In the last decade, critical approaches have substantially reshaped the theoretical landscape of security studies in Europe. Yet, despite an impressive body of literature, there remains a fundamental disagreement as to what counts as critical in this context. Scholars are still arguing in terms of “schools” while there has been an increasing and sustained cross-fertilization among critical approaches. Finally, the boundaries between critical and traditional approaches to security remain blurred. The aim of this paper is therefore to assess the evolution of critical views of approaches to security studies in Europe, discuss their theoretical premises, investigate their intellectual ramifications and examine how they coalesce around different issues (such as state of exception). The paper then assesses the political implications of critical approaches. This is done mainly by analysing processes by which critical approaches to security percolate through a growing number of subjects (such as development, peace research, risk/crisis management). Finally, ethical and research implications are explored.

Introduction

This Manifesto is the result of collective work. The author of this article is a network of both junior and senior researchers referred to as c.a.s.e. collective who share an interest in critically examining contemporary practices of security. The aim of this paper is to collectively assess the evolution of critical views of security studies in Europe, discuss their theoretical premises, examine how they coalesce around different issues, and investigate their present – and possibly future – intellectual ramifications. The specificity of this text thus lies in the very way it has been thought and written through a networked collective.¹

¹ The initiative was taken in Paris, in June 2005 at a workshop entitled ‘Critical approaches to security in Europe’. The initiative for gathering those who were interested in the changing landscape of security theory in Europe was strongly inspired by an Ole Waever piece on this theme, entitled "Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New "schools" in Security Theory and Origins between Core and Periphery." (Waever 2004a). The conference took
The article is driven by two broad motivations. First, the authors share the view that, over the past two decades, important innovations in the study of ‘security’ have emerged among European scholars in particular (Waever 2004a). Although the genesis of these innovations involves scholars on both sides of the Atlantic, these approaches have arguably gained momentum and density in Europe, leading to the emergence of distinctive European research agenda(s) in the traditionally US-dominated field of ‘security studies’. Consequently, it was hence felt that time had come to evaluate these ‘European’ approaches both in order to increase their exposure and to push them further in specific directions. Second, the aim of working and writing as a collective, a network of scholars who do not agree on everything yet do share a common perspective, is based on the desire to break with the competitive dynamic of individualist research agendas and to establish a network which not only facilitates dialogue but is also able to speak with a collective voice. In this sense, the article can be read as a ‘manifesto’.2

The article is organised as follows. It begins by reviewing the emergence of a heterogeneous corpus of critical literature within the field of security studies in the 1990s, and the moves that led to its structuration in what has been called the ‘Copenhagen’, ‘Aberystwyth’ and ‘Paris’ schools (Waever 2004a).3 It argues, however, that this categorisation can be misleading if taken too seriously. Indeed, rather than pinning down these schools geographically, the section shows how Aberystwyth, Copenhagen and Paris are dispersed locations associated with specific individuals and debates much more than unitary schools of thought. As such, it will show how the

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2 In order to understand the composition of the text, we believe it is important to briefly explain its genesis. After the COST Paris Training School, paper givers and additional PhD candidates gathered and elaborated a first draft of the current article. One, two or three members of the collective wrote each section of the article, regularly exchanging comments and suggestions. At various subsequent stages, drafts were read, commented and amended by Didier Bigo, Jef Huysmans, Michael Williams and Ole Waever. The paper then came back to the students who are responsible of the final shape of the article. In addition, we would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers, Felix Berenskoetter and also Rob Walker who have been instrumental in commenting and editing this manifesto.

3 Waever lists ‘hard-core postmodernists’ and ‘feminists’ under ‘other participants’ (2004). Because we begin from the suggestive classification that informs Waever’s analysis, this article necessarily works within, but also seeks to problematise, both geographical and theoretical limits. Although very interesting work drawing on Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida or Jacques Rancière (such as Benjamin Muller, Peter Nyers, Patricia Molloy, Lene Hansen or Roxanne Lyn Doty) is not directly discussed, such work needs to be considered within of a conversation that is now rapidly expanding.
dialogue between different scholars has shaped the conceptual discussion through a set of encounters, producing the appearance of ‘schools’ talking to each other.

This is followed by a more detailed discussion of the clusters of innovations associated with the three ‘schools’, outlining their main contributions, intellectual context and cross-fertilization. By pointing to some of the theoretical insights but also dilemmas that have emerged out of these ‘schools’, the section opens up to the main part of the article which deals with new paths to explore for the critical approaches to security in Europe.

The third section draws attention to how the analytical innovations outlined previously can be used to investigate issues such as the spread of the security label to other fields of research and practice, questions about exceptionalism, governmentality and risk, as well as the politics of belonging and the privatisation of security. We also show how these new fields of enquiry provide new problematisations and add to the literature in terms of conceptual articulations and theoretical implications.

In section four we provide one possible answer to the persistent interrogations raised by constructivist / reflexive approaches such as about how critique provide useful insights not only for analysis and critique, but also for active engagement in international politics?. This question plugs into a wider debate over the status of the producers of knowledge, the role of ‘security’ intellectuals and the modes of intervention in politics. What underpins critical approaches to security in Europe is the identification and denunciation of depoliticization, both in the social realm and in the realm of academia. It is therefore to be understood in part as a call for the return of a certain number of issues in the realm of politics. We contest both a vision of research as detached from political contingency and action, and the scholastic illusion that tends to inform critical work: the critique of texts does not produce, per se, political effects nor resistance. This manifesto can therefore also be read as a call against research without politics, which we believe can be tackled by a collective engagement and work.

**Critical approaches to security: a history of encounters**

Theories in the social sciences do not occur in a vacuum. They are tied to and developed in relation to specific socio-historical (external) and intellectual (internal) contexts in which they emerge and/or to which they are applied. In terms of intellectual context, ‘critical turns’ in security studies have to be understood through the intellectual transformations occurring in social and
political theory (see, e.g. Ashley 1984). CASE were influenced by and part of a critical literature contesting a political and social science that thought of itself as value-free and looked at its research object from an impartial Archimedean point. Instead, this literature emphasised the impact of socio-political processes on the emergence and structuration of political questions and institutions and the immanent presence of normative political choices in social science and political theory. In terms of socio-historical context, the emergence of the new social movements in the late 1970s and the 1980s, the formation of an internal security field in Europe, the second Cold War and Détente in the 1980s and the end of the Cold War are among the key historical events that were important for the development of CASE.

However, to establish a direct causal link between the development of CASE and the internal and external contexts of its emergence, without attending to the actual practices of and encounters between the actors of the field during that period would amount to an exaggeration of this relation, leading to an overly simplified narrative of what has actually happened in the security studies field in the 1980s. As Ken Booth (1997) reminds us, ‘there is a tendency to assume that changed conceptions of the world are, for academics, either the result of being persuaded by a decisive book or being shocked by major events in world politics. People seem determined to make us either simply disciples or positivists’ (Booth, 1997: 98). Instead, personal encounters, material conditions or the very contingency of life itself also play an important role in the emergence of certain ideas and approaches. An examination of the trajectories of security scholars, their interactions, influences and transformations would provide us with a more complex understanding of the configuration of the field.

CASE has developed through two series of encounters between what has been construed as schools of thought (Wæver 2004a). The first encounters took place between scholars associated with the Aberystwyth and Copenhagen schools. Both schools share strong roots in political theory as well as in IR debates and their repositioning in relation to peace research and strategic studies. The third group of academics, referred to as the Paris School, has its roots not in IR but in political theory and sociology of migration and policing in Europe. The second series of encounters that were constitutive for CASE was between this group of people and people associated with the Copenhagen and Aberystwyth schools of thought. These two sets of encounters have resulted in an increasingly institutionalized platform for discussing security issues.

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4 When broadly referring to the critical/reflexive literature on security, we will use the capital initials CASE. ‘CSS’ refers to the precise ‘Critical Security Studies’ project, and ‘c.a.s.e. collective’ refers to the group of scholars who have contributed to this manifesto.
However, it would be a mistake to reduce CASE to these three schools of thought. As a result of individual engagements and, probably more importantly, their institutionalization via European research projects and the founding of International Political Sociology section and journal in the International Studies Association, CASE has expanded. Despite its strong European intellectual roots, in terms of people, CASE have included a number of researchers who are usually not directly associated with any of the three schools of thought. Most notably is Rob Walker’s crucial ventures at the cross roads of political theory and security studies in IR through his writings and his editing of the journal Alternatives.

While we largely focus on the ‘European’ densification and singular structuration of critical perspectives on security studies, this point is an opportunity to stress the strong yet oft overlooked connections between CASE and the ‘dissident’ modes of thought (Ashley and Walker, 1990) that emerged in the mid-1980s through a set of encounters between mostly North American scholars. These encounters related to and produced an important corpus of literature, lying at the intersection between critical social theory (Ashley, 1987; George and Campbell, 1990), political theory (Walker, 1980;1987) and a variety of critical perspectives on the discipline of International Relations, including contributions by Richard Ashley (1981, 1984), David Campbell (1998), Michael Dillon (1996), James Der Derian (1987), Jim George (1989, 1994), Bradley Klein (1990), Josef Lapid (1989), and Michael Shapiro (with James Der Derian, 1989) among others. These ‘dissident’ perspectives engaged at the general level with the way in which Western social sciences were embedded in the specific political narrative of modernity, turning to International Relations to stress its “backwardness” (George, 1994) and its dependence upon the sovereign account of the possibilities and limits of political life (Walker, 1993). Beyond specific inputs on strategic and security studies (Klein, 1990; Walker, 1983, 1988; Chilton, 1985), and their contribution to a critical engagement with the modern concept of the political, the power/knowledge nexus, the production of security discourses, the traditional disciplinarisation of the academic field, and the political consequences of scholarly production, constitutes a significant part of the conceptual background of CASE.

