**Provided for non-commercial research and educational use only.
Not for reproduction, distribution or commercial use.**

This article was originally published in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd edition, published by Elsevier, and the attached copy is provided by Elsevier for the author's benefit and for the benefit of the author's institution, for non-commercial research and educational use including without limitation use in instruction at your institution, sending it to specific colleagues who you know, and providing a copy to your institution's administrator.

All other uses, reproduction and distribution, including without limitation commercial reprints, selling or licensing copies or access, or posting on open internet sites, your personal or institution's website or repository, are prohibited. For exceptions, permission may be sought for such use through Elsevier's permissions site at:

<http://www.elsevier.com/locate/permissionusematerial>

From Licata, L., Mercy, A., 2015. Collective Memory, Social Psychology of. In: James D. Wright (editor-in-chief), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd edition, Vol 4. Oxford: Elsevier. pp. 194–199.

ISBN: 9780080970868

Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. unless otherwise stated. All rights reserved.
Elsevier

Collective Memory, Social Psychology of

Laurent Licata and Aurélie Mercy, Research Center for Social and Cultural Psychology, Unité de Psychologie Sociale, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, Belgium

© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

This article is a revision of the previous edition article by J. Prager, volume 4, pp. 2223–2227, © 2001, Elsevier Ltd.

Abstract

Collective memories are shared representations of a group's past based on a common identity. Social psychological approaches of collective memory have addressed their antecedents and functions. Their formation is affected by cognitive and emotional factors, but it takes place in the context of human interactions with other humans or with cultural artifacts. They are shaped by, and transmitted through, narratives. Because they intervene in the definition, maintenance, and mobilization of social identities, they have a strong impact on intergroup relations. Collective memories influence the present, but they are also influenced by present psychological states and needs.

Introduction

Through the expression 'collective memory,' a psychological faculty – memory – is attributed to a social group, whether small (a family, a group of friends) or large (a whole nation). Collective memories are instrumental in defining, maintaining, and mobilizing social identities. As a consequence, they are involved in intergroup relations, particularly in intergroup conflict and reconciliation processes. For example, Barack Obama began his second inaugural address (21 January 2013) by reminding the principles of equality and freedom on which the USA were founded. Then he emphasized the continuity of their history: "Today we continue a never-ending journey, to bridge the meaning of those words with the realities of our time" (White House, 2013). And he listed some of the lessons learned from this history. The first one was about racial equality: "Through blood drawn by lash and blood drawn by sword, we learned that no union founded on the principles of liberty and equality could survive half-slave and half-free." This was an allusion to Abraham Lincoln's second inauguration address: "until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword." Through this speech, Obama depicted the USA as a united people that, beyond social and racial divisions, share the same identity and strive to achieve the same goals. He did it by drawing on the collective memory shared by Americans and by stressing the continuity of the nation, as well as by casting himself as the continuator of the founding fathers of the nation. Thereby, he asserted his legitimacy as the President of the USA and tried to mobilize Americans toward the realization of his political agenda.

Most scholars refer to the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1980, 1992) as the founding father of collective memory studies, although he did not coin the term (Olick et al., 2011). Halbwachs was influenced both by Emile Durkheim's sociology of collective representations and by Henri Bergson's philosophy of subjectivity. Accordingly, Halbwachs tried to conciliate an individual-based and a collective-based accounts of collective memory. But Halbwachs defended different, apparently incompatible, theses on the nature of collective memories. In *The collective memory*, he wrote "it is individuals as

group members who remember" (Halbwachs, 1980: p. 48) whereas, in *The social frameworks of memory*, he stated "it is only natural that we consider the group in itself as having the capacity to remember" (Halbwachs, 1992: p. 54). Thus, Wertsch (2002) distinguishes two interpretations of collective memory: the strong and the distributed versions. According to the strong version, groups have memories above and beyond the minds of group members. Wertsch views this version as a metaphor that can be useful in some circumstances – i.e., when dealing with very cohesive social groups – but should not be taken literally. In contrast, the distributed version assumes that group members share some representations of the past, without positing that the group itself has a memory. Among distributed accounts of collective memory, one can further distinguish homogeneous and complementary variants. The homogeneous variant assumes that all group members share the same representation of the past, whereas the complementary variant posits that group members hold different representations, but that these are coordinated to form a system made of complementary pieces.

