongly sensitive to the number of competitors, and the like. At the foundation of all this lies the sharpness of spatial behavior generated by the standard assumptions of perfect homogeneity. We believe however that the world is pervasively heterogeneous, and we have made it clear how, in a particular model, this restores smoothness. Furthermore the Hotelling conjecture has been obtained by further introducing enough heterogeneity in both firms and consumers. Here, this amounts to adding a second, non-spatial dimension which arises from differences in products and tastes. Since firms are not informed about the details of such differences, heterogeneity operates as a hidden dimension in our model. This has a deep effect on market structure because it creates some kind of sluggishness which, in turn, may stabilize competition.\footnote{This idea is not entirely new: Dasgupta and Stiglitz [3] obtained a similar conclusion in patent race games.} Not surprisingly, the degree of heterogeneity required to sustain a central agglomeration increases for larger markets and higher transportation rates. This generates a trade-off leading to the clustering of firms for $\mu/cl$ relatively large and to the dispersion of firms for $\mu/cl$ relatively small.

Our study is limited in several respects. Firstly, keeping as close as possible to Hotelling, we have assumed a linear market, a uniform distribution of consumers and a perfectly inelastic individual demand. Nevertheless we hope that...
the idea of heterogeneity is sufficient to render our existence results valid for some such extensions. Secondly, for a wide range of \( \mu \), we have no analytical results about the existence and nature of equilibria other than the central agglomeration. In particular, the question of dispersed equilibria remains open. Nevertheless a numerical analysis of the 3-firm case, suggests that such equilibria may exist either alone or together with an agglomerated equilibrium.

Our approach to spatial competition can be connected with some other issues in economic theory.

(1) The "Folk Theorem" for competitive markets states that if firms are small relative to the market, then the market solution is approximately competitive.\(^6\) Here, we know that the market price prevailing in the agglomeration is greater than a strictly positive constant whatever the number of firms. To the extent that \( \mu \) as a function of \( n \) does not go to zero, our analysis provides a counter-example to the Folk Theorem when firms are price-makers. Indeed, in this case, the equilibrium prices decrease but do not reach the competitive level—although at the same time the equilibrium profits converge to zero. The reason is that, under these circumstances, the products provided by the new firms are different enough from the existing ones, to preserve some monopoly power for each firm.

(2) The outcome of the Lancaster [13] entry process results in a regular spacing of products over a linear space of characteristics. This is to be contrasted with the following. Assume that a clustering of products already exists at \( l/2 \) and consider the problem faced by new entrants. If \( \mu \) remains large enough, i.e. \( \mu > c_1 \), new firms will select products close to the existing ones and no firm wants to re-design its product. The entry process stops when the marginal profit net of the entry cost becomes negative. Over the spatial realm, an analogous contrast can be drawn with the Löschian [16] firm entry process.

(3) Hotelling’s contribution was seminal to many other theories, including party competition and voting theory. Clearly, our approach could be extended to such topics. In particular, this could avoid the standard nonexistence outcome encountered in dealing with the \( n \)-dimensional version of the spatial competition model. Results already obtained by Wittman [27] are very promising.

Queens University,  
Université Libre de Bruxelles,  
McMaster University,  
and  
Université Catholique de Louvain

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\(^6\) A rigorous proof of this result has been given by Novshek [21] when firms are quantity-setters.