We will come back to these aspects in the next section. But first we need to return to the encounters which informed the formation of a European configuration of critical outlooks on security.

In Europe, the existence of various perspectives on peace and security such as alternative defence and Peace Research during the Cold War and the works of scholars such as Johan Galtung and Dieter Senghaas makes it somewhat misleading to point to the 1980s as the historical phase during which an intellectual ‘rupture’ from orthodox approaches to security occurred. Giving more credit to this intellectual inheritance in the development of contemporary rethinking of
security studies, Ken Booth (1997: 86-87) notes that while the end of Cold War, as a historical event, provoked an intellectual crisis for strategists adopting an orthodox approach to security, it was less disturbing for those who had already raised their concerns about the weaknesses of the dominant approaches to security in IR. This partly explains why peace research institutes were important loci of new approaches to security during the 80s and the 90s in IR (Wæver 2004b).

From its establishment in 1985 to its closure in 2004, the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) has been one of the institutes wherein collective theoretically informed yet empirically oriented research on security was carried out in Europe. Rather than focusing on grand theoretical debates within IR, the research of COPRI emphasized the development of new concepts in order to understand security dynamics at work in Europe during that period (Huysmans, 1998: 483-84). One of the most innovative works within CASE, the securitization theory, was developed through creative processes within the COPRI. This approach defines security as a speech act. It argues that security issues are the political outcome of the illocutionary force of security agents and that one of the most effective ways of analyzing security issues is through the discursive practices in different security sectors (Wæver, 1995: 54; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998).

In the critical security studies literature, what is generally referred to as ‘Critical Security Studies’ (CSS) is associated with scholars such as Keith Krause, Michael Williams, Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones. Owing much to the vision of critical theory in IR developed initially by Robert Cox, but also drawing on analytical inspirations such as the Frankfurt School and the post-positivist movement in IR theory, CSS sought to make explicit the largely statist and military-oriented assumptions of traditional security studies as a means of opening the field to greater theoretical scrutiny and debate, as well as allowing it to address a broader range of issues (Krause & Williams 1996, 1997) 6. A further development of this critical project (sometimes called ‘capital C’ critical security studies), is what has come to be known as the ‘Aberystwyth School’. In the view put forward by Wyn Jones and Booth, the axis of security studies should be the emancipation of individuals. Specifically, Booth and Wyn Jones’s Frankfurt School oriented critical approach

5 COPRI hosted various researchers, such as Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaître, Egbert Jahn, and Lene Hansen whose research interests and scholarly directions cover a broad spectrum (see Guzzini and Jung, 2004). A serious turn came, however, from the entry of Barry Buzan’s into COPRI in 1988 as the Director of one of the research projects of the Institute, ‘Non-Military Aspects of European Security’.

6 The volume edited by Krause and Williams (1997) – Critical Security Studies –, which includes contributions of various scholars associated to CASE, is considered as the major text of this approach.
suggests that realism’s military focused, state-centred and zero-sum understanding of security should be replaced by a collaborative project which would have human emancipation as its central concern (Booth, 1991, 2005a, Wyn Jones, 1999, 2001, Sheehan, 2005.). Today this approach has developed to forge its own particular emancipatory ‘theory of security’ and research agenda (Booth, 2005b: 260).

Parallel to the development of these critical security studies agendas in IR, the political construction of security was also an important concern for a number of researchers analysing from a more political sociological and political theory perspective policing practices, the formation of an internal security field in Europe and the securitization of migration. They introduced an agenda focusing on security professionals, the governmental rationality of security and the political structuring effects of security technology and knowledge. With the exception of Huysmans, most of them were working in Paris with Didier Bigo and the journal Cultures et Conflits. Hence, Wæver’s coining of them as the ‘Paris School’ (Bigo 1996, Bigo and Guild 2005, Huysmans 2000, 2006, Tsoukala 2004, Ceyhan and Tsoukala 1997, Bonelli 2005, Hanon 2000).

Whereas development in Aberystwyth and Copenhagen took place largely within IR and through exchanges with the existing experts on the field of international security, strategic studies and peace research, the works of the researchers associated with the Paris School had varied disciplinary locations, including political sociology, criminology, law and IR, and interacted with experts in areas broadly covered by internal security. What bound them together was a research interest in policing as a structuring practice, the politicisation of societal insecurities, including hooligans and migration, and border controls, and the structuration of internal security fields. Disciplinary boundaries between security analysis in IR on the one hand and criminology and continental political sociology of security on the other made a productive debate between Copenhagen and Aberystwyth on the one hand and Paris not likely. In addition, since much of the work that falls under the Paris School was initially done in French, a language barrier also needed to be broken down for the encounter to take place.

From the perspective of an IR and English language readership in English, the sequence between the three schools was seen as Copenhagen, then Aberystwyth with Paris as a late comer. And this is still the presentation adopted by many contributions which add to the mainstream IR debate on security. This narrative usually starts with the contribution of 1983 Barry Buzan’s People State and Fears, and moves from there to the perspectives of Copenhagen and Aberystwyth, with the occasional addition from Paris as if it were an “enlargement” of the concept of security, or even a dilution of the concept (Croft and Terriff 2000, David 2000). Such a perspective involves a form of teleological vision in terms of progress or backlash between the
schools. We will see later on that the theoretical elements given by the three approaches of critical
security studies are far from being an enlargement of a substantial security ‘realm’. From a
political sociology and criminology perspective, the sequence is different, especially in the French
readership for whom Copenhagen arrived late.7

While the representation of schools of thought, then, helps to establish analytical
categories as a first step for mapping the disciplinary field, a further investigation into these sub-
disciplinary identities reveals the fallacies of essentialising what otherwise are flexible groups of
researchers. Wæver’s (2004a) recent study also underlines the difficulty of drawing clear-cut
dividing lines between the three schools. Despite its title, it was not so much about their
differences than about a sociological explanation of their parallel emergence as a collective
phenomenon. However, naming, usually by outsiders or critics, schools (neorealism, English
School, Copenhagen School, etc.) tends to strengthen their identity and produce debate in terms of
monolithic schools. Yet, as Williams (1999: 343) has put it, ‘both theoretical and political reality
are rarely so conveniently structured, and to present them as such rarely advances of our
understanding of either.’ To reconcile these two realities, our work would benefit from a
sociological reading which takes into consideration the contingencies that structure academic
debates.8

7 This story can be traced back to the seventies, with the influence of so-called French theorists introducing
‘constructivist’ agendas in North America. Foucault, Barthes, Derrida, Deleuze (and to a lesser extent Bourdieu)
were both lost in translation and discovered during the eighties. They activated fierce debates in literature,
political theory, post-colonial studies, reaching history, sociology, political science and finally IR in the mid-
eighties. A transformed and reinvigorated (un)French theory developed by American and Canadian scholars then
circulated back, helping to stop partially the attacks these theses were facing ‘at home’. These readings, as well
as the writings of various French expatriates, opened a sphere of discussion on otherness, migration, identity,
borders, sovereignty and the place of the professional of politics, as well as a reflexive approach to technology
(Latour, Sfez). However, the new location of the debate in France was paradoxically in sociology (Bourdieu,
Boltanski) and political science (Lacroix), including public policies (Lascoumes), and history (Noiriel), as well as
criminology (Ericson, Haggerty, Garland, Sheptycki, Wacquant) but not in philosophy and political theory.
Finally, political sociology and IR which were always less separated found common grounds in this “come back”
and applied them to the questions of migration, minorities and forms of political dissent (Bigo 1992, Bigo and

8 For CASE, converging interest on migration and security created the conditions for a few contingent encounters to
take place. Wæver was invited to Paris in 1995 and Bigo had by then written critically about the Copenhagen
School. Huysmans, who worked both on the concept of security in IR and the securitization of migration in the
EU, met Bigo at the conference organized by the ECPR Standing Group on International Relations in Paris in
1995. Huysmans acquired a crucial role as the initial interlocutor of the “Paris School” with critical security
The many exchanges between the members of the different approaches succinctly described above have not led to a deepening of conceptual trenches, but to the realization that there is enough common ground between the researchers to facilitate constructive debate and to develop new conceptual tools and empirical research from the initial works. The cooperation across and through conceptual differences, which is a key activity within the *c.a.s.e. collective*, has recently been institutionalised in a number of major research networks. It is to this institutionalization, which makes it increasingly superfluous and misleading to talk about totally distinct, much less opposed or competing schools in Aberystwyth, Copenhagen and Paris, that we turn now.

*Late Institutionalization(s)*

Encounters amongst different scholars/schools, as discussed in the last section, were characterized by informal and undirected exchanges and confrontations. By institutionalization(s) we mean a set of more formalized, long-term relations that allow us to talk about a common European research agenda on critical security issues. The use of the plural form “institutionalization(s)” serves to remind us of the multiple paths of cooperation leading towards institutionalization: research networks, journals, panels and training of a future generation of critical scholars.

The aim of *c.a.s.e collective* is precisely to go beyond the artificial boundaries in order to combine a variety of critical approaches under a common framework without, nonetheless, reducing one approach to another. Three research networks⁹ enabled research to focus on scholars and in defining the specificity of the Paris approach. In the 1990s, a mutually enriching dialogue between Huysmans and Bigo, on the one hand, and among Huysmans, Bigo and Wæver, on the other, led to a debate about societal security and the importance of blending practices and speech acts in order to strengthen the theory of securitization promoted by the Copenhagen School (Bigo, 1998; Huysmans 1998b; Wæver, 1998; Balzacq, 2005). Also the collaboration between *Alternatives* and *Cultures & Conflits* and the initiation of an International Political Sociology section played an important role in sustaining exchanges across the disciplinary and linguistic boundaries.