Frederic Bartlett (1932) is generally credited for having introduced collective memory in the field of psychology. In *Remembering: a study in experimental and social psychology*, he defended a distributed account of collective memory, and criticized Halbwachs for having reified the concept. However, according to Bartlett, remembering is social in nature. Far from being enclosed in the individual's mind, it is a skilled activity that takes place in the framework of human interactions (Sutton, 2008). This activity does not amount to retrieve information that was previously stocked in the individual memory system, but rather implies an active reconstruction of memory traces as a function of the present situation. More precisely, it is the interaction between schemata inherited from our cultural background or from our personal experiences and the situational context that determines this reconstruction. This reconstruction is therefore influenced by the social context in which remembering takes place, which implies that representations of the past can be distorted, both at the individual and at the collective levels. Indeed, social groups such as nations 'flatter and deceive themselves' (Baumeister and Hastings, 1997).

As an object of scientific inquiry, collective memory lies at the crossroads between behavioral and social sciences. Historians, sociologists, political scientists, philosophers, cultural scientists, anthropologists, and philologists, as well as psychologists have contributed to develop what has been referred to as 'memory studies' (Olick et al., 2011). Somehow paradoxically, the contribution of psychologists, and particularly of social psychologists, appeared relatively late in the history of this movement, and it still represents only a small portion of the bulk of studies and theoretical developments on collective memory. In psychology, interest in collective memory and social representations of history sprang in the 1930s with the work of Bartlett (1932) then waned only to regain some visibility from the 1990s on. However, as we shall see, this contribution has been continuously increasing ever since and, as we shall argue, this contribution is significant.

Psychologists have addressed different categories of questions regarding collective memory: how do collective memories form? What are their social psychological functions? And what is their influence on intergroup relations?

The Psychological Antecedents of Collective Memory Cognition

Coman et al. (2009) anchor their approach of collective memory in cognitive psychology, in line with Bartlett's interactionist and constructivist stance. They reckon that collective memory should not be conflated with individual psychology. However, they emphasize that collective memories should not only be studied at the collective level – publicly available symbols maintained by society – because it is the interplay between these public symbols and individual psychology that makes these memories collective. This interplay is necessary because of the very nature of human memory. Coman et al. advocate a social interactional approach to memory according to which internal and external factors should be considered: "When it comes to the study of memory, the claim would be that, in order to understand how a person remembers what he ate last night, a researcher needs to consider not only the neural mechanisms underlying memory, but also, for instance, the visual cues in the environment, such as the pile of dishes in the sink" (2009: p. 127). Human beings reconstruct their memories by using cues available in their environment. For example, bartenders use the shape of glasses as cues to remember complex orders. They place the appropriate glass on the bar when they receive the order; the presence of different glass shapes then guides their memory. The use of social artifacts is seen as a response to the limitation of human mnemonic capacities. As Sutton (2008: p. 220) pointed out, "it's just because isolated items aren't stored atomically in the brain that our relatively vulnerable biological memories are supplemented by more stable external scaffolding. Brains like ours need media, objects, and other people to function fully as minds." Likewise, society restructures the world so that the group better remembers. For example, the Washington Lincoln memorial was built in order to guide people's remembering of this president as a godlike figure. Thus, the memories of people who visited the Lincoln memorial are influenced in

a similar way, which gradually changes their collective memory. Thus, the interactions that group members have with social artifacts shape their memories (Coman et al., 2009).

With his 'lay historian' metaphor, Klein (2013) also advocates for the taking into account of the role of cognitive processes in the formation of collective memory. Lay people are regularly facing the necessity of explaining the past, either for themselves or for others. Klein parallels the construction of lay knowledge about the past with the three steps involved in historical research: archival (access to knowledge), explanatory (elaboration of causal reasoning about past events), and representational (elaboration and communication of a representation adapted to an audience). Cognitive or sociocognitive processes intervene at each of these steps when lay historians form their historical knowledge. These processes may lead to biases, thus hampering the epistemic function of collective memory. For example, people's evaluation of the truthfulness of testimonies depends on their evaluation of the reliability of the source: they tend to use ready-made heuristics when the source is deemed trustful, or adopt a critical posture when it is not, thus influencing the archival step. At the explanatory step, other cognitive phenomena may then interfere. For example, people generally try to explain unexpected or unpleasant events, thus neglecting events that appear to follow the 'normal course of history' or that are pleasant. They also underestimate chance and overestimate causal explanations. In addition, they often fall prey to the retrospective illusion or hindsight bias: when the outcome of a sequence of events is known, people tend to overestimate the probability of that particular outcome over all other possible ones. This might lead to reconstructing the sequence of events in order to explain this outcome through a coherent narrative that logically leads to it, thus obliterating elements of the past that do not contribute or contradict this narrative. Finally, social cognitive biases can also interfere at the representational step, when a representation of the past is communicated to others through narration. Explaining is always explaining something to someone. Therefore, the representation that one communicates may be influenced by the characteristics of the audience one is addressing. A study showed that participants provided different explanations of a mass murder as a function of whether they addressed a personality psychologist or a nonspecialist: their explanations were more dispositional in the former than in the latter case. Thus, people adapt their message as a function of the way they perceive their audience. In brief, various cognitive and social cognitive processes known by psychologists may shape laypeople's understanding of the past and, indirectly, contribute to the formation of collective memories.

Collective memory approaches anchored in cognitive psychology or social cognition already pay due attention to interactional factors. Some approaches have gone a step further in that direction by stressing the importance of conversations in the formation and transmission of collective memories.

Conversation

According to Middleton and Edwards' (1990) discourse-analytical approach, in the course of conversations, people

coconstruct their memories or contest other people's accounts of an event. Versions of events are seen as pragmatic speech acts deemed to achieve rhetorical functions, so that a version cannot be taken as a person's real memory. Collective remembering is then studied as a joint activity rather than as the product of this activity: memory is the act of remembering and forgetting together.

Coman et al. (2009) also contend that conversations play a pivotal role in the formation of collective memories. People often talk about past events that had important consequences for their social group. These conversations can thus be instrumental in the spreading of memories across the group. One speaker, especially if she is seen as an expert, may influence a listener's memory that could, in turn, influence another listener, and so forth. For example, individual memories of family members were collected before and after a conversation about a story they had just read. Individual recollections were much more similar after than before the collective remembering, and story details that were shared during the conversation were disproportionately included in individual accounts of the story. Conversely, collective remembering can also lead to the forgetting of some elements of a narrative: listening to someone who communicates some items of a narrative, but fails to communicate other related items, facilitates recall of the communicated items while inhibiting the recall of unmentioned ones (Stone et al., 2010).

Narratives

Bartlett (1932) studied the formation of collective memories by asking participants to recount a story they had just read to others. According to Jerome Bruner (1990), human thought is organized by storytelling, but this cognitive mechanism is validated and maintained socially. As accounts of events involving some temporal or causal coherence (Laszlo, 2013), narratives have been viewed as means *par excellence* for forming and transmitting collective memories. In cultures with literacy, these historic narratives are mainly conveyed through texts. Written accounts of the distant or close past of nations are very influential in shaping and maintaining a sense of national identity. These narratives are not univocal: they are debated and contested in the public sphere, where several versions of the same events often compete (Jovchelovitch, 2012; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). But this very process of contestation ensures that the memory of the event is kept alive. Laszlo (2013) has studied the historical trajectories of nations as remembered by laypeople. For example, these studies showed that the history of Hungary is remembered as a story of grandeur (anti-Ottoman, then anti-Austrian fights) followed by decline (Trianon Treaty, wars), then by a slow but incomplete redress (end of Soviet rule). Hungarian collective memory is familiar with the 'First victory, then failure' pattern, but not with the 'Failure, then victory' one, which prevents Hungarians from making sense of the fall of the Berlin wall as it rather belongs to the latter.

Emotions

When an event affects the lives of large numbers of individuals, it triggers emotions. As these emotions are shared among

group members, they may facilitate the formation of collective memories about that event. Hence, according to Pennebaker and Banasik (1997), collective events are more likely to lead to collective memories when they bring social change; are emotionally loaded; elicit social sharing; are socially rehearsed by the mass media; and are associated with collective behaviors such as rituals, demonstrations, or commemorations.

Flashbulb memories are vivid recollections of the personal circumstances in which one receives the news about a shocking event. For example, many people remember how was the weather, where they were, or what tune was playing on the radio when they heard about the 9/11 attacks. Research on flashbulb memories concentrated quasi exclusively on negative – often violent – collective events, such as the assassination of political leaders, terrorist attacks, disasters, and catastrophes (Paez et al., 2009). These events prompt emotions in most, if not all, members of a population. Berntsen (2009) has shown that social identity relevance, rather than personal relevance, was central for the formation and maintenance of flashbulb memories. Flashbulb memories and collective memories share many characteristics and are probably two ways of studying the same phenomenon (Paez et al., 2009).