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⁹ Three research networks – financed by the European Commission and primarily focused on European security – have been crucial for the institutionalization of CASE: ELISE, *European Liberty and Security*, which ran from 2002 to 2005, provided the initial impetus to a formal network of cooperation on critical security approaches across some European countries. It brought together seven institutional partners from six countries. This cooperation was enlarged under Challenge, *The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security*, an integrated project running from 2004 to 2009 with 23 institutional partners. Finally, a complementary research network, known as *COST Action 24 (The Evolving Social Construction of Threats)*, running from 2004 to 2008.
conceptual explorations of state, modern politics and exception; empirical investigations of a
variety of actors, such as the police, military, European bureaucracies and privatization of
security; and topical engagement ranging from anti-terrorism measures, migration and asylum
policies to databases and surveillance. These research networks further sustained the inter-
disciplinary opening towards researchers from sociology, anthropology, law and political theory.
Second, critical security approaches shifted geographically. The Northern European States, the
UK and France had developed a three-school debate, which now receives fresh impulses from
Eastern and Southern Europe. The effects of these interdisciplinary and geographical widening are
too early to assess, but will most likely enrich conceptually and empirically critical approaches to
security in the near future.

The institutionalization of critical approaches to security was assisted by the increasing
density of interactions at major international gatherings, journals, edited books, and the training of
next generations of scholars. These late institutionalisation(s) naturally create significant
challenges for CASE as most of its participants have so far sustained a rather un-formal and un-
attached dialogue with one another. The main challenge which is related to the conditions of
possibility of this dialogue in the new forum the c.a.s.e. collective is now developing and
expanding. Related challenges pertain to the continuous efforts made to provide bridges among
these approaches; for instance, how CASE can bridge the language barriers. With English being
the lingua franca of contemporary academe, how will the language barrier play out in the future?
How can particular academic influences be brought to the fore of the English-speaking
community? Then, a productive dialogue among CASE researchers and other in academia will
depend on how effectively CASE can open up to the non-academic world. Finally, the production
of dialogue across particular positions will also depend on whether CASE can speak to a non-
European audience. Many of these questions will be touched upon with the frame of this
Manifesto; yet before so doing it is important to note that beyond schools and encounters are
specific theories and research programmes that cohered into these “schools”. Theories and
research programmes provided the ground upon which commonalities across each “school” were
identified leading to, for instance, internal changes within each theory through the influence of
another, attempts to face the key strength of other theories providing impetus for extensions and
elaborations, as well as parallel and joint exploration of new theoretical and empirical challenges.

brought together 23 scholars of 13 European countries. These three research networks institutionally display
personal affinities and intellectual convergences conducive to the progressive institutionalization of CASE.
The next part of this Manifesto will provide a synthetic overview of each “schools” theory and research programme and their point of juncture and fertilization.

**The Politics of Security**

*The Uses of Identity: Processes and Implications*

The theoretical contributions of Buzan, Wæver and others – ever since an article by McSweeney (1996) coined the ‘Copenhagen School’ – combine three main conceptual ideas: securitization, sectors/referent objects and (regional) security complexes (Buzan 1991, 2004; Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan & Wæver 2003; Wæver, 1989, 1995, 2000, 2003). The reflections of the Copenhagen School are the result of a rare theoretical merger between something like an ‘English School constructivist realist’ coming from a strategic studies background (Buzan) and a self-proclaimed ‘poststructural realist’ strongly influenced by the works of Derrida and Kissinger (Wæver). This merger, and the diversity and heterogeneity in the thinking of each single author, creates a complex and dynamic, yet also very vulnerable theoretical position, drawing upon a broad range of diverse influences. Often as part of controversies and critiques, much attention has in the past been attributed to the idea of securitization and, in particular, securitizations using identity as a referent object (Wæver et al., 1993). Yet, the recent publication of a fully-fledged theory of regional security complexes (Buzan & Wæver, 2003) has made clear that single elements of the theory can perhaps best be understood in conjuncture, by taking into account how processes of securitization in the theory work in combination with the concepts of sectors/referent objects and security complexes.

The idea of securitization describes processes ‘in which the socially and politically successful ‘speech act’ of labelling an issue a ‘security issue’ removes it from the realm of normal day-to-day politics, casting it as an ‘existential threat’ calling for and justifying extreme measures’ (Williams, 1998: 435). These processes can have different ‘referent objects’ depending on whether they belong to an economic, environmental, political, military or societal sphere (what Buzan and Wæver call ‘sectors’). The idea of sectors allows them to be more systematic with respect to their general claim that, in principle, everything can become securitized. Yet, only if a claim to treat something with exceptional measures is accepted by a relevant audience, does a ‘securitizing move’ (the mere claim) turn into a (successful) securitization (exceptional measures are actually taken). With regards to the societal security sector, Buzan and Wæver argue that the referent object is often identity. Looking at real-world security rhetorics, one will observe, they claim, that issues like migration have often been treated as an issue of security by reference to a threat to
national or transnational identity (see e.g. Huysmans, 2000). More precisely, migration is often the case of an overlap in the security rhetoric of economic (‘jobs’) and societal security (‘national identity’) (Buzan et al., 1998; Sheehan, 2005). Moreover, since identity-related securitizations often appeal to the emotions of their audiences, certain layers of the security rhetoric may also be more tacit, invoking myths of stability and unity that can only be understood fully from within a community.

It was the combination of securitization with the societal sector and the referent object of identity which has led to a major controversy towards the end of the 1990s (McSweeney, 1996, 1998; Buzan & Wæver, 1997; Williams, 1998). McSweeney (1996, 1998) initiated the debate by arguing that Buzan and Wæver treat identity as a fixed entity. This would be theoretically inadequate because identity would always be fluid and contingent, stemming from the discursive constructions of an only imagined community. What McSweeney had in mind was to think of identity issues as processes of identification. Therefore, McSweeney stressed the always political and decision-based nature of identity issues. With that, McSweeney opened the securitization-identity nexus to a perspective which allows to examine how a securitization impacts on processes of identification. Rather than treating identity as a referent object, as one can see in the case of Ireland, a securitization can lead people to identify with things because of a particular securitization. In contrast, the Copenhagen School treats identity issues as more stable and sedimented (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 243; Buzan et al., 1998: 205) by focusing on how a fluid identity is (artificially) frozen by a securitising move (Williams, 2003: 520). In this sense, the event/process of securitization is understood as an event/process of signification, i.e. an event or process of fixing meaning by the securitizing act.

While the McSweeney debate was concerned with the micro-dynamics of securitization and identity, the fully-fledged regional security complex theory of Regions and Powers (Buzan and Wæver, 2003) has introduced a broad macro-perspective on world politics based on the idea of securitization. Here the securitization of identity is just one dimension among many others which can constitute the pattern of amity and enmity in a region. Again, the precise pattern depends on the real-world securitizations of actors. Thus, threats and conflicts can be perceived as mainly being military-political, environmental, societal and/or economic (which resonates with the sectors-approach developed in Security, A New Framework of Analysis).

To determine the distinct security dynamics of different regions in the world, Buzan and Wæver look at global, interregional, regional and domestic levels. The most important regional level is defined by the polarity structure of regional powers which – in contrast to great powers – only impact on the security dynamics within a region, constituting the regional structure as
unipolar, bipolar or multipolar. In terms of regional patterns of amity and enmity, Buzan and Wæver allow regions to range from conflict formation (e.g. South Asia) to the dense institutional and normative net of a security community (Europe), thereby operationalising empirically Wendt’s claim against Kenneth Waltz that ‘cultures of anarchy’ may range from Hobbesian to Kantian, depending on ‘what actors make of it’ (Wendt, 1992, 1999). In other words, the concept of security complexes is broader, incorporating security communities but also the more realist picture of ‘conflict formations’ present in many regions of the world. In their own terminology, a ‘security community’ is a situation of no securitizations among the main actors of a region, a rare case of ‘asecurity’ in world politics (Wæver, 1998; Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 343-376).

Merging the thinking of Buzan and Wæver creates a thought-provoking and innovative conglomerate of more static versus more dynamic, more objectivist versus more relativist and more substantialist versus more relational elements (McSweeney, 1996: 82; Stritzel, 2006). The many intellectual influences and contrasting theoretical premises realise the old English School pledge for methodological and theoretical pluralism but they make their ideas at the same time also vulnerable to diverging interpretations, and to vigorous criticism, conceptual modifications and theoretical extensions (e.g. Balzacq, 2004, 2005; Stritzel, 2005, 2006).

Unmaking security: desecuritisation and emancipation

The securitisation of identity has brought home the realisation that discourses (and practices) have political effects. These effects ranged between the ‘tactical attractions’ of securitisation as attention-grapping and the structuring of communities on the model of ‘political realism’ (Huysmans 1998; Williams 2003). As ‘a kind of mobilization of conflictual or threatening relations, often through emergency mobilization of the state’ (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998: 8), securitisation does more than just potentially open the political scene to extreme right groups for example. It entails structural effects by reconfiguring and ordering societies on the model of emergency or exception (Aradau 2004a; Behnke 2006; Huysmans 2004b). Securitisation (CS) and emancipation (Aberystwyth) are two concepts that attempt to grapple with these ambiguous effects.

As securitisation is defined in opposition to normal politics, as a politics of exception or ‘abnormal politicisation’ (Alker 2005: 197), unmaking it implies a retrieval of the conditions of normal politics. Desecuritisation would therefore bring issues back to the ‘haggling of normal politics’ (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). Although it has been suggested that the normal politics implied by the framework of securitisation is that of liberal democracy (Aradau 2004a; Behnke
normal politics remains undefined in the CS framework. Attempts to theoretically unmake securitisation engage however with a twofold understanding of normal politics: politics as normality (the objective socio-political order) and politics as normativity (the principles and ethical concepts that can transform the status quo). Although normative intent is implicit in any description of normality, desecuritisation can be thought in register of a politics of normality and emancipation in that of a politics of normativity.