Emotions are therefore crucial determinants of the formation of collective memories, but their role extends far beyond this formation phase. Collective rituals are particularly effective in maintaining collective memories. To be sure, commemorative ceremonies are designed for this very function. Those rituals, through their form and content, are effective in reminding the event through the repetitive reactivation of the cognitive representation. However, rites are more than reminders, they are reenactments of the event (Connerton, 1989) and, as such, they also engage bodies. In collective emotional gatherings, people perform the same gestures, adopt the same postures, sing the same songs at the unison. This synchrony leads to an important social sharing of emotions, to the point of eliciting feelings of 'identity fusion.' This experience then revives the common identity and the beliefs associated with it (Paez and Rimé, 2014).

The Social Psychological Functions of Collective Memory

Cognitive, social interactional, and emotional factors thus play a role in the formation and maintenance of collective memories. Beyond the question of their formation, social psychologists have devoted much attention to their functions. Rather than providing an accurate account of the past, their main function is to provide a *usable past* (Wertsch, 2002); a representation of the past that can fulfill some role in the present. Collective memory "retains from the past only what still lives or is capable of living in the consciousness of the groups keeping the memory alive" (Halbwachs, 1980: p. 80). According to psychologists, collective memories are kept alive if they meet the needs and motivations of group members. These needs have been described as epistemic – providing a clear representation of the group's past – and/or identity – defining the group's identity. Social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) and social representations theories (Moscovici,

2008), either independently or in combination, have often been mobilized in this framework.

Social Identity Approaches to Collective Memory

Tajfel and Turner (1986: p. 16) defined social identity as “those aspects of an individual's self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging.” Collective memory fulfills various functions with regard to social identity (Klein et al., 2011). First, collective memories contribute to the group's definition. According to Liu and Hilton (2005: p. 537), “History provides us with narratives that tell us who we are, where we came from and where we should be going. It defines a trajectory which helps construct the essence of a group's identity, how it relates to other groups, and ascertains what its options are for facing present challenges.” Representations of the group's past, which are constantly renegotiated as a function of the present situation, thus provide content to the social identity. In addition, these representations have a normative function as they define how that group should behave. Paralleling Malinowski's views on myths, Liu and Hilton contend that social representations of history serve as ‘charters’ that define how the group should react to a present situation, because group members draw a ‘moral’ from their interpretation of a past event. Beyond these cognitive and normative aspects, the simple fact that those representations are shared brings a sense of cohesion among group members. Thus, this imagined past simultaneously creates a ‘horizontal’ solidarity between contemporary group members and a ‘vertical’ solidarity with past and future members of the group. In brief, sharing representations of the group's past confers psychological reality to that group.

In particular, representing the group as continuous through time facilitates identification with it (Sani, 2008). Conversely, presenting the group's history as discontinuous may elicit collective angst regarding the group's future, which can lead to group protective attitudes, such as opposing immigration (Jetten and Wohl, 2012; Smeekes and Verkuyten, 2013).

Second, collective memory contributes to set the group's value. According to Social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), people are motivated to hold a positive view of their group because their social identity is an intimate part of their self-concept. The group's value is assessed through intergroup comparisons. As a consequence, one needs to belong to a group that compares positively with relevant out-groups in order to derive a positive collective self-esteem. A group's past – its successes and failures; its moral or immoral actions – hence contribute to defining its relative value. Social groups thus compare their respective pasts, and generally strive to derive a positive sense of their identity through this comparison. This helps explain why collective memories are often biased toward positive accounts of the in-group's past and/or negative accounts of out-groups' actions in history (Baumeister and Hastings, 1997). In addition, it accounts for the fact that some representations of the group's past – such as reminders of past misdeeds – elicit strong defensive reactions (Branscombe and Doosje, 2004).

Third, collective memories can be used for legitimizing past, present, or planned actions of the group. For example, Serb

nationalists referred to memories of the Kosovo battle in 1389, after which the Serbs had lost control over the Kosovar territory, in order to legitimize the deportation of Muslim Kosovars in the 1990s.

Fourth, collective memories can be used in order to mobilize members of a social group to accomplish a particular collective – often political – project in the name of their shared identity (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). For example, the Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba adapted his discourse as a function of the audience he was addressing: in front of a Congolese audience, he would represent the history of colonization as undermined by the Belgians' cupidity and contempt whereas, in front of a Belgian audience, he would emphasize the friendship that the colonial experience had allowed to build between the two nations. Far from being a simple example of opportunism, this apparent lack of coherence actually reflected a stable political project, which demanded different actions from different actors. Hence, he had to mobilize the Congolese against the paternalistic colonial ideology, as well as make sure that the Belgians would collaborate with the new independent State (Klein and Licata, 2003).

Collective Memory and Reconciliation Processes

The management of collective memories of a past conflict is crucial to the quality of the present and future intergroup relations. Indeed, narratives shared inside the implicated groups often diverge. Given that social groups are motivated to perceive themselves in a positive way, these narratives are fundamentally selective, including and excluding historical events in order to characterize one's group in a positive way, at the expense of the former enemy's image (Bar-Tal, 2003).

In a postconflict context, the status attributed to a group during the conflict is determinant for the contents of the collective memory. These contents will be very different whether the group is casted as the victim or as the perpetrator in the historical narrative. Thus, if the positive actions of a group allow its members to value, and assert their moral character, its negative actions pose a significant threat to collective self-esteem, especially among highly identified group members (Branscombe and Doosje, 2004).

Memories of past misdeeds committed by the group are therefore difficult to integrate into the group's history. Being casted as a perpetrator group has consequences both within the social group and between social groups. Individuals seek to differentiate themselves from members who have committed negative actions. Therefore, the perpetrator status is associated with important tension, undermining social cohesion within the group. However, this status may also have a positive impact at the intergroup level. Indeed, group members may experience negative group-based moral emotions, such as collective guilt, shame, or regret (Giner-Sorolla, 2012). For example, memories of colonialism have been shown to trigger collective guilt or shame among young generations in formerly colonizing countries (Volpato and Licata, 2010). These aversive emotions motivate individuals to implement acts of reparation toward out-group members (Branscombe and Doosje, 2004).

The victim status also affects the social dynamics within and between groups. This position can be traumatic for the group, and hence also threaten its cohesion. However, if the traumatic event is commemorated – which highlights the common destiny of group members and accentuates distinction from other groups – the integration of past in-group sufferings in collective memory may have the opposite effect and increase social cohesion (Bar-Tal et al., 2009).

Victimhood also involves a competitive component: people draw comparisons between the sufferings of the groups involved in the conflict (Noor et al., 2012). This competitive victimhood implies a vision of the suffering of one's group as being more important and less legitimate compared to that of the out-group, and represents a strong obstacle to intergroup reconciliation.

However, perpetrator and victim statuses are not always incompatible. Indeed, in intergroup conflicts such as wars, and especially civil wars, group members are often involved in violent actions against the out-group, while themselves undergoing violence. In that case, the recognition of one's group's victim status might prevent group members from implementing reconciliation mechanisms. Indeed, perceived collective victimhood tends to inhibit empathy toward the out-group and provides an opportunity to discard any responsibility in the conflict (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). It then tends to reduce propensity to experience collective guilt. Yet, victimhood can be reframed: group members can include their former enemies into a common group, thus sharing a common identity of individuals having suffered from the conflict (Vollhardt, 2012). This inclusive view of victimhood has the opposite effects on intergroup relations: it leads to more empathy and increases willingness to forgive the out-group.

Statuses of victim and perpetrator are associated with a gain or loss of power in intergroup dynamics. In the aftermath of the conflict, the victimized group may appeal to the international community to recognize its status, or to obtain compensation from its former opponent, which can increase its relative power. The relationship between collective memory and power is thus mutual: the dominant group often has control over the official memory, particularly through public commemorations. In contrast, low-status groups strive for recognition of their status in the official narrative. Therefore, discourses about memory should be interpreted as a function of the group's current position and of its objectives (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001).