Desecuritisation can be seen as an attempt at retrieving the normality of politics. Huysmans has defined desecuritisation as ‘unmak[ing] politics which identifies the community on the basis of the expectations of hostility’ (Huysmans 1998: 576). The discursive construction of security frames normal politics as a political spectacle of alternative discourses. By being located ‘within the realm of political argument and discursive legitimation, security practices are thus susceptible to criticism and transformation’ (Williams 2003: 512). The discursive construction of security lends it to deconstruction and normality appears as a contested process of construction/deconstruction. If desecuritisation is anchored in the core of security analysis, the tension between discursive construction and the meaning of exceptional politics remains to be explored. Moreover, the role of discursive construction/deconstruction has already been subjected to intense criticism from more sociological approaches that draw attention to the ‘authority’ to speak.

Emancipation, in a formulation that has become defining for the Aberystwyth School, is a normative engagement with normal politics. Booth has argued that emancipation should take precedence over concerns with power and order as ‘[e]mancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security’ (Booth 1991: 319). The normativity of the Aberystwyth School is defined as security, given that security is a ‘powerful political concept… that energizes opinion and moves material power’ (Booth 2005) and that can be mobilized to emancipatory ends. Security is also distinguished from order and power and redefined as inclusive of individuals. All those who have been left out of the traditional remit of security need to become its subjects.

This understanding of security has steered their critical project towards the ‘realities of security’ that have been made invisible by ‘the traditional mindset of those have dominated or disciplined International Relations’ (Booth 2004: 8). Uncovering the realities of security (or rather insecurity) entails locating human rights abuses, the oppression of minorities, the powerlessness of the poor, and the violence against women (Booth 2004: 7). Security-power-normality is replaced by security-emancipation-normativity, with emancipation disentangling security from power and achieving a fuller and more inclusive realization of security.
However, the normative separation of security from power and order is problematic, as it does not account either for the transformation of normality or for the political effects of security. Other critical scholars who felt akin to the ‘emancipation-oriented understanding of the theory and practice of security’ have become aware of the need to reformulate the concept of emancipation in relation to normality and not simply normatively (Alker 2005; Wyn Jones 2005). Besides the debatable Habermasian idea of communicative rationality as embedded in normality and thus immanently transforming the order of the normal, engagement with the concept of emancipation in its relation both to normality and normativity has been quasi-absent.\(^{10}\)

What is at stake in the redefinition of emancipation is not simply the idea of retrieving normality or of normatively constituting it, but of defining what normality is. In a Foucault-inspired approach, normality is the result of the exclusions and forms of disciplinary and biopolitical regulation of populations (Dillon 1995; Elbe 2005; Huysmans 2004a). Security is therefore not simply exceptional, but has constitutive effects upon the normal. Normality is simultaneously a field of struggle, where technologies of constituting subjects and ordering the social come up against the intransigence of political agency and the resistance of political subjects. Migrants and refugees engage in daily practices of resistance or bio-agency against securitisation, which cannot be separated from the operations of power (Muller 2004; Nyers 2006). Although these practices can be seen as having an emancipatory effect, they are often insecuring for migrants and could not be seen in the equation with security as Booth has proposed.

The Paris School has also redefined normality as constituted by professionals through technologies of ordering and managing social problems. The struggle would therefore shift from political agency to the institutional level of the professionals involved in the definition of threats and the technologies to govern them. Unmaking security would entail the disruption of the ‘regime of truth’ created by the professionals of security. Yet, both definitions of normality as struggle – on the side of the subjects constituted by practices of security or that of security professionals – do not consider normativity and its relation to the normal ordering of the social. The most difficult challenge for theorising emancipation would be to engage in careful consideration of what normality and normativity mean both for securitisation and the possibility of its unmaking.

**Mapping the Field of the Professionals of (In)security**

For the ‘Paris School’ two convergent factors explain the reshaping of the concept of (in)security. The first of these is related to the fact that the process of securitization by reassurance discourses

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\(^{10}\) See however (Aradau 2004) and (Wyn Jones 2005).
and by protection techniques does not always reduce insecurity and unease of individuals and groups. Security is not the contrary of insecurity. The definition of what is security conditions what is insecurity (risk, threat). Policing insecurity is then a mode of governmentality, drawing the lines of fear and unease at both individual and collective level (Bigo 2005, Huysmans 2006). The second element, more difficult to tackle, is the emergence and consolidation of professional networks of security agencies which try to monopolize the truth on danger and unease through power knowledge nexus.

This conception of security points towards a different understanding of securitization as meaning the capacity to control borders, to manage threats, to define endangered identities and to delineate the spheres of orders. It thus shifts our attention in three ways. First, instead of analyzing security as an essential concept, contested as it were, the Paris School proposes treating security as a ‘technique of government’ (Foucault, 1994). Second, rather than investigating intention behind the use of power, this approach concentrates on its effects (Bigo & Guild, 2003; Huysmans: 2000, 2002). Third, instead of focusing on ‘speech acts’, the Paris School emphasizes practices, audiences and contexts which enable and constrain the production of specific forms of governmentality (see Balzacq, 2005; Bigo, 2000; Bondi, 2004, 2005: 131-154; Ceyhan, 1998). Consequently, this approach argues that, today, the field of security is not only determined by the sovereign power to kill but also by the discursive ability to produce an image of the enemy which the audience identifies with. All processes of securitization are connected to ‘a field of security constituted by groups and institutions that authorise themselves and that are authorised to state what security is’ (emphasis added. Bigo, 2000: 195). Thus, to attend to the study of securitization is to focus on the setting up of the networks of professionals of (in)security, the systems of meaning they generate and the productive power of their practices.

**The Field as Methodology.** Bourdieu’s (1966: 865-906) concept of field informs most of the research of those who embrace a sociological approach to security. A field is a distinct social space consisting of interdependent and differentiated positions. In other words, a field is a ‘network or a configuration of objective relations between positions’ (Bourdieu, 1992: 72-73). To liken (in)securitization to the notion of field is, first, to invite scholars to explore the relations among security agencies, their status, roles, activities and institutional settings. The agents, we assume, are involved in field struggles. The analysis in terms of social spaces therefore requires an empirical investigation of the implications of these fights on the boundaries of the field and the extent to which they affect its existence.

Three main traits mark out the field of (in)security professionals (Bigo, 2000). First, the social space of the professionals of security functions as a field of power, the dynamic of which
creates homogeneity of interests – not of identity. Understood in this way, a field fuses different and often competing perceptions and worldviews into a unified picture of what otherwise could not be captured by a single concept. Second, this social space is a field of struggles. Of course, actors need not share the same means nor pursue a similar end. Some agents are offensive, other defensive. Yet once a field is constituted, it widens or shortens, contingent on the outcome of the power games that regulate the interactions among the players. It must be noted that players are not always conscious of the game they are playing (habitus). By the same token, fields may produce undesired effects. Third, and tied to the previous idea, the social space of the professionals of security is a field of domination. Although fields are distinct social spaces, their boundaries remain permeable. This is so, argues Bigo, because fields of security are driven by an ontological insecurity which leads them to take hold of competing social spaces in an attempt to force their definition of what counts as a threat and what ought to be done about it (Bigo, 2005: 83). Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the manner in which some discourses, however well founded, are cancelled out, if one does not examine how social spaces operate (Balzacq, 2004).

The Field as Practice: Internal and External Security. Fields only exist if they produce field effects. The inevitable question, then, is how exactly does this occur? On various occasions, Bigo (2000, 2001, 2005) has made a series of increasingly embroidered statements on the functional and geographical extensions of internal security. This coincides, he notes, with the conversion of realist and neorealist narratives of security. Thus, realists and neorealists (Posen, 1993) are no longer reluctant to use concepts developed in international relations (e.g. security dilemma) to account for what used to be restricted to the competence of domestic politics (e.g. ethnic conflicts). A major consequence of the broadening of internal security activities is the export of policing methods in world politics and, in return, the routinization of military operations in the national arena (Bigo, Guittet and Smith, 2004: 5-34).

The merging of internal and external security offers distinctive views about field effects. For instance, some security agencies which were unheeded in the past (e.g. gendarmerie, customs, border guards, immigration officers) are now at the centre of the security field because their productive power seems to be best suited to alleviate contemporary challenges. In other words – and this is the crux of the argument – the field of the professionals of (in)security functions like a Mœbius Ribbon: the location of agents (inside/outside) is not fixed. From many factors suggested and examined by the ‘Paris school’, three are of significance: the configuration of context, the nature of the issue and the struggles complexion within or outside flexible boundaries (See Bigo, 2001; Balzacq, forthcoming). Most important, though, is that if different agencies belong to the same field of the professionals of (in)security, the inherent differences between kinds of threats
disappear. This means that the restructuring of the field leads, logically, to the design of a semantic continuum of threats, ranging from irregular migration to terrorism. This continuum has real consequences not only for its intended targets, but also for security agencies and their relation to the political.

Although the Bourdieusian framework has offered researchers an extensive set of tools where speech acts were too under-determined both in their location, their emergence or their effects in relation to other practices of power, the Paris school raises a series of questions. Focusing on struggles within a field cancels out an interest in those who could be called the ‘professionals of nothing’, those who ‘at this minute, are being starved, oppressed, or shot’ (Booth 1997: 114). Consequently, practices of resistance are located within a field or among professionals of different fields (e.g. judges versus security professionals), but leave out the multiple and complex ways in which ‘the dangerous’ themselves resist practices of security. Moreover, by focusing on practices at the expense of principles that hold together political communities, the Paris School do not leave room for the possibility of re-appropriating terms (even problematic ones such as security) and re-deploying them in different contexts. Many of the terms that define the discourses of professionals are not scientific concepts, but general terms like democracy, freedom, or equality. In their universal address, these terms can be re-appropriated and re-deployed by those who would have had no access to the field and no adequate form of capital.