Collective Memories as Social Representations

The way a social group relates to its past can be envisioned in two different manners: collective memories are either depicted as weighing on the group's present, or as being influenced by the group's present (Prager, 1998). The past can be undergone or it can be chosen. For example, one can view memories of a collective trauma as bearing on the present, independently of people's will. Survivors of genocides and their descendants have to live with these sore memories, as they are included in their social identity. However, collective memories can also be tailored to fulfill current identity needs, or to legitimize behaviors. This rejoins Bartlett's contention that "with the individual as with the group, the past is continually re-made, reconstructed as a function of present interests" (1932: p. 309). For example, after the 9/11

attacks, American participants prompted to cite significant events of the last 70 years mainly listed events involving war or an attack against an American institution (Schuman and Rodgers, 2004). This suggests that people remember events that are in line with their present mental state: present to past. However, representations of the past can also influence the present. Indeed, drawing analogies between the 9/11 attacks and the Munich agreement of 1938 or to Pearl Harbor yielded an understanding of these attacks through the prism of a war metaphor. In turn, this metaphor helped legitimizing attacks of Afghanistan, then Iraq (Kruglanski et al., 2007). Thus, representations of history influence the interpretation of current situations: past to present. This example suggests that both directions of influence are part of the same global dynamic: present situations influence the choice and interpretation of particular memories, which in turn are used to make sense of present situations and to tailor people's attitudes and behaviors.

Moscovici's social representations theory (2008), provides a theoretical framework that accounts for both directions of influence. It posits that social representations form through two processes: objectification and anchoring. Objectification is the process through which complex, often abstract, concepts are gradually transformed, through social exchange, into concrete, visual images. Anchoring relates to the integration of a new knowledge into a group's preexisting knowledge system. The latter process is useful for understanding how the past weighs on the present (Liu and Hilton, 2005) as – already shared – collective memories of past events are used for making sense of current events. The objectification process is useful to account for the fact that the past is continually reconstructed as a function of present stakes (Clémence, 2002). Hence, contemporary attitudes, norms, and values are projected onto past events and historical characters in a process of objectification. This creates the illusion that current states of mind or ideological choices are based on objective historical facts, which endows them with legitimizing power (Klein et al., 2011). Finally, these past events or figures, which actually objectify present concerns, can then serve to anchor new knowledge. As Jan Assmann (1997: p. 9) pointed out "The past is not simply 'received' by the present. The present is 'haunted' by the past and the past is modeled, invented, reinvented, and reconstructed by the present."

See also: Collective Memory, Anthropology of; Collective Memory, Psychology of; Conflict and Conflict Resolution, Social Psychology of; Cultural History; Emotions and Intergroup Relations; Ethnic Identity, Psychology of; Intergroup Relations; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer: Bear and Leather Subcultures; Narrative, Sociology of; Representations, Social Psychology of; Social Identity in Social Psychology; Social Psychology.

Bibliography

- Assmann, J., 1997. *Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Modern Monotheism*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Bar-Tal, D., 2003. Collective memory of physical violence: its contribution to the culture of violence. In: Cairns, E., Roe, M.D. (Eds.), *The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict*. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, pp. 77–93.

- Bar-Tal, D., Chernyak-Hai, L., Schori, N., et al., 2009. A sense of self-perceived collective victimhood in intractable conflicts. *International Review of the Red Cross* 91, 229–258.
- Bartlett, F.C., 1932. *Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Baumeister, R.F., Hastings, S., 1997. Distortions of collective memory: how groups flatter and deceive themselves. In: Pennebaker, J.W., Paez, D., Rimé, B. (Eds.), *Collective Memory of Political Events: Social Psychological Perspectives*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, pp. 277–293.
- Berntsen, D., 2009. Flashbulb memories and social identity. In: Luminet, O., Curci, A. (Eds.), *Flashbulb Memories: New Issues and New Perspectives*. Psychology Press, New York, pp. 187–205.
- Branscombe, N.R., Doosje, B., 2004. *Collective Guilt: International Perspectives*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Bruner, J.S., 1990. *Acts of Meaning*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Clémence, A., 2002. Prises de position et dynamique de la pensée représentative: les apports de la mémoire collective. In: Laurens, S., Roussiau, N. (Eds.), *La mémoire sociale: identités et représentations sociales*. Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, pp. 51–61.
- Coman, A., Brown, A.D., Koppel, J., et al., 2009. Collective memory from a psychological perspective. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 22, 125–141.
- Connerton, P., 1989. *How Societies Remember*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, NY.
- Giner-Sorolla, R., 2012. *Judging Passions: Moral Emotions in Persons and Groups*. Psychology Press, London, UK.
- Halbwachs, M., 1980. *The Collective Memory*. Harper & Row, New York.
- Halbwachs, M., 1992. *On Collective Memory*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Jetten, J., Wohl, M.J.A., 2012. The past as a determinant of the present: historical continuity, collective angst, and opposition to immigration. *European Journal of Social Psychology* 42, 442–450.
- Jovchelovitch, S., 2012. Narrative, memory and social representations: a conversation between history and social psychology. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science* 46, 1–17.
- Klein, O., 2013. The lay historian: how ordinary people think about history. In: Cabecinhas, R., Abadia, L. (Eds.), *Narratives and Social Memory: Theoretical and Methodological Approaches*. Communication and Society Research Centre, Braga, pp. 25–45.
- Klein, O., Licata, L., 2003. When group representations serve social change: the speeches of Patrice Lumumba during the Congolese decolonization. *British Journal of Social Psychology* 42, 571–593.
- Klein, O., Licata, L., Van der Linden, N., et al., 2011. A waffle-shaped model for how realistic dimensions of the Belgian conflict structure collective memories and stereotypes. *Memory Studies* 5, 16–31.
- Kruglanski, A.W., Crenshaw, M., Post, J.M., et al., 2007. What should this fight be called? Metaphors of counterterrorism and their implications. *Psychological Science in the Public Interest* 8, 97–133.
- Laszlo, J., 2013. *Historical Tales and National Identity: An Introduction to Narrative Social Psychology*. Routledge, New York.
- Liu, J.H., Hilton, D.J., 2005. How the past weighs on the present: social representations of history and their role in identity politics. *British Journal of Social Psychology* 44, 537–556.
- Middleton, D., Edwards, D., 1990. *Collective Remembering, Inquiries in Social Construction*. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.
- Moscovici, S., 2008. *Psychoanalysis: Its Image and Its Public*. Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Noor, M., Shnabel, N., Halabi, S., et al., 2012. When suffering begets suffering: the psychology of competitive victimhood between adversarial groups in violent conflicts. *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 16, 351–374.
- Olick, J.K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, V., Levy, D., 2011. *The Collective Memory Reader*. Oxford University Press, New York.
- Paez, D., Bellelli, G., Rimé, B., 2009. Flashbulb memories, culture, and collective memories. In: Luminet, O., Curci, A. (Eds.), *Flashbulb Memories: New Issues and New Perspectives*. Psychology Press, New York, pp. 227–245.
- Paez, D., Rimé, B., 2014. Collective emotional gatherings. Their impact upon identity fusion, shared beliefs and social integration. In: von Scheve, C., Salmela, M. (Eds.), *Collective Emotions*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 204–216.
- Pennebaker, J.W., Banasik, B.L., 1997. On the creation and maintenance of collective memories: history as social psychology. In: Pennebaker, J.W., Paez, D., Rimé, B. (Eds.), *Collective Memory of Political Events: Social Psychological Perspectives*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, pp. 3–20.
- Prager, J., 1998. *Presenting the Past, Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Misremembering*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Reicher, S., Hopkins, N., 2001. *Self and Nation*. Sage, London.
- Sani, F., 2008. *Self Continuity: Individual and Collective Perspectives*. Psychology Press, New York.
- Schuman, H., Rodgers, W.L., 2004. Cohorts, chronology, and collective memories. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 68, 217–254.
- Smeeke, A., Verkuyten, M., 2013. Collective self-continuity, group identification and in-group defense. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 49, 984–994.
- Stone, C.B., Barnier, A.J., Sutton, J., et al., 2010. Building consensus about the past: schema consistency and convergence in socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting. *Memory* 18, 170–184.
- Sutton, J., 2008. Remembering. In: Robbins, P., Murat, A. (Eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 217–235.
- The White House, 2013. Inaugural Address by President Barack Obama. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-president-barack-obama> (accessed 31.01.13.).
- Tajfel, H., Turner, J.C., 1986. The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In: Worchel, S., Austin, W.G. (Eds.), *The Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Nelson-Hall, Chicago, pp. 7–24.
- Volpato, C., Licata, L., 2010. Collective memories of colonial violence: introduction to the focus section. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 4, 4–10.
- Vollhardt, J., 2012. *Collective Victimization*. Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict. Oxford University Press, New York, 136–157.
- Wertsch, J.V., 2002. *Voices of Collective Remembering*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK; New York.