**New research directions**

Having sketched out the interconnections and tensions between the plurality of critical approaches to security in Europe, we turn towards the actuality of the collective’s research, as well as possible research paths for the future. For the purposes of this manifesto, we have focused on four directions that have emerged from our research: the implications of expanding security to other fields – or what we metaphorically have termed ‘security traps’; the question of exceptionalism, risk analysis, and the ‘politics of belonging’. These four lines of research engage with several of the impasses and tensions in critical studies and propose different modalities of tackling ‘security’ critically.

*Tackling the security trap(s)*

Nowadays, matters of ‘peace and security’, as well as ‘security and development’, are considered as very closely related. These nexuses have been referred to as “mergings” (Guzzini & Jung 2004 for Peace Research; Duffield 2001 for Development). These mergings lie at the core of new
research agendas in security studies. Indeed, by extending the field of security to new social fields, such as peace and development, they allow for new research agendas within security studies. However, before exploring the possibility of common research directions between critical peace research, development studies, and CASE, we need to critically engage the notion of ‘merging’ that participates in the widening of the contemporary security agenda.

The question of the ‘widening of the field of security’ has given rise to fierce debates. The implicit argument of many of the ‘wideners’ is that by securitizing new issues such as peace and development, one encourages politicians to deal with them in a positive way. However, such an approach might be problematic. The widening of the security agenda, when justified by a concern to free people from fear and threat, might run into what we have called the ‘security trap’. Talking about a ‘security trap’ refers both to the non-intentional dimension of the consequences of widening and to the fact that these consequences might be adverse to the underlying intention. It refers to the fact that one cannot necessarily establish a feeling of security, understood as a feeling of freedom from threat, simply by securitizing more issues or by securitizing them more.

The process of securitization is a specific form of politicisation that appeals to the professionals of security. It not only points to the fact that ‘one has to deal with the problem’, but also that ‘one has to deal with it in a coercive way’. As many critical scholars have warned, when transforming a societal issue into a security issue, one takes the risk of having the issue securitized for oneself by more established security-professionals (Bigo 1996; Wæver 1995). In other words, even when widening the security agenda with the explicit intention of ‘demilitarizing’ international security, the signifier ‘security’ might on the contrary subordinate these issues to governmental security agencies, thus foreclosing the range of political options available to deal with these issues. Even if securitization is a political process, it might legitimate practices that depoliticize the approach to the securitized issues (Buzan et al 1998; Olsson 2006a; Olsson 2006b forthcoming) by giving preference to coercive approaches. This can be seen a first aspect of the security-trap.

The precise mechanisms through which the process of securitization might lead to the involvement of coercive state agencies have, however, to be further analyzed. Drawing on the work of the French historian Jean Delumeau (1986), Bigo has shown that the securitization of societal issues raises the issue of protection by insecuritizing the audience the security discourses are addressing. This insecuritization will translate into a social demand for the intervention of coercive state agencies. In other words, the processes of securitization and of insecuritization are inseparable. This leads him to speak of the process of (in)securitization (Bigo, 1995). This means that one is confronted with a security dilemma: the more one tries to securitize social phenomena
in order to ensure “security”, the more one creates (intentionally or non-intentionally) a feeling of insecurity. This happens, for example, when the military are called in to patrol streets in order to prevent terrorist attacks. Even if the underlying idea is to reassure the population, it might also create a feeling of panic (Guittet, 2006). As a logical consequence, the politics of maximal security are also politics of maximal anxiety. This is the second aspect of the security trap.

The irony is that even the most careful and critical scholar aiming at avoiding the first and second traps, might unwillingly participate in the securitization of new issues when analyzing how these issues are de facto framed in terms of security. How can one avoid, when analyzing the securitization of a phenomenon, playing into the hands of the “deep structures” of the security discourse and thus participating in its discursive securitization? This question of the ‘normative dilemma of security studies’ is the third aspect of the security-trap, highlighting the non-intentional and adverse effects of analysing the widening of security, remains the most difficult to handle (Huysmans 1998). This third aspect of the security-trap, highlighting the non-intentional and adverse effects of analysing the widening of security, remains the most difficult to handle.

Exposing these three aspects of the security trap is especially important in the context in which security has increasingly colonised various other fields.

_Peace and security_

According to Wæver, ‘Peace’ and ‘Security’ are closely related concepts, but at times – especially during the Cold War – their connotations have differed dramatically (Wæver 2004b). ‘Security’ has been the catchword for the Western establishment and ‘peace’ has been used by its political and academic critics. In the 80’s, the relationship between the power-focused Strategic Studies and peace research (PR) became less hostile and the disciplines found some shared ground in the concept of security (cf. Buzan, 1984). Since then, these fields have merged to a large extent to become Security Studies (Guzzini and Jung 2004): Peace and security have become “two sides of the same coin”.

Originally, PR was a critical voice in academic debates. PR has been based on the idea that the world is manmade and thus changeable (Wallensteen, 1988; Dunn, 1991). This view is one of the common characteristics of PR and CASE. Another shared idea is the wider understanding of security. As early as the 60’s, Peace Researchers started to expand the concept of violence to include also structural forms of violence. Violence was understood as everything that prevents people from realizing their potentials. Johan Galtung called this absence of structural violence ‘positive peace’ (Galtung, 1969: 183). When Peace Researches started to speak about security,
they redefined it in terms previously used for violence and peace, leading to some of the 'most extreme widenings in the history of security thinking' (Wæver, 2004b: 62).

Despite of some attempts to re-create PR that is informed by critical theories (for example Alker, 1988; Patomäki, 2001), the mainstream PR has become narrowly empirical. It does not reflect on its ontological foundations, epistemological premises or the origins and implications of its concepts (Rytövuori-Apunen, 1990: 289). CASE has taken over the critical role in the field of “peace and security”. Peace Researchers could learn from CASE in building deeper understandings of PR’s central concepts and in adopting new forms of criticism and reflexivity. This is especially important now when military interventions are done more in the name of peace than of security (Wæver, 2004b: 62). Peace Researchers should also reflect on the normative dilemmas of writing, speaking and practicing peace.

In academic practice, critical PR would thus be very close to CASE, but it could move beyond it with a more participatory understanding of the role of researchers. Traditionally, the role of security scholars has been that of advisers to the Prince or critics of the establishment (see Part V). Both of these roles have been assigned to peace researchers, but there have also been calls for more practical participation in conflict resolution. In their role as a mediators, researchers can help the parties of a conflict in building collective emancipatory projects and at the same time learn from this activity (see Väyrynen, 2005).

Security and Development

The post-Cold War security-development nexus (Duffield, 2001) has been developed in the UN, other major international institutions (such as the World Bank), within influential NGOs (such as the Carnegie Commission), the European Union, and major policy documents of states (for example, the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States). The merging of development and security is understood to represent a normative and progressive transformation in the means and aims of security, from a narrow and instrumental focus on national, state security, towards the protection of human life globally.

The merging of security and development is most clearly represented by the concept of Human Security (introduced by the 1994 United Nations Human Development Report (UNHDR).  

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11 Rytövuori-Apunen’s claim holds to a large extent to articles published in the main PR journals also during 1992-2002. see Jutila, Pehkonen & Väyrynen (forthcoming).

12 For example a territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru was resolved with a bi-national natural park proposed by Galtung (Galtung, 2004: 79-81).
A number of other discourses have emerged which are both part of the Human Security discourse, and analyzed separately: for example, the ‘New Wars’ (Kaldor 2001), and the ‘Greed and Grievance’ (Berdal and Malone, 2000), and ‘Failed State’ models of conflict and social unrest.

The political implications of the merging of security and development are profound. In these discourses non-Western war, or social unrest or conflict, has been emptied of political, social and historical content; both external, in terms of the international context within which conflict occurs, and internal. Conflict is understood as a private, predatory activity, fostered by elites pursuing degenerate, criminal projects. Human rights violations that are committed are understood to be committed for their own sake, rather then as a consequence of war. Social instability is understood to arise out of biological needs rather then political struggle. Individuals in weak or unstable societies appear as pre-political individuals, who will be driven by their biological needs into conflict with one another. These populations are seen as vulnerable individuals who are in a permanent situation of being ‘at risk’ from the effects of chronic threats as hunger, disease. This focus on the vulnerability of individuals, and the merging of development and security acts to pathologize the activity of entire populations in weak or unstable states. The problems associated with underdevelopment are no longer understood as amenable to political, or even economic solutions, but to be resolved on the terrain of security practices.

During the initial period of decolonisation the capacity or weakness or internal make-up of a state was explicitly not held to threaten its formal international political equality (Duffield and Waddell, 2004: 18). The re-linking of security-development reverses this and formally re-introduces hierarchy back into international relations through differentiating between the ‘dangerous’ underdeveloped states and the developed states. Within the Western democracies, the transformation of security from a necessarily limited political relationship between a territorially bound state and its citizens to a global moral principle also has serious implications. Intervention in and regulation of underdeveloped states becomes emptied of political content and transformed into an ethical necessity.

As part of the c.a.s.e collective manifesto, this section suggests the need for a critical approach to the merging of security and development. This needs to begin by challenging the depoliticised analysis of the supposed threats from underdevelopment (McCormack, 2006), discourses such as ‘New Wars’, and the ‘ethical’ nature of post-Cold War Western intervention (Chandler, 2003) and regulation of underdeveloped and impoverished states.
The privatisation of security

The trend of privatising security, as reflected in the growing role of Private Security (PSCs) and Private Military Companies (PMCs), offers a promising research agenda to CASE. It is indirectly linked to the contemporary widening of the field of security. It has been fuelled by the incapacity on the part of public security agencies to reassure and to protect in the face of a broadening of the “environment of threats”.

The issue of privatisation is important both for critical security studies that insist on the fact that the field of the professionals of (in)security is not only transversal to the inside/outside distinction but also to the public/private distinctions, thus redefining contemporary governmentality (Bigo 2003; Olsson 2003; Abrahamsen and Williams 2006). Both schools try to understand what happens when discourses of (in)security, historically considered as enactments of state sovereignty, are said to refer to the presumably “marketised” and “democratised” (Thompson 1994) realm of private security operators.

Anna Leander has analysed the political risks entailed by the “commodification of violence” by showing that the supply-side (PMCs) and the demand-side (security-demand) are inseparable: “supply creates its own demand” through the discursive process of securitization (Leander 2005 and Leander 2006). By highlighting the structural power the privatising trend gives to private companies, she implicitly confirms the second aspect of the security-trap: the maximal security option might validate itself a posteriori by fostering a feeling of insecurity. Hence, just as with peace and development, this new research agenda raises the question of the security trap and would benefit from sustained engagement with its three aspects.

Security and Exceptionalism

The question of exceptionalism has recently become a site of intense political contestation over the legitimacy or illegitimacy of recent transformations in security practices, especially in the context of the ‘war on terror’. On the one hand, policy-makers and their supporters have frequently argued that the rules of the game have changed, that this is a new kind of war, and that exceptional times require exceptional measures. The category of the exceptional has been invoked to justify and mobilize an array of violent and illiberal practices including detention without trial, derogation from human rights law, complicity in torture, ‘extraordinary rendition’, the curtailment of civil liberties, and the securitization of migration. On the other hand, critical approaches to security have converged upon the concept of exceptionalism as a means of analysing and contesting these transformations.
A key point of departure is Schmitt’s declaration that “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt 1985:5). This sharply expresses the exceptional prerogatives claimed by political authorities (however conceived) in the name of security. For the Schmitt of Political Theology, “the exception” is a situation of radical danger and contingency for which no prior law, procedure, or anticipated response is adequate. It is a perilous moment which exceeds the limits of precedent, knowledge, legislation and predictability (Schmitt 1985:6). Schmitt demonstrates the potent performative logic of security imperatives when he uses the vertigo induced by this awesome contingency to claim that “the exception” brings about a fundamental existential necessity for unlimited, unconstrained, exceptional sovereign decision. For Schmitt, ‘exceptionalism’ is not simply an adjunct to ‘normal’ politics, but a more authentic expression of political authority that has the capacity to constitute new political and legal orders.13

The critique of Schmitt is simultaneously a critique of both deployments of Schmittian logic in security discourses and the statist preoccupations of security studies. From this perspective it is vital to note that “the exception” and exceptionalism are not the same thing. The Schmittian strategy is to argue that the necessity of unlimited, unconstrained, exceptional sovereign power is brought about by the exceptional situation itself. The slipperiness of this move is exposed when it becomes clear that Schmitt’s sovereign must also declare that the exception exists in the first place. Contra Schmitt therefore, the ‘necessity’ of sovereign exceptionalism does not begin with ‘objective’ imperatives contained in the exceptional event or situation, but with sovereign exceptionalism itself. Although exceptionalism legitimated on the grounds of ‘objective necessity’ can be performatively successful, its claimed positivistic basis rests on a hollow circular logic. Exceptionalism is from the outset fiendishly entangled in an authoritarian, decisionist, politics that declares exceptional conditions (such as a state of emergency) in order to give legitimate authority to contentious policies and practices.

Whereas policy-makers may claim that exceptional times require exceptional measures and thus invoke necessities supposedly brought about by exceptional danger, critical approaches question this logic. Necessity is a political claim, not an existential condition. An event or situation does not dictate a particular (exceptional) response such as the curtailment of civil liberties or the erosion of constitutional checks and balances; the authorization of exceptionalism

13 Recent years have seen a raft of new English translations of Schmitt’s work, including Legality and Legitimacy (Schmitt, 2004) and The Nomos of the Earth (Schmitt, 2003), and a corresponding expansion of Schmitt scholarship that extends the analysis of exceptionalism beyond its initial statist framings. Nevertheless, the more established Political Theology (Schmitt, 1985) and The Concept of the Political (Schmitt, 1996) remain key reference points for critical approaches to security because of the existential imperatives they sharply express.
resides elsewhere. This prompts a series of critical questions: How do exceptions and exceptional situations come to be considered as exceptional? How are practices of exceptionalism and claims about exceptions authorized? Through what institutional, social, communicative and political processes? And what are the political implications?

These are just a few examples of the way these questions have been pursued. Securitization theory (Wæver 1995) offers resources for understanding the way policy-makers declare a condition of exceptional threat in order to give legitimate authority to practices of exceptionalism.

In contrast, Bigo argues that by focusing on elite discourses of danger and emergency, securitization theory reinforces a conception of the security field which is driven by the views and discursive strategies of elites (Bigo 2002). By focusing instead on the security professionals who manage “unease” within society on a daily basis, exceptional security practices can be understood in the context of ongoing processes of technocratic, bureaucratic and market-driven routinization and normalization.

Williams argues that because claims about exceptions occur in the discursive field, they are open to “a process of argument, the provision of reasons, presentation of evidence, and commitment to convincing others of the validity of one’s position”. They therefore remain open to the emancipatory possibility of a communicative ethics that may “avoid the excesses of a decisionist account of securitization.” (Williams 2003:522)

These critical approaches respond to the challenge of Schmittian exceptionalism. They contest both claims to any kind of ‘objective’ exception or security situation and the Schmittian understanding of a monolithic sovereign authority. Instead they analyze the social processes through which exceptionality is named, constructed, authorized and made to have very real political and violent effects. They offer vital resources for contesting the jump from the invocation of exceptional conditions to the legitimation of a politics of exceptionalism.

Yet if we are to extend the critical project, then these approaches must be questioned in terms of their critical reach and ambition. Although securitization theory successfully contests the construction of insecurity and exceptionality, it risks the reification of dramatic elite exceptionalist discourses. Although the ‘Paris school’ shifts focus from the dramatic to the routine, its ‘mapping’ project tends towards a positivism that risks excluding more radical critical openings. And finally, as pointed out above, emancipatory approaches still face difficult questions about the ambiguities of ‘unmaking’ processes of securitization.

Although critiques of Schmittian exceptionalism may abound, Walker argues that: “[t]he spirit of Carl Schmitt’s exceptionalism has by no means been eradicated from contemporary political life”, and not only in relation to the limits of the sovereign state but also to the limits of
the modern international system (Walker, forthcoming). Beyond the critique of Schmitt’s overdetermined decisionist prerogatives and discourses of emergency reside more profound philosophical questions about the nature of limits and contingency.14

The critical challenge of the exception far exceeds the statist, securitized, Schmittian version: “There comes a point where questions about limits, about origins, boundaries, and exceptions come back into sharp focus.” (Walker 1993). For example, is it possible to imagine an ethic or politics that does not ultimately suffer the problem of antagonistic or aporetic limits? The problem of the exception, once liberated from its Schmittian overdetermination, must come back to haunt the critical project at its ever receding horizons.

Security, risk, and risk management

The concept of risk has recently permeated Security Studies. Arising from different philosophical traditions, different approaches to risk determine different perspectives in risk management hinting at competing understandings of ‘politics/the political’ and ‘security’. The objective of this section is to briefly describe two major approaches to risk in relation to security and to explore the potential of risk management in opening up some of the debates within the field.

Under a rationalist tradition the concept of risk has evolved as a basis for decision-making under conditions of uncertainty (Daston, 1995, Hacking, 1990, Bernstein, 1998). Risk analysis works as an instrument in decision-making by evaluating future actions in terms of risk. As Luhmann has argued, risk is conceptualized as ‘a controlled extension of rational action’ (1993: 13). Risk analysis is an estimation of future threats – an estimation that builds on the premise that risks can be classified, quantified and to some extent predicted, and that rational behaviour can

14 CASE seems to share a belief in the possibility of eradicating exceptionalism. Yet, different interpretations of Schmitt regard the exception as the transcendent foundation of any order. For Prozorov, the problem of the exception is defined as that of the ‘singular relation between order and the transgression that engenders it’ (2004), between structure and event, between situations and their disruptions. The ‘exception’ is however not simply ‘an act’ in Zizek’s terms or an event that is simultaneously disavowed by an existing order and necessary for its functioning. The more interesting questions about the exceptions are raised by authors who have not received much attention yet in International Relations, Alain Badiou or Etienne Balibar. Badiou’s theory of the event can differentiate between ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary’ events, between what we can still call desecuritization and the conservative revolutionary legitimation of order a la Schmitt. Balibar’s discussion of the historical ambiguities of the ‘subjectivity’ of the sovereign can also open up modes of challenging practices of security at the horizon of sovereignty. Rather than solely bringing back the sovereign exception as the political and depoliticizing moment of governmentality, it is equally important to expose the processes through which governmental practices have achieved the effacement of the moment of decision and contingency.

The modern tradition of risk is, however, being contested by Beck’s theory of risk society. According to Beck, late modernity is characterized by the impossibility to insure itself against risks that, on the one hand, exceed the calculable and, on the other, have catastrophic risks that cannot be compensated. Thus, according to Beck the 9/11 terrorist events escaped rational predictions and have displayed the limits of modern insurance technology (Beck, 2002, 2003). Within IR, this has given birth to a research agenda on ‘reflexive security’ that focuses on the management of the new and constructed risks that transcend national borders (Rasmussen, 2004, Rasmussen, 2002). In the risk society thesis, hazards and insecurities are viewed as inevitable structural threats that can only be solved through cosmopolitanism; a world based on the negotiation of certain norms (Beck, 2005a, Boyne, 2001, Beck, 2005b).

An alternative approach addresses risk as an instrument of governance rather than an organising principle of life. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, risk is recognised as a means for ordering reality. As ‘a way of representing events in a certain form so they might be made governable in particular ways, with particular technologies and for particular goals’ (Dean, 1999: 177), this approach has inspired analyses of risk in a variety of disciplines such as International Relations, criminology, insurance and surveillance studies (e.g. Ewald 1986, Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Garland, 2001, Lyon 2003; Ericson et al. 2003). Two strategies have been described within this approach. Baker and Simon describe ‘risk spreading’ as the ‘wide variety of efforts to conceive and address social problems in terms of risk’, such as financial risk management, social security, police and national defence services, and environmental policies, among others (2002: 4). ‘Risk embracing’ is described, on the other hand, as the strategy that shifts the risk responsibility from the institutions to the individuals and corporations. It aims at constituting subjects which are made responsible through their management of risk (Baker, 2002). Practices of security can be understood as combinations of these two strategies. Risk is therefore a technology for the provision of security which transcends borders (Baker, 2000, Dillon, 2005, Petersen, 2006, Lobo-Guerrero, 2006a), it involves different technologies and allows us to understand the multiplicity of form through which ‘security’ is governed nowadays.

Based on these perspectives a challenge for critical security scholarship is to engender a debate between risk-based and threat-based interpretations of (in)security that will widen the traditional critical security agenda concerned with the mutual constitution of threats and identity (e.g., Krause, 1998; Campbell, 1998, Hansen, 2006). The claim of securitisation theory that the political character of security is highlighted by the constitutive role of political identity and
authority in the articulation of security threats offers an opportunity for this debate. Addressing security as risk management opens up the logic of security (Huysmans, 1998) and moves from the concern over identity, territory, exclusion, neutralisation and elimination of others placing the analysis on a more explicit temporal dimension.

Risk management locates security in a direct relation to time due to its reckoning of futures. Of course, security statements have always had a temporal element insofar as they call for defence against future threats. Yet, the concept of risk seems better suited to explore modulations of temporalities by shifting the focus from utterances referred to dangerous futures to the technologies and strategies by means of which the future is produced as computable, calculable and manageable. This debate has already begun through the analysis of insurance, particularly of terrorism insurance where risk, however incalculable, can still be mobilised as a security enabler while regulating moralities (Aradau and Van Munster, 2005, Bougen, 2003, Lobo-Guerrero, 2006a). Applications can be found in the area of security and development (Duffield, 2006, Lobo-Guerrero, 2006b) and the management of civil contingencies such as environmental hazards, food security, and health issues (c.f. Dillon, 2005a).

A second emergent challenge is that of exceptionalism which is often present in routinised politics of unease (e.g., Agamben, 1998, 2005; Van Munster, 2004). As the discussion of security and exceptionalism has already indicated, the critical problem of ‘the exception’ is that of radical contingency. As pointed out repeatedly in Foucauldian approaches to criminology, insurance and welfare, risk management works to ‘tame’ contingency and order both temporal and special relations (O'Malley, 1998, O'Malley, 2004a, O'Malley, 2004b, O'Malley, 2000, Ericson, 1994, Garland, 2003). Beyond the ‘worst case scenario’ rendition of ‘the exception’, risk management appears to work with an imaginary of calculability that is always already surpassed by the contingency of reality. An emerging question is thus, what happens with the state of exception and conceptualisations of security when practices of risk management are considered? This tension between exceptionalism and routinisation within security studies should be taken seriously and promote a critical research agenda dealing with the relationship or coexistence of risk and exceptionalism in all its different possible configurations (Aradau and Van Munster, 2006).

The Politics of belonging

The question of the nexus between identity and security, maybe still a locus of conceptual tension between the different approaches, seems to leave open research paths in many directions. ‘Identity’, as a substantive noun already contains a reified understanding of what is at stake in
what could be broadly framed as the ‘politics of belonging’. Two main processes seem to be at stake when ‘identity’ is discussed. First, different processes of objectivation (identity cards, passports, bureaucratic categories) and subjectivation (individual or group alternative identifications) destined at defining the limits of the group to be ‘secured’. Second, the mobilisation of repertoires of enunciation and action which contain plans and routines for discourses and practices of security, as well as the ‘right’ way to play them out. A serious study of both these cultural practices and its ethical and moral referents, both structured and structuring through the agents’ *habitus* is still a work in progress (see Guillaume 2002). This would engage the statonational obsession of IR literature where ‘national identities’ are conceived as objectifiable elements of territorially bound societies. Moreover, it should be the occasion to test the tools developed by critical approaches to security outside of the ‘western’ world, and abandon euro/amerocentric agendas of (in)security.

Possible new directions could be explored along two complementary lines. First, along the line of time and historicity, through for example the question of memory. But it could also be explored along the line of the heterogeneity of the spaces of practices of identity. If the question of the ‘national identity’ is to be explored more deeply, engaging the very large literature on ‘nationalism’, other spaces should also be explored: at the transnational level, the reticular social spaces of diasporas and transnational social movements in their relation to practices of security, but also, at a supranational level, the practices of security entailed in the politics of identity of the European union could be re-engaged.

*Collective memory*

A first space for critical exploration of security in the vein of the politics of belonging is provided by the nexus between security and collective historical memory. Questions of collective historical memory lurk behind a plethora of security debates, ranging from the legitimacy of political violence to post-conflict reconstruction and transitional justice (Bell forthcoming, Müller 2002). Collective memory plays a pivotal role in the constitution of collective discourses and practices of identification, the formation and reproduction of collective self and its respective other(s), which in turn shape constructions of security and insecurity and subsequent political action.

Unfolding the dynamics of collective memory’s incorporation into the formulation of collective identity could thus shed light to the role of the politics of memory and historical trauma, and the heritage of founding violence in the constitution of security imaginaries and security policies of different collectivities. The study of the memory-security relation could also help the
**c.a.s.e. collective** to build further bridges with critical history. Just as the latter recognizes the dense ambiguity of the past and the infinitely negotiable character of collective memory, the impulse of critical approaches to security has been – and continues to be – opening up the notion and practices of ‘security’ in all its complexity and equivocality, thus complicating the neat picture of the security world that the traditional security/strategic studies tend to offer.

**Nationalism, citizenship, diasporas, transnational social movements**

Different critical approaches have strongly emphasized the nexus between practices of security and practices of identity. ‘Societal security’, as a referent object of securitization processes has been the object of several discussions (Bigo 1998, Mcsweeney 1999:109, Wæver 1998, Wæver 1993, Wæver, de Wilde, et al. 1998). Others have insisted on role of bureaucratic categorisation practices in the formation of (rejected) identities (Bigo 1998), or more broadly processes of othering (Campbell 1998, Neumann 1995, 1999). Even if it has been done in important occasions (Wæver 1993), it seems that the large literature on ‘nationalism’ (particularly after 1993) has to be explored and discussed (e.g. Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1990, Brubaker 1996, Calhoun 1997). Only recent works have started to explore this direction (Roe 2004, Jutila, 2006).

Similarly, regarding the question of citizenship, the CASE tools would allow for seeing citizenship as not only defining under what conditions one can be recognized as a full member of a community but also as a way to fix the (secure) borders one should not cross in participating in this particular self-understanding/representation for fear of being perceived as and thus becoming another. The French veil affair (l'affaire du voile), for instance, provides strong evidences for the relevance of citizenship for reinvesting CASE in other fields (see Gianni and Guillaume 2004; Guillaume (forthcoming)).

But less state-centred spaces of identity practices are still left out for enquiry: if ‘diasporas’ are largely taken into account in their role of ‘immigrants’, critical approaches to security only in preliminary form engage the practices of security of diasporas as ‘transnational communities’ (Portes 1998, 2001) or as ‘emigrants’ and their relation to state practices (Dufoix 2000, Ragazzi 2005). Similarly, the practices of transnational social movements are still left out of the picture.

**Revisiting the European identity**

The CASE framework also bears significant potential for investigating the developments connected with the European Union. A CASE-inspired research agenda would for instance involve reconceptualising the mechanisms of Europeanization as transformative processes for political
identities, where identities are not givens and the nature and outcome of the processes at stake not taken for granted. The aim is to reflect on how identities are re-produced through social practices, and on how these practices are transformed, categorised and labelled as European. Implicitly then, Europeanization is approached through an interrogation on processes of politicisation and depoliticisation (Davidshofer 2006). This would imply studying for instance how the definition of items of Community external relations/foreign policy entails a competition among the various actors of these “fields” (Buchet de Neuilly, 2005), which does not only involve positions on the contents of the actions considered, but also implies debates about how the Union should be acting on the international stage – and thus on alternative conceptions of its political identity(ies). For example, an analysis could be developed on how practices defining the political identity of “others” (e.g.: “candidate countries” to the enlargement process, “neighbours” for the European neighbourhood policy (Jeandesboz 2005), “developing countries” in the context of the EU’s aid and development policy) are structured around a certain claim to knowledge and constitute a form of power and assertion of domination in the relations between the EU and third countries. – similar, in fact, to the mechanisms of Orientalism exposed by Edward Saïd (Said 1979).

**The Collective intellectual : Being Relevant**

More clearly than many other field of study in international relations, security studies have always been tied to security policy making. At the end of the Second World War, for example security analysts helped to construct a language by which the new nuclear reality could be grasped (Lawrence, 1996). More recent examples like the discourse on human security show how knowledge about security can emerge as a of co-production between theorists, analysts and policymakers. Even though scholarly practices are not identical to policy practices, it would be mistaken to regard security studies and security policy making as clearly separated spheres. Consequently, we engage in this section with the broader relevance of the production of critical knowledge, as well as the constitution of the ‘collective intellectual’.

Scientific communities engage with many exoteric communities, such as citizens, policymakers, journalists and other analysts for at least three purposes: to gain justification for their work; to gather of resources necessary to conduct research; and to influence political agendas. This triad of purposes needs to be kept in mind when speaking about relevance. Moreover, as the sociology of the sciences ever since the pioneering work of Ludwik Fleck (Fleck 1979 [1935])

15 We will leave the justification and resource gathering problematiques to sociologists of security studies.
points out, the dialogue between scientific communities and their exoteric communities is never a one-way transfer from science to relevant actors, but an interactive pattern.

CASE scholars share a consensus that there is no clear boundary between the practices of theorising security and practising security. An explicit outcome of recent debates has been agreement that any security analysis, theory, concept or publication has a political nature and hence the potential policy effects, examined in studies of securitization.  

Social science communities are never relevant or irrelevant as such: the issue of relevance always involves the questions of relevance for and with whom is, within specific social processes. Relevance is a matter of “becoming” relevant, not a static concept of “being” relevant. If CASE wants to face the challenge of becoming relevant beyond plain justification strategies, variation in the types of knowledge and actors involved needs close attention.

**From being relevant to becoming relevant**

Thus we need to ask what kind of knowledge does CASE attempt and claim to produce, and what for and for whom might this be useful? While different strands of critical security studies have not generated a unanimous set of context-independent theoretical generalisations, challenging a dominant and constraining view of reality is nevertheless a trait common to all streams of CASE. The objective of creating emancipatory knowledge via developing alternative truths has been, in particular, a central concern for some forms of critical security studies. The Aberystwyth School has especially tried to show how the concept of state security does not necessarily encompass security for the people. The Copenhagen School, on the other hand, has shown how invoking the concept of security is a discursive process that erases all rules of normal politics. This alternative insight puts a special kind of responsibility on people doing security, since invoking the word starts a process beyond democratic politics (Buzan et al., 1998: 211).

Generating concrete technical knowledge has not been a primary focus for CASE scholars. Concrete analysis of practices and technologies is, however, a needed addendum to CASE as it carries a promise of being able to provide relatively concrete knowledge to specialists on technologies of security.

The most direct contribution of CASE lies in its attempts to assist security practitioners in becoming more reflexive about their practices, as well as in helping them to cope with multiple truths, theories, and technical knowledge. The Copenhagen School has explicitly sought to help

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16 See “the Eriksson debate” (Eriksson, 1999ab; Wæver, 1999; Williams, 1999; Goldmann, 1999; Behnke, 2000) as well as Huysmans, 2002. See also section 1.3. outlining the European specificity of CASE.
the security policy makers not by identifying threats but by putting “an ethical question at the feet of analysts, decision-makers and political activists alike: why do you call this a security issue? What are the implications of doing this – or not doing it?” (Wæver, 1999: 334).

Like IR theory in general, a key debate within CASE has revolved around the purpose and “usability” of theory. Critical or not, security scholars are generally caught in the dilemma of trying to inform aspects of policymaking and attempting to generate and study academically original questions. The price of the sole focus on the latter is the growing specialisation and the closure of specific expertise into a continuously narrowing niche. This specialisation runs contrary to “commonsensical” policy-makers who usually prefer the concrete policy advice offered by think tanks.

The relationship between the study of security and the quest for security cannot be reduced to a simple research-to-policy one-way street. As Malin and Latham (2001) have shown empirically, it is the interplay of security scholars’ different practices, i.e. research, practical innovation and participation in public debate that matters. The traditionally conceived neat science-policy nexus is further complicated by the growing significance of new actors in the social scientific knowledge market, such as think tanks, consultancies, NGOs, social movements, and the media. More controversially, perhaps, some critical security scholars have called for eschewing “the temptations of seeking the ears of soldiers and statesmen” altogether and focusing on the development of counter-hegemonic positions linked to emancipatory social movements instead (Wyn Jones, 1999: 6). Change usually comes about with an interplay of anti-establishment/radical/extra-parliamentarian challengers that move the boundaries of the possible, and the re-articulation of ‘reasonable’ analysis and praxis from those who in the most general sense are part of the elite (cf. Wæver, 1997).

**Dilemmas of theory and practice**

Being and becoming relevant induce a set of thorny dilemmas for CASE, namely, (i) the autonomy vs. the relevance of the community; (ii) the limits of steering the consequences of CASE-produced knowledge; and (iii) the dilemma of impact upon political processes.

First, becoming relevant includes deliberations with exoteric communities, but to what extent will these deliberations influence academic practices in turn? Autonomy is to a certain extent a necessary pre-condition for conducting solid academic research and deliberations with clients may undermine this autonomy.
Second, if scholars lack the capacity of steering the use of their knowledge, how can they take responsibility for their knowledge? To take it to the extreme, should one also be responsible for “that majority of the readings and usages that are misunderstandings?” (Wæver 1999: 336). Given the impossibility of directly steering interpretation and usage, a careful balancing is necessary between relevance and responsibility.

Third, the analyst faces the dilemma of entering a political process which might entail negative consequences. What options are available to the security analyst when securitisation is set in motion? Buzan et al. (1998: 34-35, 204-206) argue that three options are open to the analyst, if they want to avoid sustaining or deepening the securitisation process: 1) the analyst can stop speaking about the threat and hope that this will work as a de-securitising process avoiding the adoption of the agenda of the securitising actor, 2) the analyst can divert attention to another threat, and 3) the analyst can contribute to a different interpretation of the threat being securitised through the analysis.

Finally, CASE faces the ‘truth dilemma’: is anyone interested at all in analyses that do not claim to speak the “truth”? Do policymakers even care to listen when CASE is not speaking in the name of truth? Given that much of the public authority of science relies precisely on the idea of science speaking in the name of truth, how can scholars cope with the situation where they cannot claim to speak the “truth” but are forced to do so by their exoteric communities?

CASE scholars cannot avoid these dilemmas and certainly there is no easy solution. If the practices that are pursued to tackle these dilemmas are indeed consequential for academic and policy discourses, CASE needs to openly debate these issues and to decide which practices it considers legitimate and appropriate. These dilemmas and the inherent complexity of specialist academic discourse do not make communication of research any easier. Yet, it is here that things can be improved most visibly. If CASE is to become more relevant in the future, the types of publications and audience to which it wishes to reach out may needs to be broadened, as some have argued “it is from the popular literature that the statement obtains certainty, simplicity and vividness”, and indeed, “the word becomes flesh” (Fleck, 1979 [1935]: 117).

Against research without politics

To take this discussion one step further, we believe it is of crucial importance to pose the question to CASE scholars, and more precisely to the c.a.s.e. collective as a possible figure of a critical and collective intellectual. Here two aspects are interwoven: what being ‘critical’ entails and what the ‘collective intellectual’ can be as a possible technique through which engaging with the political.
First, what do we mean by ‘critical’? Are not all theories by definition critical (of other theories)? In virtue of which principle, as a networked collective, would we allow ourselves to be self-labelled as critical? What is so critical about the general perspective we are collectively trying to defend here?

From the Kantian perspective to the post-Marxist Adornian emancipatory ideal, from Hockheimer’s project to the Foucaldian stance toward regimes of truth, being critical has meant to adopt a particular stance towards taken-for-granted assumptions and unquestioned categorizations of social reality. Many of these critical lines of thought have directly or indirectly inspired this critical approach to security in Europe project. Being critical means to adhere to a rigorous form of sceptical questioning, rather than being suspicious or distrustful in the vernacular sense of these terms. But it is also to recognise oneself to be partially framed by these regimes of truth, concepts, theories and ways of thinking that enable the critique. To be critical is thus also to be reflexive, developing abilities to locate the self in a broader heterogeneous context through abstraction and thinking. A reflexive perspective must offer tools for gauging how political orders are constituted.

This effort to break away from naturalized correspondences between things and words, between processes framed as problems and ready-made solutions permit us to bring back social and political issues to the realm of the political. Being critical therefore means, among other things, to disrupt depoliticizing practices and discourses of security in the name of exceptionality, urgency or bureaucratic expertise, and bring them back to political discussions and struggles.

This goal can partly be achieved through a continuous confrontation of our theoretical considerations with the social practices they account for in two directions: constantly remodelling theoretical considerations on the basis of research and critical practice; and creating the possibilities for the use of our research in political debate and action. This raises questions about the willingness, and modalities of personal engagement. While critical theories can find concrete expressions in multiple fields of practice, their role is particularly important in the field of security. Since engaging security issues necessarily implies a normative dilemma of speaking security (Huysmans, 1998a), being critical appears as a necessary moment in the research. The goal of a critical intellectual is not only to observe, but also to actively open spaces of discussion and political action, as well as to provide the analytical tools, concepts and categories for possible alternative discourses and practices.

However there a no clear guidelines for the critical researcher and no assessment of the impact of scholarship on practice – or vice versa. Critical approaches to security have remained relatively silent about the role and the place of the researcher in the political process, too often
confining their position to a series of general statements about the impossibility of objectivist science. 17

The networked collective and the manifesto in which it found a first actualisation may be a first step toward a more precisely defined modality of political commitment while being a researcher. Writing collectively means assembling different types of knowledge and different forms of thinking. It means articulating different horizons of the unknown. It is looking at this limit at which one cannot necessarily believe in institutionalized forms of knowledge any longer, in the regimes of truth that are too often taken for granted. It is in this sense that being critical is a question of limits and necessities, and writing collectively can therefore help at critically define a modality for a more appropriate engagement with politics.


REFERENCES


17 Here, Foucault’s ‘specific intellectual’ working within specific sectors (Foucault 1995: 109), or the ‘collective intellectual’ “Raison d’agir”, initiated around Pierre Bourdieu, can provide us with examples of an articulation between scholarship and commitment. These historical examples of commitment should be of course discussed, and could be possible starting points for forms on collective commitment to come.


Guillaume Xavier (forthcoming), "Citizenship, Identity, and Securitization: Bringing the Normative Back In"


